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NOTES TO CONTRIBUTORS.

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INLAND CREEK-DWELLERS: A STUDY OF THE EPIE-ATISSA PEOPLE OF YENAGOA LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA OF BAYELSA STATE

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Abstract

This study is an examination of the history of the Epie-Atissa people. The Epie-Atissa people are two sister kingdoms who inhabits twenty-nine villages and towns in the Yenagoa Local Government Area of Bayelsa State. Epie Kingdom have seventeen of these villages and towns while Atissa kingdom have twelve. They are a homogenous people and occupy a contagious territory with abundant natural resources. It is the history of these two sister kingdoms that this work set out to examine. To place the work in its proper perspective, the study takes a cursory look at the pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial history of the people. This is done with the intention of revealing the changes evident in the land via their contact with the Europeans. While it is an established fact that the people evolved sophisticated social, economic, and political institutions before their contact with the Europeans, the study reveals that they have undergone several changes. These changes according to findings are evident in every facet of their lives, such as their social, economic, and political lives. These aspects of the peoples live have continued to change forms from the past while new ones have replaced old discarded institutions. A clear evidence that the Epie-Atissa society is not static but dynamic. Historical methods have been utilized to get the needed information for this study and it is descriptive and analytical.

Introduction

Situated on the banks of the Ekole and Epie creeks, which are distributaries of the Rivers Nun and Orashi respectively, the Epie-Atissa people occupies the neighbourhood of Yenagoa, the Bayelsa State capital and speak a Delta Ediod Language.[1] The Epie-Atissa are sister kingdoms who live in twenty-nine villages/towns. These villages/towns have been joined together due to the rapid growth of Yenagoa, the Bayelsa State capital. Epie kingdom have seventeen of these villages/towns while Atissa have twelve. They are bounded to the north and west by the Ekpetiama and Gbarain clans, on the south by the Ogbia people and east by the Engenni and other Ijo speaking people. As a homogenous people who occupy a contagious territory with abundant natural resources, they have one of the largest

[1] E.J. Alagoa, "Traditions of Origin" in E.J. Alagoa (ed), *The Land and People of Bayelsa State: Central Niger Delta*. (Port-Harcourt: Onyoma Research Publication, 1999), 81-82.

concentration of population in the Niger Delta. The population of the Epie-Atissa according to the 2006 census of Yenagoa Local Government Area is 352, 285. [2]

Geographically, the Epie - Atissa people live in the tropical zone, therefore, they enjoy the tropical climate. The River Ekole and Epie creek which are distributaries of the River Nun and Orashi respectively outline the major topography of the area which lies in the fresh water zone. There are two marked seasons in the area, namely dry and raining seasons. The dry season begins in November and ends in March while the rainy season begins in April and ends in October every year but the August break punctuates the heavy rainfall in mid-July to part of August yearly. The land is well watered and is, therefore, very fertile. This has enhanced the fertility of the soil in the area. [3]

The origin of the Epie - Atissa people is not definite. It is believed that the Epie-Atissa people belong to a different ethnic nationality. They are also identified as being different from the Ijo people. The Epie-Atissa people as well as the Engenni people, migrated from Isoko/Urhobo clans, some of which traced their origin to Benin. They moved into Isoko land and crossed the River Niger and drifted to the banks of the Orashi River. The man that led the Epie group of migrant brothers was called Epie. They anchored at a placed between Joinkrama and Mbiama called Oguan and continued their movement on foot to a place called Akenfinafina. While all the men left their women and children in the forest between Igbogene-Epie and Engenni in search of another suitable settlement, it was the first son of Epie named Zue that founded the first settlement which was named after him as the leader of the team, Yenizue- meaning Zue's home. The Epie-Atissa people speak the Epie language which is not all that understood by the Ijo, Nembe and Ogbia people but it is similar to the Engenni and Degenma language. [4]

Pre-colonial Epie-Atissa Society

The Epie-Atissa people have evolved a well-organized way of life before their contact with the Europeans. Religiously, they explained their existence in the light of the natural environment, such as swamps, lakes and streams. Their religious world view was built on the idea of what is good and bad.[5] Evidence of the way they worshipped earlier shows that they believed in a deity called Igbudu that was worshipped individually or communally by direct contact or through lesser deities. They also worshipped their ancestors. It was believed that the ancestors helped maintain law and order and that lawlessness, immorality especially adultery among women and incest among men attracted punishment from the deity. The Epie-Atissa people believed Igbudu controlled their lives and daily activities.[6] There were other individual or household gods also worshiped by the people called *Osunemi*.

[2] N.K. Yakie, *The Epie-Atissa People: A Historical Survey*. (Yenagoa: Nay Nigeria Limited, 2010),

[3] N.K. Yakie, *The Epie-Atissa People: A Historical Survey*, 1-5.

[4] E.J. Alagoa, *A History of the Niger Delta*. (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1972), 179.

[5] C.M. Sorgwe, *Epie-Atissa since 1500: A History of an Edoid Community*. (Port-Harcourt: Osia International Publishing Company Limited, 2002), 34.

[6] Trust Okpoto, Oral Interview, Yenagoa, 6th September, 2020.

The people of Epie-Atissa also have some known cultural practices such as marriage, funeral rites, childbirth and circumcision, festivals and other recreational activities. Marriage in pre-colonial Epie-Atissa was considered sacred and ordained by God. The woman to be married was referred to as "our wife" by the extended family, which shows that all the members of the family of both the husband and wife are brought to a common kingship relationship. There were four kinds of marriage in Epie-Atissa during this period, namely, *Ofina-Meti*-a marriage where a man's brother (relative) inherits his dead brother's wife, *Odome – Otiomo*-a marriage system where relatives (cousins) were allowed to marry, *Odomo-Idu*- a kind of marriage where a man and woman just come together to live and in the process begat children and finally, the most acknowledged or recognized kind of marriage which is marriage by consent.[7] This marriage follows a very rigorous process. It involves an intending groom finding a suitable girl to marry, informing his friends and relatives about her who in turn secretly investigates the girl's character and background. When the girl is considered good, her consent is sought after which messengers are sent to inform her family who in turn investigates the man's background. If he is accepted, he is required to buy certain items for the family of the girl and on the occasion of the presentation of those items, a date for introduction is fixed after which the marriage takes place.

The people also evolved an elaborate burial system for their dead. Death they say is an inevitable end. It happens everywhere and to everyone at some point. It evokes reactions among various people depending on who died and in what circumstances. In traditional Epie-Atissa society, when someone dies, no one is expected to go anywhere especially fishing and farming for at least eight days. Relatives from other villages come to the house of the deceased to mourn with the family members. According to an informant,[8] when someone dies, the corpse is taken to the oracle to ascertain if he/she is innocent or not or if he/she died a natural dead or not (this was regarded as a mandatory rite before colonialism). If the deceased is declared evil by the oracle, he/she is tied to a mat and thrown into the evil forest as each community in Epie-Atissa had one. In some cases, such persons are buried instantly and everyone in the village was expected to carry on with their normal life and activities as though on one died. This act was expected to bring shame to the deceased family.[9] On the other hand, when the person is declared good or innocent, a normal burial ceremony is arranged depending on the status of the person. The people of the village and relatives of the deceased are expected to stay with the immediate family for about eight days, while family members alone are required to stay for at least for 21 days after the burial before carrying out their normal day to day activities.

Childbirth was also accorded some significance in Epie-Atissa in this period. Childbirth takes place in the woman's house under the supervision of a local or traditional midwife. Certain infant rituals were involved in childbirth with the aim of preserving the life of the baby. The new child is usually confined to the house for about four days after birth. During these days, access to the child was restricted to very close relatives. It was of great importance that the placenta be disposed secretly by the grandmother of the child. It was also

[7] Trust Okpoto, Oral Interview, Yenagoa, 6th September, 2020.
[8] Joel Izibedueniya, Oral Interview, Yenagoa, 27th August, 2020.
[9] Stella Yakie, Oral Interview, Yenagoa, 3rd September, 2020.

compulsory and customary that the man buys at least six yards of cloth for his wife at the birth of each child. [10] During the initial four days of delivery, the mother is given gifts and beautiful beads if it's a first child or even a male child.

Like other towns and villages in the Niger Delta, the Epie-Atissa people also evolved certain recreational activities. The various recreational activities in Epie- Atissa are the masquerade dance and a variety of other folktales/dances as well as war canoe display. Most important of these were the moonlight folk games. Some of these recreational activities were seasonal while others were leisure activities under taken either by adults or children.

Pre-colonial Epie-Atissa also had some well-known economic activities such as hunting, gathering, farming, fishing, trading, sand lifting, lumbering, and little palm cutting. They produce food crops such as plantain, cassava, water yam, sugar cane, cocoyam, potato, and banana. Vegetables like okra, pepper, garden egg, etc were also seasonally produced for local consumption. Fishing was a subsidiary occupation in which both men and women actively participated.

Epie-Atissa people also governed themselves orderly in a kind of gerontocracy in this period. They made their own laws and ruled themselves properly. The basic traditional political unit was the village (*Aken*) and the ward (*Iyeni*), also referred to as quarter or compound. Each village or town was an autonomous political unit headed by the oldest man called *Ebeneken/ Obeneken*. Each village was a socio- political and democratic unit. Next to the head of the village was the ward heads. The village head who is the oldest man in the village and the ward heads who are the oldest men in the wards work as a team. The view of the elders was passed to the people in an assembly of all adult men. It was the general assembly that takes the final decision which was binding on all. [11]

Colonial Rule and its Impact in Epie-Atissa

Effective colonization of Africa began in the 19th century and by the beginning of the 20th century, the whole of Nigeria had been colonized and brought under British control.[12] The British, with her deliberate intention to educate and convert the people to Christianity left a lasting impact on the culture of the people. With regards to marriage, the people still carried on with their normal marriage rites during this period. Young men were still allowed to ask for a girl's hand in marriage but not directly. Young girls were still given out for marriage by their parents as soon as a suitor comes along. In all, there were no significant changes with respect to marriage rites.

During this period, funeral rites and ceremony still took same dimension. Colonialism did not affect the way the Epie-Atissa people buried their dead. The system of consulting the oracle to ascertain the state of the dead was still invoke. This practice remained as it has

[10] Joel Izibedueniya, Oral Interview, Yenagoa, 27th August, 2020.
[11] C.M. Sorgwe, *Epie-Atissa since 1500*, 35-36.
[12] S.I. Larry, "Colonial Rule and the Emergence of Centralized Administration in Kolokuma Clan", *Taraba Journal of Political Science and International Relations*, 1(2), (2014), 164-174.

been. Likewise, childbirth and circumcision processes were not affected even though it was discovered that female circumcision has been proven to be very dangerous and sometimes lead to death. [13]

Before colonial rule, there was no festival that was officially or unanimously celebrated by the Epie-Atissa people. The Epie Women's attack on government establishments in Yenagoa in 1958, which is referred to as the "Epie Women's Riot of 1958" has continued to serve as one vehicle of unity among the Epie people as this birth the celebration of the Obunem Epie festival. This incidence has continued to unite the people of the kingdom for decades and still does. From that period to date, the event is remembered through the Obunem Epie Festival which is celebrated yearly around June. The people of Atissa kingdom also began the celebration of the Uge Adiafa Festival during the colonial era. As a matter of fact, the Uge Adiafa Festival celebration which is a New Yam Festival introduced in the kingdom by Chief Fredrick Aduku Simagu, a native of Ogu town preceded the Obunem Epie Festival as the Uge Adiafa Festival started in 1945. [14]

The presence of the colonialists in Epie-Atissa created a new world view in the people. Consequently, the colonial system produced a new society. Christianity which spread rapidly in colonial times due to the conducive atmosphere created by the colonial presence brought a new world view. As a result of the emergence of Christianity, a lot of people accepted the new religion and stopped paganism as it was condemned by the Christian missionaries. Both through the church and schools opened by the Christian missions, the people gradually alienated themselves from their traditional cultural practices. In the light of the above, the worship of deities and ancestors died down.[15]

While the traditional economic activities of the people survived colonialism, the British economic policies were such that the colonies should be financially self-supporting. In addition, the British wanted their colonies to be suppliers of raw materials to their industries, thus making the colonies consumers of the products of the British industry. In keeping with this policy of self-sustenance, the British government encouraged local investment through raising of funds locally. The people of Epie-Atissa were induced to supply low-priced raw materials such as palm oil. The introduction of taxation further encouraged the production of palm oil and palm kernels. Intimately related to taxation was the introduction of currency in place of barter. The effect of the above is that, Epie-Atissa economy became a consumer economy at the expense of some productive sectors of the economy. [16]

The political system and institutions were not left out of the changes that occurred during the colonial period. The colonial era which began in 1904 in Epie-Atissa was due to the fact they were forced to surrender their guns to the colonial government that year.[17] The people

[13] George Izibenadu, Oral Interview, Yenagoa, 10th September, 2020.
[14] W. Albert, *Contemporary Issues in Epie-Atissa Nation*. (Yenagoa: I-botola Prints, 2017), 61.
[15] C.M. Sorgwe, *Epie-Atissa since 1500*, 72.
[16] C.M. Sorgwe, "The Impacts of Colonial Rule" in E.J. Alagoa (ed), *The Land and People of Bayelsa State: Central Niger Delta*, 222.
[17] C.M. Sorgwe, *Epie-Atissa since 1500*, 53-54.

were compelled to submit their guns to the colonial authority based at the Sabagriea Native Court. Although the village government system continued, the traditional rulers were supervised by the colonial administrators.

With the establishment of British colonial rule, the practice of gerontocracy declined and collapsed eventually. The status of the village in the colonial administrative system removed the autonomy enjoyed by the village before colonialism. The village dropped from being a first to a fourth tier administrative unit. Above it was the national, province, and district administrative units utilized by the colonial government. In effect, the village head lost his sovereignty as well as the power of life and death in the new era. The traditional ruler and his assembly of elders ceased to act with sole responsibility to the ancestors or in accordance with the laws of the land. Rather, he was required to take orders from the colonial officers. In order words, the ultimate authority as it affected the village was transferred to the British colonial government through various agencies. [18]

In specific terms, the political development in the country and eastern region led to the establishment of a substantive clan in Epie-Atissa. Like other regions, the Eastern Region clamoured for a House of Chiefs. This development was as a result of the introduction of indirect rule and the Native Authority System and Warrant Chiefs. A system patterned along the British colonial policy of indirect rule with local government model of three tiers. The local council was more or less like the traditional chieftaincy system. Following this development, old Brass Division was split into Central Ijo County Council, Northern Ijo County Council and South and Ogbia District Council.[19] The Central Ijo County Council also covered Epie-Atissa under the Northern Ijo District Council with provincial headquarters at Okolobiri. In a further development in 1959, Epie-Atissa ethnic nationality was separated from Northern Ijo District Council and Yenagoa became the headquarters of Yenagoa Province. The establishment of native councils and courts represented colonial indirect rule where disputes were settled. Epie-Atissa was under the jurisdiction of the Sabagriea Native Court of Brass District of the Warri Province.[20] The court area was divided into Kolokuma and Epie Division and used the Kolokuma dialect and its people, to the disadvantage of the Epie-Atissa people.[21] All of these points to the fact the village heads have lost their sovereignty to the colonial masters and were no longer in control of their territories.

Epie-Atissa in Post- Colonial Times

Post-colonial Epie-Atissa society was a major carry over from the colonial system. Thus, we will continue our examination of issues in this section by looking at the role played by

[18] C.M. Sorgwe, *Epie-Atissa since 1500*, 53-54.

[19] Omozuanvbo,Eboreime "Group Identities and the Changing Patterns of Alliance among the Epie-Atissa of Nigeria ,1870-1999". Darwin College, USA, 1992, P.63.

[20] Ibaba Sasime, *Rulers Without Sovereignty*, *the Chieftaincy Institution in Nigeria*. Port- Harcourt; Outreach Publications,2000. P..45

[21] C.M. Sorgwe, "The Impact of Colonial Rule" in E.J. Alagoa (ed). *The Land and People of Bayelsa State*: *Central Niger Delta*. Port-Harcourt; Onyoma Research Publication, 1999. Pp. 223-224. See also, N.K. Yakie, *A History* of *Epie-Atissa People: A Historical Survey*. Yenagoa: Nay (Nigeria) Ltd, 2010.

colonialism and its agents such as Christianity and western education which found their way into the African societies which Epie-Atissa is part. Though, the elders who accepted colonial rule did so with awe and disgust as they viewed the pre-colonial period as the golden age of their history, Christianity and western education were deliberately targeted to train the young ones whose brains were seen as *tabula-rasa* upon which the western culture could be written on. At independence in 1960, the young ones have come of age with colonial orientations. This is to say some of the pre-colonial and colonial practices that best served the colonial purpose were transferred to the post-colonial era. Put differently, the post-colonial era in Epie-Atissa was almost a duplication of the colonial era in all ramifications. However, it is pertinent to note that even with colonial progress, some aspects of the Epie-Atissa culture still remained untouched by colonial impacts.[22] It is also imperative to still note that certain aspects of the traditions have undergone complete change, while some have aspects of been modified.

In the marriage institution, the practice of a dead man's wife been shared or given to her late husband's brother or relative is no longer tenable as a result of Christianity and western civilization. These days, the woman is given the choice or privilege of choosing to stay or leave the family to marry elsewhere and a lot of women choose the latter. Furthermore, the practice of cousins marrying themselves is not practiced anymore. However, the kind of marriage which allows people to co-habit, bear children before they carry out the marital rites has been on the increase. With the advent of Christianity, the practice of sacrificing for atonement of sin in this system of marriage has also been kicked out. Lastly, the marriage by consent which is the most important has lost its ingredients as youths no longer go through the rigours of studying characters of each other or family background as they now claim they are marrying for love. The groom no longer seek consent but go straight to inform the girl's family of his intention to marry their daughter. In all, the marriage process has now been shortened to suit the groom as the former process appears stressful and expensive. In addition to these recognized traditional forms of marriage is the Christian marriage or white wedding which has become the order of the day. Intending couples and couples in Epie-Atissa also go to the court registry to register their marriages in this era.

Funeral rites have also witnessed some changes after colonialism, as the Epie-Atissa society no longer keep to the culture or practice of going to the oracle to investigate if the deceased was innocent, that is, died a natural death and was clean while alive or perpetrated evil while alive such as witchcraft as it is considered fetish or superstitious. Also, land or the evil forests where evil persons were buried have given way to dwelling homes for the living. Roads and residential houses have been built in some of such lands.[23] In addition, Christian wake keeps are now organized by the church for those who died in Christ according to the doctrine of the denomination he or she belongs.

With regards of childbirth, the practice of the woman staying indoors after childbirth hardly exist. More so, the establishment of health centres and hospitals have reduced the need for traditional midwives. Female circumcision has also reduced drastically. It took a lot of effort

[22] George Ayoko, Oral Interview, Yenagoa, 20th September, 2020.
[23] George Izibenadu, Oral Interview, 10th September, 2020.

and education on the dangers of circumcision on the female gender to stop it. The Epie Women's Riot of 1958 gave birth to the *Obunem Epie* annual festival. Before this time, there was no official festival, so the riot marked a great watershed in Epie-Atissa history. The festival has continued till this day and has served as a unifying factor in Epie land. The festival is used to showcase the rich cultural heritage of the Epie people as cultural displays and other recreational activities of the Epie people are performed during the celebration of the festival. In a similar vein, the Uge Adiafa Festival of the Atissa people have also gained more prominence in this era.

The point had already been made that colonialism brought Christianity to Epie-Atissa. Hence, after colonialism a new society emerged religiously speaking. Both through the church and the schools established by the Christian mission, the people gradually left their traditional beliefs. In the churches, the Christian converts were taught to despise traditional religion. In this light, the worship of the fetish deity died down. In colonial times, with the introduction of Christianity, few people started the celebration of Christmas, but still went on with certain traditional practices. However, with the passage of time, those that were truly Christianized converted some of those that still carried on with the few traditional cultural practices.[24] Ceremonial cleansing and folk-games were discontinued. In its place was introduced the New Year celebration of the western world. Also, Epie- Atissa masquerade culture which served as a recreational activity was discouraged by the Christian mission.

The post-colonial economy of the people was almost a duplication of the colonial economic activities at the early stage of independence but this has changed. The economic development during this period saw the expansion in local trade between them and their neighbours. Today, the economic profile of the area has recorded significant growth and development necessitated by the influx of people to the area due to the creation of Bayelsa State. Epie-Atissa communities have been transformed into urban centres and the development have even expanded to the suburbs. The expansion has made lands that were hitherto common in pre-colonial and colonial times to become very essential means of livelihood to the people. Many have also been employed into the civil and public service. The private sector has also created job opportunities and means of livelihood for the people.

The chieftaincy institution and political hierarchy was also not left out of the changes in the post-colonial era. Due to the interference of the colonialist with the traditional political system, the gerontocracy that existed in Epie-Atissa is no more. Now, rulers emerged through elections as there are written constitutions that regulate the affairs of the people.[25] The *Ebenibe*/*Obenibe*, for instance, is now the clan head of each kingdom. He is the highest executive and judicial authority in the Epie-Atissa. He handles the affairs of the clan. Next to the *Ebenibe*/*Obenibe* is the *Ebeneken/Obeneken* which is the village head. The position of *Ebeneken*/*Obeneken* is to rule for a period of only four years which will be contested for by any qualified indigene of the community and no longer for life. *Ebeneken*/*Obenekens* (paramount rulers) had their deputies. They administer the affairs of their communities and report back to the *Ebenibe*/*Obenibe*. Below the *Ebeneken/Obeneken* is the various compound

[24] C.M. Sorgwe, "The Impacts of Colonial Rule" 223-224.
[25] George Izibenadu, Oral Interview, 10th September, 2020.

chiefs who administer the affairs of their compounds. Even under these, there are other minor chiefs known as family chiefs (*Obeni-fam*). This position was usually given to the eldest member of each family, though the *Obeni-fam* position is not highly regarded in the political hierarchy. In addition to the foregoing are the positions of the Presidents of the Youth Councils, Spokespersons and a General Assembly.[26]

The people of Epie-Atissa have been actively involved in partisan politics from the colonial times but became more active after independence. With the creation of Bayelsa State in 1996 and the citing of the state capital in Yenagoa, a town in the twin kingdoms, they have become more relevant politically following the urbanization and massive influx of people to the city. Today, Epie-Atissa has a seat in the Bayelsa State House of Assembly (Yenagoa Constituency1) and has produced several Commissioners in the State Executive Council. The people have identified with several political parties in the present dispensation, especially the PDP and APC through which they have been elected and appointed into public offices.

Conclusion

This study has clearly shown that the Epie-Atissa society is not static but dynamic. It has undergone several changes necessitated by its contact with Europeans which led to the colonization of the people and presently, new ideas have been injected into the society that is causing both growth and disaster. These changes are evident in every facet of their lives such as their social, economic and political institutions. The institutions outlined here continue to change forms from the past while new ones replaced old discarded institutions. These have been clearly explained in this study.

[26] Goerge Izibenadu, Oral Interview, 10th September, 2020.

STRENGTHENING DEMOCRATIC MECHANISMS FOR NATION BUILDING IN NIGERIA AN OVER-VIEW

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Abstract

The Nigerian political landscape has undergone drastic transformation since its independence in 1960. Prior to its transition to democracy in 1999, Nigeria had witnessed almost three decades of military authoritarianism and dictatorship. In recent times, repeated attempts to salvage the ailing democratic institutions in Nigeria have faltered. The recent upsurge in inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflicts across the country, coupled with the resurging calls for secession from various quarters in the country has not only cast strong doubt on the future of democracy in Nigeria, but has also fueled pessimism about the continued existence and survival of Nigeria as a political entity. Whether democracy will be fledged in Nigeria for the country to be fully positioned for sustainable development to aid nation building, depends on the government's approach to resolving the underlying challenges of democracy in Nigeria. This paper explicates the need for rejiggering the existing mechanisms of democracy in
Nigeria and strengthening same for a sustainable nation building. This paper adopts a doctrinal research methodology to analyse some issues that are surrounding the sustenance of Nigeria's democracy, as well as threats to nation building. This paper also makes viable recommendations for tackling the inherent challenges of democracy in Nigeria.

Keywords: democracy, institution, nation-building, Nigeria, challenges.

Introduction

The global economic and political order which had been orchestrated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (IBRD) since the mid-twentieth century had precipitated the spread of democratization of governments across the world.[27] With the succour of the Western powers[28], hostile regimes in the third world countries were toppled while democratic governance was installed. Nigeria has not been left behind in this development. Prior to the relinquishment of political independence to the country, the British colonial government facilitated Nigeria's political transition to indigenous democracy.

Since its independence, Nigeria's democracy has been precarious and unstable.[29] In a stanchly heterogeneous nation with more than 200 ethnic groups within its borders, which were drawn by British colonialists, successive governments have struggled to forge a sense of national unity.[4] The various regions of the nation have experienced varying rates of development and democratization.

Not long after political independence in 1960, the military interrupted Abraham Lincoln's idea of the government of the people in Nigeria. After almost three decades of military dictatorship and authoritarianism, the military disengaged from Nigerian politics and ceded political power to a democratically elected government – firstly in 1979 by the Obasanjo military regime and finally in May 1999 by the Abubakar Abdulsalam military regime shortly after the demise of the Sani Abacha, Nigeria's foremost military dictator.

The transition to democracy in 1999 earmarked the beginning of the Fourth Republic. More than two decades after, four different civilian regimes have emerged and transitions from one civilian regime to another have been witnessed. Sixty-two years after attaining political independence from Britain, the country is surprisingly yet to sustain proper democratic ethos, which is the catalyst for good governance and nation building.[30] In spite of the seeming success in democratic consolidation, democratic governance in the Fourth Republic has been enwrapped in a plethora of challenges such as electoral malpractice, ethno-religious rivalries, insecurity, weak democratic institutions, insurgency, poverty, corruption, and economic recessions, amongst others.[31]These challenges do not only

[27] Ogbonnaya, U.M., Omoju, O.E. and Udefunna, N.P., "The Challenges of Democratic Governance in Nigeria's Fourth Republic" Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences(2012) Vol. 3(11): 685.

[28] The Western Powers comprise first world countries such as the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France and some western European Countries.

[29] Hoffman, D.L. and Wallace, J., "Democracy in Nigeria" 29 June 2022. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/06/democracy-nigeria [4] Ibid.

[30] Gberevbie, D.E., "Democracy, Democratic Institutions and Good Governance in Nigeria". EasternAfrica SocialScienceResearchReview(2014) vol.XXX, no.1: 133.

[31] King, C.M., LocalismandNationbuilding (Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 1999): 76; Akinsanya A.A., "The inevitability of instability in Nigeria" in Akinsanya, A.A. and Ayoade, J.A. (eds), ReadingsinNigerian governmentandpolitics(Ijebu-Ode: Gratia Associates International (2005): pp.237-252.

weaken the democratic formulae but also constitute potent threats to the sustenance of democracy in the Nigerian polity.[32]

As it is, there are seeming hurdles in the path of Nigeria's journey to strong democracy.[33]Achieving sustainable development for nation building through democratically facilitated good governance remains a challenge that stares the nation on the face.[9] More than two decades of uninterrupted supposed democracy has availed the country enough drift to position it on a trajectory of nation building. Unfortunately, a host of issues and challenges surrounding the practice of democracy in Nigeria bedevil the long -due democratic rebirth of Nigeria. Thus, addressing these issues by majorly strengthening existing democratic institutions in Nigeria will put the nation on the pathway to sustainable development and efficient nation building.

This paper therefore examines the underlying challenges of consolidation of Nigeria's democracy. This paper briefly traces Nigeria's journey to democracy so far. By appraising the existing institutions of democracy in Nigeria, this paper proposes recommendations for strengthening extant democratic mechanisms in Nigeria. This paper also contends in strong terms that, amongst other recommendations, the existing institutions of democracy must be rejiggered and strengthened in order to facilitate nation building, economic growth and development, as well as the improvement of the standard of living of the Nigerian citizenry.

1.1 CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION

Globally and with Nigeria in focus, democracy has notably become one of the most debated concepts in recent years.[10] As a concept and a system of government, the concept of democracy has continued to generate excessive ambiguity in contemporary political discourse.[11] Although it is undeniable that there have been scholastic definitions of the concept of democracy that have garnered global commendation, it must be emphasized that there is difficulty in reaching a consensus on the appropriate definition of democracy.

The genesis of the idea of democracy seemed to have been alluded to Athens in the fifth century BC.[12] The most popular definition of democracy was the one given by the then American President, Abraham Lincoln, in his Gettysburg Address, where he asserted that "all men are created equal" and posited the meaning of democracy as the "government of the people, by the people, for the people".[13] Democracy has also been defined as "a

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9 Abdulhamid, O.S., "Democracy, good governance and development in Nigeria" JournalofPublic AdministrationandPolicyResearch(2016) Vol.8(7): p.81.

10 Adamu, A. and Idachaba, E.U., "Challenges in Nigeria's Democratic Institutions: Accountability in Focus" GlobalJournalofHuman-SocialScience(F) (2017) Volume XVII Issue III Version I, p.2.

11 Abdulhamid, O.S., "Democracy, good governance and development in Nigeria" JournalofPublic AdministrationandPolicyResearch(2016) Vol.8(7): p.81.

12 Adamu, A. and Idachaba, E.U., "Challenges in Nigeria's Democratic Institutions: Accountability in Focus" GlobalJournalofHuman-SocialScience(F) (2017) Volume XVII Issue III Version I, p.2.

32 Barret, L., "Diplomatic Morality and Africa's Global Presence". DailySun,August 5, 2009. P.9.

33 United States Agency for International Development, "Democracy, Human Rights and Governance" 13 June, 2022 https://www.usaid.gov/nigeria/democracy-human-rights-andgovernance#:~:text=There%20are%20roadblocks%20to%20a,the%20daily%20lives%20of%20Nigerians.

government in which supreme power is invested in the people and exercised by them directly or indirectly through representation".[14] Karl opines that democracy is "a set of institutions that permits the entire adult population to act as citizens by choosing their leading decision-makers in competitive, fair and regularly scheduled elections which are held in the context of the rule of law, guarantees for political freedom, and limited military prerogatives".[15] Popper asseverated that democracy is in sharp contradistinction to dictatorship and tyranny.[16] The major variants of democracy are direct and indirect or representative democracy. While direct democracy seems to be the past vogue, representative democracy remains commonplace in most contemporary political settings. It involves the system by which the entire body of eligible citizens is vested with sovereignty while the political power is invested and exercised by an elected few who represent the citizenry.

Nation-building, as a normative concept, has multifarious conceptualizations.[17] The concept is probably best explained by emphasizing its key components. Undoubtedly, nation-building is a process that entails creating a geographical political entity that is characterized by laws, norms, values, and common identity. Generally, it can be defined as the process of creating or establishing a national identity with the aid of state authority for the purpose of uniting the citizens of a state for long-term political stability and viability.[18] The implication of conscious nation building is that the capacities of state institutions are enhanced to consolidate and integrate the various interests in the state.[19] It involves the engineering of a country's political landscape at a great scale. The corollary of the foregoing conceptual clarification is that democracy and nationbuilding are mutually inclusive. Fortifying the mechanisms of democracy in Nigeria is tantamount to making conscious efforts towards sustainable nation building. Therefore, in the process of strengthening democratic institutions, as will be explicated in this paper, nation-building follows naturally.

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9 Ajayi, A.T. and Ojo, E.O., "Democracy in Nigeria: Practice, Problems and Prospects" DevelopingCountry Studies(2014) Vol. 4, No.2: 107.

10 Lindell and Scott are of the opinion that the idea of democracy is derived from the Greek word – demokratia– which means 'rule of the people" and which was coined from (demos) "people" and (kratos) "power" or "rule" in the 5th century B.C. See Lindell, G. and Scott, R., "A Greek – English Lexicon" Perseus, (1999) https://perseus.tufts.edu/.

11 This address was delivered at the dedication of the Soldiers' National Cemetery on 19 November 1863 in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. Full text of Lincoln's Address could be viewed at http://voicesofdemocracy.umd.edu or http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettysburg_Address.

12 See The Webster New Encyclopaedic Dictionary (1995); See also Nwogu, G.A.I, "Democracy: Its Meaning and Dissenting Opinions of the Political Class in Nigeria: A Philosophical Approach" Journalof EducationandPeace(2015) Vol 6. No.4: 131.

13 Karl, C.L., TheThirdWave:DemocratizationinthelateTwentiethCentury, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press) p.43.

14 Karl Popper, ACentenaryAssessment:KarlMilford. (Ashgate Publishing, Ltd, 2006) p.457.

15 Igbini, M.D., "The Challenges of Nation-Building and Peace-Building in Nigeria" DanubiusUniversity Journal(2020) Vol.10 No.1: p.3.

16 Reamer, A.K., "The Concept of State-Building, Nation-Building and Society-Building" Academicand Applied Researchin MilitaryScience(2005) Vol.4(3): p.367.

2.0 DEMOCRACY IN NIGERIA

Many political analysts have described the history of Nigeria's democracy as chequered.[20] Following its separation from Britain in 1st October 1960, Nigeria formally established itself as a democracy. However, Nigerian calls for increased representation have a long history, dating back to the 1920s. Under British colonial authority, a new constitution was drafted in 1922, partly in response to Nigerian calls for reform. The following year, the nation held its first general election for a colonial legislative council. The colonial government thought that calls for complete independence would be restrained, but elections were unable to quell Nigerians' desire for self-government. Throughout the 1920s, civil opposition persisted, largely under the direction of feminist and student organisations. Thousands of Nigerian women demonstrated during the Aba Women's Riots in November 1929, against the oppressive rule of "Warrant Chief" tribal leaders chosen by the colonial government. In 1936, young nationalists from the Lagos region established the Nigerian Youth Movement.

It was obvious that Nigeria would gain independence following World War Two.[21] Another new constitution, adopted in the 1950s, gave Nigeria's federal government a framework and opened the ground for the end of British authority. The Northern People's Congress won the general election in 1959, and together with the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons, which was dominated by the south-east, they created a coalition administration.

Due to this, the first self-government ever led by a Nigerian was formed, and in 1960, the country gained independence. As Governor-General, Nnamdi Azikiwe and became the Governor General Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, was Nigeria's first and only Prime Minister. Nigeria had a constitutional monarchy for its first three years of independence, with Britain's Queen Elizabeth continuing to serve as the country's Head of State.[22]

Azikiwe served as the nation's first President and Head of State after it became a Federal Republic in 1963, and Balewa continued in his role as prime minister and head of government. However, the first republic's democracy gradually deteriorated. Elections were held in 1964, but the occasion revealed broad discontent with northern politicians' dominance of the central administration. Inter-ethnic violence occasionally broke out as well, and Balewa was murdered in 1966 as part of a brutal, unsuccessful military coup.
Major General Johnson Thomas Umunnakwe Aguiyi-Ironsi took control during the ensuing pandemonium, but he barely held it for six months until being deposed in a counter-coup.

Yakubu Gowon took his position, ushering in nearly ten years of "Supreme Military Council" control.[23]

Lt. Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu, the military commander of Nigeria's Eastern Region, disapproved of Gowon's rule. Ojukwu oversaw the region's independence in 1967 and proclaimed himself the President of the Republic of Biafra in opposition to the Gowon dictatorship and the Igbo pogroms in the north. Famine, murder, and destruction were unleashed in the south-east as a result of a violent civil war. Foreign powers with a stake in

the future of the oil-rich nation provided both sides with weapons and support, with Britain equipping the Nigerian military regime.

Nigeria and the rest of the world were both greatly impacted by the civil war. Following the 1970 capitulation of a badly battered Biafra, Nigeria was split into 12 states from its original three regions in an effort to bolster the Lagos-based central government and thwart any further attempts at secession. Images of the starvation brought on by the war inspired organizations like the Red Cross and Save the Children to launch a massive international humanitarian appeal outside of Nigeria. After the war, oil profits were used to pay for an expensive reconstruction project.
Gowon's military regime was viewed as dishonest, ineffective, and incapable of leading the nation back to democracy.24 Gowon was deposed in a bloodless coup in 1975, and General Murtala Mohammed took his place. Mohammed was later murdered in a failed coup attempt in 1976. Lieutenant General Olusegun Obasanjo, who was his deputy, assumed control and managed Nigeria's transition to democracy

Marking the beginning of the Second Republic, Alhaji Shehu Shagari was inaugurated as Nigeria's first democratically elected president in July and August 1979, and a new constitution that abandoned the British parliamentary system was adopted.25 However, Shagari's administration was characterized by widespread corruption, wastefulness, and a failure to heal the nation's ethnic and religious divisions caused by the civil war.26 In the hotly contested election of 1983, the government declared themselves the victor. Another military coup was staged in Nigeria and Major General Muhammadu Buhari became head of the new military council.

His autocratic style of rule was unpopular, and the recession made matters worse. General Ibrahim Babangida, who had pledged to put an end to military rule by 1990, but ended up staying in power until 1993, overthrew Buhari's government in August 1985. He widened a corrupt patronage network in Nigeria that is still active today and is largely supported by oil profits.

The results of the free and fair elections held in June 1993 were rejected by Babangida. He put the third republic's fully fledged establishment on hold and imprisoned the country's elected leader, Moshood Kashimawo Olawale Abiola. However, he found it difficult to quell domestic pro-democracy sentiments. Later that year, he established an interim governing council, which was swiftly superseded by a new military leader named General Sani. Abacha's rule was brutal and characterized by violations of human rights, such as the "Ogoni Nine" case. These environmental activists were murdered in 1995 on bogus murder charges, despite their protests against oil contamination in the Niger Delta. Nigeria suffered under the violent and corrupt rule of Abacha and was shunned by the world.

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[20] Hoffman, L.K. and Wallace, J., "Democracy in Nigeria" ChattamHouse29 June 2022. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/06/democracy-nigeria

[21] Ibid.

In 1997, Abacha passed away under enigmatic circumstances. With elections held in April 1999, a second transitional military administration under the direction of General Abdulsalami Abubakar oversaw a return to democracy. Olusegun Obasanjo, a former military dictator, won the presidency on the platform of the People's Democratic Party (PDP), a massive alliance of political heavyweights. The longest stretch of continuously democratic rule began when Obasanjo served two full four-year terms in power.

Democratic Mechanisms In Nigeria

Independent Electoral Commission (Inec)

INEC is the independent body established with the sole authority to conduct all elections for public positions in the nation.[27] The structure of INEC consists of a Chairman, 12 Federal Commissioners, and 36 Resident Commissioners, each of whom is in charge of a state within the 36-state Nigerian Federation. The INEC's composition is one of its main flaws, which has caused politicians and citizens to feel unfavorably about its operations.
According to the 1999 Constitution, the President of the Federation has the authority to appoint the commission's chairman, 12 commissioners at the Federal level, and 36 Resident Commissioners at the state level. However, the Senate must review and revise the appointment.[28] The risk with this system is that, in cases where a ruling political party wins a majority of Senate seats, the President's nominees for INEC could be easily authorized to promote the ruling party's platform in following elections.[29] Along with the aforementioned constitutional flaws, INEC also faces the issue of staff members' unethical behavior during the election process.[30]
Election petitions filed by unsuccessful candidates in Nigeria have increased over time as a result of democratic institutions like INEC's failure to conduct free and fair elections in the nation. The irregularities that have marred the previous five general elections—the ones in2003, 2007, 2011, 2015, and 2019-have been reflected in the volume of petitions submitted by candidates and/or political parties contesting the validity of these elections' results.[31]

Based on the foregoing, a society with an electoral body that is properly organized constituted, and capable of holding elections in a free and fair manner is more likely to experience the proper democratic norms necessary for good governance to flourish and promote development than a society without one. This implies a connection between the duties of INEC as a democratic institution, democratic practice, good governance, and societal progress – all of which are impetus for nation building.

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[23]Max Siollun, "How first coup still haunts Nigeria 50 years on". BBCNews,15 January 2016. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35312370

THE NIGERIAN LEGISLATURE

The constitution vests the exclusive law making power in the Nigerian legislature.[32] The legislative body is empowered to enact laws at the federal and state levels and see to the smooth running of the running through a facilitating legal framework.

The Nigerian legislature – the National Assembly – catalyses the practice of democracy in Nigeria through its oversight functions. It encourages the practice of checks and balances, as well as good governance, accountability, and transparency in the government.[33] The legislature increases the effectiveness, efficiency, and economy of government operation.[34] It identifies and prevents bad management, waste, misuse, arbitrary and capricious behaviour, and illegal and unconstitutional conduct. It evaluates the programs and performance of MDAs, while also making sure that the executive policies serve the public interest and inform the broader public. The legislative arm of the government also collects data to create fresh legislative ideas or change current laws, and scrutinizing administrative actions follow legislative intent, and stop the executive arm of government from encroaching on legislative power and prerogatives. It also makes the executive branch answerable by checking to see if the government's policies have been carried out and if they are having the desired effect.[35] Importantly, it promotes financial responsibility by authorizing and reviewing government expenditures and calling attention to unnecessary spending on publicly sponsored services.

Like every other institution in Nigeria, the National Assembly has experienced its highs and lows. Since the beginning of this political era in 1999, it has experienced its fair share of scandals, including forgeries of certificates, contract fraud, and bribery cases.[36] The National Assembly has evolved into a premier legislative institution for which Nigerians may be proud over time and with the implementation of some internal control mechanisms. Nonetheless, much is left to be desired in this governmental apparatus.

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[22] Oladimeji Talibu, "Nigerian Foreign Policy under Major General Yakubu Gowon, 1966-1975: Factors and Interests" (A dissertation submitted in fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Master of Human Sciences to the International Islamic University Malaysia, April 2013).

[23] Olanrewaju Olamide, "History of Nigerian Constitutional Development" Djetlawyerundated. https://djetlawyer.com/history-nigerian-constitutional-development/

[24] Dan Agbese, "Between Shagari and Buhari" TheGuardian01 July, 2022. https://guardian.ng/opinion/between-shagari-and-buhari/

[25] Section 153 (1) f (1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria

[28] Section 14(3)(a) of Part I of the Third Schedule to the 1999 Constitution.

[26] In actuality, the ruling People's Democratic Party (PDP) approved Professor Morris Iwu's appointment by former President Olusegun Obasanjo as the Chairman of INEC (2005–2010). This scenario actually played out in the conduct of the 2007 General Elections that was widely acclaimed to have been rigged in favour of the ruling party and acknowledged by the then elected late President Musa Yar' Adua, and local and the international communities. See Gberevbie, D.E., supra note 5, p.142.

THE NIGERIAN EXECUTIVE ARM OF GOVERNMENT

The Constitution vests the executive powers of the Federal and State governments in the President and Governors respectively.[37] The Executive arm of government majorly serves as the facilitator of democratic governance in Nigeria. This suggests that for democracy and democratic governance to flourish in a society, the executive as a democratic institution must act as an impartial umpire because the executive arm of government is not a creation of a particular political party but rather of the constitution and as such should be supported by all, including those who may not be in power at the moment - the "opposition", - if sustainable development is to occur in a nation.[38] Unfortunately, the executive arm of government is not exculpable in the mishandling of democratic governance in Nigeria. It has been observed that the executive branch of government has occasionally manipulated election results in Nigeria by using state institutions like the police and the electoral board to its benefit.[39]

THE NIGERIAN JUDICIARY

The judicial powers of the Nigerian Federation are vested in the courts by virtue of Section 6 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution. A key component of democratic governance that deals with the administration and administration of justice is the judiciary. In Nigeria's 22 years of uninterrupted democracy, can it be considered to have upheld this constitutional mandate, though?

Since Nigeria's last transition to democracy in 1999, the judiciary has played a crucial role in upholding the tenets of democracy by deciding on all cases resulting from preelection activities, petitions filed after general and other elections, and appeals to the Court of Appeal based on decisions of election tribunals, some of which end up at the Supreme Court.

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30 For instance, it was recorded in Justice Uwais' Report on Electoral Reforms in 2008 that INEC's staff frustrates the petition process by preventing petitioners' access to crucial documentary evidence or manipulating electoral documents while in their custody to frustrate efforts of petitioners from proving their case beyond all reasonable doubt before the court.

31 From 2003 to 2015, aggrieved candidates and parties have filed a total of 3,193 petitions in the general elections. In the 2019 general elections, 766 petitions were filed which brings the total number of petitions filed to date to 3,959.

32 See section 4 of the 1999 Constitution.

33 Boris Odalonu, "The Role of Legislature in Promoting Good Governance in Nigeria" in Aninwene, E.O., Odalonu, H.O. and Chia, B.A. (eds), StudiesinSocialSciencesandHumanities(Makurdi, Nigeria: Book Works Publisher, 2020) pp.156.

34 Ibid.

35 Obasa, M., "The Legislature and good governance" The Nation 11 December, 2016. https://www.researchgate.net/deref/http%3A%2F%2Fthenationonlineng.net%2Flegislature-goodgovernance%2F

36 Emeka Ihedioha, "The Legislature: Roles, Misconceptions and Experience in Democratic Nigeria" (A paper presented at a public lecture organized by the Department of Political Science, University of Lagos on July 1, 2012).

37 See section 4 of the 1999 Constitution.

38 Ikelegbe, A. O, "Democracy and democratization in Nigeria". In Ikelegbe, A. O. (Ed.), Politicsand government:Anintroductoryandcomparativeperspective, (Benin City: Uri Publishing Ltd, 2005): pp. 197– 214.

39 Ibid; see also Gberevbie, D.E., supra note 5, p.144.

However, the judiciary's role in advancing democratic government in Nigeria has been seriously hampered by a crisis of confidence brought on by some of its rulings and declarations. This is especially true when petitions filed by candidates who were unhappy with the results of an election are rejected because of a technicality rather than the merits of the argument.

The Nigerian judiciary has a growing reputation for corruption in recent years. Transactional justice, which refers to the practice of letting social, familial, or financial gain influence judicial decisions, is also becoming rampant.[40] Executive interference in the sacred duties of the courts is another constraint on judicial autonomy to bolster democratic governance in Nigeria.

Due to its inability to act as an impartial umpire in some of its rulings and pronouncements, the Nigerian judiciary as a democratic institution has failed to be a facilitator of proper democratic processes leading to the enthronement of legitimate political leaders in the country's democratic system, as shown in the discussion above. The democratic system could be cut short, good governance prevented, and growth hampered if the courts are unable to act as an impartial referee in electoral petitions.

THE NIGERIAN POLICE FORCE

The Nigerian Police Force is the primary law enforcement agency in Nigeria. Created by the provision of Section 214 of the 1999 Constitution, the body is invested with the power to maintain law and order in the country. By its statutory mandate of protecting lives and property, the Police is crucial to the creation of a conducive environment for democracy to thrive in Nigeria.

The entity with the authority to maintain peace and order in Nigeria during the election season is the Nigerian Police Force. The primary duties of the police during elections include maintaining order and safety throughout the process, ensuring the safety of supplies, persons, and locations used for voter registration, and ensuring the protection of citizens' lives and property during registration of voters, participation in political campaigns, and voting, as well as ensuring electoral officials' safety before, during, and after elections.

Nevertheless, despite these honourable roles that the police play in the electoral process, there have been a number of public and political complaints that the nation's police force lacks objectivity when dealing with all political parties. Oloruntimehin contends that the failure of democratic governance in Nigeria was a result of the Nigerian Police Force's involvement in the 1983 general elections.[41] He claimed that the Nigerian Police Force, which was supposed to uphold the integrity of the electoral process in order to enthrone

[40] Ebun-Olu Adegboruwa, "Challenges Of The Judiciary In Contemporary Nigeria (3): Judicial Corruption And Transactional Justice" NigerianTribuneNovember 9, 2021. https://tribuneonlineng.com/challengesof-the-judiciary-in-contemporary-nigeria-3-judicial-corruption-and-transactional-justice/

sincere political leaders, had instead turned into a tool of persecution against the opposition in favour of the ruling party, led by Alhaji Shehu Shagari[42].

The demise of democracy in a society may result from a circumstance in which the Police Force, a democratic institution that ought to be a vehicle for the development of the democratic system, turns out to be the very instrument of political tyranny. Therefore, where a country's law enforcement officials consider themselves as defenders of the democratic rights of the people rather than those of the government in power, correct democratic ethos is more likely to be reinforced and the goals of good govern ance and development to be realized.

CHALLENGES FACING THE SUSTENANCE OF NIGERIA'S DEMOCRACY

Electoral malpractice continues to bedevil almost all general elections in Nigeria.[43] Every election in the Fourth Republic has been marked by colossal irregularities and malpractices, which magnitude continues to grow by with every election.[44] Institutions of the state such as the police, the military, and even the electoral body, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) collude to manipulate the electoral process in favor of certain candidates.[45] Lack of credible, free and fair elections impedes the entrenchment of democracy in the nation.

Also, ethnic cleavages and security crises constitute potent threats to democratic governance in Nigeria. After years of oppressive military rule, Nigeria's return to democracy in 1999 created a space for the expression of long-suppressed ethnic demands. As a result of the expression of these demands, ethno-nationalist insurgencies such as the Movement for

Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) in the Niger Delta region, the resurgence of the demand for Biafra led by the Movement for Actualization of Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), and the growing notoriety of the Odua People's Congress (OPC) in the South-West have all emerged. Recently, a scattered network of insurgents has emerged.

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[41] Oloruntimehin, O., "The Nigeria Police and the 1983 General Elections" In Akinsanya, A. A. and Ayoade, J. A. (Eds.), ReadingsinNigeriangovernmentandpolitics, (Ij ebu-Ode: Gratia Associates International, 2005): p.147.

[42] (1979–1983).

[43] Ogbonnaya, U.M., Omoju, O.E. and Udefunna, N.P., supra note 1, p.688.

[44] Omodia, S. M., "Elections and Democratic Survival in the Fourth Republic of Nigeria". TheJournalofPan AfricanStudies(2009) 3(3): 35- 42.

[45] Tinubu, B. A., "Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria: Issues, Challenges and Prospects". (Text of a Lecture delivered at a National Symposium on 10 Years of Democracy (1999-2009) in Nigeria, organized by the Aminu Kano Centre for Democratic Research and Training, Mambyya House, Bayero University, Kano, on May 29, 2009).

Similarly, it has been shown in the foregoing discussion, the extant institutions of democracy are weak. The weakness of these democratic institutions is itself a challenge to continued democratic governance in Nigeria. In principle, these institutions are vested with powers to perform; however, their efficacy has been fundamentally impaired by executive interference and poor oversight mechanisms.

Major amongst these challenges that are confronting the enshrinement of democracy in Nigeria is institutionalized corruption. In Nigeria's Fourth Republic especially, the degree to which corruption has been institutionalized is worrisome. Despite the existence of two major anti-graft agencies[46], corruption has become endemic in the Nigerian public service. On the downside of it, the citizens do not get to see the expected results which they voted their elected representatives to deliver.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STRENGTHENING DEMOCRATIC MECHANISMS IN NIGERIA

In light of the foregoing challenges, the following policy options are recommended to further strengthen democratic mechanisms in Nigeria;

- Making INEC a truly independent body both in name and practice requires amending the relevant sections of the constitution because it has an impact on the appointment of important officers like the Chairman, National Commissioners, and Resident Commissioners. This will help to forestall the interference of the executive arm of government in the affairs of the electoral body. This will only improve democratic sustainability but also reduce the incidence of electoral malpractice.

- The legislature as a whole also has a part to play in the area of constitutional amendment by putting any amendment to the constitution up for a referendum so that everyone in the nation has a chance to influence how the amended portions turn out in the end. A political party in power would be prevented by this development from using its majority in the national assembly to amend any part of the constitution in favour of its own agenda rather than the popular will.

- Additionally, by refraining from using government institutions to repress the opposition, the executive branch of the government could contribute to the establishment of democratic standards in the nation. The judiciary could also be watched over in its duties as the democracy's last line

- of defense, especially when it comes to electoral matters. If democracy is to fulfil its objectives of good governance, development and nation building, the National Judicial Council, which is presided over by the Chief Justice of the Nigeria, should

[46] These are the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and the Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC).

occasionally provide training on judicial ethics for members of the judiciary. Harsh punishments should be meted on judges who are found guilty of improper conduct.

- In a similar vein, the police should be given adequate refresher and in-course training to help them understand that the institution to which they belong is a defender of the rights of the people in a democracy, a proper facilitator of the democratic process, and not necessarily of the government in power. This will help them resist the temptation to be used as a tool of oppression against the people. Any police officer that is found wanting of professional misconduct should be severely punished.

- Additionally, political education needs to be strengthened among both politicians and the general public. Through training and regular practice of democratic values, people acquire democratic norms. An Institute for Democratic Studies could be established to educate lawmakers across the country on the essential tenets of democracy. On the other hand, the National Orientation Agency should work with the INEC to implement measures to educate the public through the mass media, including television, radio, newspapers, and magazines, about the proper culture of democratic norms required of them and the advantages of democratic governance in a society as the foundation for democratic sustainability, societal development and nation building

Conclusion

In spite of the enormous challenges that are confronting the sustenance of democracy in Nigeria, there are huge prospects for democratic governance in the country. By strengthening its weak democratic institutions and making necessary legislative and policy amendments, Nigeria may well be on the path of becoming the beacon of hope for Africa, as it was a few years after gaining independence.

THE JUKUN DIVINE KING: PÁNKYÁ OF AKU-UKA, KUVYON II

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Abstract

The Jukun people of Nigeria have a unique tradition which they maintained despite colonial onslaught, and one aspect of that tradition is the *Pánkyá* of their king. On 14th January, 2022, the *Pánkyá* of Aku-Uka, Dr Shekarau Angyu Masa-Ibi, Kuvyon II, took place, accompanied with all the traditional rituals, leaving the world in limbo over the practices and their significances. Because this is a ritual that last took place 46 years ago, it became almost a new thing to so many people, even among the Jukun themselves. Consequently, there emerged different perspectives to the rituals by people all over the world. While some viewpoints condemned, others applauded the tradition as demonstrated. Therefore, it is in order to provide clarity on this particular aspect of Jukun tradition that this paper presents a discussion on the *Pánkyá* of the immediate departed Aku-Uka on 14th January, 2022. Using both primary and secondary sources, the paper revealed, among other results, that the Jukun people have well preserved traditional practices, among which is their stout esteem for their king. It revealed also that the information about the future of the horseman during the *Pánkyá* is totally false. Finally, the article concludes that, in order to create awareness and project their culture and traditions to people of the world, there is serious need for deliberate scholarly literature and art works on the Jukun and their culture.

Keywords: Aku-Uka, Divine, Jukun, King, Kingship, Pánkyá, Ritual, Tradition.

Introduction

The Jukun people of Nigeria occupy the Benue Valley which falls within the Middle Belt region of Nigeria. They are largely concentrated in Taraba State, with their capital in Wukari, seat of their paramount ruler, the Aku-Uka. They are also found in other States of Nigeria, including Benue, Nasarawa, Plateau and Gombe, with few of them settling in Adamawa and Borno States.[34] They are the founders of the famous 'Kwararafa' polity.

Before coming in contact with colonialism and the two (2) major religions that dominate them now (Islam and Christianity), the Jukun had earlier evolved a very elaborate, but complex, political and social organisation through which the society was stratified.[35] Meek described the Jukun political organisation as 'theocratic', a State governed directly by the gods, or through a sacerdotal class, where the Aku (King) serves as head of priestly class which include other officials such as Abon-Acio, Abon-Ziken, Kinda-Acio, Kinda-Ziken and Nwutsi, among others.[36]

Similarly, the Jukun tradition and culture was seriously observed, particularly in the aspect of the Jukun divine kingship, which European anthropologists such as Meek labelled as Jukun religion. He states that:

> It may seem out of place to begin an account of Jukun religion by a dissertation on the King… It would be impossible to understand anything of Jukun religion without first understanding something of what kingship means for the Jukun.[37]

However, in their resolve to understand the Jukun traditions, particularly the aspect of Jukun divine kingship, the Europeans, such as Meek, encountered challenges as he notes that:

> I do not pretend to have any profound acquaintance with Jukun religion, for there is no subject on which the Jukun, who are always a reticent people, are more pledged to silence than that of their religion in general, and the religious position of the king in particular. Moreover, the full ritual surrounding the person of the king is not merely a secret from all strangers, but is unknown to most Jukun themselves.[38]

The above was the way the Jukun held unto their tradition before coming in contact with Western ideas (Colonialism & Christianity).

Due to their inability to get proper explanation on the Jukun kingship, the Europeans and their disciples decided to project some falsehood about the divinity of the Jukun king. For instance, Smith,[39] considers the way the Jukun king returned to the land of the gods as pretence, and there was insinuation that the Jukun king must not live on the throne for more

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34 Agbu, A.D., Zhema, S. & Useni, B. *Jukun & Tiv: The 2019/2020 Conflict.* Jos: Jema Printers & Publishers, 2021.

35 Meek, C.K. *Sudanese Kingdom: An Ethnographical Study of Jukun-Speaking Peoples of Nigeria.* London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Ltd., 1931, & Abubakar, S. *Pre-colonial Government and Administration among the Jukun.* Inaugural Lecture Series, No.38, University of Maiduguri, 1986.

36 Meek, C.K. *Sudanese Kingdom: An Ethnographical Study of Jukun-Speaking Peoples of Nigeria.* London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Ltd., 1931, p.332.

37 Meek, C.K. *Sudanese Kingdom: An Ethnographical Study of Jukun-Speaking Peoples of Nigeria.* London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Ltd., 1931, p.120.

38 Meek, C.K. *Sudanese Kingdom: An Ethnographical Study of Jukun-Speaking Peoples of Nigeria.* London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Ltd., 1931, p.120.

39 Smith, E.H. *Nigerian Harvest.* Michigan: Baker Book House, 1972, p.127.

than seven years.[40] The misrepresentation has been corrected as time passed on, and today, the people strongly believe that the Jukun king can live on the throne as long as the gods permit. This was evident in the reign of the immediate departed Aku-Uka, Dr Shekarau Angyu Masa-Ibi, Kuvyon II, who lived on the throne for 45 years (1976 to 2021). Even before him, some passed Aku-Uka lived on the throne of their forefathers for up to ten years and above. Examples of such Aku-Uka included, Angyu Katakpa Agbukenjo (1596-1607), Kuvyon Nanito (1667-1770), Awudumanu Abite (1871-1903), Agbumanu Amadu Abite (1927-1940), Agbumanu Atoshi Agbunshu (1945-1960) and Ashumanu Adi-Byewi Agbunshu (1960-1970).[41]

Though some African traditions and cultures have been destroyed due to Westernization and Christianity, among others, one important aspect that needs commendation is how the Jukun are able to hold onto their tradition, particularly, their divine kingship, as demonstrated in January, 2022, beginning with the Pánkyá[42] of Kuvyon II and Pánkán[43] of Amatakhitswen. It is based on the foregoing that this article provides answers to some questions that came up following the Pánkyá of Kuvyon II on 14th January, 2022.

Pánkyá of Kuvyon II, 14th January, 2022

According to the Jukun tradition, the king (Aku) is regarded as a divine being and therefore, all rituals surrounding him, from his selection, coronation/installation and his transition to join his forefathers at the end of his rule are covered in top secret. For Meek (1931, p.339) notes that:

> It may be observed that all holders of offices, which are in anyway religious, are bound to observe secrecy as to other duties. If they disclosed, even to their friends, details of the duties required of them, it is believed that the rains would not fall and the corn would not ripen. On this account it is difficult to obtain anything like adequate information as to the precise functions of the innumerable officials.[44]

Thus, any ritual performed inside the enclosures are not to be discussed outside the enclosures. Therefore, the following account is a tentative effort to explain what is not usually spoken of at all by the Jukun.

According to Adamu, the strongest bond which links modern Jukun with their eventful past is the institution of the Aku-Uka, whom they regarded as a sole authority and an embodiment of their culture.[45] Thus, in spite of the influence of western culture on them, a typical Jukun man still relies on the political sagacity of the Aku-Uka as a unifying and stabilizing influence. This explains the large number of turnout of Jukun sons and daughters, during the

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40 See also Meek, C.K. *Sudanese Kingdom: An Ethnographical Study of Jukun-Speaking Peoples of Nigeria.* London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Ltd., 1931, Pp.142-164 & Adamu, A.D. *The Jukun and their King.* Jos: Plateau Publishing Company, 1983.

41 See the Chronology of Aku Uka in Angyu, B.A. *The Aku Uka: A Narrative for the Curious Minds.* Jalingo: De-Wisdom Innovative Press, Ltd, 2022, p.2.

42 The Jukun traditional transitional rites of the Aku Uka to join his ancestors.

43 The Jukun traditional selection, coronation/installation rites of a new Aku Uka.

44 Meek, C.K. *Sudanese Kingdom: An Ethnographical Study of Jukun-Speaking Peoples of Nigeria.* London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Ltd., 1931, p.339.

45 Adamu, A.D. *The Jukun and their King.* Jos: Plateau Publishing Company, 1983, p.5.

Pánkyá, the traditional transitional rites of Aku-Uka, Kuvyon II, to the world of his ancestors on 24th January, 2022.

To the typical Jukun man, the Aku-Uka is not an ordinary human being. He is regarded as the supreme incarnation of deity and never dies, but only transits to the world of his ancestors. Therefore, it is sacrilege to hear from the Jukun that "the king is dead", instead, the proclamation *"Ajingbanyin",* meaning the king has joined his ancestors.

As stated earlier, there was a falsehood with respect to the divine kingship of the Jukun by some European scholars and it became a controversy that nearly discredited or brought into ridicule the Jukun race in the eyes of the people of this country. This concerned the allegation that Aku-Uka must die at the expiration of between five to seven years on the throne.[46] However, Smith,[47] and Adamu,[48] further debunked the allegation, and Aku-Uka, Dr Shekarau Angyu Masa-Ibi (Kuvyon II) *CON*, the 24th Aku-Uka, survived on the throne for 45 years (1976 - 2021). However, it is important to note that taboos surrounding the seat of the Aku-Uka places his life in danger.[49]

Similarly, tradition demands that, whenever the Aku-Uka passes on to join his ancestors *(ajingbanyi)*, the news must be kept secret and, in fact, not revealed, until when all arrangements have been completed for his Pánkyá.
Smith has this to say:

> It was not until 1970 that death was publicly admitted by the tribal heads. It was secretly rumoured that death was occasioned by other than natural causes. In December, 1945, a Resident wrote, the cause of his death seems mysterious. He was in his usual robust health that morning… He was in the office when he appeared unwell and the District Officer advised him to go home and rest… His next public appearance was in early 1946 when, royally dressed and riding a horse… to the secret place of his final departure.[50]

Take note that the demise of the king was not publicized. However, in this modern time, with the availability of Information Communication Technology and other sophisticated devices, keeping secret such an important information has become almost impossible. Accordingly, a significant change was noticed in the event of October, 2021, when the news about the demise of Kuvyon II filtered out into public domain. This is modernization process at work. Smith earlier notes that:

> The Jukun Nigeria must keep pace with the changing world of which it is a part. The life of Aku is now a matter of more than casual interest to the nation as a

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46 Meek, C.K. *Sudanese Kingdom: An Ethnographical Study of Jukun-Speaking Peoples of Nigeria.* London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Ltd., 1931, p.164; Smith, E.H. *Nigerian Harvest.* Michigan: Baker Book House, 1972, p.127; & Adamu, A.D. *The Jukun and their King.* Jos: Plateau Publishing Company, 1983, p.11.

47 Smith, E.H. *Nigerian Harvest.* Michigan: Baker Book House, 1972, p.128.

48 Adamu, A.D. *The Jukun and their King.* Jos: Plateau Publishing Company, 1983, p.5.

49 Adamu, A.D. *The Jukun and their King.* Jos: Plateau Publishing Company, 1983, Pp.12-14.

50 Smith, E.H. *Nigerian Harvest.* Michigan: Baker Book House, 1972, Pp.127-128.

> whole. Therefore, the disappearance of such person from the national scene must raise questions to be answered.[51]

This is a justification of the fact that one basic characteristic of culture is dynamism. Culture is not static, but constantly undergoing changes, modifications and adjustments, either for better or for worse.[52] In the case under review, there was a modification about the news of the transition *(ajingbanyi*) of Kuvyon II to join his forefathers and other rituals that followed thereafter.

In the course of events that followed thereafter, and with final traditional transitional rites performed on 14th January, 2022, it became obvious that, despite modernity and modern government influence on people's ways of life, the Jukun still have grip of their tradition and culture through their strong bond with their king (Aku). To them, Kuvyon II was their source of national existence and unity, and so, had to accord him that profound respect as he journeyed to the world of the gods. Thus, they came out in their large numbers on 14th January, 2022, starting their procession from Wukari town to *Puje* to say good bye to Kuvyon II.

Puje is an important historical traditional site of the Jukun and serves different purposes. These purposes include social and religious festivals, *Pánkyá* and *Pankan* of Aku-Uka, and final burial rites of traditional title holders in the land, including *Nwutsi*.[53]

Categories of people and phases involved during Pánkyá

The determination of the category of people to be at *Puje* at a particular time is based on the type of ritual to be performed. During religious ceremonies and burial of traditional title holders, with the exception of Pánkyá, females are not allowed in the procession into *Puje.* However, during social festivals and installation ceremonies of Aku-Uka, both males and females are allowed in the procession into *Puje*.

The procession of people to *Puje* during the Pánkyá rites of the immediate departed Aku-Uka, Dr Shekarau Angyu Masa-Ibi, Kuvyon II, took place in two phases as follows:
Phase 1: The first group of people involved in the case of the Pánkyá of the 24th Aku-Uka were the *Káton Byene* from the Aku-Uka's Palace. These are household officials who are members of the royal enclosure and are responsible for the inner chamber of the king. Meek referred to them as the "Gentlemen of the bedchamber".[54] They left *Uka* for *Puje* in a single

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51 Smith, E.H. *Nigerian Harvest.* Michigan: Baker Book House, 1972, p.128.

52 Agbu, A.D. & Talla, S.N. The Nature of Puje Festival and Its Significance among the Jukun, 1800-2021.*Taraba Journal of Political Science and International Relations,* 2014, 1(2): 279.

53 See Meek, C.K. *Sudanese Kingdom: An Ethnographical Study of Jukun-Speaking Peoples of Nigeria.* London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Ltd., 1931; Adamu, A.D. *The Jukun and their King.* Jos: Plateau Publishing Company, 1983; Agbu, A.D. & Talla, S.N. The Nature of Puje Festival and Its Significance among the Jukun, 1800-2021. *Taraba Journal of Political Science and International Relations,* 2014, 1(2): 279 & Yamusa, G.A. *Clock of Justice*. Revised Edition, Nigeria: Blessed Ifeno & Sons (Nig) Ltd., 2017.

54 Meek, C.K. *Sudanese Kingdom: An Ethnographical Study of Jukun-Speaking Peoples of Nigeria.*London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Ltd., 1931, p.338.

file procession by 8am. They carried with them the sacred properties of the royal chamber, such as the Bupe, the instruments of royalty and power of the Aku. They were accompanied by the *"Akye",* able bodied young men dressed in loin clothes tied at the lower belly, carrying sticks and beating things they saw on the way, to clear the road of evil spirits and bad-minded persons and to protect the sacred apparatus of kingship.[55] This procession commenced by 8am from the palace, led by *Katon-Byene Acio* to *Puje*.

Phase 2: The second group to proceed were Kwarrarafa sons and daughters who came from all over the world; and other well-wishers all over Nigeria. At 10am, their journey started to *Puje* from Wukari. At *Puje*, the men sat differently from women. Traditional rulers from Taraba State and other States of Nigeria that were at *Puje* on that day included the Gara Donga (HRH, Amb. Sanvala Varzoa Shimbura, Gargbanyi II), Kuru Kona (HRH Augustine Njenmang, Venkani II), Gbong Gwom Jos (HRM Da Jacob Gyang Buba), and Long Gamai (HRH Miskoom Martin Maduutrie, Shaldas III), among others. The Taraba State top government functionaries present at *Puje* also included the SSG of TRSG, Hon Anthony Jellason, and Chief of Staff to the Executive Governor of Taraba State, Rt. Hon. Haruna Istifanus Gbana. All these categories of important dignitaries were at *Puje* to see Kuvyon II off to Nando. The presence of these personalities at the occasion represents their love and respect for Kuvyon II, who lived for 45 years on the throne of his forefathers, contributing to the development of not only his domain, but the State and the nation at large.[56]

Phases of the Pánkyá rituals at *Puje* and people involved.

Phase 1: While at *Puje*, as the people curiously awaited the coming out of the *Kuvyon II* from the royal enclosure, for them to say goodbye, as he journeyed to Nando, a rite was carried out in the enclosure. Even though it was not for the consumption of the people outside the enclosure, it is believed that the rite was similar to the one captured by Meek because of the sounds that were heard outside the enclosure. Meek notes that:

> About 2pm, a form of ritual is carried out, which is punctuated by sounds reminiscent of the response of a choir in a vestry. This ceremony lasts half an hour and after a further pause of twenty minutes, a special chant is beaten on a drum, while a fiddler strikes up the tune which normally signalizes the out-coming of the king from his palace.[57]

Phase 2: Immediately at 12 noon, the *Abon-Ziken* came out and addressed the crowd, thanking them for coming to see Kuvyon II off to Nando. Thereafter, by 12:45pm, the *Akye* came out of the enclosure to clear the way, the people went down on their knees, and as the

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55 Yamusa, G.A. *Clock of Justice*. Revised Edition, Nigeria: Blessed Ifeno & Sons (Nig) Ltd., 2017, Pp68-69.

56 See Agbu, D.A. & Zhema, S. Reflections on the Institution of Aku-Uka of Wukari since Independence, 1960-2019. Ashafa, A.M., Jatau, G. & Tor, A. (Eds.,) *Perspectives on Nigeria's Challenges in Nation Building,* Vol. II. Kaduna: Department of History, Kaduna State University, Kaduna, 2020, Pp.247-250.

57 Meek, C.K. *Sudanese Kingdom: An Ethnographical Study of Jukun-Speaking Peoples of Nigeria.* London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Ltd., 1931, p.171.

Káton Byene filed out with the royal sacred apparatuses for Kuvyon II to return them to the different places he was given during his coronation, behold, a section of the matting, at the northwest corner of the enclosure, was opened and an unsaddled horse emerged, ridden by a young man dressed in black gown, (this horseman was later to be known as Atobe Salla). Behind the horseman, also seated astride, was Aku Kuvyon II, dressed in his *Nyipo* and *Taba*. His head down to his neck was veiled with a black piece of cloth, likewise his arms, hands and legs. There was a white strip of cloth that held him to the horseman.[58]

Phase 3: The horseman on coming out of the enclosure turned the horse eastwards, then proceeded some paces north, then went westward and then headed southward. However, as he headed southward to start the journey to Nando, all the people busted into loud lamentation, some threw themselves on the ground and crying, saying; "Our Lord *(Achindoi),* Our Father *(Atai),* whither are you going? Return, oh return! In whose hands have you left us? Our corn, our beans and our nuts! He turned the horse and faced the people again. When he turned the horse again to go, a flutist started to play his flute, singing the praises and epithets of Aku, Kuvyon II, and calling on the names of all the other kings that had joined their ancestors before Kuvyon II, to welcome him as he was already on his way to meet them. He also requested the king (Kuvyon II) to salute the ancestors on behalf of the people of Wukari, and entire Jukun, when he arrives there.[59]

Phase 4: Immediately, the horseman wheeled the horse to go, the people busted into lamentation again, he stopped and the head of the women in the kingdom *(Nwutsi),* came and knelt down beside the horse, threw some dust on her chest, saying, "Are you going off thus and leaving us destitute of rain and corn"? At this juncture, the horseman collected some crops from the king's hand and discharged them to the *Nwutsi*, meaning, he had handed over the food crops, and with such a handover, the king had dismissed his people.

Phase 5: Immediately after the foregoing ritual, the horseman wheeled off, accompanied by *Batovin*, senior officials of the kingdom, with the *akye* at the front and at the rear of the procession, leading southwards to *Nando* through *Kuntsa* and *Bye-vyi*. While the procession of the king headed southwards to *Nando,* the people on the other hand started going back to Wukari from *Puje* hurriedly.

Post Nando Rituals

First ritual: Later in the day, the ritual of shaving of head was performed on traditional title holders, men, women, boys and girls. This is because there is the belief among the Jukun that the hair at that time was cursed.[60]

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58 See Meek, 1931, plate xvi; Smith, 1972, p.125 & Adamu, 1983, cover page for pictures of similar event.

59 See Meek, 1931, p.172 and Yamusa, 2017, p.109.

60 Yamusa, G.A. *Clock of Justice*. Revised Edition, Nigeria: Blessed Ifeno & Sons (Nig) Ltd., 2017, p.109.

Second ritual: In the evening, the widows of the Aku, in white loin cloths, were led to the eastern gate of Wukari by the *Nwutsi*, passing through the *Yaku-keji* enclosure, symbolizing sending off their husband. They stopped there for some few minutes and turned back to the palace with the youngest widow at the front of a single file. On reaching the palace, a rite of used during the Pánkyá were taken away from them and they were instructed to use their cleansing was carried out on them by the *Nwutsi* and other elderly women, the clothes they usual personal clothes. That means all was over from their own side of the tradition.[61]

Final ritual: To conclude the Pánkyá ritual, the procession of Kuvyon II proceeded to *Kuntsa*, where tradition demands that he (Aku) returns the traditional name conferred on him when he was crowned, and other sacred apparatuses given to him by *Kuntsa*.[62] There, they spent the night, after which the journey continued to *Bye-vyi*, where the *Kunvyi*, the traditional kingmaker, demanded the return of the *Bupe* given to the king when he was crowned. Thus, the *Bupe* was handed over to the *Kunvyi*, symbolizing the hand-over of the rain.

Finally, at *Bye-vyi*, all members of the entourage, except the *Kinda-Acio*, the horseman and the *Batovin* stopped. The later were to deliver it to the *Nando* people at the border between *Bye-vyi and Nando*, under the *Nanito.*

Revisiting some public misconceptions about the *Pánkyá* of *Kuvyon II*: It is important to say here that the Pánkyá of Kuvyon II, on 14th January, 2022, which was televised by Inferno TV and other media organisations raised several fundamental reactions that need to be cleared. Such reactions include the Pentecostals considering the event as barbaric and archaic, based on the allegation that the horseman and others must die in the course of the journey. For instance, Ochonu[63] notes that, instead of celebrating this beautifully passionate display of an ancient, traditional African funerary practice and its self-affirming and proud survival in the face of colonial and postcolonial pressure, I see derisive and dismissive contempt for the rites from the usual suspects. Not everyone was impressed because, the Pentecostal crowd was out in full force, condemning what it sees as demonic, cultic funeral rituals of the king's transition to the land of the ancestors.

Inland Town, an online media platform, even published that; "in Jukun tradition, the death of the king must be followed by the ritual suicide of the king's horseman as well as the king's wears, because the horseman's spirit is essential to helping the king's spirit ascend to the life after".[64] In fact, the talk of the day was the horseman going into the forest never to return. Thus, many critics hid their bigotry and contempt behind the image of the body of the Aku riding on a horse, tied to a man said to be the person, tradition demands, to accompany him

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61 Yamusa, G.A. *Clock of Justice*. Revised Edition, Nigeria: Blessed Ifeno & Sons (Nig) Ltd., 2017, p.110.

62 See Masa-Ibi, S.A. *Shekarau Angyu Masa-Ibi: An Autobiography of the 24th Aku-Uka.* NP: Able Productions, 2016, p.42.

63 Ochonu, M.E. 'The Aku-Uka's Funeral and Matters Arising'. *Business Day,* 22, January, 2022, @www.businessday.ng. Accessed on 13th February, 2022.

64 Inland Town. 'Aku-Uka: The Mysterious Funeral Rites of the Jukun People'. @www.inlandtown.com. Accessed on 13th January, 2022.

to his final resting place. This is a euphemism for the man possibly dying and transitioning with the king.[65]

The above reactions made Agbesele[66] to conclude that many are not conversant with the Jukun customs and traditions despite the fact that the Jukun happen to be the most mentioned and historically recorded ethnic nation in Nigeria. Therefore, a fundamental aspect of their culture, which has to do with their kingship, needs to be looked into. There is the need for deliberate literary and other works of the arts to make the Jukun customs and traditions, particularly, as they affect their kingship, memorable and appealing. Only few of such literary works exist, these include *"Sudanese Kingdom"* by Meek,[67] *"The Jukun and their King"* by Adamu,[68] and *"Clock of Justice"* by Yamusa.[69]

With respect to the horseman, investigation revealed that not only did Atobe return from this historic journey alive and strong,[70] but other previous horsemen before him, such as the horseman during the Pánkyá of Aku-Uka, Atoshi Agbunshu (Agbumanu IV), Aku-Uka, Abe Ali (Awudumanu II) and Aku-Uka, Adda Ali (Agbumanu V). The return of the horseman depended on several factors and decisions of the gods. That is why Ochonu states that in reality, many of the "Sacrificial" companions return home, spared by the gods. Only few do not. The idea is that if the gods wish, they could take the life of the king's living companion in the forest. Moreover, since culture is not static but dynamic, the Jukun culture has taken a dimension not to be considered barbaric and archaic.[71]

The benefits of the horseman is not monetary reward as speculated all over in the media, but achieving a heroic status, lionized and revered by all, and any who participates, does so enthusiastically. Thus, for one to be the horseman, it is considered a mark of great individual martial accomplishment and distinction to accompany the Aku-Uka on this great journey to *Nando.* It indicates that the person is a great warrior, a man with clean conscience and pure love for his people, and the gods are happy with him and the people.[72] Again, there is no specific family saddled with the responsibility of the horseman during Pánkyá of Aku-Uka as speculated. Selection of the person is done few days before the Pánkyá from the courageous able-bodied men that have traditional titles, after consulting the gods.[73]

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65 Ochonu, M.E. 'The Aku-Uka's Funeral and Matters Arising'. *Business Day,* 22, January, 2022, @www.businessday.ng. Accessed on 13th February, 2022.

66 Agbesele, A. 'African Literature and Passage of the Aku-Uka'. *Date Line,* 18, January, 2022, @www.dateline.ng. Accessed on 13th February, 2022.

67 Meek, C.K. *Sudanese Kingdom: An Ethnographical Study of Jukun-Speaking Peoples of Nigeria.* London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Ltd., 1931, p.171.

68 Adamu, A.D. *The Jukun and their King.* Jos: Plateau Publishing Company, 1983.

69 Yamusa, G.A. *Clock of Justice*. Revised Edition, Nigeria: Blessed Ifeno & Sons (Nig) Ltd., 2017.

70 See BBC. 'Wukari monarch death: Wetin happen to di horseman wey escort im deadi-bodi inside forest? BBC News Pidgin, 17, January, 2022 @www.bbc.com/pidgin. Accessed on 13th February, 2022.

71 Ochonu, M.E. 'The Aku-Uka's Funeral and Matters Arising'. *Business Day,* 22, January, 2022, @www.businessday.ng. Accessed on 13th February, 2022.

72 Ochonu, M.E. 'The Aku-Uka's Funeral and Matters Arising'. *Business Day,* 22, January, 2022,@www.businessday.ng. Accessed on 13th February, 2022.

73 BBC. 'Wukari monarch death: Horseman wey ride wit deadi-bodi of the late king to nando forest tok about im experience'. BBC News Pidgin, 19, January, 2022 @www.bbc.com/pidgin. Accessed on 13th February, 2022.

From the foregoing, it is important to note that in many Nigerian societies, kings are not buried because they are considered not to be mere mortals. What remains of their bodies is usually known to only few, the idea being that as representatives of some spirit beings, their transition takes different forms from that of ordinary mortals.[74] Therefore, as with every tradition, the mystery of Jukun divine kingship is an essential element, and trying to rationally explain or understand every aspect of it, using the empirical logic of verifiability is misguided.[75]

However, the world must know that the Jukun have a tradition of divine kingship with a beautiful and historic funerary practice which accord respect and honour to the sacred throne of the great Aku-Uka. This constrains Ochonu to assert that:

> It is possible to express one's discomfort with some aspects of the funerary rites without condemning a beautiful, resilient religion, an excellent kingship institution or the legacy of an ancient glorious kingdom.[76]

Conclusion

The Jukun were one of the ethnic nations in Nigeria that observed a centralized political organization which centred on their king, the Aku before contact with the Europeans or external influences. The political system was referred to as 'theocracy'. They observed their traditional and cultural practices very religiously, especially the aspects that involved the life and departure of their king.

Unfortunately, with the coming of the Europeans and westernization, a falsehood or controversy about their king emerged, which almost discredited and brought into ridicule the Jukun in the eyes of the people of Nigeria. Prominent among such falsehood was the claim that their king (Aku) must die after 5 to 7 years on the throne. However, findings from investigations, and evidence from the reign of the immediate departed Aku-Uka, have invalidated the falsehood.

Even though the daily life and transition of the Jukun king is covered in top secret, which brought about reactions from across the world during the Pánkyá (the traditional transitional rites of the Jukun king) on 14th January, 2022, this article, in a way, elucidated that some particular aspects of the Jukun trado-cultural practices are being held unto, though with some modifications, despite effects of foreign religions and westernization on them. For instance, it is obvious and very clear that the Jukun people (males, females, children and adults; Christians, Muslims and Traditionalists) still have strong respect for their king, the Aku-Uka. Invariably, they are always ready to demonstrate it at all times, not minding what the world may feel about them. This, they displayed on 14th January, 2022, when they came out

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74 Agbesele, A. 'African Literature and Passage of the Aku-Uka'. *Date Line,* 18, January, 2022, @www.dateline.ng. Accessed on 13th February, 2022.

75 Ochonu, M.E. 'The Aku-Uka's Funeral and Matters Arising'. *Business Day,* 22, January, 2022, @www.businessday.ng. Accessed on 13th February, 2022.

76 Ochonu, M.E. 'The Aku-Uka's Funeral and Matters Arising'. *Business Day,* 22, January, 2022, @www.businessday.ng. Accessed on 13th February, 2022.

in their large numbers to bid their king, Kuvyon II, farewell on his departure to the land of the ancestors.

The speculations about the horseman, that he must die in the forest is false because, from all indications, the horseman returned very strong from the journey. This should put to rest the alleged concept of barbarism seemingly associated with the *Pánkyá* rite in the Jukun tradition. Unarguably, the Jukun have a rich history, tradition and culture, and despite all factors, they have sustained their history, tradition and culture, and are gradually adjusting some to go with the time.

Puje is the Jukun traditional site which serves several purposes. Prominent among such purposes are socio-political and religious festivals. For instance, it serves as the final venue for the *Pânkán* and *Pánkyá* of Aku-Uka and the final burial ceremonies of other traditional title holders in the land.

Depending on which event taking place, the people to attend are determined. In some, mostly religious ceremonies and burials, women and children are not allowed to go to *Puje.* However, during social festivals and coronation/installation or transition of Aku-Uka, women and children are allowed.

It is also learnt that the Jukun use land not only for farming, but for other socio-cultural activities. For instance, the land space between *Puje* to *Kuntsa* to *Bye-vyi* is a large thick forest that is left uncultivated specifically for the socio-cultural, religious and political purposes it is reserved for.

Finally, there is need for Jukun scholars and artists to document Jukun history, traditions and culture as a way of creating awareness and projecting the people's culture. Thus the need for literary and art works on Jukun culture.

'HUMANITY' ABOVE ALL: COMPLEMENTARY AND CONTESTED APPROACHES IN HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION BY NON-STATE ACTORS IN POST-INDEPENDENCE AFRICA

BY

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Abstract

Post-independence Africa constitute a fertile ground for complex internecine conflicts. These conflicts have as attendant corollaries, exceeding humanitarian deprivations especially, basic food shortages, shelter and health crisis, and immense levels of human rights abuses. These humanitarian outrages stimulate concerted efforts from state, inter-governmental actors like the United Nations (U.N) through its specialised agencies and organisations with supra-national special mandates like the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Complementing the governmental humanitarian support system is the role played by non-state actors (armed, international, local, secular or faith-based) which in diverse ways became key players in the international humanitarian multi-centric system. The presence and role of the non-state actors in the humanitarian playground has not maintained a consistent character with the rules of international humanitarian law. It is centrally in this perspective that the study analysed the historical trajectories that the constellation of non-state actors provided in humanitarian interventions and assesses the extent to which such engagements respected the *Dunantian* principles of neutrality, impartiality, humanitarian service and independence. It concludes that the contributions of non-state actors vacillated between complementarity and contestation between the armed non-state and civil NGOs on the one hand and with the principal state actors on the other hand, in salvaging humanitarian concerns. The study recommends that in conflict /disaster situations, the key players notably; state and non-state interest groups, should always put humanitarian concerns above all other egocentric considerations. In the same vein, humanitarian ambassadors, especially NGOs, to gain sustainable credibility, should endeavor to maintain the international rules of neutrality, impartiality and independence in their missions to save humanity. Alternatively, where they are faced with difficult

choices, they should become influential diplomats capable of persuading protagonists and antagonists on the need to save lives irrespective of where the victims belong in the crisis divide. This requires dynamic strategic training programmes for field practitioners tailored to meet specific crisis contexts.

Key words: Africa, approach, complementary, contested, history, humanitarian, intervention, Non-State Actor

Introduction

In recent years humanitarian assistance offered in circumstances of conflict and disaster by donor governments, international organisations like the United Nations (UN), and particularly, nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) has been very helpful in alleviating the plights of even millions of persons trapped in such situations. The provision of food and medical supplies to refugees, displaced persons, and those near the battlefields in bellicose and crisis settings like Somalia, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mozambique, Angola, Liberia, Sudan, and elsewhere constitutes one of the most heroic and life-preserving activities of our time.[77] The history of humanitarian actions in Africa is typical of Fernand Braudel's *longue duree or* plural historical time order in historical narrative. [78] This is because humanitarianism predates the era of African emancipation from colonial and nominal European rule. Briefly, it foregrounds the age of African independence and post-independence management of the concept of sovereignty. It is in this perspective that the paper examines the interactions between actors intervening in the management of humanitarian crises in Africa and argues that their engagements oscillates between complementarity and rivalry.

More than often attention in such considerations is usually narrowly restricted to experts in political science, legal scholarship, international relations scientists, conflict and peace analysts and geo-political strategists. Important and indispensable as these context-relevant connoisseurs are concerned in debriefing and building sustainable recommendations on the role of humanitarian actions and interventions in conflict/disaster ridden settings on the African continent, the role of history and the historian is becoming more and more germane and urgent. A stronger engagement with history will help those that make up the humanitarian multicentric system to more accurately perceive its origins and appreciate the dynamics in a broader global perspective.[79]

The paper foregrounded with an introduction and rounding off with a conclusion is structured in three interlinking parts. Part one situates the historical context and conceptual clarification of humanitarian actions and interventions while the second part examines the phases and involvement of non-state actors in the humanitarian system in Africa. The study closes up

[77] David R. Smock, "Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict in Africa," *Peacework* no.6, United States Institute of Peace, 1996, p.1.

[78] Dale Tomich, "The Order of Historical Time: The Longue Durée and Micro-History," *Almanack. Guarulhos*, n.02, 2º *semestre* de 2011, pp.52-65.

[79] Eleanor, Davey; John, Borton and Mattew, Foley, "A History of the Humanitarian system : Western origins and foundations", *Humanitarian Policy Group Working Paper*, 2013. p .1.

with a critical analysis of the role of civil non-state actors on the African humanitarian playground.

I- Context and Conceptualization of humanitarian actions/interventions

A-The Western Preponderant standpoint of humanitarian action

There is a long term debate on the origins of humanitarian action in conflict settings in the world. More than often parallels of humanitarianism are likened to efforts made by European states and non-state actors to alleviate the plights of people affected by dehumanising practices, wars or natural disasters. In Great Britain, from the 18th c, the fight to have the slave trade proscribed and then slavery entirely abolished at the turn of the next century was based at that very period on quasi non-governmental networks and structures.[80] The presence of abolitionists' movement as far off as the coast of West Africa and the stationing of British Naval squadron at the Man-O-War Bay at the coast of Cameroon was somehow rooted on humanitarian consideration.

In the same line, the founding of the International Committee of Red Cross/Crescent (ICRC) in 1863 by Henry Dunant, the initiative of Florence Nightingale in the course of the Crimean war (1854-65) to nurse the wounds of British soldiers and reduce mortality among the combatants initiated humanitarian actions. Likewise, the founding of the St John Ambulance Association (1887), [81] and development of charitable organsations like Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (OXFAM) in the United Kingdom to address famine extended the endeavor. The proliferation of faith-based Catholic benevolent institutions like *Caritas Internationalis* and charitable protestant communities like the Quakers in England revolutionised the humanitarian chain. The growth of selfless agencies like Save the Children that emerged in 1919 to oppose the maintenance of the Allied blockade against West Germany after the Armistice,[82] and the medical missions dispatched to colonial Africa to eradicate epidemics like Sleeping Sickness, visibly placed Europe at the center of humanitarian consideration. Coupled with these actions, Europe through initiatives like the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field (1864), and the Hague Conventions (1899 and 1907), which likewise aimed to minimise the impact of war was, inspired by humanitarianism.[83]

Furthermore, colonial propaganda in countries such as France, Belgium and the Netherlands both before and after 1945, with its emphasis on the iconic figures of the doctor fighting major epidemics and the missionary working to promote health and education, helped paradoxically to arouse public awareness of the broader issues of human deprivations in Africa. The ground was thus prepared for the concept of structured humanitarian

[80] Philippe Ryfman, "Non-governmental Organizations: An indispensable player of humanitarian aid, *International Review of the Red Cross*, Volume 89 Number 865, March 2007, p.24.
[81] Davey, Borton and Foley, " A History of Humanitarian System". p 6.
[82] Ryfman, "Non-governmental Organizations." p.24.
[83] Davey, Borton and Foley, " A History of Humanitarian System". p 6.

development aid to give rise to an array of NGOs from the 1950s and 1960s.[84] This development was largely influenced by international politics around the First and Second World Wars (1914-1918 & 1939-1945) and the post second world war (Cold war) theatre that enflamed several conflicts especially in Africa. The first row of humanitarian reforms came with the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, which regulated the end of the First World War and instigated the creation of international organisations to address humanitarian issues.[85] After the Second World War, Barnett as cited by Davey et al., note that, the proliferation of agencies was especially striking: in addition to organisations established during the war, nearly 200 NGOs were created between 1945 and 1949, most of them formed in the United States. Meanwhile, the main beneficiaries of humanitarian action shifted from being Europeans in need to all peoples in need, the world over.[86] In the absence of any contradictory findings on the origins of humanitarian actions, the European roots could best serve as the model that gained popularity on the African conflict/disaster history. This is somehow justified in the report of the Humanitarian Policy Group that mentions that:

> … the development of the international humanitarian system as we know it today can be located both geographically and temporally. Its origins are in the Western and especially European experience of war and natural disaster, yet it is now active across the world in a range of operations: responding to needs in situations of conflict or natural disasters, supporting displaced populations in acute and protracted crises, risk reduction and preparedness, early recovery, livelihoods support, conflict resolution and peace-building.[87]

This conclusion in spite of its convincing character is uncritical. It leaves the African continent in the sidelines of humanitarian intervention discourse. It is worthy to note that each global society had ways of protecting humanity in instances of conflicts or in providing altruistic support to victims of conflicts and/or disasters. Indigenous African societies, of course were no exception to these classic human considerations. They were imbued with deep-seated aspects of humanism that made them epicenters of the world's humanitarian civilisation.

B-Indigenous African humanitarian initiatives in conflict settings

The rules governing the waging of war, capitulation and surrender, the end of hostilities, reprisals, peace treaties, and the fate of prisoners were numerous across ethnic communities in Africa. There were also common protocols related to humanitarian care. The treatment of persons in times of war according to their role before and after hostilities like special envoys, mediators, priests, magicians, medicine men were well regarded. The rules ensuring the protection of sites and property that either had symbolic values such as burial grounds, sacred forests and resources of vital importance like water sources, crops and cattle were carefully treasured in conflict settings.[88] Also, physical conditions relating to (women, children, the

[84] Ryfman, "Non-governmental Organizations." p.24.

[85] Davey, Borton and Foley, "A History of Humanitarian System". p 6.

[86] Ibid.10.

[87] Ibid. p.1.

[88] Mutoy, Mubiala, "AfricanStates and the Promotion of Humanitarian Principles*", International Review of the Red Cross,* Volume 29, Issue 269, April, 1989, p.96.

elderly, the disabled and sick were considered. Women, rightly considered as the "cradle" of African society, and children, regarded as inherently innocent, were entitled to special protection in times of war.[89]

While specific rules existed to protect non-combatants, there were others, equally strict, which combatants had to observe. This constituted a sort of law of war limiting the injury which could be inflicted. In Senegal, writes Diallo, "there was a genuine ethics of war which was taught to any young nobleman for his future calling as a warrior. He was taught never to kill an enemy on the ground..." [90]War could be declared only after negotiations had been undertaken and had failed and, in many regions, only by the King or Chief and in solemn form. Bello cites the example of the Kabaka of Buganda. It was, moreover, an established rule that emissaries who declared war were inviolable and protected by a sort of diplomatic immunity.[91]

Among East African peoples, tradition prohibited the use of dangerous weapons against adversaries from the same ethnic group as well as the use of arrows and poisoned spears. Sages taught "brothers not to kill each other". Furthermore, ambushes were allowed only under specific circumstances. [92]As in other ancient civilizations, the problem of compensation for damages arose at the close of hostilities. Traditionally, the chiefs of the belligerent parties met in the presence of a member of a neutral group to settle the matter by payment in cash or kind.[93] The African form of humanitarian initiatives, interesting as it is, is self-limiting in different ways. It does not quickly translate or merge into the global humanitarian system that gestated from Europe and became internationalised with globalising conventions.

C: Conceptual Clarification

One of the most complex expressions in international humanitarian diplomacy is the term intervention. It has been a long established concept in conflict studies and embodies nuances in international law that needs to be better positioned to address humanitarian related issues developing from crises circumstances. The general notion of intervention is derived from the Latin verb *intervenere*, meaning to 'step between', 'to disrupt' or 'to interfere.[94] Stepping between, disrupting or interfering brings into play the political space (the state and notion of sovereignty) to be affected. It also suggests the issue of consent in cases of humanitarian intervention and more importantly the mode and motivations of intervention. The ambiguity that goes with the questions raised confirms Kindiki's[95] remark that humanitarian intervention is "twilight area' where power, self-interest, international law and morality meet as constitutive elements of the international system."Humanitarian intervention differs from

[89] Ndam Njoya, A., "La conception africaine", in Les *dimensions internationales du droit humanitaire,*,Paris, Geneva, *Unesco/Pedone/Institut Henry Dunant,* 1986, p. 24.

[90] Y. Diallo, " African traditions and humanitarian law, II," Geneva, ICRC, 1978, pp. 4-5.

[91] E. Bello, "African customary humanitarian law," Geneva, Oyez Publishing Ltd./ICRC, 1980, p. 19.

[92] Y. Diallo, " African traditions and humanitarian law, II," Geneva, ICRC, 1978, pp. 4-5.

[93] Ndam Njoya, A., "La conception africaine", p.25.

[94]Kithure Kindiki, *Humanitarian Intervention And State Sovereignty In Africa: The changing paradigms in International Law*, Eldoret Kenya ,Moi University Press, 2003, p.2.

[95] Ibid.,p.3.

related concepts, such as 'humanitarian action', 'humanitarian operations' or 'humanitarian assistance'. Humanitarian action or operations reflect a whole spectrum of humanitarian responses to conflict and crisis situations, and many of those responses may not necessarily involve the use of force. Humanitarian assistance on its part is the act of providing aid to the government or population of a state, in order to alleviate human suffering. The assistance may be in the form of famine relief, disaster relief, and sanctuary of refugees or providing for the population's needs for food, shelter and healthcare.[96]

II-Phases and involvement of armed non-state actors in humanitarian actions in Africa

A-Phases of humanitarian driven conflicts in Africa

Monono circumscribes four main phases of the involvement of non-state actors in conflicts on the African continent: The period of wars of liberation, between 1955 and 1976, with the emergence of armed non-state groups in Algeria, Kenya, Cameroon, the Portuguese territories of Angola, Cape Verde and Mozambique, and the French territories of Djibouti. Some few exceptions of this time scope were the wars in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa which went on to the 1980s and 1990s. Most of these armed groups were recognized liberation movements inspired and led by ''freedom fighters'', and their members, if captured, had the status of Prisoners of War (POW). [97]

The second period, between 1977 and 1992 was that of ideological wars. It was influenced largely by the cold war politics and waged in Angola, Mozambique, Zaire (now DRC), Uganda and the Horn of Africa. The period of secessionist wars, which came in two waves first in the 1960s, with the Katangese and Biafran secessions in the Congo and Nigeria respectively, and later in the 1980s, with the wars of Eritrea and Ogaden against Ethiopia, as well as of Southern Sudan against the Republic of Sudan. The period of identity-related conflicts, which were complementary to most post-cold war armed conflicts in Africa abound in the Horn of Africa, the Great Lakes region and West Africa. This period stretched between 1992 and 2005, and was marked by the end of the cold war, the demise of apartheid and the decolonization of Namibia,. It ushered novel types of identity-based armed conflicts in Africa fought by new types of non-state actors, mostly ethnic militias. These included; the Mai Mai (DRC), Interhamwe (Rwanda), Kamajors (Sierra Leone) and Janjaweed (Darfur, Sudan).

B-Armed Non-State Groups: Antagonists but informal Humanitarian conduits

One of the most prominent non-state actors that remain conspicuous in the African continent are non-state armed groups or constituted militias. They are usually antagonists with controversial postures in the conflict setting. Most of these armed groups went under the cover of liberation movements inspired and led by 'freedom fighters.' Their members, if captured, had the status of Prisoner of War (POW). These groups in spite of their determination to overturn the political *status quo* by coercion were not altogether intolerant

[96] Ibid., pp. 5.-6.

[97] Churchill, Ewumbue, Monono, "Respect for international humanitarian law by armed non-state actors in Africa," *International Review of the Red Cross*, Volume 88 Number 864 December 2006., p, 905. (905-924).

to facilitating humanitarian actions. Monono graphically provides the different ways by which non-state armed groups were implicated in the conflict or post conflict humanitarian multi-centric system. Most of the groups made unilateral declarations as well as consented on methods of conducting conflicts, types of arms and weapons to be used in hostilities, incorporation of international humanitarian law in ceasefire agreements and recognition of humanitarian agencies.

In keeping with Unilateral Declarations, a host of African Liberation movements made unilateral pronouncements that articulated safe havens for civilians and non-belligerent groups. For instance: Declaration of 23 May 1968 in Kampala by the rebel Biafran authorities, pledging to respect civilian populations and to give the ICRC facilities for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and organise the exchange of POW through the ICRC . Also the SWAPO Declaration of 15 July 1981, signed in Geneva by its president, Sam Nujoma, stated inter alia that:

> It is the conviction of SWAPO that fundamental rules protecting the dignity of all human beings must be upheld at all times. Therefore, and purely for humanitarian reasons, SWAPO declares hereby that in the conduct of the struggle for self-determination, it intends to respect and be guided by the rules of the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the protection of the victims of armed conflicts and the 1977 additional Protocol relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I).[98]

Apart from these formal declarations, many liberation movements also made a number of statements of commitments to respect the International Humanitarian Law (IHL). For example the statements of commitment of December 1975 by the Ethiopian liberation movements such as the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saugua el Hamra and Rio de Oro (POLISARIO) in Western Sahara to respect IHL.[99]

Concerning the method of conducting wars, special agreements between armed non-state entities and state parties or the ICRC were commonly used to ensure compliance with IHL. In the 1960–4 Congo crisis, for example the ICRC made special agreements with the rebels in the Katanga and Orientale Provinces for the exchange of UN soldiers against Katangese gendarmes in March 1961, January 1962 and May 1963. On 18 September 1964, ICRC again, the launched an appeal to ''all exercising authority in Congo to respect POW and non-combatants and comply with the prohibition on hostage-taking and bombarding of civilian targets. Such compromises were also characteristic of the Algerian Civil war from 1958-62 and Nigerian (Biafran Civil war of 1967-1971).

Besides these humanitarian overtures, the armed non-state groups, in keeping with international humanitarian law contracted and respected ceasefire agreements and gave recognition and safe operation passports for relief agencies to execute their actions. These agreements *inter alia* had to provide safe corridors for humanitarian assistance, reasonable

[98] Monono, "Respect for international humanitarian law,"p.909.
[99] Ibid.

handling of POW and adherence of general aspects of international humanitarian law. There were several of such ceasefire agreements notably; Cotonou Agreement on Liberia of 25 July 1993, the ceasefire agreement in Abuja of 1 November 1998 between the Government of Guinea Bissau and the self-proclaimed military junta; the 7 July 1999 Lusaka ceasefire agreement on the DRC, where the warring parties resolved to respect the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 1977''; and the ceasefire agreement on Liberia in 2003, where the parties pledged to ''respect as well as encourage the Liberian populace also to respect the principles and rules of international humanitarian law in post-conflict Liberia''.[100]

In consonance with providing a safe corridor and recognition of international non-governmental organisations to provide humanitarian care, two examples of such actions are illustrative. The Kinihira agreement of 30 May 1993 between the Government of Rwanda and the rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which stipulated that in matters related to aid distribution ''the ICRC position on each individual shall be final''; the 4 August 1993 Arusha Peace Agreement on Rwanda, providing for the mandatory protection of the expatriate community and the security of contributors of humanitarian assistance such as the ICRC; the Lome´ ceasefire agreement of 18 May 1999 between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front/ Sierra Leone (RUF/ SL) on the release of prisoners of war and non-combatants through a committee ''chaired by the UN Chief Military Observer in Sierra Leone and comprising representatives of the ICRC, UNICEF, and other relevant UN agencies and NGOs''[101]

The acceptance and diplomatic encounter between the armed groups and the international NGOS especially the ICRC had an enduring impact on the non-state belligerents and to humanitarian efforts as a whole. In 1975, the ICRC provided African liberation movements with relief supplies to a total value of 172,800 Swiss francs. The application of humanitarian principles by most armed non-state actors in African conflicts also led them to create humanitarian agencies. In Algeria the *Front de libération nationale (*FLN) set up the Algerian Red Crescent Society in 1956. In Eritrea, the armed Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) also had humanitarian agencies such as the Eritrean Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (ERRA) and the Eritrean Red Cross and Red Crescent Society (ERCCS). In Sudan, the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM) created the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA) and Operation Save Innocent Lives (OSIL). Most of these ''liberation humanitarian organisations'' created by non-state actors helped considerably in the drafting and application of humanitarian principles in African armed conflicts.[102] Suffice to remark that in the 1960s and 1970s many liberation movements were recognized as observers within the OAU and as such participated in some international fora

[100] Monono, "Respect for international humanitarian law," pp. 915-916.

[101] Churchill Ewumbue-Monono and Carlo Von Flue, ''Promotion of international humanitarian law through cooperation between the ICRC and the African Union'', *International Review of the Red Cross*, Vol. 85, no. 852, December 2003, p. 757.

[102] Monono, "Respect for international humanitarian law,", p. 918-919.

on the development of IHL, such as the Diplomatic Conference on International Humanitarian Law in 1974–1977.[103]

The actions taken by armed non-state actors in humanitarian relief missions as projected were also attempts at justifying relevance in their respective national or trans-national political playground. It was also a strategy to gain importance and solidarity from the international community. Away from these primary objectives, the actions of armed non-state groups to some extent compounded actions to protect human concerns in war prone settings in Africa. Some of the armed non-state groups hardly lived up to their engagements of providing safe havens for relief operations. In the 1990s, for instance, the ICRC's attempts to broker a special agreement between the Mozambican Government and Mozambique National Resistance Movement (RENAMO) to set up a neutral ''combat-free zone'' humanitarian corridor, the ''Tete Corridor'', on the Mozambique–Malawi border failed because of security considerations. In the same vein, some of the armed groups stifled the return to normalcy because they maintained instances of human rights abuses and used relief assistance to sustain their war programmes. More so, post-independence non-state armed groups were not usually present on fora that were dedicated to discuss the respect for IHL.

[104] In most cases, the armed militias played the gatekeeper role in controlling the flow of general logistics (food, medications, equipment, vehicles and other supplies) to assist conflict or disaster trapped population. A classic example was in April 1996 during the Liberian civil war when several warlords in Monrovia intercepted and seized 322 cars from the United Nations, 167 from other NGOs together with computers, other precious equipment, food, clothing and medical supplies.[105]

III- Civil Non-governmental organizations in the humanitarian playground

A-Spectrum of civil non-state actors in the African humanitarian sphere

According to the Yearbook of International Organizations, there were about 26,000 international NGOs by the year 2000, compared with 6,000 in 1990.[106] The US alone has about 2 million NGOs, 70% of which are more than 30 years old. This ambiguity of what constitutes non-state actors persists in the literature on security, civil society and development. The most vivid distinction in the literature is between armed non-state actors waging wars and unarmed non-state actors working as civil society organisations. While the notion of armed non-state actors is well developed, there are critical gaps in conceptualizing civil (i.e. unarmed) non-state actors. Civil non-state actors in peacekeeping and peacebuilding have been largely reduced to international NGOs. [107] In spite of this generalisation, Bah Identifies three categories of civil non state actors; international NGOs,

[103] Ibid. p. 922.

[104] Ibid.

[105] Johannes Muntschick, "The 'Great War' in Liberia as classic Example for Persistent Armed Conflicts and War-Economies in Africa" *Colombia.Intercional.* no.67 Bogotá Jun./June 2008.

[106] Elizabeth Ferris, "Faith-based and secular humanitarian organizations," ,*International Review of the Red Cross*, Volume 87 Number 858, June 2005, 312.

[107] Abu, Bakarr, Bar, "Civil Non-State Actors in Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding in West Africa," *Journal of International Peacekeeping* 17, (2013), p.317.

community-based NGOs, and ad hoc community organisations. There were myriads of these organisations in Africa. Sierra Leone, Liberia and Cote Ivoire for instance, counted well over 630 NGOs.[108]

International NGOs are transnational corporate civil society organisations with clearly defined missions, well [structured management] which in most cases aimed at enhancing human security and human development. The defining features of these kinds of civil non-state actors are their transnational and corporate characters. As Krishna Kumar cited by Bah[109] notes, corporate NGOs have 'large annual budgets, and managerial practices that are closer to corporations than to voluntary organisations**.** Starling examples of these NGOs are the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) that commands a special edict in IHL, OXFAM, Save the Children Fund, *Médecins Sans Frontières* (MSF-Doctors without Borders), *Caritas Internationalis* (the official aid agency of the Catholic Church) and the Protestant World Council of Churches (WCC). In the realm of International humanitarian efforts, NGO actors could be quickly distinguished between charitable non-faith and faith-based organisations. The non-faith-based institutions were championed by NGOs like ICRC, Oxfam, Doctors without borders and CARE while faith-based structures included Caritas Internationalis and Protestant World Council of Churches. These two categories of agencies although tensioned by the secular and religious viewpoints of humanitarianism converged their actions to ameliorate the conditions of humanity affected by internecine conflicts.

Hilton provides different perspectives from which charitable organizations and NGOs could be judged. For donors, they were itineraries through which liberal internationalist sympathies could be directed. For aid workers, they became a new way to realise age-old desires to be doing something constructively and immediately. For late colonial officials, they were the agents that would step in where the state retreated, providing vital lessons in self-help for the future leaders of the country. For newly independent governments, they were both suppliers of Western funds and props to impoverished social service departments. For those missionaries and imperialists who stayed on, they were a means to give something back to the country they had come to love, and a channel through which older forms of colonial knowledge, expertise, and belief could be utilized.[110]

B-Assessing the actions of civil non state actors on the African humanitarian front

For the most part the international NGOs worked in complementarity respecting in principle the pledge of impartiality and neutrality in the provision of their actions. This was evident from the beginning of the Biafra crisis (1967-1971)[111] where British and Irish NGOs

[108] Ibid.

[109] Ibid.

[110] Matthew Hilton **"**Charity and the End of Empire: British Non-Governmental Organizations, Africa, and International Development in the 1960s." *American Historical Review*. April, 2018: 493-517.

[111] Biafra marked a series of beginnings for humanitarianism. It was the first televised famine, the West's first major response to disaster in independent Africa and the first time that the international nongovernmental sector significantly shaped the agenda of disaster relief. See Kevin O'Sullivan, "Biafra's legacy: NGO humanitarianism and the Nigerian civil war" in Christina Bennett, Matthew Foley and Hanna B. Krebs, eds.

attempted to elevate their actions beyond the politics of the conflict. Christian Aid, for example, made it clear that they were unconcerned with the military and political issues of the war and were more focused on relieving suffering on both sides, as equally as possible.' Oxfam, for its part, formally informed its beneficiaries that it was more preoccupied with humanity.[112] This position was also maintained in Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa though with challenges to respect neutrality and solidarity between the government of Ethiopia and cross-border rebel dissident groups operating from Sudan. But there was still a sense in which Oxfam's relationship with the Ethiopian government was stronger than with the rebels for strategic motives. This made it difficult to claim strict neutrality and impartiality but prudence was shaped around a neutrality principle where: "Staff in Addis Ababa could not deny that the cross-border operations saved lives, nor could cross-border managers deny that Oxfam's work in government areas also saved lives. This led to a tolerable stand-off that could be called 'neutrality".[113]

By the mid-1980s Oxfam had effectively adopted a position of close solidarity with black Africans against apartheid and open support for the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa; Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) and RENAMO. This was in the conviction that: "the apartheid system was a fundamental affront to humanity and the primary cause of poverty, humanitarian suffering and violence' among those Black African liberation movements. In the Biafra war Oxfam provided large food aid through the rebel zones and regretted that it only went on to embolden the secessionist movement to sustain the war. In 1994, Oxfam and others also provided massive humanitarian aid to the perpetrators of the Rwanda genocide after they fled to Zaire in 1994, aid workers felt uneasy with principles that allowed the *génocidaires* to use aid to dominate the relief camps, regroup and continue their violence.[114] These examples constitute some of the contractions (intended or unintended) of non-state actors in the humanitarian support system.

There were however, occasions were the African States caged in their maxim of sovereignty felt offended by some NGO actions. This was aptly the case of the Biafran Civil war (1967-1971) where suspicion of a broadly pro-Biafra sympathies prevalent in Ireland – the Nigerian Federal Government proscribed the activities of Africa *Concern* and the *Holy Ghost Order* from the country immediately after the end of the war.[115] This also came at a time when shortly after an ICRC relief plane was blown down in 1969 by Nigerian Federal Forces on grounds that it was colluding with the Biafra secessionist revolution. Thereafter, Biafra was solely dependent on supplies carried at night by unlit Joint Church Aid flights and NGO-chartered aircraft. Of the 7,800 flights into Biafra, 5,310 were operated by Joint Church Aid, which transported 66,000 tonnes of relief supplies. The Biafra war, all accounts agree, was of huge consequence: 'a formative experience in contemporary humanitarianism'; 'a test

Learning from the past to shape the future: Lessons from the history of humanitarian action in Africa, Humanitarian Policy Group, 2016, 11.

[112]Kevin O'Sullivan, "Biafra's legacy: NGO humanitarianism and the Nigerian civil war," p. 10.

[113] Tony Vaux , "Humanitarian involvement in wars of liberation in Africa in the 1980s: an Oxfam perspective", in Bennett, Foley and Krebs, eds. *Learning from the past to shape the future: Lessons,* p.64.

[114] Tony Vaux , "Humanitarian involvement in wars of liberation in Africa in the 1980s," pp. 66-67.

[115]Ibid.p.10.

case and a turning point for international humanitarian assistance'; 'opening a new chapter in humanitarian action'. 'Everyone is in agreement that modern humanitarian action in Africa was born in Biafra'. It was crucial in the formation of at least two NGOs: Concern and *Médecins sans Frontières*.[116]

The NGOs were also actively present in the domain of health provisioning. When sleeping sickness for example resurged to its second peak of over 30,000 annual cases during the civil wars in Central Africa in the late 1990s, medical humanitarian organisations, particularly *Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF*), were the only actors with sufficient interest and means to re-engage with the disease. [117] In the same connection, in Southern Sudan by 1978, sleeping sickness in Yambio had become so acute, with the World Health Organisation (WHO) seeming unable to mount a commensurate response. An international NGO working in Yambio, *Caritas*, for example, had been reporting cases to the WHO since 1973. In the absence of the promised UN intervention, *Caritas* had resorted to borrowing sleeping sickness equipment and drugs from the Belgian Development Cooperation (BDC)'s bilateral programme in neighbouring Zaire. Belgian scientists brought in from Zaire were uncomfortable with the WHO's response, estimating that the delay had cost 3,000 new infections at a price of $1.2 million, which the Belgian government now had to fund.[118] From 1986, MSF began to lead its own sleeping sickness interventions for displaced Southern Sudanese in Uganda. Eventually MSF engaged in a large global research and advocacy programme around medical innovations for sleeping sickness. *Médecins Sans Frontières* in this endeavor was greatly influenced by the works of Dr. Eugen Jamot who had made break-throughs in the mitigation of sleeping sickness in tropical Africa, especially the French section of partitioned Cameroon (1916-1961).[119]

In Liberia and Sierra Leone, for example, MSF and the ICRC delivered huge supplies of medicines during the war, operated numerous mobile clinics, and provided critical services in public hospitals. Back in February and March 1998, MSF carried out 960 surgical interventions at Connaught hospital in Freetown. It also had a surgeon at Netlands hospital and provided basic health services for around 12,000 refuges at the national stadium in Freetown. In Kambia district, it deployed a medical team, which provided medical and nutritional services for approximately 15,000 persons.[120] In December 2020, this prolific humanitarian health aid provider that was one of the only permanent international agency intervening in the Socio-political crisis in the North West Region of Cameroon was banned for suspicious collusion with armed Ambazonian forces to orchestrate their guerilla operations against the Cameroon Armed Forces. The NGO through Emmanuel Lampaert, the NGO's operations coordinator for Central Africa repeatedly refused this allegation and

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[116] Davey, Borton and Foley, *A history of the humanitarian system*. p.11.

[117] Jennifer J. Palmer and Pete Kingsley , "Controlling sleeping sickness amidst conflict and calm: Remembering, forgetting and the politics of humanitarian knowledge in Southern Sudan, 1956–2005," in Bennett, Foley and Krebs, eds. *Learning from the past to shape the future.* p. 31.

[118] Ibid. p. 38.

[119] Ibid. p. 41.

[120] Bah. "Civil Non-State Actors in Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding in West Africa," p..330.

after eight months of suspension with no hope for possible rehabilitation, decided to withdraw from the conflict scene.[121]

Faith based organisations exclusively were actively at work to provide humanitarian actions in conflict torn countries. A classic example was during the Rwanda genocide (1990-1994) where the church as an institution adopted the trio-strategies of advocacy, pastoral care and humanitarian assistance to the victims of the genocide. Through its press organs like the *Kinyamateka* , the founding and engagement of priests in human rights groups such as the Defence of Human Rights and Public Liberties (ADL), set up in 1991, strong public advocacy against human rights violations were aired to the international community. Catholic and Protestant churches also carried out initiatives to support peace efforts until the signing of the Arusha Accords in August 1993.[122] The World Council of Churches (WCC) in collaboration with the All African Council of Churches (AACC) consistently stimulated public and international opinion on the atrocities of the genocide. Besides, various church agencies accentuated pastoral care to victims and affected persons of the genocide through moral, spiritual and psychosocial support programmes. [123]The religious organizations also provided humanitarian assistance by sheltering people, including those with serious casualties requiring medical attention. During the violence against Tutsi in 1959, 1961–64, 1973 and 1990, victims of war in Rwanda sought shelter and found safety in churches. As recently as February 1994, the Jesuit-run *Centre Christus* had sheltered many Tutsi who had fled their homes after a series of murders following the assassination of Martin Bucyana, the President of the Hutu Coalition for the Defence of the Republic (CDR).[124]

In spite of the credits given to the Faith-based Organizations in providing various facets of humanitarian actions, the role of churches in the Rwandan genocide came under a barrage of criticism. In the aftermath of the genocide, the church was strongly criticized for failing the people of Rwanda, especially the Tutsi who were the primary target of the massacres. Critics argue that the church did little to prevent the genocide or alleviate victims' suffering in any substantial way. The horror of the atrocities committed, often on church premises, overshadowed acts of kindness and humanity that were expected from God's missionaries. [125]

In Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Côte d'Ivoire the existence of important ad hoc community organizations that emerged during the civil wars played a crucial role in postwar humanitarian action for peace building. These organizations included high profile ad hoc committees of religious and national elders and women's groups that played critical roles in facilitating peace negotiations between the governments and opposition forces. Though most of these were temporary and informal bodies, they played critical roles in facilitating peacekeeping. Some of the most notable ad hoc community organizations included the Inter-

[121] *Médecins sans Frontières*, Press Release 3 August, 2021, https://www.msf.org/doctors-without-borders-forced-withdraw-medical-teams-north-west-cameroon accessed on 17 September, 2021.
[122] Richard M. Benda, "Church, humanitarianism and genocide in Rwanda: beyond criticism and apology", in Bennett, Foley and Krebs, eds. *Learning from the past to shape the future. p.81.*
[123] Ibid. 81-82.
[124] Ibid. p.84.
[125] Ibid., 77.

Religious Council in Sierra Leone, the Collective of Religious Confessions for National Reconciliation and Peace in Côte d'Ivoire, the Inter-Religious Council in Liberia.[126]

Civil non-state actors were also actively at work to assist in the demobilisation and reintegration of war combatants especially children. In the conflict in the DRC, despite the signing of peace accords in 2003, fighting continued unabated in the east of the country. Recruitment and use of child soldiers characterised the conflict as all actors in the conflict and foreign-armed groups like the National Armed Forces (FARDC), and local Mai-Mai militias, employed children as soldiers. [127]Given this predicament, the ICRC congregated efforts with the U.N MONUSCO Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation and Reintegration (DDRR) agenda by paying routine visits to the centres to interview and assist child soldiers to reintegrate with their broken families.[128]

Conclusion

Informed by sacred missions dedicated to meeting humanitarian concerns presaged by internecine conflicts and/or disasters, a range of non-state organizations decided to join the efforts of states and especially non-governmental organizations, particularly, the League of Nations and later United Nations agencies to palliate human deprivations and psycho-social destabilization engendered by conflicts. Acting as missionaries of humanity, International NGOs in collaboration with local NGOs and some *adhoc* committees imposed their presence on the humanitarian front in the conflict phase and post war scenarios by physically providing advanced food and health relief services, shelter as well as mediating between the belligerent factions or using diverse forms of advocacy to drum support for peace building and rehabilitation of victims of war. Besides, the armed non-state actors which under the cover of liberation movements articulated, though not with total commitments, maxims of humanitarian conscious warfare on civilians (non-combatants, especially women and children), the civil non state actors sandwiched in the oppositions of war tried to maintain the *Dunatian* principles of neutrality, impartiality, humanitarian service and independence in their actions. This moral engagement did not work in all cases as certain field human frustrations identified by humanitarian staff on field operations or popularized by advocacy networks and embraced by some donor members, caused some international NGOs to take political positions in conflict setting. This manipulation of neutrality usually went on to strain relationship with the state actors affected by the crisis, hence confirming the dictum that the presence of non-state(armed and civil) actors on the African war scene oscillated between complementing the efforts of state and governmental organisations and rivalry. Although conflict antagonists have been projected as conduits to humanitarian support system, their role is controversial, suspicious and inconsiderate given the mechanisms they most often exploit to sustain conflicts or drum their agenda.

Recommendation(s)

[126] Bar, "Civil Non-State Actors in Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding in West Africa," pp. 322-323.
[127] Peter, Kagwanja, "Reintegration of Child Soldiers in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo: Challenges and Prospects," *International Peace Support Training Centre* (IPSTC), Series 4. No.2, 2013. p. 1.
[128] Ibid. 10-12.

From the foregoing discussions. It is difficult to say there are blue prints orientations that Non State actors could use to optimise humanitarian support in areas or situations of conflicts. Perhaps the submission of Goodhand[129] that humanitarian practice is about making tough decisions between least worst options is germane. This wavers around a political context that imposes policitisation and a messy organisational environment that is usually characterised by competing interests between what is desirable by donor organisations and what is possible in ground operations. Last but not the least; individual choices of humanitarian initiatives are usually barricaded by political and organisational options. Given this complexity of intervention in the humanitarian theatre, the study strongly suggests that interventions should be flexible enough to adapt to the dynamic contexts of crisis. NGOs, while struggling to maintain established standards, should always be aware of the constraints that stand to neutralise the rules dictated by international law. In this regard, they should be able to serve as influential diplomats that leverage state actors and antagonists on the core substance of service to humanity. This would help them to improvise alternative options when primary measures fail. In whatever circumstance of difficulties, victims of war should not be abandoned to suffer. All these requires that attention should be given to innovative training programmes that effectively and continually socialise field practitioners on the very intricate postures of the humanitarian crisis settings as they unfold.

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[129] Jonathan Goodhand, Aiding Peace? The Role of NGOs in Armed Conflict Warwickshire, Practical Action, Publishing, 2007, pp.5-8.

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CONSEQUENCES OF POVERTY AND YOUTH CRIMINAL BEHAVIOUR IN JOS SOUTH LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA, PLATEAU STATE, NIGERIA

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Abstract

Most of the poor are led to crime because of their relative deprivation and acute sense of want (Townsend, 1970). This observation seems to tally largely with the existing reality in Nigeria today where a person's worth in life and his contribution to society is solely measured by his wealth. This study examined the Consequences of Poverty and Youth Criminal Behavior in Jos South Local Government Area, Plateau State, Nigeria. Te major objective of this study is to examine the Consequences of Poverty and Youth Criminal Behavior in Jos South Local Government Area, Plateau State, Nigeria. From the findings of the study, parents play down their parental responsibilities by dehumanizing the youths and exposing them to hazards and risks of criminal behaviours, it shows that poverty is the root cause of youth criminal behavior in the study area, since the household's financial standard of their parents is low. The study adopted the Anomie and Social Control Theories. The study therefore, recommends that Government should look at the factors that led to the vicious cycle of causes of poverty and criminal behaviors of youths in the study area, parents should not neglect their responsibilities of taking good care of their children.
Keywords: Youth, Criminal Behavior, Poverty

Introduction

The incidence and severity of poverty are higher among households in Nigeria (Akerele et al. 2012) and a greater percentage of the Nigerian population lives in poverty, despite the huge wealth in the country (Holmes et al., 2012). This is because high poverty income and poor asset distribution, unequal access to basic infrastructure and services like education and health still persist in Nigeria (Holmes et al. 2012). Poverty remains a socio-economic problem that may increase criminal risk as rapid urbanization is taking place in Nigeria (Odumosu, 1999). Criminal activities in a society are characterized by prolonged poverty (Huang et al. 2004). That is, crime related matters may disrupt the development course (Mehlum et al., 2005) like economic growth (Mauro & Carmeci, 2007). More so, studies have shown relationship exist between crime and poverty.

Jos South is a Local Government Area in Plateau State, Nigeria. It houses the Governor's office in Rayfield and can thus be described as the de facto capital of plateau state. Its headquarters are in the town of Bukuru at 9°48′00″N 8°52′00″E. It has an area of 510 km² and a population of 306,716 at the 2006 census. Poverty has a great influence on the crime rate in the Jos South Local Government Area. Poverty can be in state where there is lack of the basic resources needed to maintain a good quality of life. Most of the inhabitants of the area are regarded as the privileged, as accommodation and other things are expensive there, as well as the imposing lifestyle of those who live there. However, the area is not devoid of pockets of settlement occupied by the poor such as Mai-Adiko, Fwavai, Area One, Rayfield resort area where there are poor youths that are prone to criminal behaviors. Part of the economic activity of the city has also moved to Rayfield due to the civil unrest in other parts of the city and as expected there has been an increase in crime rate in this part of Jos in recent times because the less privileged youths who have potential for crime find their way there, day and night, as the environment provides them the opportunity to carry out their criminal activities.The seriousness of youth offences in Rayfield today therefore calls for urgent solution. There is therefore the need to assess the relationship between poverty amongst the youths in Jos South Local Government Area and their criminal behavior in order to proffer meaningful solutions to reduce crime in the State.

Currently, there has been an upsurge in the frequency of unemployment in Nigeria which has caused fear among the citizens as security of lives and properties can no longer be guaranteed because idleness is the devils workshop (Egwu and Nwogbo-Egwu, 2016). Youth (people who fall in the age bracket 15-35 years) can be said to be or understood as a stage of transition between childhood and adulthood. Nearly half of all people in the world today are under the age of 31 (ICRW 2001).The youth stage is the middle rung in the ladder of life in a human population, it links the infancy and `adulthood' stages together (Webster 2004). They often constitute a major part of the total population of any nation. The success of a vibrant society is based on youth development and any stumbling block to this could constitute a limitation to youth education and hence national development. When there is a growing crime rate among the youths there is hence a serious problem that must be tackled. The various offences committed by youths as identified by Hirschi (2002) and Simatwa (2012) are homicide, rape, aggravated assault, robbery, burglary, larceny and based on the Nigerian society include stealing, loitering about and burglary, murder, abortion, keeping

fire arms, sexual harassment among others. The causes of these offences according to researchers are unemployment, broken home, peer influence personality traits and bad environment (Hirschi, 2002).

Government through the Plateau Peace Building Agency, has set up machinery to stem the activities of youth criminal activities within the Jos South Local Government Area of Plateau State.

CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS

Youth

There seems to be no standard global definition of a youth. Africa and the global south and of course many countries of the world, have long insisted that youth is not a range of ages but defined by a diversity of culturally defined social processes that mark the transition from child to adult. It is against this background that the writer finds it pertinent to look at some notable and popular definitions of a youth and to examine the impacts of the narrow definition of youth in Nigeria. According to the UN "Youth" is best understood as a period of transition from the dependence of childhood to adulthood's independence and awareness of our interdependence as members of a community. Youth is a more fluid category than a fixed age-group." The Commonwealth defines youth as 15-29 years of age. The African Youth Charter defines youth as "any individual between 15-35 years of age and seeks to resolve longstanding debates about defining youth within the African context and based on Africa's development realities."

Who a Youth is in Nigeria.

In Nigeria, prior to the emergency of the NATIONAL YOUTH POLICY 2019, The Nigerian National Youth Policy (2009) defines youth as between 18-35 years. However, the 2019 National Youth Policy has changed the above classification. By the new Policy, a youth in Nigeria is a person between 18-29 years. This explains why NYSC is limited to graduates under the age of 30years. It must be noted that most African countries have a wider definition of a youth than Nigeria, the supposed giant of Africa. For instance, by virtue of the National Youth Policy of Ghana 2010, the age bracket for youth is 15-35, an obvious adoption of the definition by the African Youth Charter, the Cameroonian government also adopted the 15-35 years definition of a youth by the African Youth Charter in their National Youth Policy 2006. On the other hand, some educational psychologists have tried to be specific by defining the age of youth in terms of number of years. According to them, youth is an age between about thirteen (13) and forty (40) (Chioma.U. 2020).

Criminal Behaviour

Criminal behavior, therefore, is an intentional behavior that violates a criminal code of a state or country (Bartol and Bartol, 2005). Based on the above definitions, criminal behavior does not just occur accidentally or without justification, as it occurs based on the intention of the person that commits the act. Again, people do join cults and sees it as an umbrella that covers them in their criminal activities in the society. The cultists are usually pushed to join

the cult as to have a voice, power and protection that poverty situation denied them. The fraternal aim is to protect the interest of their fraternal members with the objectives to fight whosoever that mess up with their member, intimidate any that goes contrary to their demands, cause commotions, crisis and even violent acts to create their awareness and most often indulge in other criminal activities (Igwe, 2002).

Criminal behaviors, such as armed robbery, kidnapping, terrorism, cyber-based crime, electoral violence and ethno-religious violence are some of the contemporary social problems bedeviling Nigeria today. They pose a serious threat to the security of the lives and properties of the citizenry. As Tanimu (2012) observes, armed robbery, drug offences, kidnapping, murder and political crime are on the increase in Nigeria.

Poverty

The concept of poverty has assumed not only local but global trend resulting in many countries administering numerous policies in a bid to curb this menace. Haralambos and Holborn (2000) assert that poverty is a situation where a person is unable to acquire the minimum necessities that make for well-being. Poverty is marked by the inability to get good livelihood, have good house to live in, support oneself without depending on others, inability to acquire good healthcare, good educational training etc.

According to Akwara, et al (2013) absolute poverty means the inability of a person or group to provide the material needs for physical subsistence and the protection of human dignity. These materials include food, clothing, shelter, water, health-care services and basic education, etc. Poverty connotes a situation that humiliates, weakens one and inability to fend for oneself. More importantly, is that the level of income determines the status of one, whether to be poor or rich.

World Bank Development Report (2000) defines poverty "as an unacceptable deprivation inhuman well-being that can compromise both physiological and social deprivation". Poverty is the deprivation of basic resources that are necessary for maintaining the quality of life in terms of food, clothing, shelter and other rights and resources that can impinge on living conditions and guarantee human dignity (Amaike, 2011; quoted in UNILAG Sociological review). It can also be described as a social problem that limits and constrains the life chances of individuals, groups and society in terms of access to valued resources without which human existence will be threatened. In its most extreme form, poverty is a lack of basic human needs, such as adequate and nutritious food, clothing, housing, clean water, and health services. World bank (2009), indexed "poverty" in terms of unlimited access to employment opportunities and income, inadequate and insecure housing and services, unhealthy environments, little or no social protection mechanisms, and limited access to adequate health and education opportunities. Poverty in Nigeria, like in most developing nations of Africa, is widespread and seems to be on the increase by the day (Odumosu, 1999).

Causes of Poverty in Jos South Local Government Area, Plateau State, Nigeria

Poor Employment Opportunity, Corruption, Poor Education System, Poor saving culture, Overpopulation, Laziness, Insecurity, Poor Government Policies.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The study adopted the Anomie Theory. The Anomie Theory as propounded by Robert Merton (2000). He based his ideology on the societal structure through interest consensuses, a system of shared values and goals. But, individuals in group have difference access to these goals in society. The individual differential patterns to the goal are denied which develops societal deviant behaviour and formlessness. The basic idea of Robert K. Merton's anomie theory is that most people strive to achieve culturally recognized goals. A state of anomie develops when access to these goals is blocked to entire groups of people or individuals. The result is a deviant behaviour characterized by rebellion, retreat, ritualism, innovation, and or conformity.

Merton's Anomie Theory is predominantly utilitarian in nature: people act criminally because they lack alternative possibilities. In this context, Merton explains monetary crimes such as robbery or burglary, but not crimes such as murder or rape. Due to the lack of access to legitimate means to achieve goals, Merton explains criminality only within the lower class, because it can be assumed that the middle and upper classes actually have these means at their disposal. The less society is characterised by social inequality, the fewer people will become anomic. The goal must therefore be a genuine social and welfare state in which it is possible for everyone to achieve cultural goals by legitimate means. In criminology, the idea of anomie is that the person chooses criminal activity because the individual believes that there is no reason not to. In other words, the person is alienated, feels worthless and that their efforts to try and achieve anything else are fruitless. Therefore, with lack of any foreseeable alternative, the person falls into criminal activity.

In his Anomie theory and implied types of criminality which contained five categories (Conformist, Innovation, Retreatists, Ritualist and Rebel), Merton maintained that conformists accept both goals and means that society holds out as legitimate while innovators accept the goals but reject the means, and use illegal means to gain money, power and success. It is innovationists whom Mertons identifies as criminals, ritualists are those who reject success goals but still perform their daily tasks in conformity with social expectations. They might hold regular jobs, but lack the desire to advance in life. Retreatists reject both goals and means and usually drop out of society by becoming derelicts, drug users, hermits or the like. The rebels constitute a special category. Their desire to replace the existing system of socially approved goals and means with some other system more to their liking makes them revolutionists of the theory. Merton believed that categories are not intentionally selected by the individuals who occupy them but are imposed on people by structural aspects of society where people live, how wealthy their family is, and what ethnic background they come from are all significant determinants on the box into which people are placed. In summary, Merton claimed his analysis showed how the culture and structure of society generate deviance. The overemphasis upon the cultural goals of financial success and high status in the society at the expense of institutionalized means created a tendency towards anomie. This tendency exerts pressure for deviance, a pressure which varies depending on a person's position and the class structure.

METHODOLOGY

This study on consequences of Poverty and Criminal behavior in Jos South Local Government Area, Plateau State, Nigeria adopted exploratory research design. It used both primary and secondary sources of data collection. By administering questionnaires, in-depth interview and focus group discussions from Favwhai and Anglo-Jos Police Station and Jos South LGA, also community leaders, church elders/religious leaders, youth leaders, law enforcement officers, local vigilante etc within the Rayfield community assisted in getting more information.

The Secondary data was collected from sources such as locally available reports, articles, journals, editorials, dissertations and Base line data. Evaluation of project document and relevant web pages related to the topic. In administering the questionnaire, direct delivery methods were used, the questionnaire was administered and time frame was given for the retrieval to avoid high incidence of instrument mortality. The researcher observed that the reasoning of the respondents varies.

Sample size determination and sampling techniques

The sample size will be determined using Taro Yamani formula of selecting the sample size. Out of the 275 respondents that make up the sample size, 120 will be the selected staff of Favwhai and Anglo-Jos Police Station while 155 respondents are the and Jos South LGA Staff.

Formula:

$$n = \frac{N}{1 + N(e)2}$$

Where;

n=Desired sample size,

N=Population of the study,

I=Constant,

e=Minimum error of calculation (5%)

n=876

1+876 (0.05)2

n=876

1+876 (0.0025)

n=876

3.19=274.6

n=275

Methods of Data Collection and Instrument of data collection

The researcher designed a questionnaire for some selected staff of Favwhai and Anglo-Jos Police Station and Jos South Local Government Staff, comprising mainly close-ended and open-ended questions that enabled the respondents to freely comment on the hypotheses and theme therein. The researcher also employed the interview method in the collection of data. This involved informal interviews, which were held with some staff of Favwhai and Anglo-Jos Police Station and Jos South Local Government Staff.

Data Presentation

The data collected was further presented in tabulated format and analyzed in order to test the research hypothesis which led to the collection of this finding.

Data Analysis and Results

Total	**Strongly Agree (SA)**	**Agree (A)**	**Undecided (U)**	**Disagree (D)**	**Strongly Disagree (SD)**
Respondents	48	72	58	80	17
Percentage%	17	26	21	29	7

Judgment

48 x 5 = 240

72 x 4 = 288

58 x 3 = 174

80 x 2 = 160

17 x 1 = 17 879

879 (no. of respondents) 275 = 3.2 Accepted.

The table above indicates that 80 respondents representing a total of 29% disagree that Poverty is the cause of youth criminal behavior in Jos South Local Government Area, Plateau State, Nigeria, while 72 respondents with 26% agree with the statement, 48 respondents strongly agree that it does affect with a percentage of 17%. 75 out of the total of hundred

percent with 17 respondent strongly disagree in all these. 58 respondents showing 26% however are undecided whether or not it does. This finding therefore indicates that Poverty is the cause of youth criminal behavior in Jos South Local Government Area, Plateau State, Nigeria.

Interpretations and Discussions

For the methodology to be used, the Likert scale of gathering data was put to use. The Likert scale holds that for a judgment to be accepted, the sum of total of respondents should be calculated by the ratio each represents and then divided by the number of respondents.; when this is done and the above is recorded, the judgment is accepted, whereas the result realized is below 3, it becomes rejected. This is further explained as thus:

Scale		Ratio
SA	-	5
A	-	4
U	-	3
D	-	2
SD	-	1

The sum of these is 5+4+3+2+1 = 15 which is further divided as thus; 15/5=3 is the certain mean. Note that the five (5) used above to divide the explanation is indicating the number of frequency the scale represents. Each variable contains the number of responses which is further multiplied by its coded figure.

For example - details derived from above:

48 x 5	=	240	
72 x 4	=	288	
58 x 3	=	174	
80 x 2	=	160	
17 x 1	=	17	879
		879 (no. of respondents)	275 = 3.2 Accepted.

DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS

The result of the data analysis shows that poverty is the cause of youth criminal behavior in Jos South Local Government Area, Plateau State, Nigeria. The analysis indicated that 72 out of total respondents agree with 48 strongly agreeing with the percentage of 26% and 17%

respectively, as against 80 and 17 respondents disagreeing and strongly disagreeing 29% and 7% respectively. This judgment is accepted because the critical mean is above 3-4 stands at 3.2 with the first two variables having the ratio of 5 and 4 respectively.

The study revealed that most of the youths who engage in criminal behavior as a result of poverty are uneducated and ignorant. It was also revealed from this study that educational background of some parents affected their children. The study also discovered that parents play down their parental responsibilities by dehumanizing the youths and exposing them to hazards and risks of criminal act.

From the study conducted on the consequences of poverty and youth criminal behavior, it shows that impacts of poverty on criminal behaviors among youth are not encouraging. From this study, it shows that poverty is the root cause of youth criminal behaviour in the study area, since the household's financial standard is quite low. There is unemployment amongst the youths and the household heads, low levels of investment; most families are landless, helpless and hopeless so they result to criminal activities like burglary, gambling, stealing, and price fixing, bribery amongst the civil servants fare hikes on commuter vehicle, corruption and embezzlement of government funds.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The factors responsible for poverty in Nigeria include low per capita income, poor education system and social discrimination (Ucha, 2010. Low income growth, macroeconomic shocks and policy failure, labor markets deficiencies, migration, ill-health /diseases, debt burden, crime & violence, environmental degradation, weak institutional base, migration and labor market deficiencies are all causes of poverty (Olowa, 2012).

Poverty can be the result of insufficient economic growth and unequal income distribution; adverse macroeconomic shocks, low human resource development; insufficient capital formation or insufficient social overhead capital; environmental degradation or pollution; overpopulation, bad governance and weak institutions; over-dependency on developed nations. Other factors are deficiencies in the labour market resulting in limited job growth, low productivity and low wages in the formal sector, minimal access to the means of supporting rural development in poor regions, inadequate access to markets where the poor can sell goods, and those victimized by transitory poverty; lack of participation in poverty alleviation programmes; retrenchment of workers, a fall in the real value of safety nets, and changes in family structures (Obadan, 1997;Ukwu, 2002;Olowa, 2012). ...

Olowa (2012) in a study on the concept, measurement and causes of poverty in Nigeria identified inadequate economic growth as the main cause of poverty in Nigeria. It linked the lack of economic growth to a very narrow and weak economic base; depending mostly on exportation of petroleum crude oil as a major source of income. The argument for economic growth as a precondition for poverty reduction is because it increases mean incomes and the narrowing of income distribution (Olowa, 2012). However, the point should be made that whether economic growth results in poverty reduction depends on what it is made up of.
Poverty is a complex concept with many dimensions. Measurement of poverty could be commenced by setting poverty line either relative or absolute, single or multi-

dimensional (Olatomide, 2012; World Bank, 2016). Poverty line is a minimum standard taking income or expense into consideration in order to define someone as either being poor or not (Adigun, Awoyemi and Fabiyi, 2015).

The high rate of poverty and unemployment among the youths in Nigeria has resulted in growing wave of crime in the society as they continue to struggle for survival with the economic hardship. Nnaike (2016) opined that the growing rate of unemployment among the youths was observed by Prof Olugamiro Jegede the pioneer Vice Chancellor of National Open University of Nigeria that with a population of about 180 million people, 50 per cent are unemployed, and 80 per cent of the youth are unemployed. The economically active population is about 103 million (age 15 to 64 years) and with a labour force of about 75 million available for work and actively seeking for jobs while the jobs are not available. According to Nwachukwu and Nwamuo (2010) when the youths are not gainfully employed either in the public or private sector of the economy, they become vulnerable to criminality such as kidnapping, terrorism, rape, armed robbery and many other social vices.

Adekoya (2018) and Ewubare and Mark (2018) have revealed the implications of human resource underdevelopment to poverty in Nigeria. Currently, a lack of a robust educational system underserved many of the poorest Nigerians. 10.5 million Nigerian children do not attend school at all, and 60% of those children are girls. These problems are especially profound in the northern, more rural parts of Nigeria. Terrorist groups such as Boko Haram that vilify Western education further exasperate the situation. Education gives many the skills they need to enter the workforce and escape impoverishment, and the lack of educational opportunity is one of the truly devastating causes of poverty in Nigeria.

(Odumosu 1999; Igbo 2007). There has been an increased rate of crime especially among the youths in recent times in Jos South Local Government Area (Police Report). The main purpose of this study is to investigate the influence of the poverty levels of the youths in this area and its relationship with their criminal behavior. Information derived from this study will be useful to policy makers and NGOs to make decisions that will alleviate the poverty levels of the youths and hence reduce criminality amongst them.

Aiyedogbon and Ohwofasa (2012) defined relative poverty by reference to the living standards of the majority in a given society that separates the poor from the affluent people. According to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS, 2010), poverty may be measured with some intrinsic parameters. They include inadequate access to basic necessities of life, environmental issues, poor infrastructure, illiteracy and ignorance, poor health, insecurity, social and political exclusion. Poverty is a universal phenomenon because inequality is in every society implying the rich and the poor. The poor are those who have low, lower and lowest quality of life because poverty is in gradation, the abject, the relative and the conventional poverty.

Poverty takes a toll on poor children's development. For example, poverty causes malnutrition which would affect the development of a child's mental thinking and healthy body. Poverty may also lead to political instability and lead to increased risk of war, mass emigration of population and terrorism. People suffering from poverty will generally have a low standard of living. They are not able to afford education and lack access to health care and education. This will lead to a low quality of human capital and thus compromise

economic growth. Poverty takes a toll on poor children's development. https://www.dineshbakshi.com › revision-notes

The social consequences of poverty include family issues, impacts on social and cultural lives, and higher rates of crime and victimisation. The economic consequences of poverty are a lack of social mobility, problems with housing and homelessness, and a segregated society. One of the main effects of poverty is poor health, as is reflected in Nigeria's high infant mortality and low life expectancy. Poor people in Nigeria face several health issues as they lack basic health amenities and competent medical practitioners. https://www.american.edu › upload › ucha_accessible

Poverty is linked with negative conditions such as substandard housing, homelessness, inadequate nutrition and food insecurity, inadequate child care, lack of access to health care, unsafe neighborhoods, and under resourced schools which adversely impact our nation's children. https://www.apa.org › families › poverty

In Nigeria, the nature of the determinants of poverty can be traced to low or declining level of economic growth, income inequalities, unemployment, corruption, and bad governance, diversion of funds into non-developmental projects, fund embezzlement, inappropriate macroeconomic policies, and inadequate endowment of human. https://apsdpr.org › index.php › apsdpr › article › view

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Relationship between poverty and crime often occur simultaneously. However, analyses show that crime is not driven by poverty alone, but rather by inequality. Countries with high overall levels of poverty do not necessarily have higher levels of crime. It is places with high levels of income inequality that typically have the highest levels of crime. Another driver of crime is a breakdown in social norms and values which results in, and is worsened by, factors such as unemployment, incomplete education, a breakdown in family structures, limited opportunities and exclusion from the formal economy. Many of these factors are present to the west of the Great Limopo Transfrontier Conservation Area (GLTFCA) in South Africa: there is social and economic inequality, a lack of economic opportunities, poor education and many families are affected by migrant labour into urban centres. The legacy of Apartheid compounds inequality as it resulted in limited opportunities and weak public services, particularly in rural areas. On the eastern side of the GLTFCA in Mozambique, there is poor governance at the local government level and poaching bosses have captured some of the governance and power structures. In both countries there is poor service delivery, which stifles economic development and limits opportunities. People in the region often turn to poaching as a way to access resources and livelihood opportunities, which are significantly fewer in Mozambique than South Africa. Underlying the aforementioned social issues is corruption, which is a problem in both Mozambique and South Africa. While South Africa has problems with corruption, the state is better functioning and more developed than in Mozambique.

Discussions And Findings

It was revealed that poverty have positive impact on youths in Jos South Local Government Area leading them to criminal behaviours. It was also discovered that poverty is associated with youth criminal behaviours. The economic status of the Jos South Local Government Area of Plateau State is also a factor of criminal behaviour. In Jos South Local Government Area, poverty has slammed an indelible mark on the citizenry to the extent that many lost their conscience and sense of decency in the process of searching for their daily bread.

Conclusion

This study investigated the consequences of poverty and youth criminal behavior in Jos South Local Government Area of Plateau State, Nigeria. The study also looked at out why youths engage in criminal activities in the study area. The purpose of the study was to generate ways of solving poverty issues in order to reduce crime amongst the youths and the vulnerable individuals in Jos South Local Government Area of Plateau State. There are frequent organized crimes in urban and rural settings such as burglary, robbery, murder of prominent people and watchmen, assaults, prostitution, rape, gambling, mugging, commercial sex, pick pocketing, and gender based violence etc.

The study specifically sought to determine the factors that led to the vicious cycle of poverty causes crime, develop plans to access and investigate criminal offences when committed in the region and they are solved by the law enforcers and policy makers in the study area. The study used the null hypothesis that there was no relationship between poverty and crime in the study area to establish the findings of the research on poverty and crime among people in ray field community.

Recommendations

The followings are the recommendations for this study:

i. Government should look at the factors that led to the vicious cycle of causes of poverty and criminal behavior in the study area.
ii. Parents should not neglect their responsibilities of taking care of their children.
iii. Government should develop a strategic plan to solve unemployment issues in order to reduce crime amongst the youths and the vulnerable individuals in the study area.
iv. Government should enact laws against youth's roaming the streets.
v. There is the need for Government to intensify more campaigns against criminal activities.

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ONUO WATER FESTIVAL OF USAKEDET PEOPLE, 1947-2000

By

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Abstract

The advent of western civilization had a downturn on many important cultural practices of the people of Africa. Understandably, a form of reawakening has led to people going back to their roots to discover what their forebears venerated and did with passion. Festivals are celebration of important periodic events which bring together people from various walks of life in every society. In Usakedetland of the southwest Cameroon, traditional water festival of Onuo was observed by the adherents of the water gods/goddesses called Ndem mmuong to mark the appeasement and appreciation of their protection upon the people and their businesses. This important religious, social and cultural event usually culminated in series of entertaining performances, water rites and rituals among others. Also, Onuo water festival existed for years and was celebrated to immortalize memories of the past kings Umuo, great warriors, fishermen and priests of Onuo called Oku-Onuo. This paper argues that despite the influence of western culture, the Onuo water festival continued as a traditional and cultural celebration of the Usakedet people. The study made use of the primary and secondary sources of information.

Keywords: Onuo, water, festival, Usakedet, Culture

Introduction

One of the characteristics of Usakedet traditional society is the periodic festival of *Onuo* and the veneration of ancestors. *Onuo* is the traditional and ritual feast of the Usakedet people who inhabit the coastal areas of *Asiantum* (now Rio Del Rey) or *Akpa Usakedet* estuary, Ndian and part of Meme rivers of Ndian Division, southwest Cameroon littoral.
The *Onuo* was originally a cult of sea-going people who would transform themselves to sea-animals, mermaids and other sea elements with spiritual aspect capable of unleashing pains on their victims and rewarding loyal adherents with wealth and protection. It was also

originally a medium of spiritual communication between the water and land.[130] Before colonialism *Onuo* was a cult used by the people to defend their rights, fight aggressions against the coastal people of Duala and other Oroko territories. Also, fertility and wealth from the gods were reasons for membership of the societies, and was equally part of *Ukpafot* cult in Usakedet.[131]

Onuo festival consisted of other lines of event such as wrestling competition among the villages in Usakedet, vigil night which took place a night to water event and processions by women or *Ebani Onuo*, youth *Mkparanwa Onuo* who were members of the *Onuo* cult. However, water rite was usually the highpoint of the festival which witnesses the immersion of the sacred boat loaded with ritual items into the *Asiantum* River. The purpose of this was to show a deep relationship between the visible world and those in the marine or water world.[132]

The *Onuo* as celebrated in Usakedet strengthened the bonds of unity and peaceful co-existence among the villages of Oron paramount chiefdom, Amoto, Aqua or Akwa in Usakedet and Efut, Balundo or Oroko neighbouring villages of Massaka and Bateka (Efut Inwang). It equally helped in the promotion of cultural identity of the Usakedet people while also making viable the authority of Usakedet traditional institution and practices despite the western or modern influences.[133] The *Onuo* festival celebrated bi or tri-annually is an attempt by the Usakedet people to relate with the spirits of the gods called *Ndem mmuon* or *mamy water* and has been celebrated for years but was instituted as a well-organized festival from 1947.[134]

The most fascinating thing about *Onuo* festival is one spectacle or display by *Ukpafot* cult which makes the event similar to *Ngondo* festival of the Duala people. As a result, the *Ukpafot* cultists well decorated and adorned by the *Oku-Onuo* (*Onuo* priest) would dive and disappear into the deep *Asiantum* river where they stayed under the water for about two hours and later emerged without their bodies and clothes or attire getting wet. Children are not allowed to attend this particular ceremony because of its spiritual implication, sacredness and secrecy which had to do with human sacrifices. Consequently, the Cameroonian government banned the festival of such magnitude in 1981 but was lifted in 1991 after a period of ten years.

Usakedet: Location and People

Usakedet (recognized officially as Isangele by the Cameroonian authority) is a language group and people located in Ndian Division of the south-west region of the Cameroons and is historically seen as a major inter-ethnic migrational or dispersal point of the various groups

[130] Effiong Okon Osung. Aged: 82. Former Village Head of Akpa Usakedet fishing settlement. Interviewed in Eyotai Village on 23/5/2021.

[131] Aboko Ita. Aged: 121. The *Iyamba* and Cupbearer of Usakedetland. Interviewed of *Iyamba Palace, Oron-Usakedet on 5-1-2020.*

[132] Ralp A. Austen. Tradition, Invention and History: The Case of the Ngondo (Cameroon). *Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines*. Vol. 126, No. xxx 11-2. (1992). Pp. 285-309.

[133] Anjeh Orami Dibo. Aged: 70. Royal Secretary. Interviewed at Oron-Isangele. 27/12/2019.

[134] Shirley G. Ardener. *Eye-witnesses to Annexation of Cameroon, 1883-1887. Buea: Ministry of Primary Education, Cameroon. 1968. Pp. 40-99.*

now making up the Akwa Ibom, Rivers and Cross River States of Nigeria.[135] Usakedet is bounded in the North by Mundemba, in the South by Kombo Abedimo, west by the Atlantic Ocean and Nigeria and East by Ekondo Titi and Kombo Itindi.[136] Following the ceding of the entire mandated territory of Southwest region to the Cameroons in 1961 through a referendum, the entire Rio Del-Rey estuary *Usakedet* or *Asiantum* because part of the Cameroons and was governed or ruled by traditional rulers and administrators of Cameroonian origin.[137]

Historically, the word "Usakedet", pronounced locally as *Usak-Areh* meaning "shiny smiling teeth" which connote the characteristics description of the riverine people who typically showed open expression of happiness and contentment during fishing outings. The daily joyous composures were often full of smiles and happiness, hence, the origin of the name *Usak-Areh* or *Usakedet* (in Efik/Ibibio).[138]

Usakedet is widely accepted among the various groups of the Lower Cross area of Nigeria as their principal place of dispersal to their present places of abode during the periods of migration of the Bantu race. Though the Usakedet people began to get influenced by foreign colonial rule since 1884 when Germany colonized the area and changed the name to Efut word: "*Isangene*", "*Isangeli*" or "*Isangele*", yet they still regard themselves as the Usakedet speaking people with distinct tribal identity in the Cameroons.

The word Isangele (as Usakedet as officially recognized today) is not original to the people. It is a recent nomenclature evolved by the Balundo or Efut people of Oroko tribe during the colonial period to undermine the continuous use and propagation of the name Usakedet seen more or less as a word of Efik/Ibibio descent, accent and root.[139]

As noted by Usim Promise Usim:

> Just as the Efik language took a central position among Akwa Ibom and Cross River States people of Nigeria during the colonial period, same did the Balundo (Efut) language dominate in the linguistic primacy of the southwest colonial administration.[140]

[135] Okon Edet Uya. *A History of Oron People of the Lower Cross River Basin.* Oron: Manson Publishing Company. 1984. Pp. 20-28.
[136] Anki Ambo Daniel. A Brief Historical Collections on the Administrative Development of the Rio Del Rey (Usakedet). 2018. Pp. 1-15.
[137] Tengwan Ambe Frederick. *Free Cameroon Now*. Buea*:* University Press. 2016. Pp. 1-5.
[138] Anjeh Aboko Ita, Aged 120, CupCup-bearer and Iyamba of Ekpe, Interviewed in Anwang-Oron, Usakedet, 14/10/2019.
[139] Anki Ambo Daniel, A Brief Historical Collections on the Administrative Development of the Rio Del Rey (Usakedet), 2018, Pp. 1-15.
[140] Usim Promise Usim, Aged 61, Youth Leader of Usakedet (Isangele), Interviewed at Oron, 23/10/2019.

The word Isangeli is an Efut, Oroko or Balundo's word: *Isangene* which means "sojourners" or "travelers" and corrupted to *Isangeli* and *Isangele* by the German, British and French administrators, writers and missionaries.[141]

However, Usakedet is one of the council areas in Cameroon having been created and renamed as Isangele on 29th June, 1977 by the Ahmadu Ahidjo led government. Usakedet is located at the cross roads between Cameroon and Nigeria, hence, the area has become the melting-pot of various ethnic populations, not only from the two nations but equally from other West and Central African countries.[142]

Table 1: Communities and Families of Usakedet (Isangele)

S/N	Communities	Tribal Stock	Family	Village Administration
1	**Oron**	Isangele (Usakedet)	Anwang Boku Uma Ukpong Irundo Ebongko Bakoko Atakpa	head by Village Head, Family Heads and Deputy Family Heads *Mbo Ufak* and *Ndiana Mbo Ufak*
2	**Amoto**	Usakedet	Akpe Efanga Abak Abre Uma Isong Isuruba	Headed by Village Head, Family Heads and Deputy Family Heads *Mbo Ufak* and *Ndiana Mbo Ufak*
3	**Bateka (*Efut Inwang* or *Efo Acha*)**	Balundo (Efut)	Bombori Dibokato	Headed by Village Head, Family Heads and Deputy Family Heads *Mbo Ufak* and *Ndiana Mbo Ufak*
4	**Massaka**	Mixture of Usakedet (Isangele) and Efut (Balundo)	Dibokato Offiong Obini	Headed by Village Head, Family Heads and Deputy Family Heads *Mbo Ufak* and *Ndiana Mbo Ufak*
5	**Archibong (corridor I and II)**	Archibong family of Calabar	Archibong Edet Ojum	Headed by Village Head, Family Heads and Deputy

[141] Anjeh Orami Dibo. Aged: 71. Royal Secretary. Interviewed at Oron. 13-12-2019.
[142] Tenwan Anube Frederick. Free Cameroon: Post Card from Isangele. https//emergingcameroons nowblogspot.com Accessed 18/3/2021.

			Aba Sutang Ikot Efanga Ikot Efanga Ambai Ikot Marusi	Family Heads *Mbo Ufak* and *Ndiana Mbo Ufak*
6	**Akwa (Oqua)[143]**	Balundo (Efut)	Akpe Efanga DIbokato	Headed by Village Head, Family Heads and Deputy Family Heads *Mbo Ufak* and *Ndiana Mbo Ufak*

Source: **F. A. Goodliffe, An Intelligence Report on the Isangeli Community of Kumba Division, Cameroon Province, National Archives, Buea, File 1080, Ag. 35, 1940, Pp. 20-23.**

Usakedet (now) Isangele has a population of about 5,000 inhabitants and was recently governed by a council of 22 officials headed by Late Mayor Caroline Offiong Usim, daughter of Late Chief Anjeh Usim of Oron chiefdom in Usakedet who was beaten and tortured by Late Major Isaac Adaka Boro of the Nigerian Army during the Nigerian Civil War of 1967-1970.[144]

Traditionally, Usakedet is divided into: Oron, Amoto, Bateka *Efut Inwang*, Massaka, Archibong and Akwa which are all original paramount chiefdoms, though there are several other villages founded and occupied by Nigerians of Oron, Ibibio, Efik, Eket, Andoni (Obolo), Ijaw fishermen, hunters and farmers. Such villages or settlements within the Usakedet jurisdiction are: *Ukoho I*, *Ine Atayo*, *Ine Akpak*, *Inua Mba*, *Ubuhu Efe*, *Ine Okpo*, *Ine Eteya*[145] all along the Rio Del-Rey estuary known locally as *Akpa Usakedet* or *Asiantum*.[146] As a result, the major ethnic groups in Usakedet are prominently made up of the Ibibio, Efik, Oron, Eket, Ibeno, Ijaw and Andoni (Obolo). However, the classification of some of these groups as ethnic groups within the Cameroons has raised a lot of controversies among those groups who all claims that they are totally independent ethnic groups from each other.[147]

[143] F. A. Goodliffe. An Intelligence Report on the Isangeli Community of Kumba Division. Cameroon Province, National Archives. Buea, File 1080. Ag. 35. 1940. Pp. 20-23.

[144] Ericson Effi Usim. Aged: 73. Retired Forestry Staff. Interviewed at Atakpa Road, Oron-Isangele. Southwest Cameroon on 5/12/2020.

[145] F. A. Goodliffe, An Intelligence Report on the Isangeli Community of Kumba Division, Cameroon Province, National Archives, Buea, File 1080, Ag. 35, 1940, Pp. 20-23.

[146] Anki Ambo Daniel, A Brief Historical Collections on the Administrative Development of the Rio Del Rey (Usakedet), 2018, Pp. 1-15.

[147] O. A. Odiong, *Bakassi Penisula: Growth, Conflict and Evolution,* Calabar, Odiong and Sons, 2008, Pp. 12-13.

Origin of *Onuo*

The origin of *Onuo* in Usakedet and *Ngondo* among the coastal people of southwest region of Cameroon came as a result of struggle against political and economic suppressions by the colonial regimes of Germany and France. However, prior to the formal organization of *Onuo*, what existed were cult groups which were segmented and operating at village levels. Such groups included *Atehereng* and *Ukpafot* among the Usakedet people while *Jengu* reigned among the Duala people and *Kribi*[148] who used to transform from human form to fish-like human called *mamy wata* or mermaid.[149]

At the end of World War II, entire Sawa littoral and Usakedet coastal people of Cameroon found themselves in a very precarious position. Its long standing leadership in Cameroonian political and economic life appeared to dwindle. Duala which used to be the political centre began to lose its relevance except acting as a mere commercial seaport where cocoa and other product were exported and imported from the interior and Akwa Ibom area of Nigeria. Such developments ignited the 1920s and 1930s anti-colonial protest in Duala, Usakedet and other parts of the coastal littoral of Cameroon.

Faced with the situation, the Sawa leadership under Alfred Ebele Ekwalla (1890-1958) and Usakedet leadership under Anjeh Usim (1897-1977) turned to their culture and history as a source of ethnic identity, an identity which might both unite the larger Sawa Bantu-speaking coastal population. The major vehicle for this new identify was the evolution of trado-political and cultural based groups called *Ngondo*, among the *Wouri*, *Kribi* people of Duala littoral and *Onuo* among the *Usakedet* people. Following the decisions of all the chiefs, herbalists and priests in the *Sawa* region to fortify and unite the region through annual festival, *Ngondo* and *Onuo* became institutionalized as annual festivals in *Usakedet* in 1947 except for a ten year ban by the Ahidjo Government which took place in 1981.

Purposes and Period of *Onuo* Festival

Iyamba Aboko Ita during an oral interview asserted that in Usakedetland the *Ndem mmuong* and *mamy wata* (water gods/goddesses) were venerated and appeased through the *Onuo* festival because of their roles in the protection of the people, land and businesses. The gods were seen as the true and effective sources of blessings, strength, wisdom, prosperity, fertility and peace in Usakedet land. Before 1991 when the ban on *Onuo* festival which lasted from 1981 was lifted by the Cameroonian government; *Onuo* was usually an annual ceremony However, due to high cost of procurement of ritual items and influence of Christianity *Onuo* festival had become a tri-annual celebration of the Usakedet people.[150] The month when it holds is usually December while dates are fixed by the *Oku-Onuo* in conjunction with the

[148] Ralph A. Austen. The Metamorphoses of Middlemen: The Duala, Europeans and the Cameroon Hinterland, 1800-1960. *International Journal of African Historical Studies*. Vol. 16. No. 1. 1963. Pp. 1-24.
[149] Ralp A. Austen. Traditional, Invention and History: The Case of the Ngondo (Cameroon). *Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines*. Vol. 126, No. xxx 11-2. (1992). Pp. 285-309.
[150] Ralp A. Austen. Traditional, Invention and History: The Case of the Ngondo (Cameroon). *Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines*. Vol. 126, No. xxx 11-2. (1992). Pp. 285-309.

Umuo-Obie in council after consultation with the gods. The last *Onuo* festival held on December, 10th -11th, 2019.[151]

Preparation for *Onuo* Festival and Rituals

Immediately the chief priest *Oku-Onuo* fixed the period or date of the festival and made some incantation before the *Iyamba* or cupbearer of *Obe* or *Ekpe*, the village chiefs *Umuo* in the presence of male *Mkparanwa Onuo* and female *Ebani Onuo* initiates to verify and confirm the date so consented by from the gods of water *Ndem mmuong*, preparation for the festival would begin. Since it is the affairs of the whole community, the king *Umuo* was always particularly very much involved as custodian of the people's tradition. Messages were sent to devotees, well-wishers, relatives and friends far and near. Before the advent of western media of communication, town criers emissaries were always engaged to disseminate such messages or information.

As a follow-up, the shrine and Village Halls *Obe* and their adjourning compounds were tidied-up and decorated with red-earth in readiness for the festival. Designs and emblems of the gods and deities such as *mamy wata*, *Ukpafot Umiako* among others were displayed conspicuously to attract public attention and show the magnitude to which the people venerated their gods and goddesses in Usakedetland. Items for ritual were acquired and foodstuffs were purchased before the festival started because none would be permitted to go out during the festive period. Such items like goats, yams, kolanuts, and other items of secret nomenclatures were acquired and kept in the custody of *Oku-Onua* who would perform both the nocturnal and diurnal rituals at the bank of *Asiantum* River. Each family prepared meals for the invitees while new attires and wrappers were bought by members and non-members to commemorate the event.[152]

Idowu corroborates that in every festival, the people must be ceremonially clean and pure morally and spiritually so as not to incure the anger of the gods and goddesses of the land, hence, in *Usakedet* society abstinence from sex, evil machination etc.[153] were ordered usually three days to the festival. The rite for cleansing of the alleged unclean members (both male and female) was performed the nights to the festival to serve as a propitiatory sacrifices for the benefit of the land and individuals involved.[154]

The Traditional and Cultural Activities during the Festival

Onuo, just like the *Ngondo* festival of the *Wouri* people of Duala, is a tri-annual and sometimes bi-annual festival of *Usakedet* people. The festival begins with a number of rituals and feasts performed to celebrate and express the unity of the various chiefdoms and communities of *Usakedet* nation. During the festival which usually begin from 4.00am of the day scheduled by the *Oku-Onuo*, such events as: traditional wrestling competition, canoe

[151] Iyamba Anjeh Aboko Ita. Aged: 122. Cupbearer and *Iyamba* of Ekpe. Interviewed in Anwang-Oron, Usakedet. 14/10/2019.

[152] Okon Christopher Ayongha. Aged: 80. Member of Oron Village Council. Interviewed in Oron-Isangele on 26/10/2019.

[153] E.Bolaji Idowu. *African Traditional Religion*. London: SCM Press Limited. 1975. Pp. 40-45.

[154] Iyamba Anjeh Aboko Ita. Aged: 122. Cupbearer and *Iyamba* of Ekpe. Interviewed in Anwang-Oron, Usakedet. 14/10/2019.

race, traditional *Ekombe* women ballads and dances, art exhibitions and fashion parades during which Miss *Onuo* pageant would emerge. At about 4.00pm the *Oku-Onuo* escorted by the *Iyamba*, priests of *Ukpafot* and other cults alongside with the entire people would assemble at the *Assiantum* river for the water ritual.[155]

The *Onuo* Water Ritual

Through the order of the *Oku-Onuo*, the well-equipped emissaries would embark on spiritual journey as they dive into the massive *Assiantum* River to seek messages sent by the water gods *Ndem mmuong* and the goddesses *mamy wata* and further propitiate or appease the gods on behalf of the people. As the spirited emissaries or boatmen are ordered to immerse into the body of the river where the *Ndem mmuong* dwelt, the *Oku-Onuo* (priest of *Onuo*) as well as other initiated elders shout: *Dio-ooo Onuo Dio-ooo* (come ooo *Onuo* come ooo) repeatedly while the *Oku-Onuo* embarked on other spiritual incantations.

The emissaries would spend about two hours inside the deep water of *Assiantum* River communicating with the gods *Ndem mmuong* and goddesses *mamy water*. Once they have been brought to the surface, the emissaries (usually 7), looked un-wet and would return with a spiritual calabash while the one they took into the water with various ritual items were seized by the gods. [156]

Impact of the *Onuo* Festival

Cultural Impact

It is strongly believed that *Onuo* festival is a strong cultural tool which normally brings inter-ethnic and national recognition to *Usakedet*. During the festival, *Usakedet* attires of various types and language are displayed while dances, indigenous foods etc. of *Usakedet* root are exhibited equally.

Touristic Impact

The *Onuo* festival plays a major role in attracting the public and visitors to *Usakedet*. It served as tourism promoter of the ancient city of *Usakedet* in particular and Cameroon in general.

Getz observed that what makes some event or festivals truly special is the unique ambience which can motivate travelers and equally serve as a catalyst for development. As a result, *Onuo* and its water-centric rituals has uniquely been recorded as one significant wonder of the *Usakedet* people.[157]

[155] Iyamba Anjeh Aboko Ita. Aged: 122. Cupbearer and *Iyamba* of Ekpe. Interviewed in Anwang-Oron, Usakedet. 14/10/2019.
[156] Eric Effi Usim. Aged: 81. Retired Cameroonian Forestry Staff. Interviewed om Oron-Usakedet on 13/10/2019.
[157] Donald Getz. *Festival, Special Event and Tourism.* Van Nostrand Reinhold: Indiana University. 1991. Pp. 75-81.

Economic Impact

The *Onuo* Festival ignites *Usakedet* communities financially by virtue of the large crowds they draw with many potential and actual buyers. Such festival is a quasi-business activity and its success is measured by its ability to attract visitors/tourists to Usakedetland. *Onuo* festival is a crucial tool in boosting the economy of *Usakedet*. Within the two day ceremony, Usakedetland played host to a number of visitors, commercial and trading interests. The two guest houses located at the ancient village of *Oron* and *Bateka* were centres of hospitality.[158]

Spiritual Impact

Religion has been part and parcel of human existence. For the African, religion is notoriously and incurably adhered to. Hence, an element of religion is found in every facet of African life with festivals as no exception.[159] Though *Usakedet* is basically a Christian society, the spiritual life of the African traditional worshippers are often rekindled whenever the festivals are staged. Again, it clearly shows that Africans are capable of living spiritual life inspite of the intervention of Christianity and Islam in most parts of the area.

Political Impact

In contemporary times, festivals play a role in the political arena of a nation. These served as platforms for the elected and the electorate or the ruler and ruled to interact and deliberate on issues. Traditional authorities do 'seize' these festival occasions to re-assert their authority over their subjects and to carefully plan actions for their communities. Bame asserts that the indigenes renew their loyalty and pay homage to their leaders. The traditional political role according to him has taken on a national outlook in the emerging African states nowadays in that, governments of the day use the opportunity for exchange of goodwill between chiefs whose people are celebrating the festival and the government of the day.[160]

Social Impact

Festivals draw people from all walks of life. This portrays the social factor that is very appreciated in *Usakedet* where 'invisible register' of attendance is marked by families and community members at such social gatherings. People from the locality who are domiciled in other parts of Cameroon and Akwa Ibom area of Nigeria are obliged to attend such occasions as mark of concern to family, clan and community. Hence, the *Onuo* festival is an occasion when people take some days off their busy work schedules to return to their roots to reunite with folks.

[158] Tom Powers and Clayton W. Barrows. *Introduction toManagement in the Hospitality Industry.* New York: John Wiley and Sons Inc. 1995. Pp. 45-50.
[159] John S. Mbiti. *African Religions and Philosophy*. London and Edinburgh: Morrison and Gibb ltd. 1969. Pp. 65-78.
[160] Kwabena N. Bame. *Profiles in African Traditional Popular Culture*. New York: Clear Type Press. Inc. 1991.

Conclusion

This study examines the importance and uniqueness of the *Onuo* water-centric festival of the people of *Usakedet* in Cameroon. The *Onuo* water festival showcases the customs, beliefs, traditions and cultures of the entire *Sawa* region in which *Usakedet* is part.
The study notes that the *Onuo* festival significantly contributes to cultural recognition, sustainable cultural heritage, economy and promotion of integration in the *Sawa* littorals in particular and Cameroon generally. Also, the *Onuo* festival which usually draw visitors, friends and neighbours from Akwa Ibom area helps to strengthen the bond of primordial relationship and brotherhood which existed between *Usakedet* and Akwa Ibom people before the advent of western influences.

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THE CONCEPT AND PROSPECT OF MOBILE MUSEUMS IN NIGERIA

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Abstract

Whereas the purposes of any Museum, are tripartite in nature from ICOM definition (which are study, enjoyment and education), the types or forms and structure by which these museums take, in other to achieve these purposes are becoming varying and increasing by the day. These have shifted from conventional immobile structures that parade the abodes of most historical and prominent cities of the world, to mobile and movable structures in form of vans and trucks that reach underserved audiences by driving directly to them and show-casing exhibits of historical, scientific and cultural forms, the fact that the latter forms "mobile museum," apart from being community-orientated is also very much accessible and at no cost to the audience, makes an inquiring and deep insight into it weighty importance, particularly considering the fact that despite it popularity and success in U.S.A., Mexico and France, to mention few, it remains a dreaded area in most Africa nations and Nigeria in particular. What then, are the frameworks, prospects, challenges and scope of mobile museum?

Introduction

The essence of museum over the years, have remained for them to serve as instruments of development and service in community in which they are situated. As agents of developments, they enforce and bring about gradual and rapid transformation directly and indirectly, via a synergy of various activities in conservation, exhibition, communication, research and in general acquisition of either artistic, industrial or scientific objects. These various activities as little or broad as they would be in their respective nature, contribute as a complete whole in effecting changes and development to the environment and indeed communities in which they are based. Communities comprise of a collection or group of individuals with a singular or common goal or interest. And since individuals, through their constant visitation and patronage of this great institution (museum), are transformed via

awareness and knowledge, or their very heritage and culture, it then follows invariable that the communities in which these individuals dwell in, are automatically prone to development and change.

Technology is been applied in creating solution to the countless number of persons who would wish to visit a fixed Museum, but, due to certain reasons can not. This is made possible through mobile museums; that is the preservation and display of cultural properties in mobile vans. However, it is important to note that the standard professional practice for museum curators and their colleagues is not undermined as a mobile museum or fixed museum. As Kavanagh has shown us, one approach to estimating professionalism is to look at a range of characteristics, and on an assessment of these characteristics - in skills based on theoretical knowledge, the provision of training and education, tests of competence for members, organization, adherence to a code of conduct, and altruisic service to museum curator's professional nature is clear (Kavanagh 1991 b:42).

However, development cannot dwell in isolation. As the saying goes; "No man is an island". Indeed to every action there must be an equal and opposite reaction. Another African adage puts in better "There is no smoke without fire". Thus there can no development, without education and educational services. As a matter of fact, a major determinant of societal developmental level is its level of education. They are both considered to be directly proportional to each other. So that a high level of education will result in high rate of development, and vice-versa.

Museums carry out various activities of which education and conservation are prime. However, in other to meet its role in educating and consequently developing its immediate communities, exhibits are displayed either temporary or permanent. Individuals, groups and schools are then the set – targets of these exhibits. However, the question now is; how do these individuals get to see these exhibits and become educated, so that they can transform and develop their respective communities? The answer is in two folds – It is either they come down to see these exhibits as they are being display in permanent structured buildings, or these exhibits are taken to them via, trucks or vans in form of **mobile museum**.

Whether the museum is 'immobile' or 'mobile', the same goals are intended and achieved. However the dimensions and proportions in which these goals are achieved under both platforms may be different, considering the environment and other economic and peculiar circumstances. A major challenge that have necessitated the evolution of mobile museums over the years, have been that of wider audiences and patronage. There is no gain saying in the fact that, most museums have not been meeting up with their targets, with regards to visitors to their galleries and exhibitions. In most cases, majority of the visitors are adults and non-schooling age group. Even when schools do patronize them, it is the financial capable ones that are able to do this, leaving behind the non-financially buoyant schools, wherein are the population of a vast majority of commoners, in whose hands are saddled the huge responsibility of delivering a better future to this generation. In the long run, museums are unable to meet up with the challenge of effecting positive changes and developments in their respective communities. Thus putting them in a most peculiar paradox. Being that as it were, there is a popular saying, that "if mohammed refuses to go to the mountain, the mountain will come to mohammed". So that if museums are not meeting up with the required patronage, then museums should be taken to the public – Thus mobile museums!

THE CONCEPT AND PROSPECT OF MOBILE MUSEUM

Mobile or movable museums are education outreach programme that brings the museum to the people. Typically they drive to schools, libraries and rural events. Their business model is to use grant or donor support, as their goal is to make the museum exhibit accessible to underserved population.

Museum education outreaches are activities aimed at providing services to the populations and people who might not otherwise have access to museum services. A key component of outreaches and indeed museum education outreaches is that the group providing it is not stationary; but mobile; in other words they are meeting those in need of the outreach services at the locations, where they are in. Apart from delivering services, museum's educational outreaches raise the awareness of existing services. Hence **"mobile museum"** is key to the over goal of educational services provided by any museum, irrespective of the country or continent. Since outreaches are supposed to be mobile, invariable and automatically, mobile museums fits in as one of the chief medium of achieving this.

The nomenclature, by which it is been called differs from place to place. While some people call it "mobile museums", others, prefer to it as "movable museums" still others regards it as "museums on wheels". The list is endless, as one move from one country to another. Whatever the nomenclature, the history of movable museum as a medium of museum educational outreaches traces back to around 1903, with the AMNH's (American Museum of Natural History) school service, which would deliver natural history objects (stuffed birds, and other animals, insects, rocks wood blocks plus handbooks) to schools at no cost. From the AMNH's experience, one would conclude that moveable museums like the 'Dinosaurs van' in its custody remain a most effective means of educational outreach, especially to school children who are the eventual leaders of tomorrow (Bonnie Sawyer 2002).

It is noteworthy to say here that moveable museums also exists, in the air and waters, as Air museum and Floating museum respectively. Hence, the target audiences determine the type of moveable museum to use. However with regards to development and patronage, moveable museums on lands are found in trucks and vans.

In New Mexico, which is the 5th largest U.S. State, and the 6th most sparsely inhabited, the 'Rail runner Express' (A van) is a moveable museum. According to its management; they need a van because New Mexico is vast and they bring a museum experience to many different towns that do not have a local museum. In fact the nearest museum could be many hours away. The van reaches students, rural and underserved populations who do not typically go to other museum. Moreover having exhibits on the van makes the museum experience less intimidating, and since the exhibits are hands-on, people really interact and connect with the content. The scope of operation is all embracing, as it could relates to either nature's, scientific, artistic, or cultural exhibits. Even floating museums. Hence, the scope is not different from those of the nominal immoveable museums (Thompson G. 1986).

PROSPECTS

As could be seen from the stories of those museums that have practiced and embarked on mobile and moveable museums units there exists resounding and great prospects from its venture. First is the general prospect of reaching out to a greater number of peoples and communities alike, within a short period of time. This been in line, with the goals of museum, which is to bring development to the community.

Secondly, it its prospect of enriching the scope and targets of the educational outreach programmes of most museums. As seen from the U.S.A. experience, in the fiscal year 2010, moveable museum had 22,144 visitors spread over their four trucks. Majority of these visitors were non-school groups. As earlier stated in the first year of its inception, the Nevada state museum, moveable unit was able to visit the whole 98 schools in the state, that year. This certainly is a thing which can never be achieved if museums were to remain in their traditional 'immoveable' state.

Another great prospect of museums on wheel is its ability to bring museums and in particular museum educational services to rural and remote areas which hitherto could not reached. The essence of educational outreach programmes is to bring museums to places and people who do not have access to it. This makes moveable museums a most veritable medium in reaching target audiences, irrespective of their locations.

Also according to the AMNH, at a school they reach up to 120 students, who are later given assignments related to the visits. Fifteen students visited the truck at a time. In the summers, a truck may see up to 300 students per day, though the visits are more fleeting, often they are as short as five minutes (Alex Ikechukwu 2006).

The overall prospects are inclined to ICOM definition of museum which is supposed to be intangible inclined. That is to say, museums are non-profit institutions. Hence emphasize when establishing any museum, should not be on making profit and money (tangible prospect). Moveable museums, since by their very foundation use grants or donor support to bring museum exhibits and museum services to people that have no access to them. This however, is not to say that these mobile museums do not generate funds, as a matter of fact it does generate as more audiences would automatically translate to more funds. But a line should be drawn between profit-making and fund generation. this is because it is very possible to generate funds and still not make profit. These being the axiom upon which all museums, whether moveable or immoveable are built upon.

Narrowing the prospects down to Nigeria, and indeed the NCMM (National Commission for Museums and Monuments). One is quick to point out that great are the prospects before the Commission. If eventually it decides to embark on a moveable unit in its educational outreach programmes. Considering the vast space of land in Nigeria, (both in the north, south, east and west) the prospects are so great. Many of these regions and people in these localities are inaccessible and do not or rather cannot visit the museum. Hence Moveable (mobile museum) vans in these places would help in no small way in brining the past culture and heritage of these people right to them at little or no cost to them.

Moreover, Nigeria accidentally happens to be the most populous black African nation. The number of schools in the country is enormous. Through moveable museums. Certain schools that are unable to bring their students to visit the museum are invariable reached. Even schools that are in very remote and distant areas, which the NCMM museum education officers, find difficult to reach, are easily contacted via the moveable-museums.

National Museum Esie awareness programme (Mobile Museum) October, 2012.

All these in the long-run would increase the volume of patronage of our National museum. Needless it is to say they the level of development of the nation at large would rapidly increased. This is consequential upon the fact, that their is increased community developments, as more people get to know about their cultural heritage.

CHALLENGES

A major challenge which moveable museums faces in America is that of funding according to AMNH. Fundings of these such units are through corporate sponsorships. These fundings aims at one funder per truck, but when money is tight, they accept partial sponsorships. Corporate sponsors get several benefits:

(i) Advertising via that logo on the truck that travels the city;
(ii) Branding right for their publicity documents and
(iii) Typically the truck and van will attend the funder's guest at those such functions.

The largest cost is staffing. The four educators are each paid between $35,000 to $40,000 per year. (That is between ₦466,666.67 to ₦533,333.33 per month). This cost of staff makes funding so very difficult to them.

Another major challenge is that of high cost of exhibition. The AMNH's exhibit team fabrication two of the exhibitions and two outsourced to a fabrication company. Each truck's expenses (e.g. books and handouts, minor repairs, maintenance, fuel, material supplies) is around $50,000 per vehicle per year (that is about ₦666,666.67 monthly).

Again, coming home to Nigeria, one discover that apart from the high cost of funding, there is a most challenging factor that would embrace Nigerian museums in a bid to actualize moveable museum. This in the presence of bad roads. Most of the rural and even city roads in the country are non motor-able. Bad road infrastructure, is not just a bane to Nigeria's vibrant economy, but also threatens developments in the culture, tourism and even agricultural sectors. Since moveable and mobile museums are conveyed via motors, the aim would be more or less defeated with the presence of these deplorable road networks.

Insecurity in the country due to activities of insurgents and terrorist groups, armed robbery, Boko Haram, etc are another main problems envisaged, with regards to establishment of moveable museums; especially in the northern parts of the country. It must be stated out that despite the fact that this part of the country, stands to gain a lot from mobile museum, terrorist activities and insecurity poises a great hindrance to the actualization of the goal.

In the overall, the peculiar nature of Nigeria makes the challenges encountered different from that of the American experience; (from the AMNH perspective. The issues of poor funding, resultant upon low budget allocation to the NCMM, lack of maintenance culture, poor roads, corruption, amongst others adds to the increasing files of potential challenges that might be encountered along the line.

However, one is quick to point out that these problems are only normal, and to be expected. The prospects greatly overweighs these challenges. Through a proactive and dynamic

management, these challenges would be over-come in the immediate short-run. Thereby bringing about a more robust NCMM in the long-run.

Conclusion

In summary therefore, one observes that museum around the world devised various media by which its set goals and targets can be achieved. This range from nominal museums to war museums, science museum, virtual museums and even moveable and mobile museum, just to mention, but a few. However, a most appealing type is the moveable museums scattered around the world. in forms of vans, truck, museum and floating museums. Nigeria cannot afford to be left behind in this global trend. Especially, considering the fact that the population and geographical set up of the country, largely encourages this forms of museum. As noted by Okpolo (1998:18) the NCMM is the largest single cultural institution in the country that can mobilize Nigerian artists to produce in commercial quantities the varying artistics expressions of our diverse society. It operates a network of museums in the country and therefore is the main museum agency with varied museum services, (for which moveable museum, should be included). In other words with over forty-five (45) stations spread across the various states, including its headquarter in Abuja, NCMM can only realize the objectives of its initiators in the current dispensation, including the vital function of re-educating our people on their culture, if it has a full moveable and mobile museum unit.

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INTER-AGENCY RELATIONS AND THE MANAGEMENT OF SECURITY IN NORTHEAST GEO-POLITICAL ZONE OF NIGERIA, SINCE 2009

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Abstract

Upon return to democratic system of governance in 1999, Nigeria has been faced with challenges of internal security like kidnapping, communal crises, Farmers-Herders conflicts, oil bunker, insurgency, banditry, militancy amongst others. This paper x-rays the deadliest of these challenges: the menace of Boko Haram in the Northeast. BH insurgency has led to the destruction of lives and properties worth billions of naira since its onslaught. This paper seeks to examine Nigeria's history of Inter-agency cooperation and collaboration in the fight against this menace in the North-East Nigeria. How it has been, and the impact on security management. The study also expands the concept of Inter-agency collaboration, causes of insecurity in Nigeria, counter insurgency, challenges of Inter-agency collaboration. Data were collected from both primary and secondary sources. The research recommends continued c collaboration, cooperation, training and capacity building so as to ensure effective security management. The paper is a value addition to the Federal Government of Nigeria attempts in combating internal insecurity from the network of all security apparatus in the country.

Keywords: Inter-agency, Security, Collaboration, Management

Introduction

In Nigeria, the North-East states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe has been experiencing significant terrorist attacks by members of the Boko Haram since 2009. This group has been

responsible for large scale kidnappings, killings, bombings through the use of improvised explosive devices (IED), suicide attacks on civilian, Police and military targets throughout the Lake Chad Basin. The Boko haram activities have resulted to death, in thousands of uncontrolled injuries and destruction of private and public property. According to the United Nations Refugee Agency UNHCR, about "1.5 million people have been displaced due to the insurgency and over 13, 00 have been killed" by the Boko Haram sect. The Resurgence of the group indicates that it still remains a dangerous asymmetric threat to the northeast region, the Nigerian state and its neighbors in the Lake Chad region. The operational weakness of the security forces also intensified the violence of the Boko haram, as the jihadist over-ran major towns and communities, capturing terrorists in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe States. Furthermore, a recent report of the international crises group (2016) warned that "the nature of Boko Haram's tactics and geographical reach will make the group's comprehensive defect difficult.[161]

In another development, the United States Department office in August 2017 observed that, the Nigerian security forces handling of counter-terrorism operations against Boko Haram in the Northeast lacks coordination and effectiveness. This however, calls for a reinvigoration of the counter-terrorism operations against Boko Haram especially with regards to Inter-agency Relations, collaborations and coordination to fight and defeat Boko Haram terrorist in the Northeast, Nigeria [2]

Conceptual Clarifications

Below are some of the central concepts the paper has conceptualized:

Collaboration: The Concepts of collaboration is as old as journey of man on the planet earth. The United States government accountability agency reports (GAO) of 2012 broadly defined collaboration as any joint activity that is intended to produce more public value than could be produced when the agencies act alone. (Lawrence et al 1990:98). View it also as any joint activity by two or more organizations that is intended to produce more public value than could be produced when the organization act alone. Furthermore, humankind learnt that the best way to surmount a form[162]idable obstacle is to join hands in some form of collective effort or the other. This generally meant that such otherwise her clean tasks become easier to accomplish because the collective strength of the forces is pooled for goal attainment. In essence, pooling strength or synergizing as it is often described in security environments, not only enables us to accomplish otherwise difficult tasks, it also ensures that the weakness of individual is counter-balanced and obviated. Collaboration in its generic sense describes some form of cooperation when two or more parties who may or may not have any previous relationship converge to work jointly towards attaining a common goal of mutual interest.[3]

[161] Amnesty International.(2014).Nigeria: more than 1,500 killed in armed conflict in Northeast Nigeria in early 2014, London: Amnesty International Publication

2 United Nations Development Program (UNDP),(1994),Human Development report, Oxford University press

3 Inter-agency Collaboration: A handbook of effective Security and Crises management in Nigeria.

4 Inter-agency Collaboration in Nigeria.

The term liter-agency collaboration can therefore, be generally defined as any joint problem-solving activity which involve two or more organizations/institutions or groups which is aimed at achieving a collective goal which may ordinarily be difficult to be achieved alone organizational/institutions or groups efforts. There are examples around the world where both security institutions have collaborated together with a view to provide security services such as promoting peace, policing communities, military development. This is also the situation in the northeast and many parts of Nigeria, where many informal non-state security groups have provided policing and military services to communities.[4]

The Concepts of Security

There are divergent approaches to conceptualize the concepts of security which is the antithesis of insecurity. Security need was the basis of the social contract between the people and the state, in which people willingly surrendered their rights to an organ (government) who oversees the survival of all (Stan, 2004).Security according to Macmillan dictionary online version define it as the total protection and the safety of a country and its citizens. Chamber dictionary define security as freedom from vulnerability and freedom from overthrown of government. While Baldbin sees Security as protection from threat and danger, absence of threat to acquire values or freedom from fear.[5163]

Security may also be defined as a protective condition which statements either try to acquire, or preserve, in order to guard the internal threat. Security is increasingly viewed as an all-en-compassing condition in which people and communities live in freedom, peace and safety, participate fully in the governance of their countries, and enjoy the protection of fundamental rights, have access to resources and basic necessities of life and inhabit an environment which is not detrimental to their health and wellbeing.[6]

In view of the above, the concepts of security depict and ability of a country to maintain its territorial boundary and curtail any threat to the wellbeing of its people, including relations with other nations of the world. Security therefore, is equally seen in terms of a nation military capability or the struggle to overcome internal and external aggression.

Inter-Agency Relations and Management of Security in Nigeria

Threats to national security in Nigeria are diverse and have continued to increase over the years and seem to have gone beyond the handling ability and capability of the Nigerian Police alone. The number of security agencies that are now mandated to work on different aspect of internal security has increased, for example, the military, civil defence, civilian Joint Task Force CJTF and Department of State Services (DSS). The armed forces of Nigeria and various law enforcement and intelligence organizations are partaking in internal security operations with a view to complementing each other to curb internal security challenges and

[5] Macmillan dictionary online version

6 Tanko S, Paul Issues in Criminology security Studies and Disaster Management

7 Jude M, Strengthening Collaboration between security forces and Non-State security group in the counter-Terrorism operations against Boko Haram Extremist in the Northeast Nigeria.

to protect Nigerians territorial integrity and Sovereignty particularly with terrorist taking a foot holds in the country.[7]

Inter-agency relations, according to Albert, it refers to as the art and act of promoting active working relationships among multiple security agencies with a view to improved process outcomes at reduce cost. He noted that under such arrangements, cross functional and cross-agency teams jointly applying centralized control and decentralized execution, construct to coordinate adaptable and agile efforts against various threats. Managing national security therefore, is the responsibility of the security agencies whose Joint efforts of this nature have often led to the effective curtailment of such threats. Inter-agency relation therefore, emphases the need for collaboration by actors in the security sector. The impacts of collaboration among security agencies are:

i. Enhancing security through the instrumentality of collaborative joint problem solving
ii. Provide a platform for officers from different security agencies to learn and adopt new ideas on joint problem solving[i]
iii. Provide a platform for cross learning for participants to from different security agencies to appreciate security management efforts by sisters' agencies
iv. Pooling strengths while reducing the effects of institutional weakness
v. Foster synergy and cooperation among security agencies. [8]

Collaborative Strategy in the fight

Violence in the north-east of Nigeria escalated in early 2015 as terrorist carried out deadly armed attacks in the states of Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Kano and Taraba States resulting in territorial gains. Worried by the spread of the Boko haram menace and radical ideologies of its affiliated terror groups, a summit was convened shortly after 300 girls were kidnapped from a school in Chibok by the Boko haram in April 2014 in Paris, the France capital. In attendance were the leaders of Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon and Benin along with representative from France, UK, EU and U.S the Submits was held to discuss the impending threat of Boko Haram and examined the Modus Operandi of the collective effort to combat the menace of the terrorist group.[9]

In other to end this menace, The Nigerian government collaborated with other governors in neighboring Chad, Cameroon and Niger Republic, together; they took a number of steps to increase effort to counter Boko har[164]am terrorist attacks across the Lake Chad region. To coordinate efforts, aimed at countering Boko Haram, in the region, Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria formed a multinational joint task force. This bilateral and multilateral combination by regional military forces successfully challenged and succeeds in pushing back Boko Haram which significantly reduced its control over territory.

[8] Global Security: An Appraisal of the Boko Haram Insurgency in Northern Nigeria, Journal of Sustainable Society. Vol 2.2013.
[9] Inter-Agency Collaboration
[10] Contemporary Threats to National and International Security, and Appropriate security measures. Retrieved from www.nato.gov.si

The effects of the Regional collaboration through the MNJTF in combating the Boko Haram Terrorist as enunciated by Olanisakin at the 7th edition of the National Security Seminar by National Defense College include: a formidable force structure, accessibility of border towns and improved intelligence gathering.[10]

Formidable Force Structure Strategy

The regional collaboration between Nigeria, Cameroon, Chard and Niger led to the United Nation U.N approval for the deployment of 8,700 troops to 10,000 troops. This gave rise to more formidable force from the LCBC countries and Benin in the fight against Boko Haram Terrorist and has increase the area hitherto being covered by the MNJTF and consequently reduced Boko Harm Terrorist movement and Operation.[11] [165]

Cross Border Relations

To enhance national and regional security under the auspices of the Lake Chard Basic Commission LCBC, the formation of the Multinational joint tax force MNJTF facilitated easy access to the troops of all LCBC countries to conduct operations against Boko Haram across the international Border without the usual protocols. This has ensured that Boko Haram Terrorist no longer use these border towns as save heavens. Collaboration has therefore, facilitated the accessibility of border towns leading to enhanced security and the resumption of economic activities.

Improved Intelligence Gathering

The ability to acquire intelligence is a critical factor in countering the Boko Haram Terrorist. The operation between the MNJTF member countries has facilitated intelligence sharing between them and increased the number of human intelligence sources. It has also facilitated the handing over of suspected Boko Haram terrorist between the countries. This has contributed to the quality of intelligence in the counter insurgency operations within all the countries. [12]

Joint Task Force (JTF) in Counter- Terrorism

Terrorism is a non-conventional and asymmetrical warfare which is mostly carried out between non-state armed actor's majority on civilian or military targets which include critical military and national infrastructures. Therefore, any attempt in tackling terrorism without tapping into the civilian local resources is doomed to fail as contemporary trends in countering terrorism has underscored civilian modes of warfare" (Bell, 2011). Engagements between governments and civil defense groups can bring about greater stability in areas where the government or the international community has little influence or effects. However, the counter-terrorism operations against Boko Haram was for a longtime

[11] Jude M, Strengthening Collaboration between security forces and Non-State security group in the counter-Terrorism operations against Boko Haram Extremist in the Northeast Nigeria

[12] Jude M, Strengthening Collaboration between security forces and Non-State security group in the counter-Terrorism operations against Boko Haram Extremist in the Northeast Nigeria

dependent on a military centric approach which could not deal with the asymmetric and Gorilla tactics adopted by Boko Haram and hence did not yield much positive results.[13] [166]

The military-centric approach adopted exposed the shortcomings of the Nigerian security forces. The collaboration with the NSSGs in the theater of the counter terrorism operations has recorded visible signs of operational success. This is acknowledged by the Nigerian army's joint investigation team (JIT), August, 2013, Report, which noted that "The involvement of these youth volunteers CJTF, crowned the operations with sources not envisaged in the past. Their efforts complemented that of JTF which brought about substantial sanity, restoration of social and economic activities in the northeast region.

In another effort to defeat the insurgents, in various communities in the northeast, the military and various community vigilantes started collaborating in a bid to defect the common enemy Boko Haram (AQAY, 2012). This collaboration has been very significant to the extent that it has not only led to the dismantling of the caliphate declared by Boko haram but reduced their activities in the area.[14]

The emergence of the civilian groups which are referred to as CJTF in the theatre of the counter terrorism operations in the northeast region of Nigeria brought some vigor and efficiency into the military campaign against Boko Haram terrorist. The collaboration between these groups has recorded huge operational success in terms of dismantling Boko Haram from the areas they declared as caliphates, as already mentioned. The reduction of the escalation of its violence and the restoration of law and order in the northeast

Challenges in inter-agency collaboration in the fight against Boko Haram

As Albert noted, inter-agency collaboration refers to the art and act of promoting active working relationship among multiplies security agencies with a view to improving process outcomes at a reduce cost. Inspite of opportunities for inter-agency collaboration as evident in the institutional mandates of the different agencies that when covered above, security agencies in Nigeria continue to engage in turf wars' and unhealthy competition over cross-cutting mandate which in turn negates the essence of their formation.[15][167]

The overlapping historical origin of the army, police and other agencies has been linked to their rivalries in recent times. This overlapping historical origin and the dramatic status transformation (especially) in favor of the army is argued to have engendered the struggle

[13] Jude Momodu, Strengthening Collaboration between Security Forces and Non-State Security Group in the Counter-Terrorism Operations against Boko Haram Extremism in the Northeast, Nigeria

[14] Anyedeke,O. (2014). Nigeria the community turns against Boko Haram. IRIN,Retrieved from www.irinnews.org/2014/08/11

[15] Inter-agency Collaboration: A handbook of effective Security and Crises management in Nigeria

[16] Inter-agency Collaboration: A handbook of effective Security and Crises management in Nigeria

[17] Jude Momodu, Strengthening Collaboration between Security Forces and Non-State Security Group in the Counter-Terrorism Operations against Boko Haram Extremism in the Northeast, Nigeria

[18] Inter-agency collaboration and Crises Management in Nigeria

for seniority and superiority among the forces, which is essence, has been source of the "Cold war" between the forces and the services, from which destructive clashes emanate. [16]

Other challenges are Rife, there are duplication of agency roles and it is coming knowledge that some agencies rush to claim credit for successful operations and team efforts involving other agencies yet distance themselves from failure. Some agencies fail to share information and intelligence with others agencies. Disagreements sometimes arouse over command and control which agency play the lead role.[17]

Dearth of Real – time intelligence, this is a challenge to the multinational joint task force MNJTF collaboration effort against Boko Haram. This attributed to the inability of the countries to collect and exchange timely information for smooth counter- terrorism (CT) operations against Boko- Haram insurgent in the Northeast.[18] Northeast.

Differences in Military tactics, Doctrinal differences is a challenge to effective operations against the Boko Haram BHT. Doctrinal differences at the tactical level do not allow for effective joint patrols in the border areas which are crucial for confidence building and development of synergy. Thus, the doctrinal difference among the countries constitutes a hindrance to effective operations. This makes cooperation at the tactical level difficult, thus, a challenge for regional collaboration in the fight against the BHT. [19] [168]book)

Differences of Standard Operating Procedure (SOP)

Mode of operation differs across the security community. Hence, there are several conflicts that emanate from a lack of understanding of standard operation procedure (SOP). Whenever there is collaboration arrangement, the coordinating agency needs to defined and simplify a standard operating procedure that all participating agencies can relate to for such a task or operation to succeed. Nigeria has several security institutions that routinely participate in internal security operations One of the key innovations that was developed in response to the challenges posed by insecurity in the country resulted in an inclusive security approach that saw the establishment of the Joint Task Force (JTF) system. The deployment of JTFs in several levels of internal security and counter-terrorism operations amounts to tacit acknowledgement of the fact that the primary institution responsible for internal security in Nigeria is overwhelmed, hence the need for sister agencies to support its efforts. [20] efforts.

Mutual Mistrust among Security Agencies

For effective Collaboration, trust is paramount. Most Security agencies do not trust each other with intelligence and operational schematics. Conflicts usually exist between military and paramilitary agencies when it came to intelligence gathering and sharing. Some agencies believed every information at their disposal is classified even while they are well aware that sister agencies need such intelligence to prevent breaches of the peace. Communication when not adequately and timely shared could pose a serious challenge in the collaborative nature

[19] Inter-agency Collaboration: A handbook of effective Security and Crises management in Nigeria
[20] Inter-agency Collaboration: A handbook of effective Security and Crises management in Nigeria

of jobs. However, there have been clashes involving the personal of security agencies over perception of superiority or domination, refusal or failure to respect status, the right to access, collect and utilized intelligence data, right to lead during joint operation, civil/Military relations and so on, which members of the public interpreted as civil/ military conflicts. The most common of these are usually between

i. Soldiers vs. Policemen
ii. Policemen vs. DSS
iii. Policemen vs. civil Defense personnel
iv. Customs vs. Immigration personnel (especially at the border).[21] jobs.

Impacts of the Collaborative Operations

The collaboration of the security forces and the NSSGs has increased the number of the fighting forces. The Army realized the vigilantes' potential as a source of local knowledge, intelligence and man power. The entrance of the NSSG into the counter terrorism operations become a force multiplier as well as game changer-as the collaboration between the NSSGs led to the sacking of the insurgents in the areas they forcibly declared as Caliphate in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe States. The Civilian Joint task force are members of the environment, i.e. Northeast thus they understand the dynamics of the local contexts and they enjoyed the trust of their people this makes it easy for them to have access to information about the activities of the terrorist groups which they supply to the military. [22]

The Collaboration between security forces and the (CJTF) fighting Boko Haram has enhanced joint operational planning, execution and coordination in effectively countering Boko Haram. The CJTF has been trained and has often been equipped of with arms by the military. They have collaborated with military in a number of operations both as frontline and support agents (International Crises Group,2014). The CJTF, Vigilantes assist the security operatives by identifying and the Boko Haram suspects, controlling security checkpoints, monitoring the movement of people in the community. Furthermore, the collaboration between security operatives and the CJTF in the area of operation has enhanced the allocation of resources and equipment such as weapons, intelligence information etc. The CJTF were also trained on the use of arms against Boko Haram in self-defense and to safe guard communities. (Human Right Council,2015). [23]

Conclusion

Inter-agency collaboration has made a significant impact in the fight against terrorism in the northeast region. The collaboration has become important due to its inherent benefits and effectiveness in the tackling terrorism. This benefit includes improving relationships, improving information sharing among the various security agencies in the operations theater. Therefore, the 2005 report of the United States Governmental accountability office (GAO)

[21] Inter-agency Collaboration: A handbook of effective Security and Crises management in Nigeria
[22] Jude Momodu, Strengthening Collaboration between Security Forces and Non-State Security Group in the Counter-Terrorism Operations against Boko Haram Extremism in the Northeast, Nigeria
[23] Jude Momodu, Strengthening Collaboration between Security Forces and Non-State Security Group in the Counter-Terrorism Operations against Boko Haram Extremism in the Northeast, Nigeria

observes that "the 21st Century will be difficult if not impossible, for any single agency to address alone". This assertion also speaks to the facts that, inter-agency collaboration is a step to successful dealing with 21st Century evil of terrorism and such collaboration could be global, regional sub regional or it could be inter-agency or between state and non- state actors.

Recommendations

Government should encourage regular training of the military, CJTF, Hunters and the Vigilante in the counter terrorism operation against the Boko Haram. Both the CJTF and the Government security forces are deficient in asymmetric and guerilla war tactics which the Boko Haram terrorist employ. The government most therefore, invest more in training and capacity building in asymmetric and guerilla techniques so that they will be able to out with the Boko Haram terrorist. Furthermore, they need to collaborate more in areas of training their members' modern techniques in counter-terrorism, joint operational plan, joint stimulation of the plan and the final execution of the operational plan to defeat the Boko Haram terrorist (BHT).

MULTIPLICIT THREATS TO INTERNAL SECURITY IN NIGERIA: OVERVIEW, STRATEGIES AND EVALUATION

By

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Abstract

Internal security has widely been explained within the context of the protection of state values as enshrined in varied state laws. It entails the defense of critical human and infrastructural assets of the state, the maintenance of the territorial integrity as well as the protection of the lives and properties of citizens from every possible threats. This paper examines the nature of contemporary human security threats to Nigeria's internal security and also explores its implication for the general security of the Nigerian state. Within this scope, Nigeria has had many challenges that have all conspired to threaten its corporate national security and also become a major stumbling block to the realization of a conflict-free and safe Nigeria for all its citizens and residents alike. The paper identifies some of these potent threats in the last decade and a half as violent conflicts and crimes that are social, political, economic and ideological in nature which have given rise to a general atmosphere of insecurity within the Nigerian state. The multiplier effect of these threats have resulted in an upsurge of inter-communal clashes, insurgency, terrorism, proliferation of ethnic militias, oil theft, piracy and banditry which are also particularly potent threats to national security. The paper argues that the Nigerian state is in great danger of losing its nationality, unity and development if the current military-centered approach is not reviewed in order to systematically check and address these threats. It concluded by advocating for a synergy between the citizens of the state and the internal security agencies to curb this dangerous trend by the use of modern technology and intelligence.

Keywords: State, Security, internal security, threats, strategies

The Concept and Background of Internal Security In Nigeria

The concept of internal security may be applied to the act of keeping peace within the borders of a sovereign state or other territories that are self-governing. This peace is maintained by generally upholding the national laws of the states concerned and defending the territory of

the state against any form of internal security threats. This responsibility may also rest on the shoulders of the police or the para-military forces within the state, or in very exceptional situations, the military may be required to compliment the efforts of the internal security agencies.

The major threats to may range from low-level civil disorder, large scale violence, or even an armed insurgency. These threats may be directed at either the citizens of the state, or the organs and infrastructure of state itself. It may range from petty crime, serious organized crime, political, social or industrial unrest, or even domestic terrorism. At other times, foreign powers may also act as a threat to the internal security of another state by either committing or sponsoring terrorism or rebellion, without necessarily declaring a state of war (Mamdami. 2004, 66).

In Nigeria, the major threats to internal security over the last decade and half is terrorism which is accentuated by violent extremist ideologies, separatist and nationalistic agitations, proliferation of ethnic militias, kidnapping of people for ransom and armed robbery which are at times orchestrated by trans-border criminal networks. The perennial agrarian/pastoralist farmers' crises is another particularly potent threat to Nigeria's internal security because of its tendency to trigger ethnic and religious interpretation. Other threats to Nigeria's internal security include cattle rustling and banditry, religious, inter-ethnic and intra-communal crises, economic sabotage reflected in oil theft and piracy, disruption, arson and vandalism of vital national assets, murder and cultism-related violence, cybercrime, political violence, especially election-related, and corruption, money laundering, electoral fraud, trafficking in persons, drug dealings and arms racketeering, and fraud that exacerbate poverty and inequality which further constitute the motives for crimes and threats to internal security.

Within this context, it is important to highlight, in particular, the potent threat that the Boko Haram crises posed to the nation's internal security. A strategic statement from President Muhammadu Buhari during his 2018 State Visit to the USA clearly situated the conflict within the transnational space. Even the then Director General of the Department of State Security (DSS) in a public statement also linked the crises to some foreign actors. Other informed sources have attempted to establish a link between Boko Haram Terrorism and the armed militias masquerading as actors in the farmers/herders' fatal violence in some states in the northern part of the country (Akinrinade, 2002 98).
These dynamics present four (4) trends that paints a dangerous scenario to the nation's national security in the future. These trends are;

1. It points to a globalisation of an internal security challenge.
2. It points to a growing synergy between terrorism and international conspiracy which by implication, is fast evolving into another phase in the nation's terrorism narrative and a veiled expansion of the terror campaign and theatre in a form that could be defined as 'dispersal of terrorism'.
3. It complicates the challenge of spread of the proliferation of not only light weapons in the civil society, but of military grade weapons beyond the traditional terror theatre.

4. It triggers the risk of the exposure of the vulnerable groups especially the youths, the unemployed and the aggrieved victims, who are mostly women and children, to armed struggle. It is today on record that that various individuals who fall into this category have found safe haven in the recruitment of insurgents either as informers, child-soldiers, accomplices or companions(Ayua, 2002,21).

The combined effect of these trends is that Nigeria's internal security is currently facing stress from multiple fronts which if not properly addressed holds the danger of escalating to a level where the nation's existence may be genuinely threatened again more than five decades after the Biafra war.

In geo-locating these threats, it could be clearly perceived that the North-Eastern part of the country is the epicenter of Boko Haram terrorism and violent extremism, Borno State in particular being the theatre of the conflict whose threats and actual devastation has ravaged an extended expanse of territory across the entire northern region. The Agrarian/pastoralists farmers' violence has predominantly been located in the North-Central states with occasional flashes also across the country. Cattle rustling and armed militia campaigns against the state have today taken over the entire North-Western states but with predominance in Zamfara, Katsina, Kaduna and the adjoining states of Niger and Kebbi. This is while kidnapping and armed robbery have become lucrative enterprises across all states of the federation without any exceptions.

Underlying these manifest threats are a number of salient but highly potent threats to our internal security. These include corruption which has the potentials of limiting the resources available to the state both for developmental purposes and for national security enhancement actions, particularly, in relation to enhancing the operational capacity of critical intelligence, law enforcement and military agencies. In essence, corruption inhibits the capacity of the state to guarantee national security, while also in effect, weakening citizen's confidence in the government in such a manner as could engender self-help and anarchy. In the past decade, corruption has gulped a large chunk of the trillions of naira allocated to defense and internal security in Nigeria, sometimes leaving members of the security and the armed forces hapless and helplessly vulnerable to attacks from the insurgents.

Others threats include cybercrime or cyber warfare which has potentials of electronically sabotaging the critical national assets and systems of Nigeria, and re-ordering the values of the state. The alleged cyber intrusion of Russia in the electoral process of the USA presents a classical case study in this regard. Indeed, it is being postulated that future warfare could be cyber-based and the world is gradually gravitating from nuclear arms race to cyber-warfare race, a component of warfare that is cheaper to deploy but as devastating in effect as nuclear warhead launch (Brenner, 1996, 118). Unfortunately, this is a component of national security threat that Nigeria as a nation is yet to fully acknowledge as potent and plan towards.

Equally potent is climate change which is expanding desertification, deforestation and engendering internal and regional migration of herds and humans from hinterlands for greener pastures with its attendant high-scale security implication. Indeed, fundamental to

the widening herdsmen/agrarian farmers' violence in Nigeria is this critical factor and it is posited that this reality must be acknowledged in evolving a solution to the threat. Other identified salient threats include political, ethnic and religious intolerance, violence extremism, separatist agitation, steady rise in unemployment and mass poverty, widening social and economic inequality, proliferation or firearms, and drug abuse which is fast becoming a major social problem, particularly amongst youths in the northern part of the country (Ojo, 2013,33).

Outline of Existing Internal Security Management In Nigeria

Internal security strategy is the sum total of a state's concern with the identification, prevention and nullification of manifest or envisioned threats to the nation, its people and its values through skillful intelligence acquisition, sensible precautions, tactical planning and efficient preventive, deterring and reactive endeavors all designed to guarantee strategic national peace, security, law and order. (Utstein, 2004).

As a process that requires the selection of appropriate responses to unique situations, the crucial challenge often faced by policy makers and internal security practitioners rests on the question of the most appropriate strategy to adopt to suit a particular security threat without violating international law and human rights law (Koufa, 2006).

Today, there are three (3) established threads that broadly capture the approaches to internal security management within the global space which are currently engaged in the counter-terrorism activities in Nigeria. These are:

1. ***Political/Diplomatic Approach*** **–** this approach assumes that internal security threats are politically-driven and to guarantee security, such threats should be politically discredited, operationally disrupted and eventually defeated (Sheehan, 2004). It is predicated on dialogue with a view to addressing political causes, while seeking international collaboration to deny actors involved in such threats the access to space, logistics and international legitimacy to operate.
2. ***Military/Law Enforcement Approach*** **–** this approach is based on the assumption that insurgency, terrorism or other sundry threats to internal security are a tactical violence in which the adoption of military force targeted at the 'center of gravity' – command and control, facilities and operational bases – of such threats is most desirable. This military strategy is often referred to as 'boots on the ground', and it is built on the principle of 'attrition'. The approach proposes enough firepower to weaken and deter actors engaged in such internal security threats. It also includes independent military action, or joint tripartite action between the military, the intelligence and the law enforcement community (the police). As convincing as this approach has been, the challenge remains on how to adopt it in a manner that will prevent collateral damage which might be viewed as violations of human rights (Wilkinson, 2006). This is because human rights abuses increase fears among the civilian population, alienate the public, attract sympathy to the terrorists and often times provide speedy flow of recruits to insurgents particularly in situations where the ideology oiling and the insurgency is as sensitive as religion or political issues as is the case with Nigeria.
3. ***Hearts and Minds Approach*** **–** this approach is premised on the assumption that the threat to internal security is a consequence of social, economic and political

deprivations amongst the population which is often expressed in frustration and violence. It can also be through fundamentalist or ideological indoctrination as was the case of the Boko haram in the north east of Nigeria. In this kind of situation, only addressing the root causes of these deprivations through good governance, developmental projects, well-structured de-radicalization processes, youth entrepreneurial empowerment programs and quality national leadership will address the all-encompassing factors that engender such threats and shift the population's sympathy and support from the insurgents or the threats actors to the government. (Wilkinson, 2006).

Challenges and Strategies of Internal Security In Nigeria

In practical terms, the Nigerian internal security architecture is a coagulation of military and law enforcement strategies. It is woven around the concept of 'Joint Task Force' (JTF). The components of the JTF are drawn from the military, the police and other para-military security outfits like the Civil Defence and the Department of Security Service. However, the command, tactics and control of the force is evidently and exclusively vested on the military component (Osaghae, 1996, 45). This is a serious misnomer, as internal security of any state is within the purview of the internal law enforcement agencies like the police. The police has the constitutional mandate to safeguard lives, protect the properties of citizens and generally maintain order within the state. The implication of this military-centered approach within the JTF setting is that counter-terrorism initiatives and operations of the country are led by the military, guided by military culture and predominantly regulated by military laws and practices in relation to the rules of engagement and treatment of arrested terrorist suspects. The other components like the law enforcement components and the para-military are left with more or less secondary roles to play in the operations. As such, not being the lead agency, it is a challenge for the police to bring law enforcement standards to bear in an operational theatre in which the military plays the leading role, and in which most often, the military operate independent of other components of the JTF. For instance, the military take custody and debrief arrested suspects in line with military laws and practice, or even in some other instances, engage suspects with clear military intent of 'taking them out' unlike the intent of the police which usually rests on the use of minimum force for purposes of incapacitating, arresting, investigating and bringing to justice any arrested suspect (Ekeh, 1999, 21).

Under this framework, evidence collection and preservation in aid of prosecution by law enforcement agents is often a huge challenge as the scene of the crimes might have been tampered with by personnel of the lead agency, the military, who might be oblivious of the investigative and prosecutorial value of such pieces of evidence no matter how minute they might be. Hence, as a military-driven strategy, the approach of the military is to apply maximum force including bombardment of suspected terrorist hideouts in a manner that will leave no evidence of prosecutorial value. This is in contradistinction to the established law enforcement approach to internal security where operations are planned and executed in such a manner as to preserve evidence at the scene in aid of investigations and prosecution afterwards (Donnelly, 1989, 81).

The military or JTF approach is further compounded by the fact that while military commanders may be grounded in military law, they may not be conversant with the vitals of criminal law and Evidence Act. The implication is that investigation is ultimately hampered, long detention of terrorist or suspects is engendered and prompt and successful prosecution of terrorist elements by law enforcement agents is encumbered. Furthermore, the approach also raises question on the critical issue of inter-agency collaboration. This centers on the complexities relating to blending military law, tradition and practices to civil law, law enforcement practices, ethnics and standards in a counter-terrorism structure in which law enforcement component is subsumed under military command. This clash of professional standards does not only threaten the success of internal security operations within the JTF setting in Nigeria, but it also impacts on treatment of arrested suspects in relation to rule of law and human rights protection.

While these strategies and challenges must be appreciated, they however provides an opportunity to address the following fundamental questions that border on internal security management and human rights in Nigeria.

1. Can internal security be effectively managed through an exclusive law enforcement approach?
2. In the event that military approach is exclusively adopted, as obtained presently, what should be the role and functions of law enforcement agencies and other para-military outfits involved in the operations?
3. In a JTF approach as being experienced in Nigeria today, being a shared responsibility, how best can military laws and traditions be blended with criminal law, law enforcement tradition and rule of law in an internal security framework that is premised on joint military and police operation?
4. Granted the mood and apprehension of citizens, how best can the demand for rule of law be blended with public expectation on internal security?

Internal Security Management: An Alternative Strategy

Internal security in modern times is built around the following three (3) critical factors:

1. People – the people in this instance refers to quality human resource which encompasses highly trained, motivated and equipped body of women and men who are recruited under the Thomas Hobbes' social contract theoretical framework and charged with the responsibility of coordinating communal safety and security. It also includes the ordinary citizens who represent the most critical component of internal security management as they are the most vital information -generation asset within the internal security architecture. Beyond this, the people also include the political leaders whose vision, will, depth of knowledge of the dynamics of internal security management and firm commitment for the existence and survival of the state oil the internal security drive. The importance of the people in internal security management proposes that political actors (strategic policy makers), professional security bureaucrats (the Police and intelligence communities) and the citizens must appreciate that an effective internal security framework requires that each of these human components must place national interest above all other considerations and commit to collaborating in identifying and prioritizing security threats. They must

also collaborate to evolve strategies directed at mitigating the threats and partnering with each other to guarantee communal security.

2. **Technology** – as a component of the internal security management web, stakeholders in the security apparatus of states must appreciate that in a globalized world, technology must be accepted as both a challenge and a solution. As a challenge, virtually all crimes today are conceptualized, designed and manifested with the aid of technology. Cybercrime, kidnapping, insurgency, separatism, armed robbery, fraud and other transnational crimes are all aided by information and communication technology or other innovative technologies in one way or the other. It therefore goes to say that the advancement in technology is indeed a threat to internal security. Conversely, technology is also a solution to internal security threats as it provides solutions (hardware and software) that could be engaged and deployed to prevent, detect and disrupt elements that constitute threats. Indeed, modern internal security activities including intelligence and policing functions are increasingly driven by technology rather than by the numbers of bodies deployed physically to security functions. Certain crime management software have been designed, for instance to aid in the ability of police forces around the world to crime-map, identify the profile, pictures and signature of criminals, manage criminal databases, 'follow the money' and undertake online scientific criminal investigations. Admittedly and unfortunately, these are capabilities that Nigeria police currently lacks due to its weak technology base.
3. **Systems** – effective internal security strategy requires that there should be national policies to define roles of collaboration. The policy should also set operational processes, values and principles, regulate interactions within and among strategic actors, and provide a framework for periodic performance evaluation and accountability. Internal security, being a subject of national consensus, it should also be subjected to episodic evaluation and re-evaluation in order to continually attune it to the wishes and consent of the citizens and the dynamics of crime and technology.

Summarily therefore, internal security is premised on the quality of the human asset base of the country, revolutionary technology advantage, and a well thought-out policy and process to drive the system (Freedman, 2015,67).

Recommendations

With the benefit of hindsight, a hybrid internal security management approach that is built on the following concepts is hereby recommended if Nigeria is to succeed in curbing the menace of threats to internal security it is facing from all angles and in all its geopolitical regions. These recommendations provide some way forward:

1. Citizens' consent and community policing principles – This approach first of all emphasize the pivotal role of the police in internal security management. This recommendation will guarantee citizens ownership, consent and support in the need to find a lasting solution to issues that affect the security of the people directly. Even though there is a lot skepticism concerning the manipulation of the community police by the local politicians, within this context, it is a small sacrifice to pay for the potential continuity of the state itself as the framework continues to be perfected.

2. Intelligence-led policing practices – this approach will ensure efficiency within the extended Nigeria police family especially the intelligence department whose very critical functions have been relegated to the background within the JTF. Intelligence gathering may lead to further successes in the fight as it may also lead to the apprehension, investigation and prosecution of not just the foot soldiers but of the masterminds as well.
3. Technology-driven policing operations – this tactic will guarantee the full deployment of science and technology to address internal security challenges in a most cost-effective and professional manner that will align the internal security management orientation to global best practices. Drones can be employed and deployed to volatile regions and also unmanned fighter jets equipped with night vision and sound proof capability can also be deployed to the theatre in order to minimize casualties.
4. Inter-agency collaboration – when clearly stated and defined, this approach will categorically spell out the roles and functions of every agency involved in the force to avoid role conflict and clash of supremacy that will eventually jeopardize the operations. Every component of the JTF needs to be given the latitude to operate within the confines of its jurisdiction for the overall success of the operations of the force. This collaboration should not be taken for granted because any inter-agency rivalry will only undermine the efforts of the entire process.
5. Security reforms – this is necessary In order to address overlapping functions that engender budgetary wastages and uncoordinated approach to internal security management. This reform should also include a major re-organization, a re-equipment plan and a new operational culture that will restore their privacy within the internal security setting of the country which require a re-dissection and re-engineering. It is through this that the prominence of the military in internal security management as well as the resonating agitation for state police or other para-policing bodies for the country will be addressed.
6. State Governments cooperation – state governments need to accord genuine attention to internal security by ensuring the routine convocation of state security council meetings during which patterns and trends of crime and challenges of law enforcement within their different states will be x-rayed and strategic approaches developed to address such threats.

Generally, the strategy of dispensing with internal security should take cognizance of Section 217(2) (c) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999 as amended) which provides that the military could be deployed to suppress insurrection and act in aid of civil authority. The President, Commander-In-Chief of the Armed Forces of Nigeria, relying on this provision, could strengthen the framework for the deployment of the military to complement the police in serious internal security challenges of magnitudes that have practically escalated beyond the operational capacity of the police. Sanda (2013) observes this process is what has been conceptualized as Military Aid to Civil Power (MACP) when it involves the use of firearms and Military Aid to Civil Authorities (MACA) which refers to the engagement of the military to support civil powers in the management of disasters or emergencies.

There is also the need to evolve an internal security policy that will adopt these approaches as Nigeria's internal security management framework and intelligence driven internal security architecture; strengthening of inter-agency collaboration framework; strengthening of the criminal justice administration profile of the country; and harmonizing as well as strengthening the legal and operational framework for criminal justice management within in the West African sub-region.

Conclusion

The Internal security of any nation is a catalyst to its national development and the assurance of its citizens' confidence and strengthening of state's legitimacy. It is however, a product of synergy between the citizens, the government and security agencies, just as it is driven in modern times, by the engagement of cutting edge technology and intelligence functions. Any nation desirous of internal security must of necessity develop a national policy framework that is designed to strengthen the capacity of its police as well as the relationships within and between strategic actors in the internal security of the state. Therefore, until Nigeria appreciates these essentials of internal security management, it shall continue to engage reactive approaches and the debate on internal security in the country shall continue to resonate.

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LEADERSHIP CRISES AND THE CHALLENGES OF DEMOCRACY IN AFGHANISTAN: AN APPRAISAL OF TALIBAN AUTHORITY IN AFGHANISTAN, 1994 – 2021

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Abstract

Leadership crisis has engulfed Afghanistan for long period of time. This is born out of quest for power among the actors (the Taliban and Pro-Democracy group) in the country. Interestingly, the Taliban came to limelight following the final withdrawal of Soviet troops in Afghanistan on 15th February, 1989. This marked the end of communist regime in Afghanistan. The Taliban emerged as a force for social order in 1994 in the Southern Afghan Province of Kanadhar and took full control of Afghanistan in 1996. The word "Taliban" echoes and reechoes terrorist phenomenon in the mind of people wherever it is mentioned. Taliban became a formidable authority in Afghanistan and subsequently toppled by foreign power, particularly, the US-led invasion in 2001. Thereafter, democratic government was installed. The activities of Taliban authority which do not connote democratic principles made them to be regarded as terrorists. Meanwhile, the Talibans believe that the principle of government should be rested on the Quranic injunction. On this note, between 1996 – 2001, Taliban authority ruled with Sunni principle which is a threat to the existence of Shia group who has its stronghold in Iran. At the same time, the US-led government see the Taliban as a terrorist group because of its defiance to democratic principle. Can ideological struggle within the ambit of religious law be tagged as terrorism? In view of the foregoing, it is pertinent to appraise Taliban authority in Afghanistan since 1996, up till 30th August, 2021, when the Taliban lunched itself back into state affairs in Afghanistan. The methodology adopted is secondary source which comprises the use of relevant materials such as textbooks, journals, newspapers, and other relevant documents.

Keywords: Democracy, Leadership Crisis, Ideology and Terrorist.

Introduction

Leadership is ability to lead, the ability to guide, direct, or influence people. These are qualities of leadership which Afghans have demonstrated to influence people in Islamic

political system. The Taliban movement was created in 1994 by a senior *mullah* (Islamic priest), Mohammed Omar, in the southern Afghanistan city of Kandahār to galvanize support for Islamic government. The name *Taliban*, meaning, "student," refers to the movement's origins in Islamic religious schools, or madrasas, although most members knew war all their lives and attended the madrasas only for rudimentary religious training[169]. The Taliban is a Sunni Islamist nationalist and pro-Pashtum movement founded in the early 1990s solidly for Islamic principle.

The United States sees democracy as a system of government that must observe specific rules and regulations. Democracy requires quality leadership to galvanize people for proper conduct of democratic norms. There is no doubt, the western world is an ardent supporter and propagator of democracy to the outside world. This has made the entire world to see the western world, particularly the US-led government, as an agent policing the entire world on democratic values. Both western and US-government had been at logger-head with Taliban for political supremacy. While the Taliban had bias for Islamic principle which is totally against the ideal of democracy, the US believes that democracy is the only means of government that can guarantee equal right for all in any society.

To US-led government, any society that negates the tenets of democracy falls short of the features of a civilized society, which tends to promote act of terrorism or oppression. The policy of using religious principles as means of governing state or society tends to promote particular interest of certain group of people who believe in that particular religion. This has made activities of the Taliban authority inimical to the US. Also, the alliance or fraternization with the Russia Communist system created bad relationship between the US-led government and Taliban authority.

In view of the foregoing, the paper analyzes the Taliban authority in Afghanistan from 1994 to 2021. The Taliban is a Sunni Islamist nationalist. The word "Taliban" is Pashto for "students" composed of peasant farmers and men studying Islam in Afghan and Pakistan madrassas, or religious schools[170]. The Taliban found a foothold and consolidated their strength in southern Afghanistan. By 1994, the Taliban had moved their way through the south, capturing several provinces from various armed factions who had been fighting a civil war after the Soviet-backed Afghan government fell in 1992. On 27th September, 1996, the Talibans captured Kabul, killed the country's president, and established the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. This marked the beginning of Taliban authority in Afghanistan[3171].

To have in-depth analysis of germane issues in this study, the following sub-titles are critically examined. Geographical location and people of Afghanistan, brief historical account of Afghanistan as an entity, the political logjam in Afghanistan and emergence of Taliban, the coming of democracy and its sudden disappearance in Afghanistan, lesson from sudden collapse of democracy in Afghanistan and conclusion.

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Geographical Location and People of Afghanistan

Afghanistan lies at an average elevation of 1885m above the sea level and is regarded as one of the countries located on the highest peak in the world. the highest mountain peak in the area is Noshaq at 7,485 metres. The land mass has a total area of 652,860 km (252,070 mi)[4172]. Afghanistan is approximately 94% of the area of Texas and one of the largest countries in Asia and 41st biggest countries in the world.

Afghanistan is bounded to the east and south by Pakistan (including those areas of Kashmir administered by Pakistan but claimed by Indian), to the west is Iran, and to the north is Central Asian states of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. In the northeast, it has border with Xinjiang, China, at the end of the long narrow Vakhan[5]. It is a land locked mountainous country located at the Central Asia and South Asia. It is also seen as part of the Middle East.

Afghanistan has a very scarce rainfall, which makes rainfall in the area unpredictable. There is a great difference in summer and winter temperature and of the day and night temperature, as well as the extent of which change of climate can be attained by slight change of place.[173][174]

The climate known with Afghanistan in the nights are clearer than the days. The smallest daily range in the north is when the weather is cold; the greatest is when it is hot.
For seven months of the year particularly from May to November, the range exceeds 17^0 C (31^0 F) daily. Waves of intense cold occur, lasting for several days, and one may have to endure temperatures of 24^0 C (-11^0 F), rising to a maximum temperatures sink as low as 25^0 C (-13^0 F). There are four (4) major rivers in the country, these are: Kabul River, Hari River, Amu Darya River and Helmand River. She also has smaller rivers, lakes and streams. The capital of Afghanistan is named after Kabul River[6]

In term of religion, Islam is the major religion, with approximately 99.7% population, while other religions, such as Christianity, Sikhs, Hindus and Baha'i, share the remaining percent. Afghanistan is regarded as multiethnic and cosmopolitan society. The following are the ethnic groups in Afghanistan: Tajik, Baloch, Uzbek, Hazara, Airmaq, Turkmen, Pashai, Nuristani, Kards, Gujjar, Arab, Brahui, Kyrgyz, Sadat, Qizibash, Pamiri and others[175].
The Afghan government is established as a Sunni Islamic Republic. Therefore, there is a strong societal pressure to adhere to Sunni Islamic traditions. The moral code of the Islamic doctrine tends to govern the political, economic and legal aspects of an Afghan's life[176]. Not all Afghans are strictly observant Muslims. For example, many people do not pray on a

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regular basis. Nevertheless, everyone tends to engage with Islam on some level as Islamic customs form the basis of many general cultural norms in Afghanistan[177]. There are two main variations of Islam in Afghanistan Sunni and Shi'a. An Afghan's ethnicity is generally presumed to determine which denomination of Islam they belong to. Most Pashtuns, Tajiks and Uzbeks are Sunni, while Hazaras constitute the largest Shi'a population of Afghanistan. There are some exceptions, such as the Pashtun Turi tribe and the Badakshan Tajiks, who are Shi'a[178].

Brief Historical Account of Afghanistan as An Entity

Concomitantly, Afghanistan has long history of domination by foreign rules, the territory regarded as Afghanistan was severally conquered by different states at different period. At the beginning, Asia and Europe had peculiar interest, this made the Afghans to be conquered by Darius I of Babylonia circa in 500 B.C., and Alexander the Great of Macedonia equally conquered the area in 329 B.C. Thereafter, in 11th century, Mahmud of Ghazni, who established an empire from Iran to India, is regarded as the greatest of Afghanistan's conquerors. Thereafter, the Persians, Greeks, Kushans, Huns, Turks, Mongols, again the Turks, again the Persians, and finally the British and Russians[179].

Actually, prior to the 18th century, Afghanistan did not exist as a definable nation. Political consolidation into a viable nation-state occurred, into what we now have as "Afghanistan" with the advent of British, and Russian imperialism. Irreconcilable interests of both Great Britain and Russia has remained subject of controversy in the political activities of Afghanistan till present.

In 1736, Persian ruler, Nader Shah, took control of most of the region that is present day Afghanistan. After Nader Shah was assassinated in 1747, Ahmed Shah Durrani was chosen as the ruler of Afghanistan. During Durrani's reign, Afghanistan borders were extended into India in 1760s. This further brought proximity between Afghanistan and India under Durrani. While this extension was going on under Durrani, the Russian authority was making serious approaches to Afghanistan territory.

Meanwhile, in 1809, the East India Company, acting British representative in Asia, signed the Anglo-Afghan Treaty with Shah Shuja, the King of Kabul. Political anarchy reigned in Afghanistan for two decades. Warring tribal factions, dominated by Sikhs of northern India, struggled for control in the early 1800s. Shah Shuja fled to Lahore in 1813 and remained under the British protection until Dost Mohammad Khan consolidated Afghan tribal power in 1836. Dost Muhammad sought British approval of his new position as Amir and appealed for British aid against Persia[180]. The British denied the request on the ground that Dost

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Muhammad had previously sought aid from the Russian authority. This caused British growing concerned about Russian advances in central Asia. For interest of the Great Britain to be protected, British authority felt that there was urgent need to use Afghanistan as buffer state to protect all approaches and advances by Russian authority to British India[181].
The protectorate came after Britain fought three Anglo-Afghan wars on the territory of Afghans for British interest the protectorate of Afghanistan was declared by Britain. The first Anglo-Afghan war was fought between 1839 and 1842. The war ended with the defeat of the entire British-led Indian invaders by Afghans force under Abdur Akban Khan. The second Anglo-Afghans war was fought between 1878 and 1880, the British authority led this war and was equally defeated by the Afghans. This battle was referred to as the Battle of Kandahar, victory recorded by the Afghans led to the emergence of Abdur Rahman Khan as the new Emir.

In 1901, Habibullah succeeded his father (Abdur Rahman Khan). Habibullah was assassinated while on hunting trip in Laghman province on February 20th, 1919. His brother, Nasirullahi Khan, briefly succeeded him as emir and held power for only one week before he was ousted and imprisoned by Amanullah Khan, the third son of Habibullahi[182]. Afghanistan got independence in 1919, the country celebrates her independence on 19th August every year to commemorate the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1919 and relinquishment from British protectorate status.

Remarkably, Russian foreign policy focus on preservation of the Soviet Union, the improvement of international connections, and the spread of Communism through the activities of COMINTERN (an international Communist organization founded by Lenin in Moscow in 1919 and dissolved in 1943)[183]. This was formed to advance Russian agenda in Central Asia and other areas. To keep the strong ties between Afghanistan and Russia, Amanullah sent two letters on April 17,1919, to Moscow by saying:

> "Afghanistan was free and independent, and pointed out that the Afghans psychology had always contained in it ideas of equality, humanity and liberty"[184].

To show commitment and empathy towards Afghanistan, Lenin replied on May 27, 1919, congratulating the King and the Afghan people for their heroic defence of liberty, and accepting the proposal to establish diplomatic relations with Soviet[185]. This was great opportunity for Russia to have alliance with Afghanistan against British authority. This

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diplomatic relation created avenue for Russia to have alliance, which equally caused unabated rivalry between Russia and Great Britain till date.

The Political Logjam in Afghanistan and Emergence of Taliban

Though Afghanistan has experienced semblance of dictatorial democratic rule in the past, in 1978, People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was the only one-party holding sway in Afghanistan. The Saur Revolution ushered in insurgent troops led by the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) when President Mohammed Daoud Khan was violently attacked on 27th April, 1978. Prior to this period, President Muhammed Daoud Khan had taken power five (5) years before by overthrowing and sending into exile his cousin, King Zahir Shah, in similar brutal attack[186]. In the evening of 27th April, 1978, Afghanistan radio announced that the Khalq (people) were overthrowing the Daoud regime. The use of word *Khalq* is equally known as communists in Afghanistan. In the announcement, it was made clear that PDPA was leading the coup and controlled the media. The violent change of government was orchestrated by PDPA through the Saur revolution, which ousted the regime of the unelected autocratic Mohammed Daoud Khan. Nur Muhammad Tarki became the Head of State and Government on 30th April, 1978. The government was regarded as the de facto political party which brought a government into power without any organized election but through the barrel of gun[187].

Thereafter, Tarki's government was installed. Tarki and Hafizullah Amin were seen as the arrow heads of the newly formed government in Afghanistan then, they introduced several contentious reforms during their rule such as land and marriage reforms and enforced policy of de-Islamization alongside the promotion of socialism. For the first time, universal education and equal right for women were introduced. These various moves made Tarki and Amin's rule to become unpopular amongst both Afghanistan and Soviet Union. By December, 1979, Soviet intervention supported by few elements in government, had commenced by Soviet military forces, during which Karmal was made the leader of the new government. Karmal's government lasted for seven (7) years, (1979 - 1986), Karmal era was marred with the Soviet-Afghan war, in which Soviet and Afghan government forces fought against the Afghan Mujahideen in order to gain the control of Afghanistan[188]. The war brought untold hardship to Afghans with large number of civilians killed and many became refugees in Pakistan and Iran.

In 1980, a constitution was introduced as part of government is policy to widening its support base. However, government policies under Karmal failed to bring required peace to the war-ravaged country. In 1986, the General Secretary of PDPA, Mohammad Najibullah, became the Head of Government. Policy of National Reconciliation was introduced and pursued by Najibullah. By 1987, a new Afghan constitution was introduced and democratic elections were conducted for various offices in 1988, which was boycotted by Mujahideen. Between

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1988 – 1989, Soviet Union government withdrew from Afghanistan. In 1990, a twist to politics of Afghanistan came, as another constitution was introduced, Afghanistan became an Islamic Republic, and PDPA was transformed into the Watan Party[189].
Amazingly, the introduction of new constitution could not stop the political crisis in Afghanistan. Rather, the political crisis rendered government incapable of defeating the armed opposition in open battle. This was demonstrated in the Battle of Jalalabad. With an aggressive armed opposition and internal crisis such as failed coup attempt by the Khaliq faction in 1990, coupled with the dissolution of the Soviet in 1991, the Najubullah government collapsed in April, 1992[190]. The collapse of Najibullah's government triggered another civil war, which led to the emergence of the Taliban and eventual takeover of Afghanistan by Taliban in 1996.

The coming of Taliban into the government in Afghanistan ushered in another model of government which met stiff opposition of American government because of terrorist activities linked to Taliban by harbouring Al-Qaida, a wing of Islamic organisation fighting against American policy. In 1995, newly formed Islamic group known as Taliban rose to power on the promise of peace because of political turmoil amongst various militia groups such as Mujahdeen against other rebels. Most Afghans, exhausted by years of drought, famine, and war decided to settle down with Taliban for upholding traditional Islamic values. At the initial stage, the Taliban outlawed cultivation of poppies for the opium trade, crack down on crime, curtail the education and employment of women. Islamic laws were fully enforced strictly on Quranic injunction[191].

Apart from political logjam in the country, from 1995 to 1999, drought seriously affected farmers and many rural areas became inhabitable. Over one million Afghans fled to neighbouring Pakistan, where they languished in squalid refugee camps. In 1997, the Taliban authority continued unleashing reign of terror on the Afghans. Najibullah was publicly executed, the ethnic groups in the northern region, under Masood's Northern Alliance, and the south, supported by Hamid Karzai, continued to fight the Taliban for control of the country.

Within this period, Afghanistan became al-Qaida Headquarters for terrorism activities around the world. For instance, in 1998, US-embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, was bombarded. Minutes later, another truck bomb detonated outside US embassy in Dar e-Salam, the capital of neighbouring Tanzania. The dual terrorist attacks killed 224 people, including 12 Americans, and wounded more than 4,500 people. Osama bin Laden was accused of masterminding the coordinated terrorists' attacks on August 20, 1998. President Bill Clinton

[21] Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, The Saur Revolution: Prelude to the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan……..Extracted on 22nd November, 2022
[22] Conciliation Resources, Afghanistan, President Najibullah and the National Reconciliation, www.c-r.org, Extracted on 10th November, 2022.
[23] Michelle M. Examining Extremism: Lashkar-e-Taliban, www.csis.org, Extracted on 11th November, 2022.

ordered cruise missiles launched against a pharmaceutical plant in Sudan, where bin Laden allegedly made or distributed chemical weapons[192].
By year 2000, it was clear to US authority that bin Laden was being harboured by Taliban government in Afghanistan. The US demanded the extradition of bin Laden to stand trial for various degree of terrorist acts levelled against him. The Taliban government declined to extradite him. Different sanctions were meted out to Afghanistan through United Nations. Alas! The Taliban refused to answer the call of United Nations by continually ignoring international sanctions[193]. On September 4, 2001, Taliban government arrested eight (8) international aid workers accusing them of spreading Christianity. The aid workers were released on 15th September, 2001.

On September 11, 2001, the activities of Taliban drew attention of the world to Afghanistan when hijackers believing to be agents of bin Laden commandeer four (4) commercial airplanes and crashed them into the World Trade Centre Tower in New York, the Pentagon, outside Washington D.C. and a Pennsylvania field, killing thousands of people.
On October 7, 2001, after Taliban refused to surrender, bin Laden, US and British forces lunched airstrikes against Taliban authority in Afghanistan. After weeks of intense bombardment, the Taliban fled to southward of Khandahar. On December 7, 2001, the Province of Zabul was surrendered and the rule of Taliban came to an end in Afghanistan. On December 22, 2001, Hamid Karzai, a royalist and ethnic Pashtum, was sworn in as the leader of Interim Government in Afghanistan. Karzai entered Afghanistan after living in exile for years in neighbouring Pakistan. This marked the end of Taliban dictatorial rule in Afghanistan[194].

The Coming of Democracy and its Sudden Disappearance in Afghanistan

After the exit of Taliban government in 2001, the authority saddled with the responsibility of governance under the control of Hamid Karzai was teleguided and supervised by the United Nations. Hamid Karzai led Interim Government was given mandate to serve till 2004, when the government was mandated to organize elections. The US and British forces played significant role in the political activities of Afghanistan in order to ensure that democratically elected government was installed[195].

The constitution which empowered the Afghanistan people to organize election in 2004 was regarded as the Supreme Law of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. It was agreed upon by more than 500 delegates representing Afghan men and women from across the country at the Constitutional Loya Jirga (December 13, 2003 - January 4, 2004). The Constitution was

[24] An Website of the United States Embassy, East African Embassy Bombings, https://www.fbi.gov, Extracted on 11th September, 2022.

[25] Remarks by President Biden on Afghanistan | The White House, https://www.whitehouse.gov, Extracted on 11th September, 2022

[26] Remarks by President Biden on Afghanistan | The White House, https://www.whitehouse.gov, Extracted on 11th November, 2022.

[27] Instability in Afghanistan, https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-afghanistan, Extracted on 24th November, 2022.

formally ratified by President Hamid Karzai at a ceremony in Kabul on January 26, 2004. The constitution contained 162 Article. In spite of human rights being championed by the United States in Afghanistan. The Article 3 of the constitution stated clearly that "No law shall contravene the tenets and provisions of the holy religion of Islam in Afghanistan"[196]. This proviso alone has gaged any other faith apart from Islam. It prevented equal opportunity and level playing ground of other religious activities which is a great threat to the survival of democracy. The constitution paved way for people to aspire to the office of President, the list of individuals participated in the election was 23 persons, 19 out of this candidates were independents and four (4) candidates represented political parties or coalitions.

On October 9, 2004, the Afghan people went out to cast their votes. This was regarded as the first nation's direct presidential election. In that election, according to the United Nations, over 10 million Afghans registered to vote in spite of uncertain security situation and attacks on some polling sites and election workers. 41 percent of registered voters were women. The election was supervised by the Joint Electoral Management Body (JEMB) which was formed by the government of Afghanistan and the United Nations. Election took place in 22,000 polling stations throughout Afghanistan, as well as Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan and Iran. In Pakistan, there were 700,000 and Iran had 600,000 eligible voters. This gave every residents of Afghanistan opportunity to vote in the general election. After the election, the result was declared and Hamid Karzai was declared the winner on 3rd November, 2004, with 4,443,029 representing 55.37% of total votes counted in the election[197].

This election ushered in democratically elected government which lasted till 15th August, 2021, when the Taliban took over Kabul. The interesting issue that required interrogation is that why sudden collapse of democracy in Afghanistan with $145 billion being expended on security, education, health to protect democracy and human right being touted by United States[198]. How did the Taliban tagged terrorist organization found its way back into the arena of power again in Afghanistan? These questions could be hinged on the assertion of James Rusell Lowell which says "democracy gives every man a right to be his own oppressor"[199] the Taliban must have taken the assertion by Lowell as a threat to their own existence because of the strong belief in the tenets of Islam. The historical background of Afghanistan people in the hand of different nations who had waged wars against Afghans and conquered them for political and economic purposes could be one of the reasons why the Afghans are resolute about their strong conviction on how they should be governed according to Islamic tenets not on western ideology being championed by the United States.

Lesson from Sudden Collapse of Democracy in Afghanistan

[28] The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, www.diplomatie.gouv, Extracted on 24th November, 2022.

[29] News Letter, Global Security, Afghan, Presidential Election, www.globalsecurity.org, Extracted on 9th November, 2022.

[30] Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), www.saigar.mil.pdf, Extracted on 24th November, 2022.

[31] Mohammed A. Vanguard Newspaper, "Democracy" without democrats, April 19, 2018, p34,

There are good number of lessons that could be learnt from the collapse of democracy in Afghanistan. One of them could be the belief of American government that it could transform the culture of Afghanistan. The thought of American politicians, non-governmental organisations, and donours is that the things that worked in advanced democracies would work in fragile democracy like that of Afghanistan. The American authority thought liberal values were universal. And because they were universal, they would be, if not embraced, at least appreciated.

The Presidential model of government is not fascinating to Afghans because it created and gave enormous powers to president. The new constitution created a top-heavy system that gave the president 'nearly the same power that Afghan kings exercised." Strong presidential system is appealing because it offers the opportunity to the people to determine actions. But the concentration of power inevitably alienates other stakeholders, particularly in the local and regional levels. This singular act made it difficult for the grass root Islamic scholars to see themselves as part and parcel of government. Majority of Sunnis believed that they were being cut off in the affairs of their own nation which totally inimical to the spread of Islam. Also, the presidential system is not really too good in Afghanistan because it heightened tension of political polarization along ethnic, religious, tribal, linguistic, and ideological lines. The Afghan system required a formidable political system rather than a Single Nontransferable Vote (SNTV). The SNTV restricted competition, while political party system allows competition which is really good for Afghan society, if properly organized and nurtured very well[200].

The Talibans were well rooted at the grassroots, which gave them opportunity to gain recognition among the locals who were not versatile with western ideology. The locals accepted them as part and parcel of the communities than central government fashioned on European model or style of governance. It made them to always provide governance than the distance and corruption ridden central government which was created by United States in the name of projecting human rights and respect for the rule of law. The United States saw a strong, centralized authority as the answer to Afghanistan's problems. Unfortunately, the quirky and confused electoral system, undermined the development of political parties and the parliament. Few Afghans believed in a government that they never felt was theirs or wished to wade through its bureaucratic red tape. Afghans affinity to traditions and culture made them believe so much in informal and community-driven dispute resolution, and local figure they trusted. This rendered legally framed institutions under the democratic government redundant.

The emergence of President Ashraf Ghani was welcomed with great hope and aspiration in the United States authority. However, his style and capacity to deliver as expected turned out to be a mirage. Academic prowess of Ashraf Ghani is very impressive. Before becoming president in 2014, Ghani enjoyed a stellar career abroad as an academic and economist focused on failed states, only returning 24 years later to pursue his dream of rebuilding the country. He studied at New York's Columbia University, before teaching in the United States

[32] Maria E. K. Democracy in Afghanistan, The Makings of Stability https://www.globalgovernanceproject.org, Extracted on 24th November, 2022.

during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s.He worked with the World Bank from 1991, becoming an expert on the Russian coal industry, and finally moved back to Kabul as a senior UN special adviser soon after the Taliban were routed out in late 2001. In the end, his explosions of bad temper and displays of arrogance with fellow Afghans and Westerners were all too frequent and soon made him a loathed figure[201].

More importantly, the character of Ashraf Ghani, which he, as person, denounced hunted him at the end. He asserted in a particular interview granted to AFP, that: "I'm not going to have an isolated life," but in the end he did exactly that— increasingly confined to the presidential palace with only a handful of trusted aides. In his last years in office, Ghani watched as he was first cut off from talks between Washington and the Taliban that paved the way for the US exit from Afghanistan, and then forced by his American allies to release 5,000 hardened insurgents to lock down a peace deal that never materialised.

Dismissed as a "puppet" by the Taliban, Ghani was left with little leverage during his final months in the presidential palace, and resorted to delivering squawking televised diatribes that did little to improve his reputation with Afghans[202]. The aloofness and his isolation kept him away and cut him off completely from the people. To buttress this point, a veteran author, Ahmed Rashid, wrote; "Ashraf Ghani never allowed anyone to get too close, remaining aloof,"

In any society, all round leaders are required to galvanize needed support base for government business to work effectively. Adequate communication on issues affecting people should be communicated in clear language devoid of ambiguity. This makes people to accept government easily and also when issues arise against the image of the citizens will have enough information to defend their government. Total disconnect from the people, Ghani's regime gave opportunity to Taliban to have easy ride into arena of power in Afghanistan, which led to the sudden collapse of democracy that was installed and nurtured with huge amount by the American government.

Conclusion

It is obvious, there is no any perfect system of government or institution anywhere in the world. The United States seems to be carried away with the values of democracy she operates and enjoys within her sovereignty. The background of Americans suggests the type of government they operate till date. And this spur them to fill that the whole world should operate and enjoy same system, forgetting that the experiences, cultural beliefs, and traditions differ. Also, the United States never understood Afghanistan. American planners thought they knew what the country needed, which was not quite the same as what its people wanted. American policy was guided by fantasies; chief among them was the idea that the Taliban could be eliminated and that an entire culture could be transformed in the process.

[33] The Punch Newspaper, Agency Report, The Rise and Fall of Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, 15th August 2021

[34] The Punch Newspaper, Agency Report, The Rise and Fall of Afghan… 15th August 2021

The leadership crises and challenges of democracy in Afghanistan are hinged on the fact that majority of Afghans are not too keen about democratic values, rather Islamic tenets, which are fundamental to them in the running of day to day activities of government. Majority of people had great respect and belief in Taliban leaders because of religious affinity. This has always given the Taliban opportunity to gain sympathy.

To the minority and pro-democracy, the emergence of Taliban government is an aberration which they find difficult to live with and work under its control. Although the situation on the ground could be highly fluid, Afghan women who have stood up for gender equality, democracy, and human rights clearly face imminent risks. This led to mass departure of large number of people when the Taliban struck and took over the mantle of leadership.

One of the first things the Taliban did when they emerged was providing "rough and ready" dispute resolution. Often, they outperform the local court system which corruption was norm under democratic government installed by American authority. "Afghans report a great degree of satisfaction with Taliban verdicts, unlike those from the official justice system, where petitioners for justice frequently have to pay considerable bribes." This system which allowed kick-back syndrome is unacceptable to the ordinary Afghans. It equally made democratic principle less attractive to Afghans. The unfolding events in Afghanistan require thorough examination under Taliban government for effective management of human rights. Also, there should be a medium of collaboration with Taliban authority to disregard working with al-Qaida and other terrorist groups that are known to the international community.

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CHALLENGES OF MARITIME SECURITY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA

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Abstract

The major thrust of this study is to assess the challenges of maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. The need for this study arose as a result of the perceived increase of the maritime security challenges in Nigeria vis-a-vis its damaging effect on the country's maritime economic. The main objective of the study is to examine the challenges of securing the Gulf of Guinea in Nigeria. The study adopted Marxian Political Economy theory as theoretical framework. The study vigorously argued that the aforementioned maritime crimes were driven by economic motive. Secondary data were used. Data collected were analyzed through the use of content analysis.Literature review however shows that piracy, sea robbery/ drug trafficking , kidnapping and hostility in the Hydrocarbon zone of the Gulf of Guinea has generated legal and illicit means of livelihood for both domestic and foreign partners, small arms running in the Gulf of Guinea posed serious and continuous threat to the Nigerian state. In other words, the availability and wide circulation of small arms and light weapons posed the greatest danger to peace and security, especially in our region and finally reviewed that the direct consequences of maritime insecurity such as weak policing, poor border cooperation, oil theft/ illegal refineries and fishing poach, among others, are bane to Nigerian economy and its prospect. It was recommended

that the maritime security budget should be even more than that of land and air space security budgets, as well provision of ample surveillance facilities, including platforms in policing EEZ; furthermore, governments of these piracy prone areas should employ more hands to police the vast areas of their territorial waters; the IMO should work out modalities, principles or ways that may provide good order at sea.
Key words: Maritime Security, Sea power, Piracy, Interest, Gulf of Guinea etc.

Introduction

The end of the Cold War in 1989, the collapse of Communism, and the breakup of the Soviet Union led to remarkable changes, transforming global international relations from bipolar to uni-polar politics. The main actors today are the United States and its allies. At the same time, democratic and economic reforms across the globe create a focal point for international attention. Its emergence as the sole super-power puts the United States, with its focus on globalization and the enthronement of democratic governance worldwide, in a position to dictate major global economic, political, social and security issues (Mark, 2004).

Nevertheless, the world faces widespread threats and uncertainties. The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States brought a new dimension to the war on terror, giving it the center stage in emerging global politics (Thomas, 2006). Meanwhile, ongoing Middle East crises, instability in the Persian Gulf Region, and the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq have exacerbated global energy instability (Anyu, 2007).

Some analysts ascribe these situations to a stepped up struggle for political control over oil and natural gas. The politics of oil have always been of strategic interest to both producers and consumers. Some major countries have become wary of the reliability and security of their traditional sources of oil and natural gas because of unstable political and security situations in regions where these resources are abundant. Hence, the most industrialized nations, including the United States, Japan, China and many European Union (EU) countries, now seek new, safer and more reliable sources of supply. As a result, the Gulf of Guinea (GoG), with its abundant economic resources, has emerged as one of such areas of interest.

The GoG sub-regional oil fields are increasingly attractive to oil companies because they deliver higher profits per barrel than oil from most other parts of the world (Anyu , 2007). Similarly, the sub-region has proven reserves of 46 billion barrels, and with extensive exploration and exploitation efforts underway, this is expected to hit 100 billion barrels by the year 2010. Oil industry experts predict that by 2030, the industry will have invested more than $50 billion in the sub-region. Furthermore, according to the U.S. National Intelligence Estimate Report, oil supply levels from the sub-region to the United States are expected to grow from the current 23 percent of U.S. oil imports to 32 percent by the year 2023. In addition, the natural gas production potential of the GoG sub-region is another reason for increased interest of the world's major energy consumers.

External interests in the sub-region have grown as competition for influence in the sub-region has taken on new dimensions. Against the backdrop of ongoing competition for crude oil resources between the United States and European countries, China, India and Japan have swiftly enlarged their interests with both positive and negative results. The presence of these external interests have resulted in huge investments and increased shipping activities. Multinational companies in the energy sector compete for oil exploration licenses and

currently spend billions of dollars and euros to erect drilling platforms, pipelines and transport hubs. In addition to bringing positive prospects to the sub-region, these increased activities have created challenging security issues, including increased piracy, poaching, terrorism, militant youth activities, environmental degradation, illegal bunkering, oil pipeline destruction and international conflicts (Kupolokun, 2003). These security issues need to be addressed to make the maritime environment investor-friendly and to safeguard the interests of member-states of this sub-region, particularly Nigeria, which is the focus of this thesis.

Nigeria's defense policy seeks to ensure stability within the West African sub-region by 1) making the Nigerian Armed Forces one of the most capable and efficient in the continent, 2) becoming a full partner in United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU) operations, and 3) becoming an effective partner in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (Rowland, 2006). Ensuring stability and protection of sub-regional marine resources requires Nigeria to take the initiative in strengthening the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) and ECOWAS. Nigeria needs to partner with member states to develop a strategy to stem growing security threats resulting from the new strategic importance of the sub-region. This study aims to examine or understand the challenges of securing gulf of Guinea using Nigeria as a area of focus.

Statement of the Problem

The emerging security threats in the Gulf of Guinea, if left unchecked, can lead to instability in the sub-region and adversely impact its economic, social and political development. Also, the GoG's vast sea area presents great challenges to the Nigerian nation and the Nigerian sea security capacity to sustain a protective presence. The major issue that affects Nigeria is maritime insecurity in the gulf of guinea; indeed, this problem is consequent on the geo-strategy significant and importance of the exclusive economic zone (gulf of Guinea).
There is now a stiff international competition among industrialized nations including the United States, some European countries, China, Japan, and India that are looking for new, safer, and more reliable sources of energy as a result of the Middle East crisis. As the United States tries to wean itself from its Middle East oil dependency, areas such as the Gulf of Guinea off the West African coast are emerging as potentially the mos timportant regions on the globe for access to this diminishing resource. However, the Gulf Guinea region faces several destabilizing factors and challenging Security environment (Tunde &Benjamin, 2013).

With over 90 percent of global trade passing through this hub, the Gulf of Guinea has now become the new global route for the oil trade. Seafarers and general maritime activities are now witnessing a very tough time in the Gulf of Guinea and the West African coastline, over the years, has increasingly become a haven for criminality. Meanwhile, West African nations on the coastline have been witnessing turbulent times in sea traffic. These countries' territorial waters have come under sudden transnational crime attacks such as hijack of oil vessels, oil bunkering, hostage taking and kidnapping, sea robbery, human and narcotic trafficking, and smuggling of arms; all perpetrated by sea pirates (Klare & Volman, 2005).

In similar view, Ezirim & Onuoha, (2010:2) noted that Africa's maritime domain has been caught in-between affluence and afflictions. Its maritime domain is surfeit with rich aquatic and mineral resources critical to the survival of its people and states, both for subsistence and for economic mainstay. These resources are also vitally important in the security development nexus for both the continent and the international community. Regrettably, in the wake of the 21st century, African waters have now overtaken the traditionally dangerous area such as the Strait of Malaccain the Southeast Asia in terms of visibility in the global map of piracy.

International Maritime Bureau, report (IMB, 2005) revealed that between 2003 and 2008,there had been 293 incidents of pirates attacks in the West African coastline. In 2010, there were45 cases, and in 2011 it rose to 65, while 37 vessels were attacked in 2012 where pirates carted away goods, money and other valuables. The consequences of all this is that the region loses over $3billion revenue to illegal bunkering annually with Nigeria being the worst hit. While Nigeria is said to lose over 100,000 barrels of oil daily, Benin Republic on its part loses colossal sums in revenue as ship owners now wary of seaport due to pirates' activities.

Apart from smuggling and small arms dealing, the coastline is notorious for human and hard drugs trafficking. And if the pirate activities are left unchecked, they could surpass those of the Gulf of Eden, which had been known as the most dangerous waterways due to activities of Somali pirates. According to statistics (2003), data raised by the UN Office on Drugs and Organized Crime also shows a trend away from robbery cases to kidnappings and hijackings. Indeed, security threats in the maritime arena are of a multidimensional nature. In addition to piracy, boundary disputes, disagreements over fishing rights, problems relating to pollution, migration, illegal trafficking; hence, virtually every sphere of national and regional security has a maritime dimension. A cross-cutting issue may well be the socio-economic situation of coastal communities. According to, Peter (2007), there is growing awareness in the world and Nigeria that the vast resources and potential in the Gulf of Guinea are being undermined by multifaceted domestic, regional and international threats and vulnerabilities. Therefore, the main objective of this study is to examine the challenges of maritime security in the gulf of guinea. Other objectives are the following:

i. To assess the piracy in the Gulf of Guinea that undermine maritime security in Nigeria
ii. To analyst the small arms running in the region pose a threat to the Nigerian state
iii. To evaluate the insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea adversely affected investment in Nigeria

Contextualising the concepts of Maritime Security and Sea-power
Maritime Security

Maritime security is one of the latest additions to the vocabulary of international security. Initially coined in the 1990s, the concept has received growing attention due to the intensification of concerns over maritime terrorism since 2000, the rise of modern piracy off the coast of Somalia and elsewhere, maritime crimes such as human trafficking, and the

increasing significance in recent years of the so-called 'blue economy' and issues relating to maritime environmental protection and resource management.

A significant number of states and other international actors place maritime security high on their security agendas. This priority is reflected in several governmental and intergovernmental strategies for maritime security published in the past decade—including those of the United States, United Kingdom, France, India, NATO, the European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU)—as well as in multilateral statements such as the G7 declaration on maritime security, and in the work of the annual international Our Ocean conference on the theme.

If maritime security has become a core concern among major global security actors, the same cannot be said of International Relations (IR) and security studies more widely, where its study is scattered at best. Existing literature tends to consider such issues in terms of particular geographic hot spots and the management of specific threats, such as maritime piracy in east Africa, strategic rivalry in the South China Sea or the Arctic, organized crime in west Africa or human trafficking in the Mediterranean (Felix, 2009). Issues such as port security, illegal fishing or environmental crime have received less attention, and the connections between all these themes remain underexplored.

Other literature subordinate developments at sea to wider themes in IR, such as Great Power politics, geo-strategy or international regime-building (Jack and William, 2010). The rise of the maritime security agenda has been reflected in a renewed interest among maritime scholars in the question of order at sea in an age of globalization (Jo Inge and Geoffrey, 2016), and in its increasing significance in national strategic, policy and doctrinal publications. Less attention has been paid to the maritime arena as a crucible of international change and innovation in and of itself. This is an important oversight, and one that risks obscuring specific and novel patterns of international interaction, governance and political order at sea (Daniel and James, 2002).

This article argues that the maritime security initiatives and activities that have been observable throughout the past decade call for a more substantial treatment of the matter in the academic discussion. It is time for the discipline to pay more attention to the maritime arena and move beyond sea blindness. The objective of this article is accordingly to summarize some of the core observations that can be made with regard to these developments and activities at sea, and outline the ways in which these require more focused research.

> Our goal is twofold: first, to give some order to current developments so as to provide direction and foundations for further maritime security studies; second, to explore the fascinating challenges raised by maritime security phenomena in wider discussions within IR and security studies Our discussion is structured in three main sections, each of which outlines a core dimension of maritime security. We begin with a consideration of the issues and themes that comprise the maritime security agenda. These include the manner in which it has been theorized in security studies to date,

as well as its growing prominence in security policy thinking and documentation. Second, we examine the ways in which maritime security actors have responded to these challenges in practice, focusing on issues of maritime domain awareness, coordination of action and operations in the field. While we aim at providing a broad overview, many of our examples stem from the western Indian Ocean, in relation to which paradigmatic observations can be made. Third, we turn to the mechanisms through which the new maritime security agenda is being disseminated to local actors through a process of devolved security governance. We focus particularly on efforts to distribute knowledge and skills to local actors through capacity-building and security sector reform (SSR).

Security for a nation is its ability to feel secured against threats that could undermine its stability or threaten its survival (Ciro, 1992). It is the basic requirement for survival as an independent nation-state in international politics. During the nuclear age, security policies focused on the physical survival of the state (Mark, 1992). It was assumed that security policies were anchored in rational assessments by knowledgeable analysts and that clearly defined threats could be identified and appropriate strategies developed to counter them.

In conventional security thinking, a state's military power is measured against the power of other nation-states. The net assessment helps to determine the minimum military power a nation-state needs to deter a hostile attack, or at least to defend itself (second strike capability). Nation-states with enough resources focus on measures to attain a military balance of power with their rivals. Factors like force, cohesive power and inter-state conflicts are cornerstones of security analyses of the superpower nuclear rivalry during the Cold War era.

In contrast, in the Western academic community, the post-Cold War research agenda for regional security in Africa emphasizes multi-dimensional threats, including a broad spectrum of vital interests. These vital interests include the organic survival of the national population, the protection of state sovereignty, the well-being of citizens and political status and prestige. Contrasting the conventional security view, the nature and type of threats in this expanded concept of security are much more complex. The complexities are specifically due to dynamic causal links among four major dimensions of security: military, economic, ecological and ethnic (Ganiyu, 2006).

African states need determine how to deal with both internal security threats from political separatists and traditional external security threats. However, political separatism is more of a political and social problem than a military-strategic one. Thus, African security in this thesis refers to the ability of an African state to counter all threats to its survival, ranging from external aggression to threats of economic, political, social and cultural insecurities, while simultaneously grappling with the challenges of nation building and good governance.

In the conclusion, we outline the future challenges for maritime security studies that follow from these observations. We argue that in addition to the traditional concerns of studies of sea power and the legal structures governing the sea, maritime security studies need to pay greater attention to the interconnectivity of different threats and

issues, to novel forms of governance and order at sea, and to the dissemination of the new maritime security agenda through capacity-building teraction to the discipline more widely.

Sea Power

Sea power encompasses the control of international maritime trade, the operation of navies in war, and the use of navies to achieve political influence during peacetime (Eric, 1990). Naval strategists like Alfred Mahan identify six principal factors affecting the sea power of nations: geographical position, natural resources and climate, the extent of territory, population, the character of the people, and government policy (James et al, 2002). Julian Corbett updates Mahan's list to include economic strength, technological development, and dependency on maritime trade. He observes that these characteristics determine the ability of nationstates to develop and successfully employ sea power (Michael, 1976). Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond defines sea power as a nation-state's use of naval forces to send armies and commerce to its allies across seas and oceans, and to territories where access is needed for war (sea control) and to prevent enemies from doing the same (sea denial) (Biobaku, 2005).

The concept of sea power is applicable to the security concerns of a globalizing world economy. The ultimate goal of sea power is unrestricted access to the world's common transportation routes, as well as access to markets and materials. Ensuring good order (safe and unrestricted access) to the Gulf of Guinea sub-region is the cardinal objective of this thesis. Good order requires a naval presence. Naval presence encourages stability and security and sets the stage for diplomatic and political cooperation. Achievement of sea control and sea denial requires a well funded, structured and efficient navy.

Dimensions of Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea and its adverse effects on Maritime Security in Nigeria

According to article 101 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS): "Piracy consists of any of the following acts: (a)any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: (i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State; (b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; (c) any act inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in sub-paragraph (a) or (b)." In its initiatives to counter piracy and armed robbery at sea International Maritime Bureau (IMO) is implementing an anti-piracy project, a long-term project which began in1998. As observe by Daniel (2008), previous study clearly demonstrated that piracy and maritime insecurity cannot be understood in isolation from political and socio-economic developments on land. in this regard, Allen (2011:18) affirms that:

> In Nigeria, the weakness of the state and its infiltration by organized crime creates fertile ground for piracy. Moreover, motives of personal enrichment

> coalesce with the political objectives of the Niger Delta rebels seeking to end the economic exploitation and marginalization of their region; for example, utter collapse of the Somali state preceded the rise of piracy in the Gulf of Aden here a culture of violence, a pervasive war economy and lack of alternative sources of income turned piracy into a plausible survival strategy.

Also, Stefan (2011:07) observes that effective counter-piracy requires more or less functioning statehood; Nigeria is far from stabilizing its state apparatus, therefore, may seek international cooperation to improve maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. Effective counter-piracy is hampered not only by weak statehood, but also by certain aspects of national and international law. Under the law of the sea, the international community is permitted to intervene against piracy only on the high seas outside territorial waters. This rule applies even in cases where state's ability or willingness to take action in its own territorial waters is restricted or non-existent. For example, in the case of Somalia, the UN Security Council made sure it asked the Transitional Federal Government which hardly possesses any power in the country for its approval of antipiracy measures, despite this being unnecessary under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

Furthermore, Daniel, (2008) identified cost as an obstacle to counter-piracy; however, if it is true that maritime security is inseparable from security on land and political, economic and social developments, then, effective counter-piracy demands nothing less than a comprehensive programme to strengthen weak states, promote good governance and support social and economic development. Nonetheless, purely military operations will not be enough to dispel the spectre of piracy from the Gulf of Guinea. Rather, multilateral, cross-border initiatives for resolving political conflict and establishing effective statehood remains the fulcrum.

Consequently, in recent years, the Gulf of Guinea region has remained the second most exposed to pirate attacks. According to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) 2013 report, the number of attacks increased by nearly 50% between 2011 and 2013; it is anticipated that it may be higher in2014. Similarly, Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea is a threat (Alexander, 2014). Over the last decade, about 551 attacks and attempted attacks have been reported, most took place in national jurisdictions, while fewer than 20% occurred in international waters, with the largest number occurring off the coasts of Nigeria. In 2013, according to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) reporting Centre, of 234 reported incidents worldwide, 30 took placed off the coast of Nigeria, including 2 hijacks; these attacks occurred mainly when ships are anchored bound for, or leaving offshore oil platforms, storage at sea, vessels and ports. However, latest assessments are that the risk of attacks shift further from the coast, unpredictable use of violence against crews, including use of guns, and hijacking of tankers for fuel theft or "petro-piracy" are worrying trends. Michael (2012:65) asserts that:

> Nigeria has one of the highest numbers of piracy incidents. The Gulf of Guinea accounted for 427 out of 1434 attacks in African waters between 2003 and 2013.The frequency of attacks in the Gulf of Guinea was not as high as those of the Somalia coast, and is however on the rise. The

> traditional modus operandi of pirates activity in the region had largely involved the use of speedboats to attack and steal cargo, valuables and cash from crews, when vessels is are anchor or in harbour, but mostly close to shore. Pirates are, however, increasingly modifying their tactics by hijacking fishing vessels, particularly within Nigerian waters, and using them to attack other vessels operating off the coasts of neighbouring countries like Benin and Cameroun; recent attacks have extended further at sea and have focused largely on oil-transport vessels aimed at stealing the petroleum products. As noted Gulf of Guinea piracy is an organized crime, sometimes highly sophisticated, and illicit siphon of oil. They engaged in black market circles of the stuff, and then deposit it back into the global supply.

As cited in David (2013), governance issues and widespread corruption have led to an unfair distribution of energy Income (as well as other negative externalities such as pollution), and have hampered development and fuelled piracy.

Their operations in the Gulf of Guinea are primarily based out in the Niger Delta; an area that constitutes ideal grounds for development of pirate groups, those issues have encouraged the formation of insurgent groups, such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). The Delta's geographical terrain encourages clandestine activities of pirates; its proximity to the congested Port Harcourt harbour and the Oil and Gas Free Zone, Onne, where large mangrove-hidden waterways makes it an ideal location from which to launch attacks on anchored and passing ships. While pirates are mostly based in Nigeria, they conduct attacks throughout the Gulf of Guinea70% of it, reported between 2006 and 2013 took placed off the coast of Nigeria. This has serious implications for global security, as growing insecurity in the region would make it difficult for Nigeria to export oil as well as other foreign trade which may in turn reduce its ability to effectively fight against international terrorist organizations such as Boko- Haram (Barrios, 2013). Also, Rider (2013:45) argues that:

> For decades, piracy and armed robbery at sea have been common off the coast of Nigeria; amidst extreme poverty, high oil revenue, and poor regulation of maritime activity, corrupt government and a long history of political violence in the Niger Delta. Maritime crime spread from Nigerian waters to the whole region, criminal gangs continue to exploit Nigeria's poor governance of the maritime domain and use violence to enrich-themselves and show little sign of stopping.

Majority of the Gulf of Guinea piracy comes out of Nigerian water ways. Recorded incidents indicate that the world's most dangerous shipping routes are along the coast of Nigeria, with a small extension into the territorial waters of Benin and Togo. There is no doubt that pirates will continue to threaten the region's oil and shipping industries for years to come due to the oil producers 'doubled risk exposure'. Therefore, global shipping trade is bleeding due to piracy Ukeje. (2003) noted that recent piracy attacks targets vessels carrying petroleum products. These vessels are attacked because there is a booming black market for fuel in West Africa.

The weakness and general inadequacy of the maritime policies of Gulf of Guinea states and hitherto, the low level of cooperation between them allowed criminal networks to diversify

their activities and gradually extend them away from the Nigerian coast, out on to the high seas. Pirates focus on stealing cargoes and siphoning fuel, mostly in territorial waters, close to shore. It is extremely important that Gulf of Guinea countries and their allies collaborate to police the sea lanes of the area, as disruptions in crude oil supply not only affect countries such as Nigeria, but ultimately have an impact on the global economy (Florian, 2013).
Similarly, Nkosazana (2010) has argued that the piracy is an international problem even if it was happening off the African coast. The problem, however, is that Gulf of Guinea piracy is, above all, an organised crime problem and most of these pirate attacks do occur in international waters, more often than they occur within the sovereign borders of states, which are set at 12nautical miles offshore, and are thus subject to countries' own laws and legal systems, rather than being subject to international law. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 1982, as cited in Wagilda (2007: 10), stated that:

> Each country's sovereign territorial water extends to a maximum of 12 nautical miles (22km) beyond its coast, but foreign vessels are granted the right of innocent passage through this zone; Passage is innocent as long as a ship refrains from engaging in certain prohibited activities, including weapon testing, spying, smuggling, serious pollution, fishing or scientific research.

There is thus a great need for co-operation and information sharing between pirates infested states in West Africa, but so far that cooperation appears to be patchy. However, an agreement between 22 West and Central African states was signed in June 2013 aiming at coping with the growing threat of piracy and to strengthen the region's maritime security. There is a consensus to the Yaoundé Declaration, formally known as the Code of Conduct Concerning the *Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery against Ships and Illicit Maritime Activity in West and Central Africa.* The ambition with this agreement is to increase regional cooperation and capacity building in combating piracy, while the world discusses whose responsibility it is and weather there is enough regional competence for a successful counter-piracy campaign, the piracy in the Gulf of Guinea is expanding and there are no indications that this expansion will end any time soon, unless proper counter-piracy efforts are implemented. It is on this note; Brooks (2012:34) stated that:

> Whilst the public only hears about piracy and maritime terrorism when there is a serious incident, the problem is continuous and the costs to the industry, and hence to the end consumers of maritime trade, are growing. As in other armed conflicts, technology could provide more reliable, effective deterrents and safer counters. Meeting that challenge is what Institution of Engineering Technology can do. Through Insights like this, and by enabling debate, the IET's Marine Transport Group encourages innovation in the search for effective solutions. "Piracy can only be addressed by means of a comprehensive multi-layered approach that involves political, technology and societal measures, to strengthen security capabilities improve intelligence gathering, sharing, and help bring about more effective law enforcement. It also requires multinational cooperation on land and at sea.

Indeed, piracy in the Gulf of Guinea cannot be viewed in isolation from the oil production in the Niger Delta region and the socio-economic and environmental circumstances

surrounding it. Allen (2012) has identified some factors responsible for maritime insecurity in the region, prominent among which is the fact that the Nigerian state contains vast oil wealth yet proceeds from the trade is not circulated but concentrate in few hands which have consequent impact on her economy resulting to oil theft bunkering, piracy, smuggling, trafficking and rising inequality these have necessitated on shore and offshore security challenges. The lack of meaningful economic opportunities and a prolonged pattern of environmental degradation could be attributed to this crime which progressed from small opportunistic attacks to more coordinated and organized attacks. With this in mind, the real solution to this menace must be found in addressing its root causes (Alexandria, 2009).

One of the shortcomings underlying underdevelopment is government's failure to build and maintain domestic oil refineries. Despite being the region's largest oil producer, Nigeria is unable to refine most of its crude oil itself, resulting in the continuous need to import large quantities of refined oil at much higher cost. Furthermore, each transaction provides ample opportunities for corruption; the lack of domestic refineries also means that the coast of Nigeria is packed with oil tankers on a daily basis, which makes for easy targets amongst looters and pirates. As long as Nigeria's fraudulent and corrupt oil policies are not addressed, the collective effort by West African states in combating piracy in the Gulf of Guinea cannot amount to the kind of meaningful change necessary, without structural reforms that would empower the populace, by providing alternative means of livelihoods, especially for youths and bringing, at least, part of the nation's wealth back to people, any effort at stopping piracy can only be cosmetic (Allen, 2012: 09)

Therefore, piracy may be seen as maritime threat and violent action against Persons, Sea trade, Cargoes, Oil facilities, Ships, vessels and among other legal investment on high sea. These actions are considered as acts of maritime terrorism which posed operational challenge to Nigeria's security and her national economic growth, as most domestic and foreign investment, as well potential investors are not willing to continue their operations in State (Aminu, 2010).

Having identified issues raised by scholars (Allen, 2012; David, 2013; Ejiofor, 2010;Masson, 2013; Rider, 2013 & Stefan, 2011) who identified institutional failure as basis for piracy in Nigeria and Gulf of Guinea; Daniel (2008) Nicole & Marie (2009), Wingrin (2010), Nkosazana, (2010), and Ukeje (2003) are of different perspective, that piracy is resultant effect of internal and external nexus which is consequent on energy interest in the black Market. Considering their arguments, it is crystal clear that much attention were given to the root causes of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea; however much has not been done on how piracy undermines Nigeria security within the maritime environment and beyond, thus, this study intend to fill this identified gap.

Small Arms Running in the Gulf of guinea Region and its Threat to Nigerian Security

The spate and intensity of violent conflicts in Nigeria have been linked to the proliferation and weak control mechanisms on small arms and light weapons smuggling via our porous land and sea borders. While billions of dollars are being spent on conflicts in Africa, 60to 90 per cent of deaths associated with conflicts in the region are linked to the illegal sale and

proliferation of small arms and light weapons, The country accounts for about 8 million out of the 100 million small arms currently in circulation (Ahmad, 2012).
Decades of violence and instability in some part of Nigeria, which include the activities of militancy in the Delta area; and insurgent groups in northeast Nigeria, are major drivers, of proliferation and illicit circulation of small arms and light weapons (SALW). These characterized other forms of arm violence. Over the years, this has reinforced the sceptre of insecurity, which, in turn, compromises the prospects for growth and development. Consequently, the people are often worst victims due to conflicts that continue to exacerbate organized crime, poverty and underdevelopment, which, in turn, has led to a high sense of insecurity among the rural and urban poor in the country.

According to Kwaja (2012), large caches of combat weapons transferred from Libya after the fall of Maummar Gaddafi are suspected to have fallen into the hands of terrorist groups. This prompted the adoption of Resolution 2017, which drew attention to the risk of destabilization posed by the dissemination of illicit SALW. After the over-throw of the Gaddafi regime, an assessment report(2012) revealed that influx of about 420,000 returnees to Niger, Mali, Chad and Mauritania, as well as the inflow of un-quantified and unspecified number of ammunitions from Libya to the Sahel states within the West Africa region include Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal. The insecurity associated with the activities of Boko Haram is evident in the spate of bomb attacks and killing of thousands of Nigerians, with serial attacks on police stations and armouries where stockpiles of weapons are acquired by the dreaded Islamic sect in Northeast Nigeria Chris (2012:03) argues that:

> This is a major consequence of the privatization of violence to the extent that non-state actors are challenging the authority of the state in the acquisition and control of the instruments of coercion. In the long run, the region is poised to confront the challenges posed by the increased privatization of violence by informal groups such that the state will be forced to bargain with competing forces and authorities in order to maintain its hold.

Tambuwal (2013:07) attributes the insecurity that has engulfed the country and other parts of Africa largely to the protests across the Arab world, and sought the assistance of development partners in tackling them. He argues further that as a region, we have been negatively impacted by the Arab spring, and particularly the fall of the Gaddafi regime in Libya. The proliferation of light and heavy weapons which fell into the hands of Non State Actors is causing havoc and instability. The Nigerian government is trying to come to grips with the situation and some drastic measures, including the declaration of a state of emergency in the most-affected states, have been taken. Therefore, security situation in the region should obviously take centre-stage.

Similarly, Usman (2010) asserts that more than half of these millions of small arms and light weapons in West African sub-region are in the hands of non-state actors and criminal groups. The non-state actors are made up of militants or ex-militants, vigilante, hired political thugs, ethno-religious-militia groups, like Boko Haram, ombate cult, among other groups scattered all over the country. They are mostly sponsored by anti-government or wealthy politicians.

It is an open secret that politicians control a number of armed Youths. In same vein, United Nations Security Council Report (2012) on Sahel region attributed that:

> Spate of attacks and hijack by pirates is largely due to their ability to access SALWs. In fact, piracy in the economies of the region has resulted in an annual loss of revenue of $2 billion, while the numbers of ships that en-route to various sea ports via busy hub are at risks and have declined in their numbers as a result of serial attacks. On the whole, transnational organized crimes associated with oil bunkering, trafficking in cocaine and counterfeit medicines holds sway (UN, 2012:07).

The activities of armed pirates in the Gulf of Guinea have placed the region on the front burner, which sees the region overtaking Somalia as the world's piracy hotspot. Within the last 14 years, attempts have been made to manage the menace posed by the proliferation of SALWs in terms of putting in place control mechanisms. This include Moratorium on Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons in ECOWAS Member States, signed in October, 1998; the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition and Other Related Materials, signed in 2006; as well as the West African Action Network on Small Arms(WAANSA), which was adopted at the WAANSA General Assembly in January, 2007.

The ECOWAS Conference of Heads of State and Government also provided a basis for the establishment of National Commissions on Small Arms by Member States. Arms running are facilitated by certain intermediaries based on legal or illegal demands coming from particular lawless or restricted environments. The Geneva-based organization, Small Arms Survey (2001) maintains that, "SALW do not proliferate themselves… rather, they are sold, resold, perhaps stolen, diverted and maybe legally or illegally transferred several time.
At each juncture in this complex chain of legal and illicit transfer, people-brokers, insurgents, criminals, government officials and or organized groups are active participants in the transmission (Okoro. 2007). Africa is the second largest continent in the world and the second most populated as well due to the sheer size of some of its countries, there is the chronic problem of border security, Nigeria is an example. Kelvin (2005:20) argues that:

> It will be very hard to find any country in the world capable of effectively controlling such extensive borders. Arms traffickers exploit this situation to smuggle SALW into the country. It is also interesting to observe that some part of northern Nigeria are experiencing instability and armed conflict for quite some time, the porous border in the northeast makes it easy for weapons to be smuggle in to inflamed and protract violence.

He continues by stating that arms are accessible largely to the following factors, such as simplicity and durability, low cost and wide availability, portability and easiness to conceal, lethality, usability by military, police and civilians, border porosity, ineffectiveness to guarantee internal security, corruption, unemployment and low income as well other armed battles.

One of the important impediments to managing small arms proliferation and armed violence is the tendency of politicians to utilize this violence to their own ends, coupled with the financial capacity of politicians to foment violence or buy political victory (Amaize, 2003)

.There have been numerous allegations since the 2003 elections of political leaders creating and arming groups of young men as tools for electoral intimidation. Similar allegations arose in the build-up to the 2007 elections Politicians have used violence to ensure political victory and through that victory get access to government resources and state power. Political violence is not, however, limited to election, high-level political officials have been accused of involvement in oil bunkering, community clashes, ethnic, religious clashes and for personal gains or accused of complicity by lacking the political will to arrest and detain officials known to be involved in these activities (Amaize, 2003).
The strength, level of equipment, and skills demonstrated by armed groups has increased speculation that these groups must have some form of high-level support and that they could not have established themselves without help from 'high-ranking' politicians who use them for self interested gains. Abia, (2003:27) observes that:

> Those who should be instrumental in pushing for action to limit the use of armed groups by politicians are therefore the same politicians who benefit from their use. One important source of funding for standing politicians to pay for armed groups is the so called 'security vote'. This is a nebulous allocation in each state and local government budget.

Many factors have contributed to the development of gun culture in the Nigerian polity where more individuals and groups, as well as politicians, are appealing to the instrumentality of SALW in order to achieve their socio-political and economic goals(John, 2007). The proliferation of SALW in Nigeria has many causes; these include trafficking, local manufacture and theft of weapons belonging to individuals or the authorities. The Nigerian society no doubt has become militarized as socio-cultural relationships among the various groups in the country have broken down over decades.

To address this problem, is a bit cumbersome but very important, especially when considering any programme of prevention. The closeness of Nigeria to conflict zones of West African states, its porous borders with Benin Republic in the West, Niger and Chad in the North, Cameroon in the East, makes Nigeria a major destination for SALW. Of much importance is the increase in the number of ethnic based militant groups often in wider scope which often receive support from their kinsmen who either import or manufacture them illegally. This is coupled with those brought from peace keeping operations and the police either selling or leasing their weapons, and those stolen from legal owners sometimes end up in black markets where civilians buy them for personal use.

The above implies that SALW flows to the country and its eventual usage in insurgencies are largely determined by the structures on ground, for example, porous border both in the North, West and the Niger Delta regions where there is access to international water ways are tell-tale signs of the permissive Nigerian system that condones non-state actors dealing and trafficking in arms (Ogundare and Elijah, 2010), hence the free flow of SALW in Nigeria. Adetiba (2012:12) observes that:

> The availability and accumulations of SALW by a group or individual are easily translated to accessibility through Border States in conflicts, more so access to SALW is determined by the resources of the recipient actors to act as patron. In contrast to the above, the growing bodies of evidence of

> availability of SALW and its usage in civil unrests and conflicts across the country shows that the way in which both state and non-state actors acquire SALW are different. But what explains the contradiction between underdevelopment and the proliferation of SALW particularly in the context of 1999 till date vis-à-vis political corruption and socio-political and economic injustices against one another? An understanding of this show that people arm themselves not only because of their unwarrantable situation but also because of exploitation, injustices and politics of exclusion.

Therefore, the proliferation of SALW and the upsurge of insurgencies in Nigeria would not be appreciated without identifying some of the reasons behind the proliferation of SALW in Nigeria. These factors that reinforce proliferation are: Long military rule, profitability and its socio-economic utility, domestic agitation for resource control, unemployment, poverty, growth of ethnic militias, politicization of ethno- religious difference and political (electoral) violence.

The resurgence of armed insurrection in the Niger Delta, after militants had surrendered their weapons under a comprehensive amnesty programme packaged by the Federal Government, underscores the need for international collaborative efforts to combat proliferation of arms in the entire Gulf of Guinea, to protect oil and gas facilities, Ejiofor (2010) reports that after years of explosive and armed attacks on oil workers and installations in the Niger Delta, which almost crippled Nigeria's crude oil production, late President Umaru Musa Yar' Adua took a bold step in June, 2009, to proclaim an amnesty for militants in the oil-rich region. The proclamation was part of the recommendation of the Presidential Panel on Amnesty and Disarmament for Militants of the Niger-Delta FGN, (2009:08). The statement affirmed that:

> Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria acknowledged that challenges of the Niger Delta arose mainly from the inadequacies of previous attempts at meeting the yearnings and aspiration of the people. This neglect, made some elements of the Niger Delta populace to resort to "unlawful means of agitation for the development of the region, including militancy thereby threatening peace, security, order and good governance and jeopardising the economy of the nation. The government realised that many of the militants were able-bodied youths whose energies could be harnessed for the development of the Niger Delta and the nation at large. Whereas many persons who had so engaged in militancy now desire to apply for and obtain amnesty and pardon; Now therefore, I, Umaru Musa Yar'Adua, President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, after due consultation with the council of States and in exercise of the powers conferred upon me by the provisions of Section 175 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, make the following proclamation: "I hereby grant amnesty and unconditional pardon to all persons who have directly or indirectly participated in the commission of offences associated with militant activities in the Niger Delta; The pardon shall take effect upon the surrender and handing over of all equipment, weapons, arms and ammunition and execution of the renunciation of Militancy Forms specified in the schedule hereto, by the affected persons at the nearest collection centre established for the purpose of Government in

> each of the Niger Delta States; The unconditional pardon granted pursuant to this proclamation shall extend to all persons presently being prosecuted for offences associated with militant activities; and this proclamation shall cease to have effect from Sunday, October 4, 2009.

Sequel to the above, Ejiofor (2010) maintained that proactive measure of control was sin qua non to crack down small arm running at the Gulf of Guinea by ensuring that arms do not enter the wrong hands by blocking all routes through which weapons are imported and transported in the region. The fight against internal militancy should not be left in the hands of individual countries alone. Security agencies in the various countries should be proactive and collaborative by monitoring movement of arms and sharing information. The maritime boundaries should also be effectively policed to ensure that arms shipment is detected and effectively intercepted.

The current practice of using government forces such as the Joint Task Force to fight armed militants is out dated, and wasteful as security forces ought to have prevented the influx of arms thereby effectively and systematically preventing the conflict. As cited in Ebo (2007) who argued that the largest exporters of small arms include the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, they are responsible for supplying arms, directly or indirectly, to conflict zones. A lack of transparency by weapons exporters such as the Russian Federation, China, Pakistan, Belarus, Iran and South Africa make it difficult to assess the extent to which terrorist organizations and other non-state actors are receiving state support. Once small arms fall into the hands of non-state actors that are unaccountable to international or domestic laws, regulating their distribution is an even larger challenge. Though the uncontrolled cross-border proliferation of small arms is largely facilitated by illegal activities, particularly the Gulf of Guinea hotspot which link major sea port in Asia, Europe, Latin America is vulnerable largely to the porosity as a safe haven for Sea pirates and Smugglers; virtually all illicit small arms were originally legally produced or acquired but later fell into the hands of unintended recipients.

Therefore, prospects for good governance and political stability are hampered and minimised by SALW proliferation. The consequence of SALW proliferation is the emergence of functional illicit proliferation networks and routes in 2001 (UN Small Arms Conference) The Nigerian Minister of Defence confirmed that Nigeria is home to a million of the SALW estimated to be circulating in the West African sub-region. Indeed, contradictions emanating from Nigeria's internal governance – manifested as ethno-religious violence, armed robbery, electoral violence, ritualistic secret cults in universities often involving small arms, and a general atmosphere of insecurity – have made the country a ready market for illicit small arms and a major conduit to other parts of West Africa. Nigeria is also the bridge to Central Africa, a zone of conflict from where many weapons have been smuggled into West Africa, using the Congo River as a vital waterway.

Another striking feature of the small arms proliferation in West Africa is its transnational character, involving the citizens of various member states in a collaborative criminal network. According to Ibeanu, (2005) the situation in West Africa is frightening because the region is the most backward in term of development and most vulnerable as far as peace, security and stability are concerned.

One of the world's highest concentrations of SALW is in Africa. This is a paradox. Why does a poor continent have such a magnitude of stockpiled small arms? What is the bone of contention that leads to conflicts in Africa? Perhaps, what explains this contradictory situation between economic underdevelopment (poverty) on the one hand and gun proliferation and armed conflicts on the other is the "strongest expression of the injustice in the paradox of wealth that characterizes situations of conflicts in Africa, the fact that those who produce wealth are the poorest and those who are wealthy take the wealth by force" (Ibeanu, 2005: 37).

The foregoing implies that the main reason for people to arm themselves is not only located in their appalling socio-economic conditions but also exclusion, injustice and exploitation that they are subjected to, and clearly, SALW (guns in particular) perform two functions, viz, they abet in sustaining injustices and also offer hopes for redressing injustices, thereby confirming Naylor's assertion that the demand for SALW is a "surrogate for demand for social justice, and the firearm is the capital good intended to bring that objective" (cited in Dominick and Olonisakin, 2001; & Badmus, 2009a & b).

Nigeria is one of the Third World countries where the proliferation of this arsenal is manifested in crisis proportions and its society has become fully militarized and enmeshed in the culture of the gun. Perhaps, more than any other areas of the country, the Niger Delta region exhibits this tendency with a high degree of intensity where different oil-bearing ethnic minority groups, through their various social movements, are constantly contesting exploitation and, as a result, oiling their guns as well as gunning for oil in the region, and fighting for the soul of the country's treasury of natural resources.

Consequently, the Nigerian state has now institutionalized a regime of social repression and corporate violence to silence dissenting voices in order to protect oil exploration and its revenues. Today, the Niger Delta is confronted with social inequality, arms proliferation and pervaded by protracted violence championed by state security forces, ethnic militia movements, disgruntled youth, armed gangs, pirates, cultists, and robbers (Isiaka, 2010). From the foregoing, scholars like Amaize, 2003, Ebo 2007, Ibeanu, 2005, Isiaka 2010, among others have identified the implications and consequences of SALW on the Nigerian State, but have not given adequate attention on how small arms running in the Gulf of Guinea, whether it pose a threat to Nigeria's national security. Thus, the study will address this lacuna, as well fill the gap in the existing literature.

Insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea and its adverse effect Investment on in Nigeria

No doubt economic interest in Nigeria maritime environment are namely; natural resources, oil and gas, installations, shipping. These are strategic national assets. Dick (2010) identified these material resources as most vulnerable investment in the maritime environment. The expansion of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea poses a dire threat to local economies, potentially undermining little stability that currently exists in the region. Oil revenue, which many countries in the region rely upon, is seriously threatened by pirate activities. 7 per cent of Nigeria's oilwealth is believed to have been lost due to such criminality. Also, instability in the Gulf has sharply decreased revenue collected from trade; Benin, whose economy depends

on taxing ships entering the port of Cotonou, has experienced a 70 per cent decline in shipping activity due to piracy.

Furthermore, as piracy drives up insurance premiums for international shipping companies, the price of imported goods in the region could spike, further imperilling local economies. If these local economies falter, development and stability in the region could quickly deteriorate (Nelson,2012). However, Dick, (2013:21) argues that:

> The effects of piracy in the Gulf could well extend far beyond Africa, with potential ramifications for the larger global economy and the United States in particular. The estimated 3 million barrels of oil produced daily by the nations around the Gulf ultimately feed the North American and European markets. Nigeria alone is the fifth largest supplier of oil to the United States and by 2015 could account for a quarter of U.S. oil consumption. However, given the rate at which attacks on oil tankers are increasing, the ability of these nations to reliably provide oil to the international market could be in question. Early 2012 saw a doubling in the number of attacks on oil tankers, with as many as eight hijacks in a month. If this dramatic trend continues, the flow of oil from the Gulf of Guinea to the United States and the West could slow considerably.

Since shipping industries are responsible for about 90 per cent of world trade, according to Ihenacho (2010), shipping is an indispensable logistic service upon which the smooth functioning of the Nigerian economy is clearly and firmly anchored. The ship traffic in major ports in Nigeria, excluding tankers, is estimated at an average of 3500 vessels per annum. The oil and gas activities had greatly contributed to increase in the activity of shipping in the nation's water in terms of coastal tankers, crew boats, house boats and supply boats. Usoro (2003) stated that about 2 billion US dollars was realized from shipping activity within the companies operating in the oil industry in 2002". With the new Cabotage Act; more Nigerian flagged ships would be expected to take advantage of the business opportunities in shipping. The seaports are not only gate way to the nation's economy, they also serve as transit nodes for some neighbouring land locked countries like Niger and Chad. The Nigerian economic survival depends to a great extent on the revenue derivable from the numerous resources and assets available in the maritime environment. Therefore, the effect of insecurity within Gulf of Guinea would negatively impact on the development of the nation if drastic measures are not executed. Hence, it would be necessary to safeguard the resources and assets in this area against all forms of threats. Threat represents anything that can undermine the security of the nation or anything that constitute danger to its survival. Threats to Nigeria's economic interest can be broadly classified into external and internal threat; External threats to Nigeria could manifest inform of political and economic nature. They may arise from unresolved geo-political issues and her porous borders. Other sources of external threats could be spill over from local conflicts, civil strife and unrests in neighbouring countries.

The ever increasing interest in the Gulf of Guinea especially with regards to oil, could be a possible source of threat should Nigeria initiate a foreign policy that negatively affects the economic interest of some powerful / developed countries. Peter (2009), also identified internal threat to Nigeria's economic interest in the maritime environment these include political and communal conflicts, smuggling, piracy and sea robbery, poaching and marine

pollution. Others are maritime terrorism, crude oil theft/illegal bunkering, and pipeline vandalism and sabotage, for example; according to Nigerian Trawlers Owners Association (NITOA) (2013), there was more than 100 pirates attack on trawlers in 2007. The effect of piracy attacks was so grievous on the fishing industries as over 50 per cent of about 250 trawlers registered in Nigeria in 2003/2004 with over 40 fishing companies are no longer in business.

The act of piracy has impacted on the job opportunities and thus negatively affecting the economic growth and development of the nation. Peter (2009: 14) asserts that:

> Crude oil theft/Illegal Bunkering refer to the transfer of fuels and other petroleum products between vessels, from vessels to storage facilities and vice versa without following prescribed procedure or guidelines of the government. In the case of crude oil theft, perpetrators steal crude oil from crude oil pipelines and facilities that transverse the various rivers and creeks. At the peak of the Niger Delta crisis, Nigeria lost an estimated 70,000 – 300000 barrels per day of oil to theft amounting to $4.69 - $20.10 million US dollars at$67 US per barrel. The efforts to reduce these vices to the barest minimum through patrols, and aerial surveillance is challenging, activities of the restive youth was beginning to have effect on the revenue of governments in the oil producing states and hence stifling development in those states before the amnesty.

The threats from internal sources are not only numerous but have immediate and readily visible effect on the investment, economy growth and development. Consequently, owing to its enormous potentials in serving the strategic economic and energy interest of national leaders, multilateral institutions and multinational oil companies, Gulf of Guinea is of prominence to scholars. Fortunately, it appears that scholars like Peter (2009) & Mane (2005), in the discourse on the Gulf of Guinea have either promoted the interest of external investors and equated it with development for countries in the region as. Mane, 2005:85 argues that:

> In fact, the Gulf of Guinea is geographically and economically well positioned to the advantage of European and North American countries in quest, not only for energy security but also for markets, as the region is somewhat free of some of the risks of piracy, attacks and marine accidents associated with alternate sea routes in global commerce between the developed and developing countries of Africa.

According to Adedayo, (2014), Sea piracy and armed robbery undermine investment in offshore oil, sector of the economy, arguing that Nigerian government is heavily dependent on crude oil. This growing interest in the Gulf of Guinea is now deceptively rationalized by the development vacuum in major oil producing areas of the region.

The essence is the nature of impact of oil and gas business in oil producing states of the Gulf of Guinea, while meeting the needs of the importer. This classic example of the "Resource Curse" was also documented by Auty, 2001 & Gylfason, 2001. The term "resource curse thesis" is used to describe how countries rich in natural resources are not able to utilize that wealth to boost their economies and counter-intuitively, these countries had lower economic

growth than countries without an abundance of natural resources. Numerous studies by World Bank, 2000, IMF, 2000 & OPEC 2007 have shown a link between natural resource abundance and poor economic growth. These disconnect between natural resources are stagnant of negative economic growth can be seen clearly by looking at an example from the oil-producing countries.

The post-cold war era has come with a conviction that the concept of security is elastic, beyond mere guard of sovereignty of states. It encompasses safeguard of the human environment from destructive economic activities to comprehensive improvement in the well-being of citizens (Owolabi & Okwechime, 2007). What this means is that security focuses on the root or source of human pain and not on mere military threats against the state and its citizens. This, again, speaks volumes about the significance of human security over other forms of security within the security discourse. Beyond notions of posing security threat to the Nigerian state. Violent crisis in the Niger Delta, which is in part, result of negative socio-economic, political and environmental impact of oil industry in the region is a threat to human security and survival (Owolabi & Okwechime, 2007: 29).
This goes along with a need for strong investment portfolios and profit in and from production, externally driven to ensure sustained cost-friendliness and steady supplies. Security, in this sense, means opportunities for and safety of externally driven investments in the oil sector in any case; oil multinational corporations are agents of capitalist globalization, an important characteristic of capitalist globalization it's a relationships of domination and exploitation in alliance with the national economic and political classes. As Kiely (2005: 09) argues that:

> Market societies do not arise naturally; they are products of political and social processes. Relationships of domination orchestrated by global capital breeds insecurity at one end of the spectrum –Gulf of Guinea – manifesting through the removal of citizens from basic benefits from the land and its oil resource. Access to equal benefits from the capitalist production of the oil is the result of external and domestic political and social processes that are basically determined by the agents of capitalist globalization in alliance with their home governments and host political and economic leaders.

The rising global quest for oil in the Gulf of Guinea is not merely to satisfy energy security needs of key oil importing countries, and also to protect their investments in the oil sector in the region and seek new investment opportunities; all of which are fundamental to the economic security of home governments of the oil multinational corporations. External pressure for energy and economic security on the part of major importing countries like US and China has no corresponding pressure to address social, economic, environmental and political conditions that have resulted from oil exploration and production activities. In fact, it appears that governance becomes difficult in addressing internal issues (Collier, 2002, & Hoeffler, 2005). Perhaps, it is for this reason, Stoker (2004:76) argues that:

> Governance refers to 'all sorts of new arrangements for creating order and structuring collective action.' The ability to get things done without necessarily depending on state actors alone, nature of state and non-state actors, their involvement in addressing social problems, as well as the level

of autonomy they enjoy in the social and political processes clearly signal important indices or properties of good governance.

Certainly, governance of oil in Gulf of Guinea has had devastating impact from pressures of global capitalism at the various stages of exploration, production and marketing. Generally, policy choices of politicians in determining the nature of contract for exploration, production and marketing, and how rents are to be utilized do not promote accountability. Instead, it has contributed to corruption, bad governance, poverty and decadence in social infrastructure and insecurity associated with governance of oil in the Gulf of Guinea, as exemplified in the case of Nigeria's Niger Delta, manifests in different forms. These institutional failures have clearly reinforced the link between environmental insecurity and crime in the Gulf of Guinea (Allen, 2012).

Theo (2010) analysed that security of global waterways cannot be overemphasised; the ocean is a medium of transportation for important mineral resources, especially crude oil, and a source of food in the form of fishing. Africa straddles important sea lanes and the waterways off the west and east coasts of the continent have in recent years emerged as one of the world's most dangerous routes as vessels and crew members have been the targets of maritime pirate attacks; of particular concern is the prevalence and increase in maritime piracy activities – horizontally and vertically – around the Horn of Africa, particularly, the Gulf of Guinea where the safe transportation of commercial goods, cargo and human lives is under constant threat.

From the above analysis, it is clear that the required good order at sea is directly dependent on good governance, after all, most security challenges confronting Africa have their origin in the lack or failure of governance, as states are the primary actors and agents of good order at sea (Theo 2010:62). Thus, the required good order at sea should be viewed as a function of how states, such as Somalia and Nigeria, exercise their jurisdiction at sea to secure busy sea lanes and also to protect the safe harvesting and extraction of resources, whether oil exploration or fishing, to contribute to the desired good order.
George (2012) estimated that global cost of piracy within the current economic environment, have reached the following conclusions.

i. The most spectacular increase in the cost of piracy in recent years have been brought about by the increased ransom economic costs of piracy demanded by pirates in order to free the ship.
ii. Insurance costs are difficult to quantify as many ships avoid purchasing the increased insurance premiums.
iii. The cost of deploying deterrent security equipment varies considerably as ship owners choose to protect their property and crew from pirate attacks by different ways which may vary greatly as far as the cost incurred is concerned.
iv. The cost of Re-Routing, is also difficult to estimate, since it depends on the type of ship, the speed and the miles covered. These costs encumber most shipping companies in their attempt to avoid the impending danger of maritime piracy, especially since 16.3% of world tonnage is owned by European shipping companies.

Piracy affects the cost of trade not merely because particular ships are intercepted when delivering goods. A number of nations have also indicated that their fishing sector has declined in response to the threat of piracy. Another cost is the cost to Food Price Inflation. Approximately, 40% of piracy attacks have been on bulk carriers and general cargo vessels together, these vessels carry the majority of the world's food staples (such as rice and grain).

Pirate attacks on these vessels have direct consequences on the price of food, as deliveries of food cargo are delayed, or in the case of perishable goods, lost.

Finally, there is the cost of reduced foreign revenue, as the instability and volatility of regions, affected by piracy, forces foreign investors to look for alternative regions to spend or invest their money.

It is clear that piracy attacks constitute an imminent danger to the lives and welfare of mariners as well as cargoes and ships. Piracy, in addition, has a direct economic impact in terms of fraud, theft of cargo and travel delays, and definitely undermines the interests of countries active in seaborne trade. It is obvious that piracy has increased in the seas' neighbouring states of gulf of guinea, as recent figures indicate a significant upsurge in piracy attacks off the Nigerian coast, especially between 2012 and 2013. This rise of piracy incidents is due largely to the movement of goods by sea. Inevitably, there is always increases in piracy incidents, especially when cargoes, ships and human lives are valuable commodities. More so, that pirates acquired enough capital from ransoms; it is obvious that piracy is a complex issue and no simplistic explanations and analysis will give the maritime community a clear indication and forecast as to how this international problem will be cracked down.

Theoretical Framework

For an in-depth analysis of thechallenges of maritime security to the Gulf of Guinea, Marxian Political Economy theory **is used as a theoretical framework for this paper**. This theory was propounded by Karl Marx. Therefore, this theory, as a tool of analysis, gives some measure of analytical coherence to the variables and phenomena in the study. Marx outlined the essence of materialist understanding of history. He evolved a theory based on the dialectical materialism; essentially the theory of dialectical materialism which emphasizes the primary condition, the dynamic character of social reality and the relatedness of different elements of society.

The theory is premised on the notion that man is principally motivated by economic or material needs (Ake,1981:2). Labour is the essence of material existence, hence economic activity is man's primary concerned. The thrust of this perspective is that the understanding of societal politics and culture depends principally on the understanding of its economic structure as defined by the relations between employers of labour and the working class in the production process (Akpuru-Aja, 1998:16). To Marx, every political system corresponds to and reflects its kind of economic structure. Thus, in the preface to his work: "A Contribution to Critique of Political Economy", Marx places premium on the sub-structural component of the society (otherwise called the base or foundation) which plays a determinant role on

its super-structural counterparts like politics, ideology and culture of society. Accordingly, he asserts that:

> Neither legal relations nor political forms could be comprehended whether by themselves or on the basis of a so-called general development of the human mind, but that on the contrary, they originate in the material conditions of life… in the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations which are independent of their will, namely, relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditioned the general process of social, political and intellectual life (Marx, 1984:20).

Thus, from the substructure, one easily understands the nature of internal relations, how a society organizes, manages and reproduces itself, the causes of tension, conflicts or contradictions in any given society as well as the direction of social change. Marx holds that the primary cause of tension and social dislocation in society is economic factor. He first employed the political economy approach for analysing the root causes of conflicts and contradictions in English capitalist economy. To substantiate this, Nnoli, cited in (Ken, 2010), asserts that in understanding the economic structure, particular attention is paid to the mode of production (the organic unity of productive forces and relations of production in society), the class structure of society and the inherent contradictions among classes and how these factors determines political, economic, legal, cultural, ideological, and moral aspects of social life.

Application of the Theory

The intensity of piracy and other maritime crimes in the Gulf of Guinea is economically motivated, hence the economic sabotage within the Nigerian territorial waters alongside other states in the region can best be explained within the analytical orbit of Marxian Political Economy Paradigm.

The theory enables us to appreciate the dimensions and dynamics of the prevailing world order, which moves under the fulcrum of western capitalism/imperialism. The prevailing capitalist order favours those who control the means of production and capitalize on the control of the prevailing economic doctrine to perpetuate asymmetry relationship among other social strata.

The enormous deposit of Hydrocarbon and, other mineral resources have attracted foreign and domestic investors to the region. There are presence of multinational corporations from America, Asia, Europe and including indigenous firms from Nigeria, that pursue their respective economic and energy interest. Also, considering the geo-strategic nature of the Gulf of Guinea as a trans- Atlantic trade and shipping route/ hub; illicit activities of pirates, smugglers, and militants among others are part of the competition to acquire wealth by perpetuating their illegal act at sea.

Consequently, these groups of pirates, sea bandits, smugglers, and poachers etc; organize their actions as to benefit from the large resources in the region. Their principal objective is to satisfy their primary material condition by disrupting the legal activities of external and internal players.

Although their activities are criminally inclined, but, however, deeply rooted in mismanagement of oil revenue, institutional failure, corruption, weak maritime laws in territorial or international waters, lax security strength and most prevalence is the complex issue of governance; these have serious implications on the socio-economic well-being of Nigerian citizens, most especially the oil bearing states within the Gulf of Guinea. To this end, Ake's (1981:2) proposition seems justified on the basis that theft as a moral value was created and dependant on a particular material condition. Accordingly he asserts that:

> The morality and values of society tends to support the preservation of the existing division of labour and distribution of wealth in that society. The autonomy of morality and social values is more apparent than the real. Contemporary western morality condemns theft. And we forget that theft as a moral value is something created and dependent on particular economic condition; where there is no scarcity and no private property, the idea of theft would not arise (Ake, 1981:2).

This proposition, among others, show the importance of economic conditions in understanding society. It is, therefore, not surprising that counter piracy effort may prove abortive due, largely, to the parochial interest of littoral states, foreign consumers and the black market players on the booming hydrocarbon resources. In other words, the congress of interest among beneficiaries in the criminal enterprise will make it difficult to stem the tide.

Research Methodology

The data collected was through secondary sources and to elicit relevant information. The secondary sources are journals, books, magazines, news paper, and internet, among others. Data collected was analyzed through the use of content analysis. All materials used were dully acknowledged.

Conclusion/ Recommendations

From the foregoing, this study has evaluated piracy, small arms running and insecurity in Nigerian territorial waters, and the aftermath on the Nigerian state it has also revealed the activities of the sea pirates have been sophisticated in an organized pattern that have been difficult to dislodge. Since the Gulf of Guinea is one of the fastest-growing maritime zones in energy production, policing the maritime environment had, over the years, been an onerous task.

The study assessed that there are indications that piracy in the Gulf of Guinea is, in fact, expanding and is poised to increase, with the expansion of their illicit activities in the Nigerian territorial waters; equally the pirates have a strong motivation to expand given the

increasing oil exploration activities and shipments of oil and other cargoes which monetary values are the motivating factor.

Similarly, the study found that regional initiatives, institutional and international supports initiatives had failed due to lack of coordination among these partners largely to diverse national interests as well their latten interest of littoral states. This has been further highlighted by the absence of good governance, corruption, weak economic base, poverty, poor military capacity, among others (Onuorah, 2014).

Also, the study found that small arms running in the Gulf of Guinea is fueling social disintegration, especially the insurgency of the Boko Haram Sect in North East Nigeria based on political cum economic motive as the driven force for arms trafficking in the region. This has increased insecurity and undermines development. Small arms proliferations had caused more rapid spread of violence and intensify violence with devastating effects, including increasing crime that erodes prospects for development. The study also found that maritime insecurity in the region has adversely affected investment in Nigeria; such as hipping of cargo goods, fishing trawlers, crude oil tankers, among others. This allows the development of illegal offshore trade in crude oil and refined petroleum. Consequently, it is evidently clear that there is a nexus between oil bunkering and the rise of violent attacks by pirates in the region; Nigeria is the epicentre of these activities. Therefore, the study put forward the following recommendations for policy implementation:

i. The Gulf of Guinea states cannot overcome maritime security challenges without the support of international partners; therefor to render effective support, partner, should help them address the root causes of violence at sea. Donors should not restrict themselves to a purely security-based approach but should broaden their cooperation strategies with the Gulf of Guinea states to include economic governance, development, law enforcement and security, while involving all concerned ministries and agencies. States and donors should collectively identify capacity building needs and distribute tasks according to donors' willingness and areas of expertise.

ii. Higher and better awareness of the realities of the situation will improve cooperation amongst role players both of State and non-State actors. This will enhance the capacities to limit maritime piracy and enhanced integrated approach to maritime security in the region. In other words Naval and civilian role players involved in the maritime sphere should develope an integrated approach that connects all aspects, and they must think, plan and work together.

iii. Government should demonstrate genuine commitment to stop the flow of small arms in the region. For instance, while it is true that Nigeria has established a national committee on the implementation of the ECOWAS Moratorium on the Small Arms, indications are that the efforts made so far lack strategic coordination and consistent implementation; thus, beyond the mere signing of the ECOWAS principle not to allow importation, exportation and manufacturing of small arms, the government should strengthen its control over arms in its armory and work out necessary measures that would guarantee border security with its neighbours, as well

as improve the maritime security situation in the waters of Africa, especially in piracy prone areas.

iv. Maritime security budget should be even more than that of land and air space security budgets, as well as provision of ample surveillance facilities, including platforms in policing EEZ; furthermore, governments of these piracy prone areas should employ more hands to police the vast areas of their territorial waters; the IMO should work out modalities, principles or ways that may provide good order at sea.

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THE ROLE OF NIGERIAN MILITARY DURING ELECTION, STRATEGIC ISSUES AND NATIONAL SECURITY, 1999-2015

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Abstract

Nigerian Military had contributed immensely in the area of election and national security. As part of national security, the military sees election as part of national security issues which must be protected with required energy involved strategic think to protect lives and property of people whenever the exercise is being rolled out by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). The strategic thinking of military on national security usually provide a solid base for security architecture of the country as a long standing security institution protecting territorial integrity of Nigeria. In view of the foregoing, the paper examines the role played by the military during the elections in Nigeria as an important national assignment which should be supported to produce quality leaders across all the tiers of government for effective economic coordination in the country. This made the role of military more important. The thrust of argument in this paper is that with all efforts put in place by the military about strategic issues surrounding national security. Why Nigeria as a nation still having prevalent security challenges? What efforts are being put place to ensure adequate security measure? Examining the activities of military would give insightful comment on what the military need to do to curb security challenges. It has also given insightful information about what military has done in the past and what the military is doing currently. The method adopted in the study is secondary approach which connotes use of written documents such as textbooks, journals, magazines, newspapers, internets and other relevant documents required.

Introduction

From period of the end of the Cold War in 1989, wars continue to become more of intra--state than inter-state centre of war affairs. The case of Sierra Leone, Somalia, Liberia, and Côte d'Ivoire are some of the few examples in Africa. Given nature and the dynamism of sub-regional organizations, the risk of armed aggression against one state by another has increased considerably during the democratic period in Nigeria which threated the country national security. Consequently, security agencies throughout the world are involve in containing all security threats to national security.

The word democracy has been subjected to many interpretations and adaptations in various parts of the world today as result of its relevance to modern best system of government in the world. Democracy is not alien to Nigeria but the democratic institutions such as 'political party and security agencies' which were inherited from western culture. Nigeria's independent was basically western ideology. The institutions of this type of government were borrowed from the west countries. This borrowed system of government were expected to perform the same functions as in western countries from which they were borrowed unfortunately that is not the case with Nigeria. Many of the country politicians had neither understood the rules of the game nor had they accepted them in line with electoral values known with western world. Despite many attempt to review the election guiding rule for the conduct of elections in Nigeria, to politicians, politics is a game of do or die affair. As the rule and regulations were blatantly violated, politics became a dangerous game for both practitioners and inspectors.[2]

The Nigeria security agencies should always be seen as a partner in the democratic process and as only few countries in the world can afford to have a weak military force, as today military is becoming the determining factor of both political and economic force of any country in the world. This point is becoming common phenomenon in the case of Nigeria as a major political and economic force on the African continent. As such, it is important for Nigeria's government and the leaders as well citizens to support in building a strong the military institution and professionalism, in doing so, as the military had accept civilian leadership in a democratic setting such as the one Nigeria is currently experiencing.[3]

Overview of Elections in Nigeria

The outcomes of elections have disposed Nigerians towards skepticism, if not outright cynicism, in matters of elections. Election has been a problem of Nigerian politics. But for the first modern election in the country, following the Clifford Constitution of 1922, no election has taken place in the country without being occupied by controversy or serious socio – political disquiet.[2] The 1923 exercise can be described as a limited" election as the franchise was restricted to adult British residents and protected persons of Lagos and Calabar whose annual income was not less than one hundred pounds a year. The little tumult that the introduction of partisan political activities caused, especially in Lagos which was assigned 3 elected seats as against Calabar that was given only one was to set the trend for all subsequent elections in the country.[3]

The first major and most significant democratic elections held in the country was the 1959 elections that ushered the county into her independence in 1960. The 1959 election though

devoid of noticeable large scale disruptions and fraud, was disputed, particularly the federal elections. However, the determination of the nationalist leaders not to do anything that would destabilize the country's journey towards attaining independence prevented them from allowing the controversies to degenerate into a political debacle.[4] There has been 10 general elections to constitute Government at federal, regional (later state) and local government levels since the attainment of independence in Nigeria. Most of these elections were marked by allegations of electoral malpractices that seriously threatened to undermine national security.

The 1964 elections followed the promulgation of the 1963 Constitution which declared Nigeria as a Federal Republic and consequently recommended the Parliamentary System of democracy for the country.[5] It resulted in the change of the position of Governor – General to that of a ceremonial Presidency, while the Prime Minister became the head of government. Also the election was the first to be organized solely, independently and directly by Nigerian authorities and institutions. Campaign languages were insulting, while political activities were replete with thuggery, vandalism, arson and great insecurity to lives and property. The cumulative results were the pogroms and conflagrations that visited the elections in 1965, the crash of the period known as the first republic followed by the military take – over of the government in January 1966 and the civil war of 1967 – 1970.[6] This heralded 3 decades of military rule when elections was viewed to have impacted negatively on Nigeria's nations security.

The 1979 elections was contested by five political parties and power was near evenly distributed after the polls in a manner that signaled the emergence of regional issue –based politics, that was not far – fetched from the prevalent situation in the first republic. The allegations of massive malpractices during the elections, was reluctantly accepted due to the desire of the civil class to terminate military rule. Also, the desire of the military to return to barracks was informed by the disenchantment of the populace with the excesses of military rule. Before its demise, the republic managed to produce a second election in 1983, which has been literally described as the incumbency elections.[7]

Although the 1983 elections were successfully concluded after massive documented abuses and rigging, the republic was eventually terminated by the military.[8] Following, after the demise of the second republic, the next series of military administrations began what was termed political engineering to try to devise a new populist political order. This led to the concept of transitional arrangements that created room for phased electoral systems and the introduction of seeming grassroots approach to politics. It was under this condition that the 1988 elections took place. The 1988 election was on a non – party basis and a grassroots election to be contested at the local government level only. The elections were not eventful, neither did it generate much political impact on the system, except as part of a larger programme of transition.

The 1991 national elections was also unique in certain respects as it represented the pinnacle of trial and error system of political solutions embarked upon by the military administration. It started by first asking the public to float political parties and later dissolving the entire 13 political associations that emerged to form its own two party structure of "a little to the right"

named as the National Republican Convention and the second, 'a little to the left' named the Social Democratic Party. All politicians were then compelled to join either of these parties.[9] The period was full of political activities that led nowhere as a result of policy and agenda somersaults. The controversy of whether an unelected military president should be empowered to inaugurate or convene an elected National Assembly, ahead of an elected president, yet to elect arose, dovetailing into the June 12, 1993 Presidential election. The annulment of the June 12, 1993 presidential elections widely considered as the freest and fairest elections ever held in the country caused social and political instability which threatened the national security of the country.[10]

The 1996/1997 elections under another military administration, started as a transitional zero – party type similar to the 1988 elections. Starting with local government, the election train moved up to the National Assembly, having successfully held the state Assembly category under its political party systems. The process became negatively manipulated to encourage the perpetuation of the then military Head of State by adoption as the sole candidate by the five political parties, leading to the impression that the parties were cancerous fingers of the same hand.[11] The country was set adrift as different ethno –regional power blocs that were dissatisfied with the 1993 annulment became confrontational by setting up radio stations and quasi political groups that impacted negatively on the national security of the country.
The 1999 elections held to return civilian government were by all intents and purposes motivated by the desire of the military to appease the aggrieved populace over the annulled elections of 1993.[12] The result of the keenly contested election was vehemently disputed due to alleged malpractices that characterized its conduct.[13] Worse malpractices featured in the 2003 and 2007 elections as evidenced from testimonies from election tribunals across the entire country, where aggrieved contestants are challenging the conduct and result of the elections as announced by the Independent National Electoral commission.

Though electoral malpractices had been a feature of Nigerian politics since independence, the 2007 election revealed that it is not only undermining the institutionalization of democracy but also threatening the national security of the country.[14] Political parties, individual functionaries of incumbent governments, security agencies especially the police and officials of electoral commissions have featured regularly in allegations of perpetrating malpractices since independence.[15] Consequently the danger posed to the peace, stability and institutionalization of democratic order through the participation of these groups in electoral malpractices is inimical to internal security.

The Role of the Military in a Democracy in Nigeria

In a democratic dispensation, the military and security agencies needs to be apolitical, professionalized and devoid the tendencies to usurp power in the future. The military needs to continue to confine itself to her constitutional roles and resist any attempt by any circumstances to be lured into acts detrimental to the sustenance of democracy.[15] This is only achievable through proper training and administration of personnel to prepare them for their role in a democratic setting.

The military and security agencies are expected to perform the constitution FGN role, these roles are further elucidated in the various enabling Election Acts. There is therefore no

ambiguity regarding the roles expected of the military and security agencies in a democracy and any roles outside these would be illegal except the President Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Nigeria directs them subject to confirmation by the National Assembly. The military in the present dispensation has a lot of areas to direct its efforts. These include protecting and securing the territorial borders against aggression and armed banditry. The military has a responsibility to assist the civil police in restoring law and order when so directed by the president. A conducive working environment as well as constant flow of information to bridge communication gaps between the government and military authorities is recipes for a stable democracy. The public would need to change their attitude towards the military by treating the military as an essential component of the society. They need to see the military as an integral part of the body polity and partners with equal stake in a stable democracy and not as 'aliens'.

It is not realistic to relegate the military back to the barracks without assigning it a role outside of the national defense. In fact, it may be counterproductive. The military should be seen as a partner in the democratic process. Few countries in the world can afford to have a weak military force. This point is particularly true for Nigeria as a major political and economic force on the African continent. As such, it is important for Nigeria's leaders and citizens to support the military.

National security is the aggregate of the security interests of all individuals, communities, ethnic groups and political entities; with foreign policy, defence, economy, social development, law and order forming the core of national security[16]. It therefore follows that national security includes the protection of lives and property, and the provision of tranquil atmosphere in which individuals can pursue their lawful activities without hindrance. From this point of view, national security is a necessary condition for socio-economic development of countries, and democracy, with its values of freedom, multi-partism, the rule of law, good governance, constitutes a favourable factor for national security. Indeed, talking about democracy, Graham said it enables peoples to pursue their interests or to secure liberty or justice; or that it involves treating people with a respect to which they are entitled. [17]

Most Third World countries especially in sub-Saharan Africa, after attaining political independence, were confronted with internal crises which delayed their development. The origins of these crises are in very fragile and unstable political structures; deep contradictions between the authorities and the people; regional, ethnic and religious antagonisms within states; weak and unproductive economic structures; the use of state power for personal enrichment and repression.[18] These conditions were made worse by incessant military involvements in governance. The different authoritarian regimes and military dictatorships led their countries to total poverty.

To take their countries out of the economic chaos, African Governments went into negotiation with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. In respect to the conditions of these financial institutions, they were compelled to democratise. Moreover, donor agencies and Western Governments have linked future assistance to the extent of efforts at democratisation, the guaranteeing of human rights and the protection of vulnerable groups.[19] Though many African countries are now democratising, its practice especially in

periods of elections, sometimes threatens national security. This is seen in the rivalries between political parties, ethnic and regional groups, communities, and religious groups. In many countries, these rivalries have led to internal conflicts with a generalized crisis situation. Therefore, the non-respect of the principles of democracy can be generate security threats to the democratic system itself. For this reason, democracy needs to be carefully protected by guaranteeing national security in order to promote political stability and socio-economic development.

Role of the Nigerian Military in Maintaining National Security during Election

Hilsman stated that the traditional role of the military is to defend the territorial integrity of its nation by safeguarding the lives and property of its citizens against external aggression and internal insurgencies when called upon by the civil authority. In other words, the military is a nation's instrument used to enforce peace, guarantee safety of lives and property and stability of its citizens.[20]

According to the definition above, the military response to threats to national security concerns both the internal and external dimensions. Indeed, in practical terms, it is at times difficult to draw a distinction between the internal and external dimensions of the threat facing a nation. Besides, a country's external enemies could easily exploit the internal situation if they are ill disposed towards taking an overt military action against the target state. This is called subversive penetration, which relates to the subtle use of non-military or indirect military pressures to destabilize a state. Internal security therefore, is not only the area of responsibility of the police force. For Imobighe, there are two mains determinants of national security planning. One of them is threat and the other relates to a nation's available resources, both of men and material. In terms of the human element, it is not just the entire population, but the active segment of the population that counts. As for material resources, these include finances, industries, infrastructure, food, and transportation facilities.[21]

It is important to note that, apart from containing the threats, Armed Forces also participate more and more in mobilizing material resources mentioned above, which is the other main determinant of national security planning. Indeed, in many developing countries, the military become actively involved in road building, dam construction, medical service, agriculture and industries. The Armed Forces also have a responsibility in maintaining internal security, even in democratic regimes.

Role of Nigerian Military in Democracy

In democratic regimes, the role of Armed Forces is defined by the Country's constitution. This role is carried out under the control of civilian authorities and in strict respect of political neutrality. The primary role of a military force is to provide for a country's external security, but in the aftermath of the Second World War, many policy makers suggested that highly trained armed forces could be used for non-military purposes within the country.

Historically, democratic nations have not always strictly confined their militaries to combat missions. For example, the United States Military Academy at West Point trained many of the nation's engineers, both civilian and military. The United States Army contributed to national economic development by helping explore and survey the West, choosing

settlement sites, and building roads, dams and waterways. In the early twentieth century, the Army Corps of Engineers constructed the Panama Canal and was responsible for many other public works and buildings, even today, it provides water to the nation's capital. American soldiers have also taken on special roles in times of emergency: they have often been called in to quell urban riots.[22]

Currently, regional and international dynamics facilitate military support for democracy. This is seen in the use of Armed Forces for peacekeeping operations, conflict resolution, or promoting democracy by guaranteeing security during transition and electoral periods, under the warrant of United Nations or regional organizations. This has been done in Liberia to allow the holding of the presidential and legislative elections in July 1997 and the return to democracy after the civil war. Presently in Cote d'Ivoire and in Democratic Republic of Congo, armed forces are used by International Community to restore democratic order. If a country's Armed Forces are used by the International Community for supporting democracy outside, why cannot they be used at home for the same assignments? The essential is the respect of the principles of democracy and mainly the political neutrality.

Relationship between Elections and National Security. The relationship between elections and nation security could be situated in the flawed process of elections. This usually leads to bad governance, dwindling economic growth, persistent corruption, crime and insecurity.[23] When violence precedes an election and it is of the nature which either seeks to intimidate opponents or seek to wreak vengeance upon party defectors, national security is threatened. Consequently, it is the responsibility of government to cater for the security and welfare of Nigerians, and also to ensure that Nigerians participate in their governments. the basic form of such participation is the exercise the right to vote, which is really, a mode of expression of the freedom of which is guaranteed in the constitution.[24] Therefore, any situation that obstructs any citizen from exercising his civic and constitutional rights to vote and be voted for must be taken to constitute the violation of his rights to participate in the government of his country, state or local government. When election violence acquires a dangerous dimension, with the smuggling of guns and ammunition into the country and used. The result has been that so many people get killed for political disagreements. Once the hoodlums belong to the reigning political parties in the states or at the national level, some Attorney Generals of the states have been known to enter Nolle Prosequi for cases of murder preferred against such hoodlums. The relationship between elections and national security are symbiotic, as flawed elections affects national security of a country, while a breakdown of national security affects the peaceful conducts of elections.

Challenges for Military Commanders during Election

This period will particularly pose some challenges to NA personnel especially commanders on the ground. It is essential to have foresight and start planning right now. Some of these challenges may include:

a. The presence of the media will continuously be a challenge to commanders. You shouldn't forget that the media is ever present and they have the right to report on virtually anything rightly or wrongly. You never can know whose interest they represent. Negative actions will always attract screaming headlines. Therefore, commanders have to be adept at media handling and be proactive, if any situation requires interaction with the media you have to seek the advice of the Army Public Relations Directorate. Troops would have to be

properly educated on this. On the other hand, the media could be a useful tool to explain some positive actions by NA personnel.

b. The conduct of troops currently on different internal operations will present some challenges. Provisions for the troops in internal operation could be cumbersome especially when the security situation in their area of operations is not stable. For effective command and control, clear and simple instructions must be outlined to deal with such peculiarities without compromising the operations.

c. This period might witness accusations and counter accusations of complicity of security agents. This situation calls for caution, commanders need to ensure they up-date their Commanders Diary and encourage their troops to take note of events they witnessed. This could help to acquit the NA in the event that dishonest elements want indict or discredit the NA.[25]

Issues of Elections and Nigeria's National Security

The issues and challenges thrown up by elections in Nigeria include the mode of ensuring the autonomy of the electoral process, conduct of the electorates, issue of party agents and the conduct of the election petition tribunals. When taken together, they are capable of having grave consequences for national security of Nigeria.

Independent National Electoral Commission: The will and capacity of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) to prepare adequately a level playing – field for free and fair elections in Nigeria has remained a persistent issue and challenge to the electoral process. The President appoints the Chairman and Electoral Commissioners subject to confirmation by the senate.[25] The management staff including the secretary who is the accounting officer are normally deployed to INEC from the Federal Civil Service. Therefore, inspite of its supposed independence, INEC is very often treated as an arm of the Federal Civil Service receiving from time to time, Federal Government circulars for implementation. In 2003 and 2007 elections, INEC was accused of participating and facilitating electoral malpractices in favour of the incumbent government, through the shoddy registration of voters and conduct of the election.[26] Thus, it is suggested that INEC be made to be independent of the executive and draw its fund directly from the Federation Account.

Cost of the Electoral Process: The revised Electoral Act 2006 imposed limits on campaign expenditure by political parties. At the Civil Society Forum Seminar on 'Agenda for Electoral Reform' organized by INEC in 2003, former President Olusegun Obasanjo asked the seminar to address the issue of the staggering cost of elections declaring that the 2003 election cost the Federal Government well over ₦50 billion. He adjudged this level of spending to be unacceptable and suggested a drastic reduction and review of costs, processes and procedures. He lamented the lack of control on spending by candidates and parties and was convinced that elective offices had become commodities to be purchased by the highest bidders.[27] The issue of grants to registered political parties has tended also to serve as an incentive for unscrupulous politicians to form and register political parties. The practice should be discontinued and the culture of verifiable disclosure of contributions and donations strictly enforced as stipulated in the Electoral Act.[28]

Conduct of the Electorates: The majority of the electorates in Nigeria are predominately illiterates and not politically sophisticated.[28] These voters are easily induced with money or material things and usually convinced to perpetrate malpractices such as multiple voting, ballot box stuffing and underage voting. Some of the unemployed amongst the youths are deployed to foment trouble and cause violence.[29] Educating the electorate will enable them exercised their civic rights in such a manner that will be beneficial to the generality of the populace. It is therefore necessary to institute a comprehensive employment and poverty alleviation policies that will cater for the needs and aspiration s of the Nigerian youths, so that they become meaningfully engaged and channel their energies into productive ventures.
Issue of Party Agents: The Electoral law permitting party agents at polling centres is a challenges to security operatives. In 2003, 30 political parties were registered, while in 2007 about 50 parties were also registered. Consequently, if each of these parties deploys an agent to each of polling booths it means 30 or 50 agents, whom can easily overwhelm security operatives who will not be more than five security and unarmed guard. This creates room for ballot box snatching and other electoral malpractices. It is therefore necessary that the electoral panel set up by the President addresses this issue, as a panacea to the sanctity of the electoral process in Nigeria.

Election Petition Tribunal: The method of selecting the Election Petition Tribunal members by the executive has also been identified as a challenge. While the recent judicial pronouncement of the tribunals have been eulogized has been the last hope of the aggrieved, the selections by the National Judicial Commission will make the tribunals more independent of the executive. Also, the period of sittings of election tribunals are unnecessary long, sometimes taking close to one year for litigants to obtain justice. The case of Governor Obi of Anambra State is instructive. It is suggested that elections are held 2 – 3 months before the expiration of the tenure of an incumbent to make sufficient room for the hearing of petitions arising from election disputes.[30]

Strategies to Improve the Conduct of Elections in Nigeria and Enhance National Security

This paper will proffer strategies to address the issues and challenges identified in the preceding paragraphs for consideration as a solution to the effective management of elections in the country. They include review of the establishment of INEC, disclosure of election funds, attitudinal change of the electorates, and reduction of party agents at polling booths and strengthening of the elections tribunals.

Review of Method of Appointing INEC Chairman. The ability and credibility of INEC to conduct a free and fair election has been repeatedly impeached by generality of the public. Consequently, it is suggested the de – listing of INEC from the list of federal executive bodies and for exclusion of its members from the list of presidential appointees. The appointment of INEC could be multi – partisan with the nominees representing all political parties following which the entire membership would elect a member as chairman. On the issue of funding, the Commission should draw its fund directly from the Consolidated Revenue fund without having to present its request or collect its allocation through the presidency.[31] This will change the perception of opposition parties and many Nigerians about the partiality of INEC and the influence of the executive on it activities.

Disclosure of Election Funds. The high cost of participating in elections and the elimination of electoral malpractices should be addressed through the elaboration of the details of the power already granted INEC in the Electoral Reform Act of 2006. This can be done by setting ceilings, establishing degrees of sanctions and ensuring compliance. Furthermore, INEC must publish guidelines on funding for both the party and candidate with respect to donations (in cash or in kind), limits on contributions, types of expenditure, and total expenditure. It would also need to publish verifiable modalities for full disclosure of revenue, revenue sources and expenditures. The sanctions must be articulated and must be enforceable and payments of grant to political parties should be discontinued.

Altitudinal Change of the Electorates through Education. The political elites are usually anxious to exploit the vulnerability of the poor electorates and unemployed youths in pursuit of their self-aggrandizement. Most electoral malpractices are perpetrated by voters who have been induced by politicians to mortgage their rights for pittance. It is therefore, necessary that the government embark on mass education on the rights of the individual under the Constitution. The National Orientation Agency (NOA) and INEC should intensify their efforts in this regard. The NOA and INEC could embark on mobile publicity and education using vehicles and motor cycles by traveling to the remote areas of the country to show films and documentaries about the damaging effect of electoral malpractices on national security and the general well-being of the citizens.[32]

Reduction of Party Agents at Polling Booths. The law permitting unrestrained access of party agents at polling booths should be reviewed. Inspire of the constraints imposed by unavailability of electricity supply and the degree of illiteracy, INEC should gradually introduce e – voting on a pilot basis beginning with the next elections. This will eliminate the snatching of ballot boxes and thuggery at polling booths with the resultant threat to national security.

Strengthening the Electoral Tribunals. The pace at which election tribunals adjudicate on matters brought before them is slow and frustrating. Inspire of some landmark judgments in which the judiciary asserted its independence, some of the verdicts by the tribunal lack credibility. Because the election tribunals are slow, INEC usually hides under its cloak by not charging cases of electoral violence and malpractices to the High Courts, as stipulated by the Act. This encourages electoral violence and malpractices, as violators of the law if not punished are further emboldened to commit future crimes. Therefore, to ensure the credibility and independence of the tribunals, the election tribunals should be strengthened to enable they also enforce electoral laws through a constitutional review.

Implications of Elections for Nigeria's National Security

A free and fair election occurs when outcomes of electoral process are determined purely by the votes of the electorate. An election may be peaceful without being free and fair, if for example, there is widespread incidence of corruption or manipulation of ethno – religious sentiment. The implications of the failure to conduct free and fair elections in Nigeria are recurring political crisis, widespread poverty due to poor economic management, socio – cultural dislocations and security imperatives.

Political Implications. When there is subversion of free and fair elections, there is the possibility of protracted insecurity and persistent threat to the sovereignty of the nation. The proliferation of ethnic, religious and regional militias constitute a challenge to the sovereignty of the country and which if not managed can lead to the collapse of the state. The election crisis in western Region in 1965 and the controversial results of the 1983 elections led to the breakdown of law and order culminating in the military takeover of government.[32] Elections, therefore have very serious implications for the sovereignty of the state and national security of the country.

Economic Implications. Election manipulations accentuates widespread poverty due to poor economic management. Since there is a subversion of formal processes, accountability and distortion in the representation in the policy making process; the institutional capacity of government to provide the basic necessities of life to the citizenry is impaired.[33] This situation breeds poverty which is a source of insecurity. The feeling of exclusion and deprivation among a significant proportion of the populace creates inequality and threat to national security. Consequently, in equality creates social tension and compromises security as the mass of unemployed and poor are potential recruits for violence and crime.[34]

Socio – Cultural Implications. Once the people realize that their input into the election process are not respected, they become apathetic and refuse to perform their civic duty of voting. They will lose the inspiration to invest their hopes and aspirations in the political process, as they perceive election results as already pre – ordained and their choices irrelevant.[35] The populace become frustrated as they cannot influence change in a positive direction through elections. Therefore, they are likely to seek or encourage alternatives through anti – democratic processes such as violence, crime, arson and murder as occurred in Ondo and Oyo States in August 1983, Kogi, Plateau, Lagos, Ekiti, Gombe, Nasarawa during the 2007 elections.

Security Implications. Generally, conflict is dysfunctional to the proper functioning of the political system. Often, when stakeholders in the political system feel that their opportunities to participate in meaningful elections are thwarted by a closed political system, they may abandon the path of negotiation, conciliation and compromise for conflict. They may become antagonistic to one another and this may have negative implication for national security. They may even take up arms against constituted authority.[36]

Conclusion

Elections in Nigeria have been marred by violence, which has impinged on national security. Since independence in 1960, Nigeria has recorded a long list of controversial elections, characterized by electoral malpractices and violence. The paper analysed the overview of elections in Nigeria, implications of elections for Nigeria's national security and the relationship between elections and national security. The issues and challenges were identified and strategies to enhance the conduct of a free and fair elections in Nigeria.

Some of the findings of this paper include the fact that electoral malpractices which entails intimidation of opponents, falsification of results, rigging and arson among others have on many occasions disrupted the electoral process. This has resulted in dissent which has led to the breakdown of law and order in some part of Nigeria and impinged on national security. It was revealed that flawed elections has enormous political, economic, socio – cultural and security implications for Nigeria. The totality of the findings is that manipulations of elections has negative impact on national security, as it has resulted sometimes in regime termination, massive killings, arson, lootings and break down of law and order.

Furthermore, the paper identified issues and challenges which poses impediments to elections in Nigeria. These challenges include how to make INEC more independent and effective, how to reduce the cost of the electoral process and how to make the electorates and youths develop appropriate political culture of eschewing violence. Other issues and challenges are reducing the preponderance of party agents vis a vis security operatives at polling booths and making the election tribunals more potent in their role in the adjudication of election disputes.

In cognizance of the obvious benefits of a free and fair election to national security, a number of strategies have been proposed. These include the de – listing of INEC from the list of federal executive bodies and its financial autonomy which will be a panacea for a free and fair elections. In addition, INEC will need to publish guidelines on funding for both party and candidates, setting ceilings and establishing degrees of sanctions and ensuring compliance with the Electoral Reform Act 2006. The payment of grants to political parties should also be discontinued. There should be a deliberate policy for mass education on the rights of the individuals in the constitution through film shows and documentaries about the damaging effects of electoral malpractices on national security. The youths should be gainfully employed to reduce the temptation of been used to ferment violence during elections by the political elites.

Similarly, the reduction of party agents at polling booths will drastically reduce the incidence of ballot box snatching, intimidation and disruptions of the electoral process. Finally, the electoral tribunals could be mandated to dispose of election cases brought before them at least two months before the swearing in of the winners of such elections. They could also be empowered to trial electoral offences.

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THE USE OF AIR POWER IN THE NIGERIA-BIAFRA CIVIL WAR, 1967-1970

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Abstract

This paper examines the involvement and use of air power, better known as air force, in executing the Nigerian civil war. The air force involvement was a necessary strategy and tactics used by the Federal Military Government and the Biafran Republic in the war which lasted from 1967-1970. The paper conceptualizes the concepts of Air Power, Civil War, Federal Military Government, Biafran Republic, War Strategy and Tactics for the purpose of contextualizing their usage in the analysis. The paper relies on primary and secondary sources derived from conventional and electronic libraries for the research. The researcher uses varied sources for the purpose of corroborating the ideas available in documented literature and employed the historical and interdisciplinary approaches such as narrative and analytical methods in analysing the issues. For purpose of intellectual honesty, the research acknowledges all sources consulted through footnotes and references. The research findings reveal the usage of air power as strategy and tactics in the civil war on both sides. The paper informs the readers and the general public on the significance place of the Air Force or Power in executing the civil war. In addition, the paper serves as additional research literature and creates new research problems for future researchers interested in the Nigerian civil war, 1967- 1970.

Keywords: Air Power, Civil War, Strategy and Tactics

Introduction

Like many wars in the annals of human history, the Nigerian Civil War witnessed the used of shrewd strategy and tactics by the parties involved in their efforts to gain advantage over each other. Of particular interest was the use of air power as strategy and tactics by the parties involved in prosecuting the civil war. While some argued that the civil war was an unfortunate event that inflicted untold hardship on Nigerians and Biafrans alike, others are of the opinion that warfare is historically part and parcel of human society; hence, no human society ever lived without one form of conflict or the other. For instance, during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, warfare was an attribute of human politics locally and internationally. As a global phenomenon, therefore, warfare threatened world peace and

particularly the socio-economic and political wellbeing of the human societies. In particular, Europe experienced the Franco-Prussian and Napoleonic wars in the 19th century, whereas from the second decade of the 20th century, warfare became a global phenomenon with the First and Second World Wars fought between 1914-1918 and 1939-1945 respectively. The end of the WW II in 1945 ushered in the Cold War, following the emergence of USA and USSR as world powers until the 1990s when USA emerged as the unilateral global hegemonic power after the collapse of the USSR between 1990 and 1991.

In like manner, African societies in the 19th and 20th centuries witnessed several wars that threatened their peaceful coexistence and development. During the 19th century, traditional political communities in the area that later became Nigeria in 1914 witnessed several wars. These include the Yoruba civil wars; the Jihad movement of Usman Ibn dan Fodio, the Kanem-Borno wars and the Kwararafa wars of territorial expansion. Similarly, in an effort to resist the colonial conquest and rule, various societies in Nigeria, before the amalgamation, engaged the colonial masters in wars until they were eventually conquered and subdued by the British colonial power. Furthermore, after gaining political independence from their colonial masters, African countries witnessed spiral of civil wars which threatened their peaceful coexistence, unity and cohesion. These civil wars brought untold consequences on their socio-economic and political progress and development. Of all of these wars, the Nigerian Civil War stands out as the major concern of this paper. The Nigerian Civil War is also known as the Biafran War or Nigerian-Biafran War. The war, which broke out on 6th July, 1967, and ended on 15th January, 1970, was fought between the Federal Military Government of Nigeria and the Secessionist Republic of Biafra. The emphasis of this paper is on the use of Air Power or Air Force as strategy and tactics in executing the war by the warring parties.

Conceptual and Theoretical Framework

The Nigerian Air Force or Air Power (NAF) is the air branch of the Nigerian Armed Forces. It is one of the largest in Africa, consisting of about 10,000 personnel and aircraft, including 12 Chinese Chengdu F-7s, and 11 Dassault-Dornier Alpha Jets, 12 Embraer EMB 314 Super Tucano, armed helicopters, and military transport aircraft. The motto of the Nigerian Air Power is "willing, able and ready". It has aircraft flown as follows: Attack which includes Alpha Jet, Aero L-39, Embraer EMB 314 Super Tucano. The Fighter is Chengdu F-7, for patrol there is ATR 42 MP. Trainer and transport include Alpha Jet, MB 339A, L-39ZA Albatos and Aeritalia G222, SA 330H Puma and C130. The insignia is a roundel with the Nigeria flag inside.[203]

Air power was used as strategy and tactics in executing the Nigerian civil war. Strategy is the planning, coordination, and general direction of military operations to meet overall political and military objectives. During the civil war, the Federal Military Government and the Secessionist Republic of Biafra employed air power as necessary tactical strategy as short-term decisions on the movement of troops and employment of weapons, relief

[203]Godwin Alabi-Isama, *The Tragedy of Victory: On-the-Spot Account of the Nigeria-Biafra War in the Atlantic Theatre*, Spectrum Books Limited, Ibadan, 2013, 215.

materials and other war materials and equipments to the battlefield. In the case of the Nigerian civil war, battlefield strategy and tactics were the art and science of employing Air Forces to achieve security objectives. Therefore, while tactic is the art of using troops in battle; strategy is the art of using battles to win the war.

The use of Air Force as strategies and tactics was an essential element of the Nigerian civil warfare as it was carefully planned and well executed to guarantee victory in war, ceteris paribus. Tactics can be categorized into location, unit and individual; however, some tactics can be undertaken both by individuals and units. The classic differentiation between tactics and higher levels of strategy or levels of war remains relevant in the sense that tactics govern the use of forces on the battlefield, while grand strategy, military strategy, and operational strategy bring forces to the battlefield. Tactics are concerned with doing the job right, and higher levels of strategy are concerned with doing the right job.[204]

Before the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, strategy meant largely issues related to challenges of palisade or fortification, navigation or manoeuvre, and supply. However, the rise of mass ideologies, vast conscripted armies, global alliances, and rapid technological change in the 19th and 20th centuries made it extremely difficult to distinguish between military strategy grand strategy, which is the appropriate planning and usage of the whole societal apparatus, particularly the military, technology, the economic resources and political power.

The change in meaning and depth of tactics is largely as a result of enormous transformation brought about by technical knowhow which engineered the imperative of the use of Air Power in executing the Nigerian civil war as a manoeuvring action to gain advantage by the warring parties. The term tactics became operational strategyin the twentieth century as a result of the dynamic changes in the global society. Strategy stops where tactics starts. Strategy include the mobilization and size of the army, the type and nature of training, the spirit and morale of forces, the available weapons, including the terrain, the weather, thesize and physical location of enemies. Therefore, the tactics to be used in the battlefield are contingent on strategic cogitation.

The modern military theory which divides war into strategic, operational, and tactical levels is most appropriate and suitable for this discourse.[3] This theory has its basis in the *Napoleonic* Wars and the American Civil War, in which modern theory regarding these three levels was formulated by the Prussians, following the *Franco-Prussian* War.[4] Since then, and particularly after First and Second World Wars, 1914-1918, and 1939 and 1945 respectively, nations of the world began to apply the use of sophisticated and dangerous gadgets and weaponry occasioned by scientific and technological breakthrough to wage war. Being thoroughly developed by the Soviets, the three levels allow causes and effects of all forms of wars and conflicts to be better understood despite their growing complexity.[5]

[204]Philibus Audu Nwamagyi, "War Strategy and Tactics of Samore Toure of the Mandinka Empire", Seminar Paper, Nigeria Defence Academy, Post Graduate School, Faculty of Art and Social Science, Department of History and War Studies, 2019, 4.

In this guise, the Nigeria-Biafran war was multi-causal in nature and multifaceted in consequences. To understand modern theories of war and conflict and prosecute them successfully, the forces involved needed to thoroughly understand the three levels, especially the operational level, and how they are interrelated. The boundaries of the levels of war and conflict tend to blur and do not necessarily correspond to levels of command. Every stage concerning the planning, strategic strategy, including analyzing the circumstances estimating both the friendliness and the enemy capabilities, as well as the limitations in devising possible course of action.

Aligning with the strategic and operational tactics of warfare, national grand strategy in warfare encapsulates all the national strategy of the military. It is subcomponent of operational strategy as well as battlefield strategy and tactics employed by the warring camps in their efforts to undo each other.[6] A key to success in the Nigerian civil war was the ability to adapt rapidly to the changing situation and to exploit transient opportunities rather than strictly adhering to a predetermined course of action. The ability to adapt and exploit requires extraordinary judgment, a feel for the situation and knowing what to do and how to do it.[7] The strategic level focuses on defining and supporting national policy and relates directly to the outcome of a war or other conflict as a whole. Usually, modern wars and conflicts are won or lost at this level rather than at the operational or tactical levels.[8]

Brief Overview of the Civil War

Biafra represented nationalist aspirations of the Biafran people, whose leadership felt they could no longer coexist with the Northern-dominated federal government. The conflict resulted from political, economic, ethno-cultural and religious tensions that preceded the formal decolonization of Nigeria in 1960. The immediate causes of the war included ethno-religious riots in Northern Nigeria, a military coup, a counter-coup and persecution of Igbo living in Northern Nigeria and the control over the lucrative oil production in the Niger Delta.[205] Within a year, the Federal Government troops surrounded Biafra, capturing coastal oil facilities and the city of Port Harcourt. The economic blockade imposed during the ensuing stalemate led to mass starvation of Biafran citizens, which weakened their strength and subsequently led to their imminent defeat by the Federal Military Government troops.[206]

At the end of the war, about 100,000 overall military casualties, between 500,000 and 2 million Biafran civilians died as a result of starvation that was recorded.[207] The plight of the starving Biafrans became worrisome and a cause for concern in foreign countries. This enabled significant rise in the funding and prominence of International Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs). The United Kingdom and the Soviet Union were the main

[205]Plotnicov, Leonard, "An Early Nigerian Civil Disturbance: The 1945 Hausa-Ibo Riot in Jos" in The Journal of Modern African Studies, 9 (2),1971, 297–305.

[206]Udeagbala LO, "Economic Blockade and the Nigerian/Biafran War, 1967-1970", in WUDIL Journal of Humanities (WJH), Vol. 1, Department of History and International Studies, Nigerian Police Academy, Wudil, Kano state, 2016, 24-25.

[207]"ICE Case Studies: The Biafran War", American University, 1997, internet source retrieved on 14 May 2019.

supporters of the Nigerian government, while France, Israel and some other countries supported Biafra.

Although both land, Naval and Air Forces and troops were involved and used in prosecuting the war, this paper centres on the use of Air Power both by the Federal Government and Biafran Republic in executing the war. Beginning with conceptual clarification, the paper identified a suitable theory as the philosophical underpinning behind the war. Giving an overview of the war, the paper discusses the involment of air power in the war and also discusses the consequences of the war.

The Evolution of Nigerian Air Force

Although Nigeria's Air Force was originally proposed in 1958, its establishment was first put forward and mooted in 1961 following the nation's participation in peace-keeping operations in Congo and Tanganyika (now Tanzania) in 1964.[208]Foreign aircraft were employed during peace-keeping operations by the air forces to airfreight the regiment of the Nigerian Army to and from the theatres of operation. This means that the Nigerian Government understood how urgent they needed to establish Air Force actively supported and equipped by modern facilities to complement the effort of the forces for better national military posture. With the Government accepting the proposal for the establishment of the Nigerian Air Force (NAF), the Nigerian parliament approved its establishment and recruitment of cadets beginning in June, 1962, when the drive for manpower in the air force started.

This was a parallel development with the government dialogue with friendly nations concerning the possibility for training of Nigerian Air Force personnel in specialist areas. The first enlistment was the ten cadets in 1962 trained with the Ethiopian Air Force, while the second enlistment which was sixteen (16) cadets that followed in February, 1963, trained with the Royal Canadian Air Force. In addition, six cadets were also sent to the Indian Air Force for training.[209] This set the stage for the training of the Air Force personnel. As a result, among the several countries approached; it was the German Air Force that providedthe technical assistance for training the local Nigerian Air Force personnel in 1963.

These events set the stage for the establishment of a statutory Act of Parliament in April, 1964, to serve four main purposes of achieving a complete support of the military defence system of Nigeria in the air and ground; ensuring a fast and all-round movement of the Armed Forces; providing immediate help for the ground and marine forces to ensure the territorial integrity of Nigeria; and finally giving prestige to Nigeria in the comity of nations. The German Air Force Assistance Group prematurely put to test the fighting force in its infancy the plans made barely three years after its establishment. Although the NAF was only equipped with a few aircraft, as the war progressed, MIG 15 and 17 aircrafts were acquired to bring the war to an end speedily.

The Act saddled the Nigerian Air Force with the responsibility for the defence of the country by air. To achieve this goal, the personnel were trained in air and ground duties. Although

[208]Godwin Alabi-Isama, *The Tragedy of Victory*, 215-216.

[209]Godwin Alabi-Isama, *The Tragedy of Victory*.

formed with technical assistance by West Germany, the Nigerian Air Force started as a transport unit with aircrew being trained in Canada, Ethiopia and India. Colonel Gerhard Kahtz- head of the German Air Force Assistance Group (GAFAG) was the first commander of the NAF. It will not be out of place to say that the nucleus of the Nigerian Air Force was the establishment of the headquarters at the Ministry of Defence. The Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-17 aircraft enabled the force to remain capable until the Soviet Union during the Nigerian Civil War.

The Evolution of the Biafran Air Force

The Biafrans set up a small but effective air force, with Chude Sokey and later Godwin Ezeilo as the commanders who trained the Royal Canadian Air Force.[210] The Biafran early inventories in the Air Force include two B-25 Mitchells, two B-26 invaders (one piloted by Polish World War II ace Jan Zumbach, known also as John Brown).[211] John Brown converted DC-3 and one Dove. In 1968, Swedish pilot, Carl Gustaf von Rosen, suggested the MiniCOIN project to General Odumegwu Ojukwu. Thus, by 1969, Biafra had assembled five MFI-9Bs in Gibon, calling them Biafra Bables. They were colored green, and were able o carry sic 68 mm anti-armour rockes under each wing using simple sighs. The five planes were flown b three Swedish pilots and three Biafran pilots.

In 1969, particularly September, Biafra acquired four 940 ex-Aemee de l'Air, North American T-6Gs, which were flown to Biafra the following month, with another T-6 lost on the ferry flight. These aircraft flew missions until January,1970, manned by Portuguese ex-military pilots.[212] During the Biafran war, Biafra tried to acquire jets. Two Fouga Magisters and several Gloster Meteors were bought but never arrived in Biafra, being abandoned on foreign African airbases.[213]

Use of Air Power in the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970

Scholars have expressed different opinions on the subject of the Nigerian Civil War, particularly the usefulness, if any, of Air Power and or Air Force in executing the war on both sides. To some, the air force played insignificant role because as at the time the civil war broke out, the Nigerian Air Force was at its infantry stage since it was formally established in 1964; two years before the civil war. To others, however, the Air Force played immortal role in the civil war worthy of consideration. Therefore, in examining the place and role of the Air Power in the Nigerian Civil War, it is important and, indeed, imperative to consider Stanley's thought and position, expressed and captured as follows:

> The air war was recorded as one of the most significant technological advancement in terms of converting civil helicopters into military and war ones on the Biafran side and the extensive use of modern artillery

[210]Vidal Joao M., Texans in Biafra T-6Gs in use in the Nigerian Civil War, Air Enthusiasts, No. 65 September-October, 196, 40-47.

[211] Michael Johnson, the Douglas A/B-26 Invader- Biafran Invader, Vectaris.net, Archived from the Original, May 2013.

[212] Vidal Joao M., Texans in Biafra T-6Gs in use in the Nigerian Civil War, Air Enthusiasts, No. 65 September-October, 196, 40-47.

[213] Michael Johnson, the Douglas A/B-26 Invader- Biafran Invader, Vectaris.net, Archived from the Original, May 2013.

particularly by the Federal Forces. On the Federal side, the air war had impact in that the tactics used in the war which was generally indiscriminate bombardments, strafing and bombing of non-military targets which added substance to the suspicion raised by the Biafran Forces of genocide committed by the Federal Forces in Biafra.[214]

This excerpt encapsulates the place and relevance of Air Power in the civil war. This is further exemplified by the assertion that there were several damaging attacks by Biafran aircrafts which was delivered by the USSR. The aircraft attacks took place on 13th August, 1967. The several damaging attacks by the Biafran Aircraft suggest that Biafra engaged the Federal Military Forces on air warfare, causing severe damage in a way that awoken Federal Government from slumber.

With the foregoing development, Federal Military troops realized the situation was beyond mere 'police action' as pen ultimately alluded, and thus, required full military action. As would be expected, this propelled and compelled the Federal Troops to intensify efforts aimed at procuring aircrafts to fight the secessionists. The USSR initially supplied two MiG-15UTIs (NAF601 and NAF 602), and eight MiG-17s (NAF603 to NAF610) to Kano IAP and simultaneously sent a large shipment aboard a Polish merchant. Later, six Il-28 bombers, flown by Egyptian and Czech pilots, were delivered from Egypt and stationed at Calabar and Port Harcourt to fight Biafra.

The international community played important role in the civil war vis-à-vis the use of Air Power in the civil war. Owing to the fact that as the time the war broke out, Nigeria had not developed strong Air Force base, the international community played immortal role. Thus, Air Power mainly served the purpose of prosecuting the war in areas of bombing strategic places for the purpose of weakening the opponent.

Air Power was a significant tactics adopted by both Biafra and Federal government to acquire and supply weapons, reinforcements, food items, war equipments and materials. In this light, Britain continued to quietly support Nigeria through the war. On one hand, advancing a royalty of £5.5 million to fund the purchase of more British weapons, in other case, Britain was covertly supplying Nigeria with weapons and military intelligence as well as hiring war mercenaries to support the Federal Troops.[215] As would be expected, the supplies were done through the Air Force, which further suffice the assertion that Air Power played significant role in the Nigerian civil war.

[214]Ezeobi O. Stanley, Oguta in the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970, M.A. Dissertation, Department of History and War Studies, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, (Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna, 2016), 78.
[215]Uche, "Oil, British Interests and the Nigerian Civil War" (2008), 133–134.

Britain's decision to back Nigeria was partly because of the advised that in the event of war, the odds were slightly in favour of the Federal Military Government. More importantly, Britain calculated that supporting Nigeria was its safest option if it were to preserve its oil interests in the country. This was largely because the Cold War and the rivalry among some Western European states made it likely that other foreign powers would wade into the conflict.

Given Shell-BP's interest in Nigeria taking over the major oilfields, still in Biafran hands, it was not surprising that they overtly supported the Nigerian military course. A case in point was in December, 1967, when the Nigerian government, frustrated by the slow pace of progress in the war, requested that Shell-BP pay its royalty of £5.5 million in advance, in order to enable it to purchase arms from Britain. Shell-BP promptly complied and thus, the supplies provided to the Federal Military Government by Britain through aircrafts included two vessels and 60 vehicles.

Therefore, with the help of the international community, the Nigerian Air Force left their own mark in the minorities' areas as they were accused of indiscriminate bombing of civilian occupied areas. The situation was so devastating to the point that William Norris of the London Sunday Times, in an article titled, "Nightmare in Biafra," reported how the high-flying Russian Ilyushin jets dropped bombs in civilian centers in Biafra. He stated that, 'slowly, but effectively, a reign of terror has been created.'[216] Referring to the Federal Government's effort as 'reign of terror' was to the effect that Nigeria described the war as effort to "keep Nigeria one", thus a mere 'police action', which suggested that Biafra should have been treated with kid gloves.[217]

Another major relevance of Air Power in the civil war was the humanitarian campaigns in favour of Biafra. These campaigns began in Britain on 12th June, 1968, with media coverage on ITV and the Sun. The charities Oxfam and Save the Children Fund were soon deployed, with large sums of money at their disposal; following the mass killing of non-Ibo Mid-Westerners at Boji-Boji Agbor on 20th September, 1967; and on 23rd September, non-Ibo speaking Mid-Westerners were apprehended at Asaba, Ibusa and Agbor and taken to a rubber plantation along Uromi-Agbor road and massacred.[218] This situation made the need to adopt air warfare as a strategy and tactics to win the war more dire on the side of Biafra. Elucidating further, it is important to note that France provided weapons, mercenary fighters, and other assistance to Biafra and promoted its course

[216]Uche Santos, The Forgotten Victims: Ethnic Minorities in the Nigeria-Biafra War, 1967-1970, African Tree Press (18 February 2007).

[217]Achike Udenwa, *Nigeria/Biafra Civil War: My Experience*, (Spectrum Books Limited, Ibadan, 2011), 86-87.

[218]Orobator, S. E., "The Biafran Crisis and the Midwest", African Affairs, 86 (344), 1987, 367–383.

internationally, describing the situation as genocide. For example, Charles de Gaulle referred to Biafran course as 'just and noble', although France did not recognize Biafra diplomatically.[219] Through Pierre Laureys, France had apparently provided two B-26s, Alouette helicopters, and pilots. France supplied Biafra with captured German and Italian weapons from World War II, sans serial numbers, delivered as part of regular shipments to Côte d'Ivoire.

In reality, however, the British government supplied many more arms than it was publicly prepared to admit. Apart from direct arms supplies, it provided military intelligence to the Nigerian government and may have helped it to access sophisticated arms and mercenaries through third parties. As part of the air war equipments and materials, France also sold Panhard armored vehicles to the Nigerian Federal Government.[220] It is important to note that France had already supplied Biafra with two B-26 aircraft, Alouette helicopters and pilots in the summer of 1967 via the French arms dealer Pierre Laureys. Ralph Uwechue, Biafra's envoy to France, wrote that "the helicopters had been purchases made by the Eastern Nigerian Regional Government from France for civilian purposes well before the war".[221]

During the civil war between 1967 and 1970, Nigeria received support from the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Poland. The support was in the form of aircraft, which included twelve L-29 Delfin aircraft for training, forty-seven (47) MiG-15 and MiG-17 fighter jets, and five (5) Ilyushin-28 bombers out of which two were transferred to Lagos from Egypt. The support from Russia marked a turning point in the Soviet foreign policy with Nigeria. This is because, until the secession, Russia had indicated some level of admiration and sympathy for the Igbo and their plight. The Soviet Union thereby became pragmatic in their alignment with the Federal Republic of Nigeria as against the ideological support for Biafra.[222] With these aircrafts, such as 12 L-29 Delfin training aircraft, 47 MiG and 15 MiG-17 fighter Jets and five Ilyushin-28 bombers, one cannot but conclude that Air Power played significant role in the war between Nigeria and Biafra.

Israel-Nigeria relation and arms deal began in 1966 when Aguyi-Ironsi came to power in January, 1966.[223] The Israeli Air Force openly supplied 12 tons of food as aid to the Biafran air space in August, 1968. Mossad indirectly provided $100,000 to the Biafrans through Zurich. This was in addition to their attempted arms shipment to the Biafrans. However, soon

[219]Okogba, Emmanuel, "Revisiting The 1967 Asaba Massacre", 2016.
[220]Uche, "Oil, British Interests and the Nigerian Civil War" (2008), 125-131.
[221]Griffin, "French military policy in the Nigerian Civil War" (2015), 114–115.
[222]Levey, "Israel, Nigeria and the Biafra civil war" (2014), 273.
[223]Levey, "Israel, Nigeria and the Biafra civil war" (2014), 264–265.

after that, the Israeli government also made arrangements for a clandestine shipment of weapons to Biafra through the transport planes of Côte d'Ivoire.[224] The aid received from Israel in terms of arms and food items really strengthened Biafra and encouraged their resolve to defend the secessionist move.[225]Thus, the role of the International Community in Air Power operations in the civil war cannot be under-estimated.

For Biafra, Air Power was very important to the point that when the economic sanctions were imposed on Biafra, the only means of accessing assistance or aid was through the air.[226] To corroborate this, it is noted that Biafra was barricaded by land and sea and it was only limited quantities of goods and services could be transported by air.[227] Although Biafra was barricaded by air to some extent, it is however, imperative to point out that it was only through the air that they accessed assistance. This shows how potent the Air Power was as relief materials were airlifted to Biafra by air. For instance, in 1968, the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) was able to establish airlift for Biafra. In addition, owing to the acute humanitarian issues in most affected areas, the relief agencies took more risks adopting every means possible and those near impossible to take relief materials to the hunger and disease ravaged population.[228]All these are clear illustration to the fact that Air Force played significant role in executing the civil war during the period under consideration.

However, neither Nigeria nor Biafra had the technical know-how and or the wherewithal to manufacture or produce aircrafts, helicopters and aeroplanes as well as fighter jets to prosecute the war. It is pertinent, therefore, to note that apart from the soldiers and Biafran and Nigerian soil as the arena or theatre of war, most other materials and equipments used in the war were imported from other countries. These include the rifles, the bullets, and the war kits and food items which were mostly brought in from other countries either through airlift. In fact, before the outbreak of the war in 1967, the weapons in the Nigerian arsenal were mostly imported from other countries. For example, during peacekeeping operations in Congo and Tanganyika, the Nigerian Army had no air transport of its own, and so in 1962 the government began to recruit cadets for pilot training in various foreign countries, with the first ten being taught by the Egyptian Air Force.

Impacts of Air Power in the Civil War

[224]Levey, "Israel, Nigeria and the Biafra civil war" (2014), 270–271.
[225]Department of National Defense, Details/Information for Canadian Forces (CF) Operation Observer Team Nigeria", *Operations Database Details/Information, Retrieved 6 March 2019.*
[226]Udeagbala LO, "Economic Blockade and the Nigerian/Biafran War, 1967-1970", 24-25.
[227] Frederick Forsyth, *The Making of an African Legend: The Biafran Story,* Penguin Books, Richard Clay (The Chaucer Press) Ltd, (Great Britain, 1969, reprint 1978), 117.
[228]Orobator, S. E., "The Biafran Crisis and the Midwest", 368.

The use of the Air Force in the civil war had a significant impact on the outcome of the war, both on the Biafran and Federal side. The air to air attack was basically on relief planes which were bulky and outdated and used in delivering supplies and armaments to Biafra. Nevertheless, both sides produced a high level of killing strength and demonstration of sophistication which had psychological effect that is usually associated to bombing and strafing. To the Federal side, the burning issue was Uli Airstrip through which Biafra armed and fed itself. It was the most crucial, strategic and political aspect of military history of the war. To conquer Uli Airstrip, the Federal Forces bombarded Oguta which was about six miles away and a shelling range with the Russian Ilyushin -28 bombers, Dolphin fighters and MiG which was totally unsuitable for the war effort because of its short range and electronic deficiencies.

Air Power was used by the Federal government against Biafra in Enugu, Asaba, Onitsha and Calabar. Federal Command was divided into two brigades with three battalions each. The 1st Brigade advanced on the axis of Ogugu-Ogunga-Nsukka road while the 2nd Brigade advanced on axis of Gakem-Obudu-Ogoja road. By 10th July, 1967, the 1st Brigade conquered all its assigned territories, while by 12th July; the 2nd Brigade conquered and captured places such as Gakem, Ogudu and Ogoja. Enugu thus became the hub of secession and rebellion; the Nigerian troops believed that once Enugu was captured, the drive for secession would end. The plans and preparations to conquer Enugu began 1967, 12th September, and by 1967, 4th October, the Nigerian Army had taken over Enugu.[229] Under Murtala Mohammed, the Nigerian soldiers killed over 700 civilians after capturing Asaba. The Biafran troops repulsed the Nigerian troops three times in an attempt to cross the River Niger. As a result, the Nigerian Forces lost thousands of their troops, dozens of tanks and equipment.

In the attempt of the 2nd Infantry Division to cross the Niger from the town of Asaba to the Biafran city of Onitsha on 12th October, the Nigerian Army lost more than 5,000 soldiers, while many were wounded, others were captured and or missing. The operations by the Operation Tiger Claw of the Nigerian Forces which took place between 17th and 20th October, 1967, invaded Calabar under the command of Benjamin Adekunle (Black Scorpion). On the other hand, the Biafran troops were under the command of Colonel Ogbu Ogi who controlled the area between Calabar and Opobo and the Lynn Garrison, which was a foreign mercenary. From the water and air, the Biafrans came under immediate fire and for two days, the Biafran military supplies and stations were bombarded by the Nigerian Air Force. In the same day, the Lynn Garrison, though already reached Calabar, was fired by the Federal troops. Therefore, by 20th October, 1967, the Garrison's forces had to withdraw from the battle, while Colonel Ogbu Ogi formally

[229]Forsyth, Frederick. The Outsider: My Life in Intrigue. NY: Putnam, 1976.

surrendered to Gen. Benjamin Adekunle (Black Scorpion). Port Harcourt was captured on 19th May, 1968, and with the capture of Enugu, Bonny, Calabar and Port Harcourt, the outside world was left in no doubt that the Federal Government was superior to the Biafran forces.[230]

From the description above, it is pertinent to note that Air Power played significant role in the Nigerian civil war. In fact, it is obvious that without the use of Air Power, it would have been difficult for the Federal Government to win the war against Biafra. Therefore, in the struggle that ensued, Biafran troops were heavily attacked by air and for two days, Biafran stations and military supplies were bombarded by the Nigerian Air Force. This weakened the Biafran strength and resistance against the Federal Government. Therefore, Air Power played significant role in Nigerian-Biafra Civil War in several ways, such as supplying both Nigeria and Biafra with weapons with which the war was prosecuted; supplying relief materials and aid to both parties; relying on Foreign Air Force and technical team to prosecute the war; in transporting goods and services within and outside Nigeria for the purpose of prosecuting the war; and finally in fighting the war which has been discussed. The Nigerian Air Force Technical and Training Wing (NAFTTW) were abuzz with the large presence of Officers and men who were engaged in diverse activities. The Germans who earlier on had planned for a military corps without Nigerian Officers were training a significant number of other ranks.[231]

From the second week of November 1967, there were daily air raids on Onitsha. The Nigerian Air Force bombarded the whole town, with the planes visiting in pairs- one bomber, one fighter. They made visits at least three to four times a day, while the intervals were filled with artillery fire from across the Niger. Most of the targets hits were civilians, mainly in the inland town fleeing to nearby areas like Ogidi, Oba, Nnewe and Ahiala. Nigerian troops attempted to land in Onitsha in small river crafts and the command in Asaba under Lt. Col. Murtala Ramat Muhammed had thought that after the air and land bombardments, the Biafran troops must have fled; on the contrary, they were in trenches and in bunkers along the river bank. It was therefore, difficult for Biafrans to sink approaching Nigerian river-crafts.[232] The war effort was backed by merciless Air Force of jet fighters and bombers armed with cannon, rockets and bombs.[233] In the Air, activity was confined to the exploits of a lone Biafran B-26 American-built Second World War bomber piloted by a tacitum Pole who rejoiced in the name of Kamikaze Brown, and to six French-built Alouette helicopters piloted by

[230]Bortolotti, Dan, Hope in Hell: Inside the World of Doctors Without Borders, Firefly Books, 2004.
[231]Okpe August, The Last Flight: A Remembers the Air Force and the Biafran Air Attacks, Lagos: Aero Max International, 2011, 142.
[232]Achike Udenwa, *Nigeria/Biafra Civil War: My Experience*, 87.
[233]Frederick Forsyth, *The Making of an African Legend: The Biafran Story,* 114.

Biafrans from which they rained hand-grenades and home-made bombs on the Nigerians.[234] It is important to state that Uli-Ihiala airstrip was the symbol of Biafran resistance and thus, in order to win the war, the Federal Military Government ordered that the area be thoroughly combed after which the road was made unusable as an airstrip, and it was then converted to normal as use a road, just like the Uga airstrip.[235]

Conclusion

Air Power played a significant role in the Nigerian Civil War. Generally, the 19th and 20th centuries witnessed the rise of mass ideologies, vast conscript armies and global alliances resulting in various forms of wars. The Nigerian Civil War, for example was enhanced by rapid technological changesin which military strategy became part of grand strategy, that is, the proper planning and utilization of the entire resources of the society such as the military, the Air Force, technological, economical, and political potentials to ensure victory. The adoption of Air Power as strategy and tactics by Federal Military Government and the Republic of Biafra was largely due to the dire need for victory and survival. Alabi-Isami notes that the Air Force came in at exactly 6.30a.m and starting strafing and bombing north towards Uyo and west towards Opobo. 3MCDO had the support of the MiG Russian-built jet fighters, taking off from Calabar airport. In Nigeria, during the Civil War in the 20th century, Air Power was employed as operational strategy and tactic to execute the Civil War. This included but not limited to the size, training, and morale of forces, type and number of weapons available, terrain, weather, and quality and location of enemy forces, the tactics that was used were all dependent on the strategic considerations of the Air Force as a veritable way of winning the war. Air Power was a modern military strategic operational, and tactical level that was appropriate and suitable in the course of the Civil War.

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[234]Frederick Forsyth, *The Making of an African Legend: The Biafran Story,* 117.

[235]Olusegun Obasanjo, *My Command: An Account of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970, (*Prestige, Nigeria, 1980), 180-181.

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SLAVERS, DESPOTS AND TRUCULENT PEOPLE: THE 'PACIFICATION' OF NORTHERN NIGERIA AS A HUMANITARIAN GESTURE

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Abstract

British military actions during the early period of the conquest of Northern Nigeria achieved two things. First, it gave the British a moral currency through which they justified the deployment of military force against indigenous people, and secondly, it set a precedent and course of action against the rest of the communities that were earmarked for conquest. However, the British never saw their actions, which were usually based on faulting the conduct of communities to carry out these military actions as violations of human rights and dignities, most especially of groups termed as stateless and 'primitive,' Which they had a duty to redeem. However, this was not the same with the experiences and actions of the same British colonial military on the emirates and groups of the Sokoto Caliphate, which eventually became vassals for their indirect rule policy, which primarily worked at subjugating and economically exploiting all groups theough the agency of created chiefs, still with a claim of redeeming the primitive groups. Thus the British presented the events around the conquest of these territories in documented reports as a humanitarian endeavour. This paper argues that such a description was tactful but not truthful, because the British actions during the early years of the conquest of Northern Nigeria are best understood from the perspective of the first objective of the European colonisation of Africa as contained in the protocol of the Berlin West Africa conference and not from its favoured redemptive stand point.

Introduction

British colonial sources, in discussing the annexation of Northern Nigeria, have in almost all cases, explained the 'pacification' -as they termed it, in terms of a needed cause, in that communities within the area (most especially within the central areas known as the Middle Belt), disregarded British values and therefore needed civilization.

Since their colonialization of India and other parts of Asia, it had been a common policy of the British, to see themselves and their actions as that of harbingers of enlightenment.[236] This encouraged the deployment of British officers and men at any indication of intransigence within indigenous communities within their colonies.

Immediately after Berlin (1885), the British formalised their pursuit of gun-boat diplomacy, by the imperialising their interests with colonial rule. Although they still held their racist views of denigrating Africans, they moralised their authority by arguing the need for bringing those people ranked low in the *scala naturae* (Latin: "scale of nature")[237] into a reasonable level of enlightenment for their (Europeans) own utility.[238] From the "Punitive Expeditions" in Benin to the Ekumeku Wars among the Igbo's and those of central Nigeria, the common excuse and explanation was the aligning of the people to noble European ways, through what the British historian Nicholas Dirks describes as 'cultural technologies of rule.' More simply put, the British colonialists tried to devise, using the simplest methods they believed Africans (and the other 'lower' races) could understand and accept to be ruled by. That implicitly was what "indirect rule" was all about.

In fact, to show how British colonial thinking was inspired by the *Scala Naturae*, one not need go beyond the comments of one of the greatest Europeans of the modern world, Winston Churchill. A BBC commentary notes that In 1937, while in discussions with the Palestine Royal Commission, he was quoted as saying:

> I do not admit for instance, that a great wrong has been done to the Red Indians of America or the black people of Australia. I do not admit that a wrong has been done to these people by the fact that a stronger race, a higher-grade race, a more worldly wise race to put it that way, has come in and taken their place.[239]

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[236] Tricoire, Damien. *Enlightened Colonialism*. 1st ed., Cambridge Imperial And Post-Colonial Studies Series, 2017.

[237] Although devised by Aristotle (384-322 BC), the *scala naturae*, or that came to be termed the *Great Chain of Being*, in the 18th Century, sought to find order and relationship in the biological world. Aristotle devised a classification scheme for animals, however, by the 16th, 17th and 18th century, clergy and scholars (mainly advocates of slavery) made it to encompass humans and their differences. Thus, the physical differences of Blacks and Indians became the symbols or markers of their status as lesser humans than those from Western Europe. Lewis, Rhodri. "William Petty's Anthropology: Religion, Colonialism, And The Problem Of Human Diversity". *Huntington Library Quarterly*, vol. 74, no. 2, 2011, pp. 261-288. *Project Muse*, doi:10.1525/hlq.2011.74.2.261. Accessed 11 July 2021.

[238] Jablonski, Nina G. "Skin Color and Race". *American Journal of Physical Anthropology*, vol. 175, no. 2, 2020, pp. 437-447. *Wiley*, doi:10.1002/ajpa.24200. Accessed 11 July 2021.

[239] Heyden, Tom. "The 10 Greatest Controversies of Winston Churchill's Career". *BBC News*, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-29701767.

In Mr. Churchills thinking, the British have done no wrong themselves. While blaming the United States settlers (many of whom were from Great Britain) for the violence against the autochthonous natives of America, and likewise the British settlers in Australia for their own atrocities against autochthonous Australians, he loudly kept silent about Great Britain's actions in their then colonies, clearly alluding that they were more humane in their actions. However, in his own ignorance, or do we call it arrogance? He further alludes the they (Europeans and their settler descendants) are a "higher-grade race," denigrating all others and justifying their displacement and exploitation of the lesser humans. Hence legitimising their actions of punitive and pacification actions upon the "lesser-grade races."

These processes of punitive and pacification measures, were to showcase their superior firepower and to instil fear, by which they could begin to implement their rulership. Thus, whenever there were accusations of practices at variance with European norms, some form of 'punitive action' was taken. And when groups seemed to try to assert some sense of independence or aggression, they were 'pacified.'[240] The accusations labelled against communities by the British varied. Some were directed against activities of local leaders, while others targeted specific institutions and practices of indigenous people.

In Northern Nigeria, various groups resisted British forces during the colonial conquests from 1885. Such resistance was of no match to British military strength and in all cases, the confrontations resulted in their (the natives) capitulation. Even though the use of violence in the subjugation of communities in Northern Nigeria was conveyed by its perpetrators as 'punitive,' One would argue that the perspective of condemning the lifestyles of people whose society and culture you met in its homeostasis, and 'punishing' them for being different from you provides a very crooked reasoning. The British consideration of the African continent as *tera nullius* (Latin: vacant land)[241] legitimised all their other arguments, it was land for grabs, and they had gotten a prized possession in Nigeria. As seen with the objectives of the Berlin conference, the interests of the imperialists were simply:

> …the commercial and industrial (interests of) nations, which (is) a common necessity (that) compels to the research of new outlets…(Interests) of the states and of the powers summoned to the exercise over the regions of the Congo (that was Belgium)…(and then the least important, which had to do with the natives, and as described in the commentary to the benevolence of the convener Otto von Bismarck), commended to your solitude the interests of the native populations."[242]

It is based on the third agenda that British officials emphasized the redemptive/civilizing mission of their political domination of the study area in particular and other African colonies in general. Even though it is clear from the quote above that the 'interests of the native populations' was not a priority, of representatives of the European powers, but an act of

[240] Colonial Reports, Annual Northern Nigeria 1900-1, 1902 and 1903 http://www.hathitrust.org accessed on 07/12/2015

[241] Lindqvist, Sven. *Terra Nullius: A Journey Through No One's Land* (New York: New Press, 2005) 1

[242] *Protocols and General Act of the West Africa Conference* (London: British Government Blue Books) cited in Shepperson, "The Centennial of… 43

charity in recognition of a minority group of 'generous voices' at the conference. As such we can draw from the first objective of the Berlin conference that the main purpose of British colonial domination of African territories was the usurpation, by force, of human and material resources of areas that Europeans shared among themselves in 1885. Drawing from events of early British military actions against the smaller ethnicities of Northern Nigeria, we will examine how colonial officers made their wars of conquest appear like humanitarian gestures in their reports.

British and larger European Perspectives on Colonialism

The rationale behind British, (and European), colonial domination in Africa has been examined from various perspectives. These include economic,[243] strategic,[244] humanitarian factors,[245] psychological and racial.[246] While these perspectives offer important insights into the motives for European colonisation of non-Europeans however they do not individually offer an encompassing view. Thus assessments that consider the rationale behind European colonialism in Africa as a convergence of the various perspectives are much more illuminating. Such evaluations consider the multidimensional motivations and complex conditions that inspired the extension of European rule to Africa. Such broad views say that the motivations behind European rule in Africa were borne out of a convergence of industrial, technological and medical advancements, political, strategic and military developments that triggered the cohesive extension of public and private European establishments to Africa. Examples of such analyses can be found in Barbara Harlow's Archives of Empire vol. II: The Scramble for Africa,[247] John Mckenzie's *The Partition of Africa 1880-1900 and European Imperialism in the nineteenth Century*,[248] and Barrie Ratcliffe's "The Economics of the Partition of Africa: the Problem of Method".[249] Despite the broad views embedded in these literatures' that try to glamourize or just add a tincture of the negative, the fact that these works do not dispel the underlaying aim of British (and European) colonialism in Africa being primarily economic, only confirms that fact that entrenchment of force was inevitable. Brute force by the British, French and Germans, was only surpassed by the Belgians under King Leopold, whose actions were condemned based on relativity, rather than on conscience.[250]

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[243] Kurts, Heinz."Adam Smith on Foreign Trade: A Note on the 'Vent-for-Surplus' Argument" *Economica* vol. 59, 236 (1992)

[244] Gallagher, John. And Robinson, Ronald. *"The Imperialism of Free Trade"* The Economic History Review, vol. 6, 1 (1953)

[245] Harlow, Barbara. et al (eds) *Archives of Empire vol. II: The Scramble for Africa*, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), 93-104

[246] Harries, Patrick. "The Theory and Practice of Race: The Swiss Mission in the Late 19th and Early 20th Centuries" *Le Fait Missionnaire (LFM)* No. 9, 1 (2000), 44-45

[247] Harlow, et al (eds) *Archives of Empire…*

[248] Mackenzie, John. *The Partition of Africa 1880-1900 and European Imperialism in the nineteenth Century* (London: Metuen and Co, 1983, 2005 Edition Taylor and Francis e-library)

[249] Ratcliffe, Barrie. "The Economics of the Partition of Africa: The Problem of Method" *Proceedings of the French Colonial Historical Society*, 6 no. 7 (1982) 46-55

[250] From a promise of a humanitarian and philanthropic mission to improve the lives of Africans.Leopold II's rule in what is now Democratic Republic of Congo was so bloody, that it was eventually condemned by other European colonialists in 1908. But this was only after over 10 million people were either killed, maimed (by cutting their limbs) or even children kidnapped and taken to "child colonies" to work or train as soldiers.

Background to the Conquest of Northern Nigeria

As mentioned earlier, the use of violence in the subjugation of communities in Northern Nigeria was conveyed by its perpetrators as a redemptive mission. In this regard, British officials accused indigenous people of wrong doing before subjugating them.[251] The accusations ranged from economic sabotage against European interests, tyranny and slavery, truculence and savagery. On the one hand, the leadership of communities that operated centralized systems of governance over large populations, such as the Fulani, Hausa, Nupe and other Emirates, were accused of economic sabotage, tyranny and slavery and were overthrown. While on the other, communities with small populations, such as those in the Benue valley, the Adamawa highlands and the Jos plateau highlands and its surrounding Lowlands, that guarded their independence staunchly were accused of being truculent 'closed' societies whose members were 'savages and cannibals' and were also conquered.

The British Government took over direct control of the Niger territories via the Northern Nigeria Protectorate Proclamation of 1st of January, 1900 which also announced the appointment of Fredrick John Dealtry Lugard, a former employee of the RNC, as High Commissioner after the withdrawal of the Royal Charter of the Royal Niger Company on the 29th December, 1899.[252] Prior to this George Taubman Goldie of the United Africa Company, who had been busy around the coastal areas of the south moved up into the interior, sought and received a Royal Charter in 1886 and changed the name of his company to RNC. The RNC, apart from trading, was to protect British spheres of interest around the Niger as guaranteed in the Berlin Charter. Hence Sir Goldie's endeavours were in line with Barbara Harlow's argument about persons with purely commercial interests who succeeded in lobbying Parliament and roping in or fast tracking the involvement of their home countries into their colonial venture.[253]

Lugard, after taking over the company's rights on behalf of the British government, orchestrated via conquest the extension of British rule to the remaining territories of Northern Nigeria. From his headquarters in Lokoja, Lugard arranged for the survey of Northern Nigeria in preparation for its conquest which began with the large centralized Emirates that were subdued by the WAFF between 1900 and 1903.[254]

First Polities Conquered

See Rannard, Georgina, and Eve Webster. "Leopold II: Belgium 'Wakes Up' To Its Bloody Colonial Past". *BBC News*, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-53017188.

[251] Colonial Reports, Annual 1900-1… 12

[252] The Northern Nigeria Gazette January 1, 1900 vol 1:1 PRO 10586/1 106161 and Colonial Reports, Annual No. 346 Northern Nigeria1900-1, http://www.hathitrust.org accessed on 07/12/2015

[253] Harlow, et al *Archives of Empire*… 6

[254] Colonial Reports, Annual No. 409, Northern Nigeria1902, http://www.hathitrust.org accessed on 07/12/2015

The first three centralized polities to be subdued by the British were Bida, Kontagora and Wase. These three were subjugated by the Royal Niger Constabulary (RNC) with the aid of personnel of WAFF. The RNC had in 1897 defeated Bida troops and removed its southern province, (what eventually became Kabba Province), from under its authority.[255] In his first report, on Northern Nigeria that covered 1900, Lugard accused the leadership of the first two entities of dissipating the human population, of the area between the banks of the River Niger and the boundaries of Zaria and Sokoto, on one hand, and the area towards the highlands of the north-east on the other, with an extensive scorched earth system of slave raids.[256]

The British decided that indigenous leaders who raided for slaves were to be removed. However, an immediate excuse was used for the needed action. As such, in July, 1900 Lugard reported that forces loyal to the leadership in Bida and Kontagora planned a combined attack on the British garrison at Wushishi.[257] He got wind of the attack from leaked messages sent to the Emir of Ilorin who was asked to join in the assault on British led troops. The attack, according to British reports, was preceded by the murder of the leading men of Wushishi. The report stated that Bida and Kontagora were confident as they thought that a significant number of British forces had been exterminated by the Ashanti, in a military conflict between the British and the Ashanti, in the Gold Coast (Ghana).[258]

WAFF forces defeated both Kontagora and Bida cavalry in skirmishes that lasted between July, 1900 and January, 1901 that culminated in the occupation of the two metropolises.[259] In Bida, Lugard appointed a new Emir and issued him with a letter of appointment similar to what transpired in British India. In the report Lugard wrote that part of the letter of appointment stated that the new appointee was to govern justly in accordance with the laws of the Protectorate, obey the High Commissioner and be guided by the advice of the Resident. After placing the new leader firmly under British rule an important part of the report stated that all mineral and 'wastelands' had become the property of the English crown.[260]

In all his actions, Lugard always regarded the position of the Crown as his main priority, Africa and Africans were to serve at the crowns behest, not as their equals, being that the *Scala Naturae* clearly designated Africans in the lowest rung. His views about Africans were also fascinating, and conjoined with those of Flora Shaw, his secretary, who eventually became his 2nd wife, one sees a couple with a highly eugenic scope to life:

> …the typical African ... is a happy, thriftless, excitable person, lacking in self-control, discipline and foresight, naturally courageous, courteous and polite,

[255] Colonial Reports, Annual 1900-1… 13
[256] Colonial Reports, Annual 1900-1… 13
[257] Colonial Reports, Annual 1900-1… 13
[258] Colonial Reports, Annual 1900-1… 5 and Hopkins, A. Quasi-States Weak States and the Partition of Africa" *Review of International Studies* vol. 26, 2, (2000), 316
[259] Colonial Reports, Annual 1900-1… 13-14
[260] Colonial Reports, Annual 1900-1… 14-15

> full of personal vanity, with little of veracity; in brief, the virtues and defects of this race-type are those of attractive children.[261]

Still yet, Lugard obviously was in a dilemma as his campaigns grew, his "higher-grade race" manpower was depressively incapable of administering those conquered areas, and so, although he deprecated blacks in general as a race, he couldn't cope without their utility. It was therefore inevitable that he would have to strategically seek manpower from among them after subjugation.

What stirs the curious mind here is that immediately after the mention that the manner of appointment of the new Emir of Bida was drawn from British policies in India the report immediately declared all mineral and 'wastelands' property of the English crown. If indeed British intentions were humanitarian, why then immediately usurp economic resources belonging to territories of a conquered ruler. Our argument therefore, is that presenting the take-over of local mineral resources and uninhabited land shortly after declaring the defeat of a slave raiding ruler and his replacement with someone that obeyed British laws, in one breath, was a way of disguising British economic interest behind a humanitarian facade.

The pattern of disguise that Lugard used in his report on Bida was repeated in his report on Kontagora. However, this time he tried to rope in Caliphal authorities in Sokoto by asking them to nominate a successor for the deposed ruler.[262] The Sultan was the leader of a loose confederation of Islamic ruled city states. He had the religious honour of ratifying the nomination of local king-makers on the election of a new Emir. The letter Lugard wrote to the Sultan at Sokoto and the Sultan's reply forms an interesting record of literate communication between European colonizers and African rulers. The examination of such an important part of the events of the conquest of Northern Nigeria does not fall under the purview of my current analysis. However, what does is Lugard's interpretation of the events captured in his report as follows:

> Two of the most powerful of the Fulani Emirs have been deposed because after repeated warnings they would not desist from laying wastes the whole country and carrying off the people as slaves. Both the fine cities which were the Fulani capitals have been preserved from destruction. The loss of live has been confined almost entirely to the Fulani horsemen, viz, to the slave-raiders themselves and have suffered heavily while the peasantry and slaves have suffered little."[263]

The words of Lugard quoted above show how he continuously justified the British war of conquest by making it appear as redemptive. This is so because he reported that only members of the overthrown aristocracy that participated in slave-raiding activities were punished by British led military forces. However, an examination of the second part of the

[261] Duignan, Peter, and Lewis Gann. *The Rulers of British Africa 1870—1914 Stanford University Press*. 1st ed., Stanford University Press, 1978, p. 340.

[262] Colonial Reports, Annual 1900-1… 15

[263] Colonial Reports, Annual 1900-1… 15

quote is necessary to gain a deeper understanding of British intensions for the remaining territories that they brought into colonial Northern Nigeria.

> The Fulani rule has been maintained as an experiment for I am anxious to prove to these people that we have no hostility to and only insist on good government and justice and I am anxious to utilize if possible their wonderful intelligence for they are born rulers and incomparably above the negroid tribes in ability. It was with this objective that I invited Sokoto to nominate a new Emir for Kontagora and I have hopes that the effect of such a message may lead to a better understanding of between us and the Mohammedan rulers. The defeat of these chiefs has again almost too late checked the great organised slave raids towards the Niger. There still remain the great slave raiders of the east Yola and Bauchi and I propose this year to open up the trade routes in that direction" [264]

Once again Lugard presented his report with tact. This is so because after reporting his removal of the Fulani rulers of Bida and Kontagora he conveyed that he was going to remove the leadership of other slave raiding Emirates so as to pave the way for trade. However, before his emphasis on trade Lugard reported that the British retained the services of the Fulani, in governing the Emirates, because of their comparative intelligence. His statement, in effect, not only instituted the administrative system that was termed "indirect rule" but also instituted ethnic/ cultural hierarchy in colonial Northern Nigeria. A negative trend that permeated both the colonial space and has affected its successor state. The question that begs to be asked here is why did the British claim that their removal of Fulani aristocracy was for the liberation of peasants and slaves? When soon after the declaration of British rule the administration instituted a racially motivated political system that maintained Fulani rule as sub-colonials.

As mentioned earlier, Lugard did not hide British administration's intention for the remaining Emirates of Northern Nigeria. As such the statement "There still remain the great slave raiders of the east Yola and Bauchi and I propose this year to open up the trade routes in that direction." This comment clearly showed that the British were not going to spare any part of the territories that fell within the mandate obtained from Berlin, not necessarily because of anti-slavery or for pacification, but because of the growing economic value, which the French had already begun to harness in areas such as Borgu.[265]

However, the events that led to the subjugation of Bauchi and other territories to north began with interactions with the RNC. As such, the third polity that was subjugated by the British in Northern Nigeria was Wase. Wase was a vassal of Bauchi Emirate and a Caliphate outpost located in the lowland area of the Jos Plateau.[266] Wase was accused of disrupting RNC trade routes and bombarded in 1898 two years before the British colonial government declared a

[264] Colonial Reports, Annual 1900-1… 15

[265] Lupton, Kenneth. "The Partitioning Of Borgu In 1898 And The French Enclaves In Nigeria, 1900-1960." *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*, vol. 12, no. 3/4, 1984, pp. 77–94. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/44715371.

[266] Nengel, John. "Echoes of the Sokoto Jihad and its Legacies on the Societies of the Jos Plateau" *The Sokoto Caliphate: History and Legacies 1804-2004 Vol 2*, edited by Boboyi H., 182-183. (Kaduna: Arewa House Ahmadu Bello University, 2006), 182-183

Protectorate over Northern Nigeria.[267] Thus after some fracas regarding trade and territorial rights between the company which had a trading post in Ibi to the south of Wase and Kobri the ruler of Wase (*Sarkin Dutsi*), a combined force of Royal Niger Constabulary (the RNC's military wing) and the newly formed West African Frontier Force (WAFF) with the aid of a 7-pounder gun and a maxim gun subdued Wase on the 11th September, 1898.[268] The RNC's trading post at Ibi was later used as the staging point for the subjugation of Emirates that were located further north.

British conquest of the centralized Emirates in the north-east and north-central areas started with Bauchi in February, 1902 and Yola in April of the same year and Zaria.[269] As I mentioned earlier, British subjugation of these Emirates followed the accusation of extensive and systematic slave raids said to have been carried out during the dry season. Zaria whose Emir had been friendly with the British since February of 1902 was eventually deposed in April, 1903 due to his continuous slave raiding activities while Katsina surrendered peacefully. Early March 1903 saw the fall of Kano, while Sokoto the seat of the Caliphate capitulated less than two weeks later in the same month.[270] The Emir of Kano was accused of tyranny and despotism.[271] This is evident in the way that the British presented his hold on Kano.

> Alieu himself was a tyrant who was detested by the people, but had inspired so deep a dread and fear that his will was law. Certain death awaited anyone who disobeyed or who was even suspected of wavering and thus he managed even in his own absence to compel a resistance which few besides himself desired"[272]

It should be noted that because the Emirates had standing armies and very large populations from which thousands of fighting men could be drafted, British forces faced them with a good number of men and much more equipment especially maxim guns, 7 and 9 pounder artillery guns and subjugation was achieved once and for all because in those societies large territories and the population therein were in obedience to centralized political structures.[273]

Conquest of Small/ Non-Centralized Polities

In the case of non-centralized polities where the population was highly segmented conquest took decades and battles were fought from one polity to the next because each community or confederating group of villages independently arranged their security as well as defence. In line with Lugard's puritan presentation of the British conquest of Northern Nigeria small polities were accused of truculence and therefore pacified. Thus they were accused of

[267] Freemantle, J. *Nigeria Northern Provinces: Gazetteer of Muri Province*. (London: Waterlow and sons, 1922), 5 and 9 and Nengel, John. "The Polities and Cultures of Plateau State" in Mangvwat, Monday. (ed) *Centenary History of Plateau State 1914-2014,* (Jos: Plateau State Government, 2015), 55

[268] Freemantle, *Nigeria Northern Provinces*… 5, 9 and 14

[269] Colonial Reports, Annual 1902…13

[270] Colonial Reports, Annual, 1900-1… 12 and 13 and Colonial Reports, Annual 1902 … 31-35

[271] Colonial Reports, Annual 1902 … 30-31

[272] Colonial Reports, Annual 1902 … 30

[273] Colonial Reports, Annual 1902 and Colonial Report, Annual No. 437, Northern Nigeria 1903 http://www.hathitrust.org accessed on 07/12/2015

negative tendencies ranging from blocking trade routes, attacking caravans and blocking the construction of communications lines. It is in this regard that British military action against cultural groups around Chikara and Limu in the far north area, the Tiv of the Benue valley and the numerous cultural groups in the Jos plateau area is best appreciated.[274]
The British accused members of cultural groups around the Chikara area of attacking trade caravans that passed through their area. Colonial officials continuously made such accusations against small polities in Northern Nigeria. What British reports failed to say, however, was that such attacks on trade caravans, that emanated from the Fulani and Hausa Emirates, were the objects of retaliation against the military incursions of the Emirs in the area.[275] In the case of Limu the people were accused of the kidnap of one of the load carriers of WAFF. Consequently, the whole town, which was not a small one even by British standards, was raised to the ground. British commanders of WAFF and the colonial Police constabulary were often displayed this brazen show of force. However, British authorities were made not to tolerate such severe action when European Christian missionaries began to work in Northern Nigeria.[276] The Tiv were conquered because colonial officials perceived them as virile and warlike. The immediate reason for the military action against the however was to prevent them from disrupting work on telegraph lines that the British were constructing through their territory. This was similar to the pacification of the Pyem (located at Gindiri) and (the Berom around) Bukuru that were subjugated in 1905 in order that a mail line be opened from Bauchi.[277]

It should be noted that at the turn of the new century (1900), activity in the central Nigeria area transformed from just that of subjugation or pacification for humanitarian reasons, to the outright capture of areas for purely economic purposes.

Having already subjugated and established British administration in Bauchi Emirate to the north of the Jos Plateau, it became a base from where conquest of the inhabitants of the northern highlands of the Plateau was carried out from.[278] For the inhabitants of the highlands of the Jos Plateau however, they were conquered because of the rich mineral deposits that lay in the alluvial soil beneath them.[279] Thus their land was the object of attraction to European commercial concerns, spear headed by the Niger Company which had just relinquished its Royal Charter but was still in close collaboration with the Colonial Government, while the population was earmarked to provide a source of cheap and unskilled

[274] Colonial Reports, Annual, 1900-1… 5 and 6
[275] Ochonu, Moses. *Colonialism by Proxy: Hausa Imperial Agents and Middle Belt Consciousness in Nigeria*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, Bloomington, Indiana 47405, 2014). 29-35, Tambo, David. "The 'Hill Refuges' of the Jos Plateau: A Historical Examination" *History in Africa*, vol. 5, (1978), 201-204
[276] Mangvwat, Monday. "From Colonial Conquest… in Nengel, John *Mandyeng Journal of Central Nigerian Studies*, Early Rains Editions, (2001), 80
[277] Mangvwat, "From Colonial Conquest… 80
[278] Fwatshak, Sati. "Colonialism and Indigenous Enterprises on the Jos Plateau 1902-1925" in Nengel, John. et al (eds) *Mandyeng Journal of Central Nigerian Studies*, Department of History, University of Jos, Early Rains Edition, (2001), 59
[279] Fwatshak, "Colonialism and Indigenous… 59

labour for the anticipated mining that was to take place in the area and this was to influence colonial policies towards them.[280]
Imperial officials were eager to access the revenue that would accrue to official coffers from the boast in economic activities that was to follow tin mining activities on the Jos Plateau such as charges and fees for mining leases, taxes from manual workers on the mines, taxes on both European and local goods consumed around the mining industry and above all the venture was be used to achieve the commoditization of labour, commoditization of agricultural produce and introduction of British currency, all of which were alien to the pre-colonial economy of the Jos Plateau.
The commercialization of mining in this area presented a dual challenge. The first had to do with the subjugation of the seemingly truculent groups, who came in small numbers and therefore presented unique aggressions, and the second was the manner by which they could be mobilised for 'pacification.' This is an important point to note due to the fact that with the emergence of a new economic activity (European tin mining) in an area previously described as a no-go territory due to wrongful allegations of aggressiveness and unfriendliness of its peoples,[281] there was a need not only to introduce a new form of social, political and economic administration, but as an initial step, introduce a new population, which to the colonial administration, would be more pliable for the work of exploiting tin and controlling the area until the autochthons were pacified and indoctrinated into 'modern society.'[282]

Lugard for one, clearly showed his preference for the more organised northern emirate groups (as compared to the 'pagan' groups) which had for centuries built aristocracies and bureaucracies with the guidance of Islam. In fact, Lugard not only built a racist perception of British superiority of the colonies, he also racially stratified colonial subjects based on their congruencies to the more superior Europeans.[283] On the side of the emirates, the Plateau natives were 'primitive' and only viable as slaves and chattel, while on their own side, the natives viewed the emirates as a brutish, violent group, whose history of inhuman enslavement meant the pillaging and displacement of their societies peace and coexistence.[284]

Thus the numerous polities of the Jos Plateau were subdued with much epistemic and practical prejudice that was based on the marriage between the Emirate/British cartographic

[280] Mangvwat, Monday. *A History of Class Formation in the Plateau Province of Nigeria 1902- 1960: The Genesis of A Ruling Class.* (Durham, North Carolina, 27701: CAP World Series, 2013), 49,51-53
[281] David C. Tambo. "The "Hill Refuges" of the Jos Plateau: A Historiographical Examination". *History in Africa*, vol 5, 1978, p. 214.
[282] Lugard, F.D. 1923. *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa*. London: William Blackwood and Sons, p. 72.
[283] Turaki, Y. *The British Colonial Legacy in Northern Nigeria: A Social Ethical Analysis Of The Colonial And Post-Colonial Society And Politics In Nigeria*. 1st ed. Jos: Challenge Press and Publishers, 1993, pp. 83-85.
[284] Nengel refers to the case of narratives of enslavement of the Afizere and Anaguta by the Bauchi emirate in their pursuit of building a city wall that will equate that of Kano. In the narratives by Afizere and Anaguta oral sources, he notes that it was alleged that not only were the enslaved Afizere and Anaguta people under Bauchi inhumanly treated during the building of the Bauchi wall, they were also added into the wall when they grew too sick or too old to work. Nengel, John G. Interview on the Existence or Otherwise of Organised Trade in Pre-Colonial Jos Plateau. Residence, Behind ECWA Staff School, Zaria Road, 2017.

imagery of "otherness" on the people of the area. Also the conquest was carried out via the use of a technologically backed military force against the unsophisticated disposition and rudimentary weaponry of the people of the Jos Plateau whose only strength was their sheer determination to maintain their independence. And as their efforts failed to safeguard their independence in the face of a technologically backed encroachment. And although the resolve at resistance was far more staunch on the Jos Plateau in comparison with what transpired at the Emirates, however because the number of people who engaged in the defence of the small polities were fewer and British officials resorted to the use of fewer men and fewer guns often referring to the military operations as patrols, tours and even escorts with several communities having to be revisited forcefully due to what the British referred to as their 'recalcitrance' to independence.[285]

On the whole colonial administrators have admitted how difficult the task of bringing the heterogeneous groups of the Jos Plateau area under imperial rule was. This they attributed to the confidence the people had from their success in evading prior attempts at alien control from the Emirates. In those early years of the extension of British rule to the area however imperial officials had to resort to repeated punitive patrols, imposition of fines, seizure and plunder of farm produce and lives stock, scorched earth military measures and forced relocation of entire villages from mountainous "refuges" alongside other subtle political and economic measures in order to maintain his Majesty's suzerainty over the Jos Plateau groups.[286]

Conclusion

The puritan reportage of British military actions during the early period of the conquest of Northern Nigeria achieved two things. First, it gave the British a moral currency through which they justified the deployment of military force against indigenous people. Second, it set a precedent and course of action against the rest of the communities that were earmarked for conquest. Thus I have shown that British officials faulted the conduct of communities with small populations and carried out military actions against them. In a similar manner the leadership of centralised societies in Northern Nigeria were conquered and replaced with new appointees.

Despite that the British found fault in the leaders they encountered during the period of conquest of Northern Nigeria they however did not fault the existing political and economic system they found on ground. Hence the system of administration was not only left unchanged but was employed to provide a cost effective administrative model for the High Commissioner of the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria which he termed "indirect rule" was made subservient to British officials. Thus the deposition of old Emirs and imposition of

[285] Netting, Robert McC. "Clashing Cultures, Clashing Symbols: Histories and Meanings of the Latok War" *Ethnohistory* Vol. 3:4, Duke University Press, (1987), 252- 380, Lugard, Frederick. *Political Memoranda: Revision of Instructions to Political Officers on Subjects Chiefly Political and Administrative 1913-1918*, (London: 3rd Edition, Frank Cass, 1970), 249-263, SNP 7/12/2600/1911 Report on Patrol Sura, Mongwor and Bandang March to April, 1911

[286] Ames, C. *Gazetteers of the Northern Provinces of Nigeria vol. IV: The Highland Chieftaincies (Plateau Province)* (London: Frank Cass, 1934), 40-41, McC. Netting, "Clashing Cultures, Clashing…356 and 363-370 and Montol patrol 1916

new Emirs that was repeated in all the conquered Emirates and the seat of the Caliphate was just a change of personnel.

Therefore, presenting the events around the conquest of these territories in documented reports as a humanitarian endeavour was tactful but not truthful. Thus, British actions during the early years of the conquest of Northern Nigeria are best understood from the perspective of the first objective of the European colonisation of Africa as contained in the protocol of the Berlin West Africa conference quoted earlier and not from its favoured redemptive stand point

NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR ATROCITIES AND RESILIENCE OF MEN AND WOMEN IN THE RIVERINE COMMUNITIES OF SOUTH-EASTERN NIGERIA, 1967 – 1970

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Abstract

The study examined the plights of men and women of fishing communities in South-eastern State during the Nigerian Civil War. The littoral fishing communities of the State became the landing ground of troops of the 3 Marine Commando Division and Biafran army from where a forward push was made into the hinterland. The fishing communities in South Eastern State domiciled in the creeks, rivers, and rivulets contributed to human, material and military needs of the Federal troops for the successful execution of military needs of the Federal troops for the successful execution of military operations in Ijaw and Igbo heartlands. The study further argues that the role played by coastal and fishing communities were not gender bias because both men and women were exposed to danger, risk, deprivation, hunger and displacement. While men ferried troops through the creeks into the hinterland, women provided food and warm. The study submitted that it was consequent upon the sufferings and courage of men and women in the fishing communities that the Federal troops of the 3 Marine Commando Division made victorious incursions into the hinterland and eventually squeezed Biafra into an enclave. Also, the post war conditions of men and women in the riverine and coastal communities of the former South Eastern State of Nigeria had severely deteriorated 50 years after the war. Nonetheless, this study employs historical methodology using both the primary and secondary sources.

KEYWORDS: Nigerian Civil War, Men, Women, Riverine

Introduction

The nature of suffering and courage endured by men and women of the fishing communities of South Eastern State during the Nigerian Civil War of July, 1967 to January, 1970 raised concerns and contributes immensely to a better understanding of the saddest period of Nigeria's post-colonial history.[287]

The activities, suffering and courage of men and women of the fishing communities of the area seldom received attention and commendations from writers, scholars and historians. Also, before the formal outbreak of war on 6th July, 1967 at Garkem village, Major Isaac Boro, Commander of the 3MCDO's Sea Training School in Atimbo, Calabar and heavily and mercilessly terrorized Oron, Uruan, Ibeno, Andoni, Efik and other Ibibio fishermen and women in creeks, sea and rivers under the false belief that Biafra could draw food supports from local innocent fishermen who braved the odds and risked their lives for a little or no mention in almost all the scholarly works on the war 50 years after.[288]

The pre-war mobilization and movement of ammunitions, foods and other items by Biafran Leader Emeka Odumegwu Ojukwu from Portugal, Tanzania and Cote d'Ivoire[289] discreetly through Cameroon and fishing communities of Oron, Ikang, Akpabuyo, Efiat, Ebughu and Udung Uko exposed men and women of those communities to untold suffering and resilience in the hands of Biafran secret military marine transporters and Nigerian army equally.[290] This initial scenario unarguably distinguishes and scores men and women of fishing communities of South Eastern Nigeria as first to experience the pains and courage associated with that war which later penetrated to Ijaw and Igbo heartlands at full-fledged stage.

This is the study of the extent of resilience, courage and sufferings unleashed on men and women of fishing communities of the former South Eastern State of Nigeria presently structured as Akwa Ibom and Cross River States during the Nigerian Civil War. It is also necessitated by the longing to balance the partial, mindless and lopsided reconstruction of the war by writers, historians and other scholars who apparently avoided to celebrate the braved odds and pains endured by people of the fishing communities who knew nothing about the 'why' of the war but paid ultimate prices. They rather situated reconstructions on what Umoh described as "battle-centric military history" thereby leaving the posterity in a travesty of information pertaining to pains and courage of people in fishing communities who saw, partook and suffered the war odds before those in the hinterlands of Ijaw and Igbo and other parts of Ibibio.[291]

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[287] Joseph C, Anene and Godfrey N. Brown. *African in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*. Lagos: Ibadan University Press. 1970. P. 158.

[288] Alexander A. Madiebo. *The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War*. Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishers. 1980. P. 125.

[289] Philip Effiong. *Nigeria and Biafra: My Story.* New Jersey: A Sunghai Books. 2003. Pp. 258-265.

[290] Effiong Okon Osung. Aged: 87. Family Head. Interviewed at Atak-Ibang, Udung Uko on 2/4/2019.

[291] Ubong E. Umoh. Defeat Made Easy: Ibibio Ethnic Nationality and the Biafran War, 1967-1970. In: Philip Afaha (ed). *Witness to History in Honour of Sir Sebastian J. Umoren*. Abuja: Command Publishers. 2015. P. 78.

Identifying the Fishing communities

The creation of South Eastern State from Eastern region of Nigeria by General Yakubu Gowon of 20th May, 1967 was a pre-war strategy aimed at deflating the vituperous influence and intention of Colonel Emeka Ojukwu as shown during his declaration of the Republic of Biafra.[292] Incidentally, all the fishing communities located in Oron, Efik, Andoni, Ibeno and Ibibio such as Abana, Mbit-Ekpa, Inua Oron, Atabang West and East, Ine Odiong, Ine Atayo, Ine Okpo, Okposo, Inua-Mba, Ubughu Efe, Ine Akpak, Inua Abasi, Mmendoro, Akpa Edok, Ute-Efiong, Akpa Ikang, Ndito Eka Iba, Edonwi, Ikpala-Iko, Akata, Elokpon, Ntafre, Iwopom-Opolom, Akpa Mfri Ukim and Ine Okpo Iwa among others were riverine or fishing settlements in South Eastern Nigeria and were unarguably also the main theatres of the war.

Those places largely populated by men and women of the fishing communities of Oron, Efik, Ibeno, Uruan and Andoni (Obolo) were heavily militarized in compliance with Ojukwu's warning and boast on the 7th April, 1967 in the face of possible economic blockade of the former Eastern Nigerian Coasts by Nigerian warships that he would "line the bottom of our creeks, with the debris of the Nigerian Navy".[293] While the Gowon-led UK support Nigerian army with over 7,000 soldiers were militarily equipped, Hank Warton, a six foot tall American citizen who later crash landed his DC-4 plane loaded with submachine guns and ammunitions in Cameroon was busy supplying guns to Ojukwu to equip the undersized and ill-trained soldiers of less than 5,000 men most of whom were drawn from the fishing communities of South Eastern Nigeria.[294]

Equally, men and women who could not embark on distant fishing expeditions in the areas mentioned above, settled at the nearest fishing settlements or home-based locations. In the Oron area or community, riverine settlements like Esuk Mma, Ine-Okong, Atak Ibang, Ute-Antai, Ute-Iyata, Ute Brama, Okposo, Akpa Mfri Ukim, Ute-Effiong, and Mbit-Ekpa were peopled by fishermen whose activities were paramountly subsistent and composite in nature.[295]

Courage and Suffering of Men/Women during the War

Courage depicts the choice and willingness to confront pain, suffering, danger and intimidation while suffering is the state of undergoing pain, distress or hardship. Suffering entails an experience of unpleasantness and threat to the happiness and life of an individual. According to Cassel, suffering is a universal human experience described as a negative basic feeling or emotion that involves a subjective character of unpleasantness, aversion, harm or threat of harm to body and mind.[296] Both terminologies impinged on the wellbeing of the people of the South Eastern Nigeria under the military command of Yakubu Gowon, Head

[292] Philip Effiong. *Nigeria and Biafra: My Story.* New Jersey: A Sunghai Books. 2003. Pp. 176 -177.
[293] O. A. Odiong. *Bakassi Peninsula Growth, Conflict and Evolution: Migration to Relocation*. Calabar: NES and Leaders (Nig.) Limited. 2008. Pp. 3-14.
[294] Amechi Umeorah. *War Report: A Documentary of the Nigeria/Biafra Conflict.* Toronto: Chase Publications. 1983. Pp. 90-95.
[295] O. A. Odiong. *Bakassi Peninsula Growth, Conflict and Evolution: Migration to Relocation*. Calabar: NES and Leaders (Nig.) Limited. 2008. Pp. 3-14.
[296] E. J. Cassell. *The Nature of Suffering*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2003. P.152.

of State of Nigeria and Colonel Emeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, leader of the secessionist Biafra[297] who declared Biafra a republic on the 30th May, 1967 thereby paving way for one of the first most painful physical and mental experiences of the people of the riverine areas of the lower Cross River basin in all the sixty years of colonialism and sixty-three months of Nigeria's first republic prior to the civil war.[298] It is essentially a fact that the iteration of the display of courage among women in the face of modern armed aggression predates the 1967-1970 civil war in Nigeria. The story of bravery, resilience and valour exhibited by Ibibio women in opposition to British colonial injustices which culminated in the women's war *Ekong Iban* of 1929[299] apparently pioneered gender subservience, courage and suffering of Ibibio women, who like other African women, sought to assert themselves against any act of gender intimidation, aggression and threat, hence, another brave attempts during the 30 months old conflict in Nigerian.[300]

Udung Uko – Eyotai

In the Oron area, late Madam Afiong Osin Emenyi of Eyotai community courageously confronted the unfriendly Biafran soldiers during an event of the murder of late Mrs. Usine Ebieme went for fire-woods in the Beach in Udung Uko by Biafran soldiers in 1967. Mrs. Usine Ebieme went for fire-woods in the Beach forest where she was killed for daring to see the face of the Biafran leader, Emeka Ojukwu. The Biafran leader was hidden in a bunker at *Onyi-Olibi* where he came to take receipt consignment of ammunitions and weapons en-routes Cameroon. The news of the killing of Mrs. Ebieme moved Mrs. Afion Osin Emenyi who courageously rounded-up men and women using early morning church bell on pretext of calling for early morning church prayer in the Methodist Church, Eyotai. Mr. Edet Akan (Azumini) led men and youths who invaded *Onyi-Olibi* and Eyotai beach where two Biafran soldiers were mercilessly killed, three lynched and guns seized. This revenge mission by Eyotai people resulted in vacation of the area for about 2 months orior to liberation by Federal troops. The purpose of the killing of Mrs. Ebieme was to avoid the spread of information which could lead to trace of the movement of the Biafran leader, Emeka Ojukwu who was in the area secretly. The bunker is still there and should be recommended as tourist site. Though the number of children (males and females) subjected to the anguish of death, suffering and deprivation during the war remains unascertained till date, yet, one particular event at Udung Uko where Mrs. Eno Efiong Okon, mother of two month old twins was man-handled and beaten up because her husband was alleged to have supported Nigerian soldiers with fishes and other food items, becomes an issue in this study.[301] She boldly resisted all

[297] D. Agedah. *The Military in Politics from Aguiyi-Ironsi to Ibrahim Babangida*. Lagos: Perception Communications. 1993. Pp. 7-10.

[298] Frederick Forsyth. *The Making of an African Legend: The Biafra Story*. New York: Penguin Books. 1977. P. 13.

[299] E. O. Akpan and V. L. Ekpo. *The Women's War of 1929: A Popular Uprising in South Eastern Nigeria (Preliminary Study)*. Calabar: The Government Printers. 1988. P. 53.

[300] Mfon Akwang Isaiah. In: Philip Afaha. *Witness to History in Honour of Sir Sebastian J. Umoren.* Abuja: Command Publishers. 2015. P. 236.

[301] Efiong Okon Osung. Aged: 90. Family Head. Interviewed at Atak Ibang, Udung Uko on 2/4/2022.

attempts to cause her to divulge the where about of her husband who was hiding in a nearby hideout.

Accordingly, gender and cultural prejudices and activities of both the Nigeria and Biafran soldiers in the fishing communities of Oron, Uruan, Efik, Opobo, Andoni, Itu and Ibeno during the fratricidal war had equally received condemnation from world leaders and international community who frowned at the activities of soldiers towards women,[302] children and men of fishing communities.[303] According to Atanang who asserted that in 1968, Idua Ukpata and Afaha Eduok women named Mrs. Afiong Tom and Nkoyo Edet Edem were caught in the creek where they were mercilessly raped and subjected to severe beatings as they objected to such immoral advances by Biafran soldiers who had to custody their female victims in their camp for period of two to three weeks or less to satisfy sexual urge. In the nearby village of Esuk-Oron,[304] Mr. Nnaubom Enang Okon was killed for protesting while his wife was raped in his presence.[305]

In March, 1968 some fishermen and Miss Elizabeth Ekpenyong, a-20 year old lady from Okopedi Okobo were arrested on their way from Oron to Calabar through paddled-dug canoe at night while the war was raging along in the Oron-Calabar estuary. For daring to take such risk and courage, through "such a large expanse, dangerous and fast flowing river" the fishermen and Miss Ekpenyong were forced to take men and soldiers of 3MCDO on the same trip from Calabar back to Oron after spending three horrible days in confinement. As s result, the fishermen and Miss Ekpenyong were later recruited as local intelligence agents for 3MCDO troops.[306] In Eyotai village, a young man of 30 named Osung Uye Owefiak while masquerading during the traditional *Ekpo* festival week, courageously confronted Nigerian soldiers who were enforcing ban of any traditional festival in the area. Osung Uye Owefiak's mission was to boldly signal to the soldiers that the war had desecrated the culture and festive mood of the people. Despite all efforts by villages and few soldiers to dissuade him from fighting the soldiers, he went ahead and struck a soldier death with his machete. As a result, Osung Uye Owefiak was shot dead thereby accentuating yet another protest by villagers. Osung Uye Owefiak used a popular local ballad to show his courage by disguised as masquerader to protest military intrusion and desecration of the people's culture and tradition.

In Oruko, propelled by their vaunted final offensive and intent on breaking the morale of the Biafrans, the Nigerian Air Force continued to vent its rage with air attacks on an unarmed civilian population. In March, 1969, a twin-Jet Illyushin bomber roared over the market centre of Oruko in Oron fishing area and plastered it with fragmentation and phosphorus

[302] F. Forsyth. *The Making of an African Legend: The Biafra Story*. New York: Penguin Books. 1977. P. 13.
[303] Alexander A. Madiebo. *The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War*. Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishers. 1980. P. 239.
[304] Etim Atanang. Aged: 76. Village Head. Interviewed at Idua/Ukpata on 27/4/2019.
[305] Asukwo Andu. Aged: 92. Family Head/Fisherman. Interviewed at Idua/Ukpata. 28/4/2022.
[306] G. Alabi-Isama. *The Tragedy of Victory: On the Spot Account of the Nigeria-Biafra War in the Atlantic Theatre.* Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited. 2013. P. 97.

bombs.[307] During that market day called *Udueassang,* over 300 women, 150 men and about 50 children were sent to early graves. Since that awful event of the bombing of Oruko market, which was the most popular symbol of Oron commercial institution, the market became completely undermined till date.[308]

Opobo (Ikot Abasi)

According to Obot Okoko, late Mrs. Euphemia Okoko, a kalabari lady who married to Chief Richard Okoko of Ikot Obong, Ibekwe in Ikot Abasi in the then Opobo division couragfeously saved her husband's life when she boldly disarmed and intimidated the Biafran soldiers who were after her husband. Mr. Richard Okoko was then a Personal Confidant Secretary to Justice Egbert Udoma who was equally seen as an avowed opponent to Biafran project and independence. As a result, Biafran soldiers were reduced to "armless or toothless bulldogs" as they ended up apologizing to Mrs. Euphemia Okoko whose husband was listed for elimination or assassination. The huge, gigantic and intimidating physical appearance and posture of the Kalabari-born Ibekwe woman could not allow the soldiers to embark on their dastardly mission with utmost sense of fearless commitment, hence, Chief Richard Okoko who was hidden in the same compound was saved from barrels of the Biafran soldiers' guns courtesy of Madam Euphemia Okoko's temerity and courage.[309]

Opobo (Eastern Andoni)

In Eastern Obolo (Andoni, Opbo division), fishing in creeks by women and sea by men were completely abandoned until the 31st March, 1968 when the area was liberated by about 35,000 men of the 3 Marine Commando (3MCDO) of the Nigerian Army Commando by General Benjamin Adekunle who moved from Calabar through Oron, Eket and Ibeno marine way towards Western Andoni, Bonny and Port Harcourt in Rivers State with final crossing through Opobo river in May, 1968.[310] Eastern Obolo in Opobo division then had Edonwi, Ikpala-Iko, Akata, Elokpon, Aganzat, Ebon-Okolo and Elokpon Uchi as major fishing settlements along the various creeks of the area. As a result, Biafra's efforts to block Ibeno and the area against the advancing Nigerian troops aiming toward Western Andoni, Bonny and Port Harcourt created mixed experience of suffering and courage by men and women of Ibeno, Eastern Andoni (Eastern Obolo) whose mainstay came from rivers, creeks and rivulets of the area. According to Etefor, the entire people of Eastern Obolo area of Okoroette, Elile lived in the bush and forest throughout the war since they refused to cross or migrate to Western Andoni to join their kiths and kins. Every one encamped in the forest to avoid being caught and handed over to Nigeria soldiers by people of the neighbouring village of Ikot Inyang Okop in Ikot Abasi who have refused to accommodate the Obolo

[307] H. Umeorah. *War Report: A Documentary of the Nigeria/Biafra Conflict.* Toronto: Chase Publications. 1983. P. 35.

[308] Effiong Edunam. Oruko Market: The Career of an Extraordinary Civic Institution. *Ekpo Oro Cultural Festival Magazine*. 2013. Pp. 16-17.

[309] Obot Okoko. Aged: 40. Public Servant. Interviewed at Ikot Obong, Ibekwe, Ikot Abasi on 12/4/2019.

[310] Godwin G. Alabi. *The Tragedy of Victory: On the Spot Account of the Nigeria-Biafra War in the Atlantic Theatre.* Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited. 2013. Pp. 222-225.

people whom they tagged "saboteurs" because their son, Hon. U. O. Ekemeokot was a strong supporter of the Igbo party, the NCNC led by Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe.

Again, every Obolo man and woman was regarded as pro-Biafran because late Hon. U. O. Ekemeokot, who represented Opobo South in the Federal House of Representatives during the 1st Republic was a stunt member of the Igbo dominated party, the NCNC and active supporter of Biafran secession. Consequently, upon the arrival of Nigerian troops, women were wantonly raped, men tormented and killed while those who escaped to forests lived under severe hunger and suffering. Also, late Mr. Ikokinemebe Micah Elebe, the first university graduate of the area from the University of Ibadan was tortured and killed by the Nigerian soldiers since his brother and mentor, Hon. Ekemeokot was not found.[311]

Abana (Bakassi)

At Abana, a fishing village in Bakassi, Biafran and Nigerian soldiers completely put women, men and children into untold suffering, raping and hunger especially through the mercilessly posture of Isaac Boro.[312] Isaac Boro who regarded every fisherman and woman as food or fish supplier of the rampaging Biafran soldiers who were greatly decimated by hunger following the blockage of borders against food and ammunition supplies by Gowon who swiftly acted upon the 'hunger theory'[313] of Chief Obafemi Awolowo who advised and theorized as follows:

> All is fair in war, and starvation is one of the weapons of war. I don't see why we should feed our enemies at in order for them to fight harder.[314]

Uruan

As accounted by Abete, daily life in Biafran controlled fishing settlements of Akani Obio Uruan, Ishiet, Adadia and Akpa Mfri Ukim, Ine Okpo Iwa in Uruan and parts of Itu consisted of acid combination of fear, hunger and suffering. In Ishiet, a widow named Ikwo Bassey lost her husband to cruel bullets of Biafran soldiers who demanded to rape her but were aggressively opposed by her husband late Mr. Asuquo Bassey. Abete asserted further that though the war affected men and women who depended on fishing yet farmers and hunters were also exposed to loss, loot, and fear thereby precipitating severe hardship, hunger and suffering among the people.[315]

Post-War Environmental and Health Conditions of Women and Men of Fishing Communities of South Eastern State of Nigeria

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311 Harry John Etetor. Aged: 70. Paramount Ruler. Interviewed at Elile Village, Eastern Obolo on 20/4/2019.
312 Godwin G. Alabi. *The Tragedy of Victory: On the Spot Account of the Nigeria-Biafra War in the Atlantic Theatre.* Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited. 2013. P. 252.
313 Amechi Umeorah. *War Report: A Documentary of the Nigeria/Biafra Conflict.* Toronto: Chase Publications. 1983. Pp. 49-75.
314 Chinua Achebe. *There was a Country: A Personal History of Biafra*. England: Penguin Books. 2012. P. 233.
315 Sunday Abete. Aged: 50. Public Servant. Interviewed at Ibiaku-Uruan on 5/4/2019.

The study attempts at this point to show how women and men of the area lived 50 years after the war. Although men and women of the area are engaged in fishing of various types such as *Obu, Afiyak, Uwan, Mfioro, Ekpeburukim* among others, yet, there are large cultivable lands which are basic sources for meeting food needs and livelihoods. Women are at the centre of subsistent food production while men travel distances for sea foods.[316] Unfortunately, attempts after the war to grow crops on subsistence basis have been disrupted by highly marginal environment due to waterlog, pest, farm diseases, soil erosion and destruction of forest and water resources as a result of incessant bombings of the area during war, thus began a cycle of accelerated poverty. Poor farmers now exploit lands while scarcity of fuel woods results in the burning of crop and animal wastes formerly used to maintain soil fertility.[317] In those fishing communities, men and women get overworked while their problems keep increasing due to poor healthcare facilities. Food scarcity and lack of portable water render them diseased due to dysentery, diarrhea, malaria and typhoid fever. Pregnant and lactating mothers top list of most vulnerable people.[318]

Conclusion

No examination of the Nigeria civil war of 1967-1970 would be complete without the recognition of the role of women and men of the fishing communities of the former South Eastern State of Nigeria. Apart from the social role of the women generally which accord them pride of place and honour for their reproductive capabilities, women of the fishing community of the area have been adversely made to "suffer a war they had no say in its making". During the 30 months old fratricidal war, women exhibited courage and suffering alongside men of the area in a more severe and daring nature than their counterparts in the hinterlands of Igbo and Ijaw because of their peculiar terrain, occupations and environment. Men assisted both the Biafran and the Nigerian soldiers to paddle wooden canoes to distances without fear during the period the war lasted, while displayed hospitality by cooking and making food available for the Biafran and Nigerian soldiers without fear all in an effort to see to a stable and united society. Unfortunately, little or no obvious recorded or globalized remarks were made of the activities and efforts of those traumatized and forgotten members of the Nigerian state. For example, following the formal surrender by General Philip Effiong on the 15th January, 1970, a 3-stage unity plan Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Reconciliation (the 3Rs) was announced by General Gowon,[319] yet, the once traumatized and shattered but courageous men and women of the fishing communities of the area wre not effectively touched 50 years after the needless war they knew nothing about. As the war ended, the poor men and women of the area who adversely suffered the pangs of loss, courage and suffering of the war while trying to overcome their war experiences became

[316] Mary Essang. *A Study of Oron Community: An Introductory Guide on the Cultural Heritage of Oron Society.* Calabar: Paico Limited Press. 1954. P. 51.

[317] Joseph Davidson. Women's Relationship with the Environment. In: Geraldine Readon (ed.). *Women Environment.* Oxford: Oxfam Publishers. 1993. P. 4.

[318] Robert Palmer. Enduring the Drought: The Response of Zambia Women. In: Garaldine Readon (ed.). *Women Environment.* Oxford: Oxfam Publishers. 1993. P. 43.

[319] Esin Okon Eminue. Military Regimes and Political Development in Nigeria, 1966-1999. *Ibom Journal of History and International Studies.* Vol. 14. No. 2. December, 2012. P. 199.

once more subjected to post-civil war social, environmental, economic and health related problems which have continued to lengthen their courage and sufferings.

Prior to 1967, women and men of the riverine communities of the former South Eastern State were highly prosperous and comfortable economically. The creeks, rivulets and rivers yielded abundantly, marine transporters such as late Etim Edet and Asukwo Effiong (*Ekod*) among others were relatively living in affluence.[320] Between 1970s and late 1980s, the deterioration of the economy of inhabitants of the area steadily and rapidly began due to activities of sea pirates and armed robbers most of whom were men of the defeated Biafran army.

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BOKO HARAM AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN NORTH-EAST, NIGERIA

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Abstract

This paper explored the experience of women and children in the ongoing Boko Haram insurgency in North East, Nigeria. Since 2010 clashed with the military and other government security operatives, the group has continued to terrorized people including women and children who are the most vulnerable during conflict. Using the qualitative method based on primary sources of data collection comprising of key informant interview and focus group discussions; and documented evidence, the study found that women and children were the most severely affected by the insurgency. Consequently, women and children were abducted by the insurgent groups and forced to become suicide bombers, cooks, human shields, sex-slaves with non-Muslims women and children converted to Islam. Women suffered emotional torture due to the death of their husbands and children became orphans, and were internally displaced and many forced into becoming refugees in neighbouring countries. The study concludes that with government putting in place effective policy framework towards addressing the root causes of the Boko Haram insurgency and providing safety-nets to affected women and children in the region will help in mitigating the spread of violent extremism and ameliorating their challenges.

Keywords: insurgency, violence, Boko Haram, women and children.

Introduction

The Boko Haram insurgency has impacted negatively on the lives of women and children especially in the North Eastern region. Women and children have been used by Boko Haram as weapons of war in various ways, either as human shields, sexual and domestic slaves or child soldiers. As Zena points out, the rise of Boko Haram in 2009 has led to their growing

interest in women in both their actions and propaganda.[321] The kidnapping of 276 female students in Government Girls Secondary School Chibok, Borno state in 2014 and the 2016 Dapchi kidnap of 110 female students in Yobe State clearly showed a pattern by which women and children have become assets for war crimes by Boko Haram.

These incidences however, are the rather gross actions of this group, a number of studies- Human Rights Watch; UNICEF; Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme; and Read; have indicated that there have been and are quite a number of unreported cases of Boko Haram abduction of women and children in different villages and towns within the North East.[322] Child Soldiers International's report shows that within the year 2018 alone, Boko Haram persisted with rather shocking levels of violence, with children routinely targeted for use as suicide bombers, with at least 43 cases in the first six months of the year.[323] This number continued to increase in 2019 despite the effort put by government to end the insurgency. This study adds to the literature that examines the motive behind Boko Haram violence against women and children and vis-a-vis kidnapping of young women and children using data gathered during the research in North East Nigeria. It equally raise issue concerning what the insurgents used with kidnapped old women which existing literatures have not been interrogated. It adds to a little but growing evidence base that underscores the need to investigate the issue and seek to respond and address it in the region.

The fact that women and children are highly vulnerable for capture is a major strategic setback for our security agencies, but also the mere fact that those not captured live in perpetual fear, with an expectation of their own day of reckoning shall come, has led many of them to voluntary radicalize. This portends to a potential growing population ready for radicalization and induction into the next generation. As many participants asserted "because of poverty, lack of having access to the means of livelihood and for survival purposes attracted many women and especially children to willingly join Boko Haram".[324]

Drawing insights from Nigeria and beyond, this study critically examines the Boko Haram atrocious violence against women and children in North East Nigeria. The study argues that mitigating the spread of violent extremism and ameliorating their challenges in the region depends on effective policy framework towards addressing the root causes of the Boko Haram insurgency and provision of safety nets to affected women and children. The first section of the study deals with Boko Haram insurgency and its mode of operation in the North East. The second section examines the Boko Haram violence against women and children. The third section focuses on vulnerability of women and children as the most affected by Boko Haram insurgency. This is followed by a discussion section and conclusion.

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[321] Eugenia Zena, "*Impossible Women and Boko Haram: The Paradox of Female Support to Sharia Law*," https://www.e-ir.info//2019/02/17/impossible-women-and-boko-haram-the-paradox-of-female-support-to sharia-law/

[322] See (HRW, 2014; UNICEF, 2016; NSRP, 2017; Read, 2017).

[323] Child Soldiers International, *Children Pay the Heaviest Price in conflict*, report, 2019, https://reliefwed.int/report/world/2018- children-pay-the-heaviest-price-conflict

[324] Women participants, (IDPs, Teacher's Village camp, Maiduguri), interviewed by the author, August 15, 2019.

The Boko Haram Insurgency

There is a wide range of literature on Boko Haram insurgency in North-East. Violence is primarily perpetrated by the terrorist group responsible for human rights abuses across Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, and Niger. The violent activities of the insurgents and the military counter insurgence operations have reportedly affected nearly fifteen million people since 2009. Azad, Crawford and Kaila argue that the conflict has triggered an acute humanitarian and forced displacement crisis, with devastating social and economic impacts on the population, further deepening underdevelopment and regional inequalities; and the most affected groups in the conflict are women and children.[325] The Boko Haram insurgency has affected mostly women and children in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states.

The insurgents employed different tactics in carrying out multiple modes of attack, including suicide bombings, seizure and destructions of villages, forced displacement, abductions, sexual violence targeting women and girls and forced recruitment of children. As observed by Azad et al., although Boko Haram-held territory has reduced in size over the last few years owing to the military raid, the group continued to perpetrate consistent attacks in some states.[326]

Before we delve into further discussions, it is worth noting to know what Boko Haram really denote in order to understand their motive. For example, Idahosa's study showed that Boko Haram whose real name is *Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'a Awati Wal Jihad* (the Sunni community for the propagation of the Prophet's teachings and Jihad) is a radical Islamic group founded in 2002 by Mohammed Yusuf.[327] This was corroborated by Onuoha's findings that Boko Haram originally call themselves group of the people of Sunnah for Da'awa and Jihad. Onuoha further noted that since 2015 after the group has split, they also known as 'West African Province' after becoming part of the Islamic State.[328]

Pearson holds that "in March 2015, Boko Haram's pledge led to the faction's rebranding as Islamic State's West Africa Province (ISWAP)".[329] Accordingly, the group in its narratives of grievance opposes Western education simply because Boko is Haram, the Hausa translation of the phrase means Western education is sin. The name Boko Haram was fabricated by people and mass media due to their rejection of western education and

[325] Azad Abul, Crawford Elizabeth, and Kaila Heidi, "Conflict and Violence in Nigeria: Results from the Northeast, North Central and South South Zones," World Bank Report (2018). http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/118551538025875054//

[326] Azad et al., "Conflict and Violence in Nigeria".

[327] Osareti Idahosa, *"Boko Haram and the Nigerian State: A Different Perspective", Peace and Security Studies Project. December, 2015. https://researchgate.net/publication/307648672_*

[328] Freedom, C. Onuoha, Boko Haram: Nigeria's Extremist Islamic Sect, Aljazeera Report, http://studies.aljezeeera.net/en/reports/2012/02/201222911305194897.html

[329] Elizabeth Pearson, "Wilayatshahidat: Boko Haram, the Islamic State, and the Question of the Female Suicide Bomber," In *Boko Haram Beyond the Headlines: Analyses of Africa's Enduring Insurgency, ed.* Zenn J. (New York: Combating Terrorism Centre U.S Military Academy, 2018), 33-52.

westernization. This implies that the insurgents have never once called themselves Boko Haram.

In regards to its origin, Osisioma highlights that at the inception, the main tenet among its followers was the replacement of western system with Islamic system governing by Shariah Law as they believe democratic and secular rule is in contradiction to Shariah.[330] Though, there is a significant disagreement among researchers with regards to precise period when Boko Haram began. Some opine that the sects originated from Maitatsine an extremist group that appeared in the last three and a half decades or so in Nigeria and known to have perpetrated an extreme violence against both individuals and the state.

In contrast, other scholars hold different views about the group for having linked with the Shiite who are known to have being the most fanatic Islamic group in Nigeria. And indeed, others see them as having a strong connection with international terrorist groups such as Al-Qa'ida and Al-Shabaab. This view is corroborated by Aghedo and Osumah's finding that Boko Haram is believed to have operational links with some international terrorist organizations including AQIM, Al-Shabaab in Somalia and other rebel groups in Algeria and Mali.[331]

The sect adopts tactics similar to that of Al- Qa'ida movement such as the use of vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in attacks against high-profile public targets and crowded places like institutions and shopping centres. This is evident in the Boko Haram numerous attacks in different places using women and children as suicide bombers. Initially, the sect targeted only security agents and government buildings. Later they expanded their attacks on politicians, religious and traditional leaders and eventually on everyone.

Moreover, Boko Haram type of conflict is distinct from other long-standing ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria because the group targets both Christians and Muslims. Though, some scholars opine that the main target of the sect is Muslims that opposed their ideological inclination. Christians are only casualty of war; they are not the primary target. This is because as Pérouse de Montclos and Antoine point out, Boko Haram jihad is primarily an inner spiritual fight, rather than a consecrated war against non-Muslim particularly Christians.[332]

This is to say that Boko Haram does not exclusively target Christians they rather kill Muslims because for them once a Muslim does not believe in their ideological inclination, his or her blood must be shed. Some studies note that the insurgents perceived both Christians and Muslims that reject their ideology as enemies, and legitimate targets of attack. Kyari's

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[330] Benjamin C. Osisioma, "Conflict Management and Peace Building in Nigeria: Finding the Common Ground," Conference, South East Zonal Summit of the NIM, September 27, 2016, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/308691154

[331] Iro Aghedo and Oahre Osumah, "Insurgency in Nigeria: A Comparative Study of Niger Delta and Boko Haram Uprising," *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 50, no. 2 (2015): 208-222, https://www.africabib.org/rec.php?RID=A00003388

[332] Perouse de Montclos, Mac Antoine, *Boko Haram, Islamism, Politics, Security and the State in Nigeria* (Leidan, Ibadan: IFRA-Nigeria, African Study Centre, 2014), 2. https://www.ascwebshop.nl/webwinkle-Product-59187249.html.

findings affirmed that the insurgents have perpetrated violent high-fatality attacks on Christian and Muslim places of worship, among other incidences.[333]

However, Mang's study reveals the perceptions of some respondents during his study on Boko Haram violence. He noted that some perceive it as the hidden agenda to unleash terror on Christian faith despite that more Muslims are relatively affected than Christians as a disguise.[334] But Pérouse de Montclos and Antoine argue that the insurgents' struggle was not solely target Christians.[335] They target both faiths. Osisioma also affirmed that they are perpetrating untold terror against innocent citizens of every faith and persuasion.[336]

No matter what the argument is, the resultant effect of Boko Haram insurgency has severely been on women and children. The vulnerable groups are not only victims of insurgency but perpetrators of violence as well. They have been used as suicide bombers and fight side by side with the insurgents. The massive recruitment and use of underage remains a hallmark of war in the region. Amnesty International's report indicates that among other atrocities committed by Boko Haram includes attacks on schools and abduct many children as child soldiers or wives.[337] Children constituted the large number of people recruited and use as soldiers; while girls were forced into marriage.

Due to the increase on this phenomenon, Child Soldiers International documented the sexual and other forms of gender-based violence against women and girls as the principal instruments of war used by the insurgents.[338] The vulnerable group are use in perpetrating attacks on innocent population. Abdu and Shehu's study confirmed that 13% of the incidents of suicide bombings in North East between January 2014 and December 2016 were perpetrated by young; among them were 44 children, 40 girls and 4 boys regardless of their gender.[339] These signify the threat our future generation will be to the region.

Boko Haram And Violence Against Women And Children In North-East Nigeria

Some scholars looked at Boko Haram violence against women within the context of sexual and gender-based violence. As Oriola highlighted, one of the basic aspects of Boko Haram violence was the systematic rape of young women as part of their larger strategy for continuity. The aim was to continue rising new generation of insurgents that would adopt the ideology of their ancestors by repeating same acts of rape of women, impregnating and

[333] Kyari Mohammed, "The Message and Methods of Boko Haram," in *Boko Haram: Islamism, politics, security and the state in Nigeria*, ed. Montclos P. Mac Antoine (Ibadan: Africa Study Centre, 2014), 9-32.
[334] Gyang H. Mang, "Christian perceptions of Islam and society in relation to Boko Haram and recent events in Jos and northern Nigeria," in *Boko Haram: Islamism, politics, security and the state in Nigeria*, ed. Montclos P. Mac Antoine (Ibadan: Africa Study Centre, 2014), 85-109.
[335] Perouse de Montclos, Mac Antoine, "*Boko Haram*".
[336] Osisioma, "Conflict Management,".
[337] Amnesty International, *Nigeria: Help Children Ravaged by War or Risk a Lost Generation in the Northeast,* Report, 2020. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2020/05/ (accessed October 15, 2022).
[338] Child Soldiers International, "*Children Pay,"*
[339] Abinoam Abdu and Shehu S. Simon, "The Implication of Boko Haram Insurgency on Women and Girls in North East Nigeria," *Journal of Public Administration and Social Welfare Research* 4, no. 1 (2019).

abducting such rapes' descendents.[340] This indirectly shows the insurgents' little interest on older women and women with children are not target for rape. Boko Haram goal was to increase their population via impregnating as many young women as possible. But this issue throws up a whole host of questions related to what Boko Haram do with older women abducted along with young ones, what kind of violence they perpetrate against them and why they stayed long or are still in captivity.

Maiangwa and Amao in their study note that the spate of Boko Haram violence against women and girls was on the increase since after the Chibok abductions.[341] Hinshaw affirmed that as from April 16 to May 5 2014 the group kidnapped approximately 41 women from various villages in North East.[342] Human Rights Watch reported the same incidence of kidnapping of 60 women from Borno State by the group.[343] It is observed that some of the abducted women were used in carrying out suicide attacks/suicide bombings. Concurrently, Odebode, Alechenu and Soriwei documented the first suicide bombing in the North East that occurred on 8 June, 2014 in Gombe State where a female suicide bomber blew herself and a soldier up close to the Quarter-guard of the 301 Battalion of Nigerian Army.[344]

However, the reason behind Boko Haram violence against women and children especially abduction raises concerns among scholars and practitioners. For instance, Sverdlov identified three reasons for Boko Haram violence against women and children. First, is the systematic targeting of schoolchildren to end western education as their main principle missions since they considered it as sinful. Second, is the abduction of women, since 2010 the group has abducted approximately five hundred women in region. Third, is to avenge the government's arrest of the group leaders' wives. In other word, Boko Haram violence against women is to get back at the government which they considered illegitimate.[345] Similarly, Maiangwa and Agbiboa assert that Boko Haram kidnapping of women and children may be viewed as a response to same government action of continued detaining members' wives and children under the police custody.[346]

According to Oriola, abducting schoolgirls would make other students frightening of attending schools thereby achieving their goal of ending western education. He further noted that some escaped kidnapped girls refused to return to school chosen to get married

[340] Temitope B. Oriola, "Unwilling Cocoons": Boko Haram's War Against Women," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 40:99-121, https://doi: 10.1080/1057610X.2016.1177998

[341] Benjamin Maiangwa, and Olumuyiwa Babatunde Amao, "Daughters, Brides, and Supporters of the Jihad": Revisiting the Gender-Based Atrocities of Boko Haram in Nigeria," *African Renaissance* 12, no. 2 (2015), 117-144.

[342] Hinshaw D, "World News: Boko Haram Insurgents Kidnapped More Girls in Nigeria" *The Wall Street Journal",* 9 June.

[343] Human Rights Watch, "Those Terrible Weeks in their Camp: Boko Haram Violence against Women and Girls in Northeast Nigeria" 2014.

[344] Odebode, Alechenu and Soriwei, "Female Suicide Bomber Attacks Gombe Barracks" *The Punch* June 9.

[345] David Sverdlov, "Rape in War: Prosecuting the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and Boko Haram for Sexual Violence against Women," *Cornell International Law Journal 50* no. 2 (2017). Available at: https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj/vol50/iss2/6

[346] Benjamin Maingwa and Daniel Agbiboa, "Why Boko Haram Kidnaps Women and Young Girls in North-Eastern Nigeria," The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Dispute (ACCORD).

instead.[347] But empirical evidences from this study found couple of reasons behind the group targeting of women and by extension children. This includes impregnating many women and young girls to increase their population; recruiting and use of children as combatants in order to take their place after them etc. No matter what the reason is, Boko Haram violence against women and children including suicide bombing should be seen as part of the group's dramatic strategy use against government itself.

Furthermore, many children kidnapped by Boko Haram have been subjected to unthinkable violence and abuse. Since the beginning of the insurgency, thousands of children including boys and girls have been recruited by the insurgents and used in suicide attacks.[348] It is worth noting that kidnapping, use of women and children as suicide bombers and sexual violence is seen as a defining characteristic of Boko Haram insurgency in the region. Many women became pregnant owing to forced marriage and rape. Boko Haram violence against women and children has so many negative implications on the victims.

Vulnerable Women and Children: **The Most Affected By Boko Haram Insurgency**

Women and children are the most vulnerable groups that can ever be found in every conflict prone zones. Perpetrators of armed conflicts use women and children as new weapons of war to achieve their goals in both inter-state and intra-state conflicts globally. In North-East for instance, the prevalence of sexual violence within the Boko Haram crisis has been widely reported in humanitarian assessments, human rights reports and media coverage from the early days of the insurgency. A study by Read affirmed that Boko Haram's abuses against women and girls, including abduction, forced conversion to Islam, physical and psychological abuse, forced participation in insurgency operations and forced marriage, rape, and other sexual abuse have inspired fear among people in the region and contributed to the group's notability within the region and the world at large.[349] As one participant interviewed for this research put it "we are exposed to all forms of violence - physical, sexual and emotional violence. The women are treated as sex slaves; they just do anything they want to do with them".[350]

Women have no value in the eyes of the insurgents and they were treated as subhuman; they can be used at anytime and under any circumstances. A participant of FGD also revealed that "I was with Boko Haram for over three years serving as a housewife together with other women seating here, we were in the Shekau's Camp before we left the group and some joined Mamman Nur, a faction group".[351] Numerous members moved to the latter's camp as he was less violent than the former this is because any little offence or mistake committed by a member in Shekau's camp is punishable by death. Many former associate of Boko Haram

[347] Oriole, "Unwilling Cocoons," 112.

[348] UNICEF Report, "Children on the move, children left behind," 2016.

[349] Joe Read, "Sexual Violence and the Boko Haram Crisis in North-East Nigeria," *Humanitarian Practice Network*, October 24, 2017, https://odihpn.org/publication/sexual-violence-and-the-boko-haram-crisis-in-north-east-nigeria/ and

[350] Woman participant (Internally Displaced Person, Bakassi IDPs camp), interviewed by the authored, August 18, 2019.

[351] Woman Participant (IDPs, Bakassi camp), interviewed by the author, August 18, 2019.

confirmed that several members were executed by the group's leaders due to sometimes alleged simple offences.

Women participants likewise reported that they were subjected to sexual violence. Regardless of her younger age, a teenager revealed that, "I was forced to marry one of their members and I gave birth to a baby as a result".[352] Although, the insurgents abduct both women and girls they sometimes prefer to have more girls or young women. Many reasons were cited why they abduct more girls than women. According to several respondents, "this is part of their conspiracy to impregnate as many girls as possible in order to create the next generation of Boko Haram.[353] The insurgents use abduction as a strategy to multiply their numbers through raid in the night on schools and communities in various villages. A good example was the abduction of Chibok school-girls in Borno state in 2015 and later the Dapchi school-girls in Yobe state in 2017.

Tens of thousands of women suffer from sexual violence and rape. For instance, the Amnesty International reported that the insurgents rape women and girls caught at home or trying to run during night raids.[354] A woman who was physically assaulted by Boko Haram and had fled attack in 2020 narrated that "...I started hearing some women were shouting and screaming and crying...I saw the men come out of the house... Then afterwards, the women were confused. Their dresses were not normal".[355] The report shows that the insurgents also commit rape and other sexual violence.

A child respondent narrated that "I know some girls that were abducted by Boko Haram and married to their members. There was a time when I am playing with my friends some people came on motor cycles call us and go with the little grown girls with them after they tied their faces with a black peace of garments".[356] Most respondents assert that abduction is the main strategy employing by Boko Haram.

This study found that more children were also abducted and used in various roles. As one former child soldier narrated "Boko Haram attacked my town I and other children while running we were abducted, I was 10 years old then. This is how they separated me from my mother".[357] Some children loss their parents and relatives either as a result of death or being refugees in other countries. Another child stated that "I was abducted by Boko Haram when I visited my grandmother in Ngala, Borno state. They locked me in a room for good one month before they took me to Sambisa Forest as a result of being attacked by soldiers".[358]

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[352] Young girl participant (IDP, Bakassi IDPs camp), interviewed by the author, August 18, 2019.

[353] Women participants, FGD (Internally Displaced Persons, Dalori IDPs camp), interviewed by the author, August 10, 2019.

[354] Amnesty International, *Nigeria: Boko Haram Brutality against Women and Girls needs Urgent Response-New Research*, Report, 2021. https://www.amnesty.org.ng/2021/03/24/bokoharam-rape-sexual-violence/ (accessed October 13, 2022).

[355] Amnesty International, "Boko Haram Brutality".

[356] Child participant, FGD (IDP, Dalori IDPs camp), interviewed by the author, August 10, 2019.

[357] Former Child-Soldier (Internally Displaced Person, Dalori IDPs camp), interviewed by the author, August 10, 2019.

[358] Ex-Child Soldier (IDP, Dalori IDPs camp), interviewed by the author, August 10, 2019.

Children sometimes voluntarily join the group due to many reasons such as poverty, means of survival, ethnic kinship, religion etc, but majority of them used to be abducted. They believe that using force make such children to scare them and follow their command under whatever condition.

The continuing violence in the region rendered women and children more vulnerable and easy target for recruitment. Rosie O'Connor, Theresa and Ngozi observe that "in 2018, Nigeria had the second-highest number of children (1,947; 1,596 boys and 351 girls) recruited for roles in the conflict".[359] There have been numerous reported cases of grave violations against children including maiming, rape, attacks, human rights violations and other maltreatments. The Human Rights Watch argues that while there has been extensive literature on Boko Haram and the horrific threat it causes, not much is written about women's suffering... in captivity.[360] A woman participant lent credence to this that "I suffered a lot at the hands of Boko Haram in the bush".[361] There are a lot of revelations of maltreatment of victims especially those that were made to join by force.

Even though the insurgents maltreated their victims for whatever reason best known to them, non-Muslim abductees suffered most especially by being rejecting to renounce their faith. The interview conducted by Human Rights Watch with victims reveals that for refusing to convert to Islam, they and many others they saw in the insurgents' camps were subjected to physical and psychological abuse, forced labour, forced participation in combat, carrying ammunition and sexual abuse.[362]

Children as young as ten years old are not left out as their captors taught them all kinds of violent behaviours. A child narrated that "I have seen people killed, I know how to shoot and we were taught how to detonate bombs".[363] Children were exposed to extreme levels of violence; they were partaken directly in the fight and witnessed killings. As one respondent noted, "I have seen many people slaughtered in my face. I became violent to the extent that when someone makes me feel discomfort I used to feel as if I can take his life".[364]

Furthermore, a number of studies have lent credence to this that a shocking attribute of the continuing insurgency in the region has been the use of children in both support roles and in direct combat. For example, Donli, Makanjuola, and Manyok's study revealed that Boko

[359] O'Connor Rosie, Betancourt S. Theresa and Enelamah V. Ngozi, "Child Protection to a Rights-Based Situation Analysis" *Health and Human Rights Journal* 23, no. 1 (2021): 27-41. https://www.hhrjournal.org/2021/06/ (accessed October 15, 2022).
[360] Human Rights Watch, Those Terrible weeks in their camp: Boko Haram Violence against Women and Girls in North East Nigeria, https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/10/27/those-terrible-weeks-their-camp/boko-haram-violence-against-women-and-girls (accessed September 16, 2018).
[361] Woman participant (IDP, Dalori IDPs camp), interviewed by the author, August 10, 2019.
[362] Human Rights Watch, "*Those terrible weeks."*
[363] Former Child Soldier (IDP, Dalori IDPs camp), interviewed by the author, August 10, 2019.
[364] Ex-combatant (Internally Displaced Person, Bakassi camp), interviewed by the author, August 18, 2019.

Haram was listed for recruitment and use of children for atrocious activities.[365] Some children were forced to kill their parents in the presence of other people in order to make them not to think of coming back to their village or to be forgiving.

Evidence shows that most suicide attacks recorded were executed in various places by Boko Haram child soldiers. A police officer interviewed verifies that "children experienced all manner of violence. They do whatever they were directed to do by their commanders, they may be asked to go and kill people, burn houses, and explode bombs".[366] Such children have become 'instrument of command' in the hands of Boko Haram. An ex-combatant confirmed this when he says "first, they have changed my life from civilian to armed person. They force us to slaughter people because they believed that by doing that we would become strong".[367]

However, concerning suicide, no woman or child would force to commit such act as many people thought. A participant averred that "children that were used as suicide bombers have slaughtered countless people to the extent they became out of their senses that is why they are carrying out suicide bombings".[368] Such children have been use to kill they become wild and don't know anything apart from bloodshed. They are used to it; they were turn into violent and dangerous machine without human feelings. For instance, Hayden; BBC; affirm that in early 2016 at least 83 children have been used as "human bombs" in attacks on non-soldiers and soldiers in military checkpoints mostly claimed by the insurgents. 55 were girls, 27 were boys, and one was a little girl; most of the girls were under 15 years and 27 young girls have carried out suicide attack in Borno in early 2017.[369]

The incidence of using children continued in 2018 with new strategy. Evidence shows that there were reported cases of suicide attacks in Maiduguri carried out by women asking for a favour to ease themselves in people's houses without knowing they were carrying explosive devices. Several people have lost their lives as a result of these incidences. Correspondingly, a participant lamented during focus group discussion:

> When I was with them the father of my son is in charge of handling bombs. He used to bring bombs to our house and taught me how to handle the bombs using ice blocks in order not to explode. Some girls and women among us who agreed to wear bombs were told to go to Maiduguri Monday Market, Baga Road or any other crowded area

[365] Donli Patricia, et al., *Perceptions and Experiences of Children associated with Armed Groups in Northeast Nigeria.* NSRP/UNICEF Report, 2017.

[366] Police Officer, (Police Division Office, Maiduguri), interviewed by the author, August 15, 2019.

[367] Ex-combatant (Internally Displaced Person, Teacher's Village camp, Maiduguri), interviewed by the author, August 20, 2019.

[368] Ex-combatant, interview.

[369] Sally Hayden, "Boko Haram: huge rise in children used as 'human bombs' by Islamists in Nigeria, UN warns," *Independent Post, August 22, 2017,* https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/boko-haram-child-suicidebombers-west-africa-unicef--nigeria-islamists-terrorists-9707166.html
BBC, "Nigeria's Boko Haram Conflict: Huge rise in Child Human Bombs," *BBC Post*, *August 22, 2017,* https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41010993

> to commit suicide bombing. The truth is that they don't force anyone to commit suicide.[370]

It is evident that many suicide bomb attacks were carried out by women; and some of them were caught in very crowded areas before they succeed in detonating the devices. It is worth noting that women and children who were forced to join and refused to cooperate fully suffered the most. A woman narrated that "women and girls who were forced to join the group were been kept in a place called Khandak, i.e. a prison detaining women and girls who refused to believe with their ideology until they do so before allowing them to live as Awam i.e. slaves of war".[371]

Similarly, a child respondent narrated the atrocities perpetrated against them by the insurgents in Sambisa Forest, "myself and other children were abducted from our parents by Boko Haram and took us to bush when they attacked our town; we spent a good four years with them before I escaped. We served them as slaves for good two years before they freed us from slavery".[372] Abuse and slavery were used against victims in captivity as many participants of this research affirmed.

Some women also averred that "such women i.e. forced to join the group were maltreated, they have no freedom and they were living in object hunger and starvation".[373] Other participants in their narration mention force marriage as a kind of punishment used against women force to join the group or get killed by the sect. And whenever they did something wrong no matter how small it is they will be killed".[374] Non-Muslims such as Christians among them were threatened with death if they refused to convert to Islam. A young woman described how Boko Haram placed a noose around her neck and threatened her with death until she renounced her faith. Other victims were repeatedly threatened with whipping, beating, or death unless they converted to Islam.

Being at Boko Haram captivity is not an easy situation as one can experience so many things. A participant noted that, "I have learnt many things while I was with the insurgents in the Sambisa forest. I have seen how people who misbehave among us are badly tortured".[375] Children are badly maltreated. A community ruler averred that, "the boys are just like foot solders; they are given any assignment to do no matter how hard or dangerous it is, such as force or command to go and kill their own family as a sign of loyalty and promotion in the hierarchy".[376]

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[370] Woman Participant (IDP, Teacher's Village camp, Maiduguri), interviewed by the author, August 20, 2019.
[371] Woman Participant of FGD (IDP, Teacher's Village camp, Maiduguri), interviewed by the author, August 20, 2019.
[372] Young Participant formerly associated with Boko Haram (IDP, Teacher's Village camp, Maiduguri), interviewed by the author, August 20, 2019.
[373] Women Participant of FGD (IDPs, Teacher's Village camp, Maiduguri), interviewed by the author, August 20, 2019.
[374] Women Participant (IDPs, Teacher's Village camp, Maiduguri), interviewed by the author, August 20, 2019.
[375] Former Child Soldier (IDP, Teacher's Village camp, Maiduguri), interviewed by the author, August 20, 2019.
[376] Participant (Key Community Member, Maiduguri), interviewed by the author, September 5, 2019.

It is noteworthy to note that children were force to commit atrocity toward innocent people. They have borne the brunt of the insurgency especially in the conflict-affected states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe. Badiora asserts that women and children were severely affected by the insurgency directly when they are abducted or attacked, and indirectly when their husbands or parents especially fathers are killed leaving them as widows and orphans.[377] They have been the victims of extreme violence and trauma. Abdu and Shehu confirmed that numerous women and girls were severely affected by the insurgency such as social displacement, psychosocial problems....[378]

The violence has resulted to the death of many people and continues to exterminate the lives of tens of thousands of people including women and children; and forced more than two million out of their homes. A quite number of children had fled alone leaving their parents and family members due to violence eruption. Overwhelmingly, children sought refuge more than anyone else owing to the continuing violence. UNICEF reported 1.4 million children displaced in the North East.[379] It is pertinent to say that there is no doubt the conflict affects woman, children and men but women and children are affected differently and frequently have become primary targets of Boko Haram violent.

Discussions

This study aimed to examine the Boko Haram violence against women and children in North East Nigeria. Boko Haram violence against vulnerable women and children is evidenced in the region and many reasons were documented for the insurgents' targeting of these groups. The study found that the motive behind massive abduction of women and children was to extent the insurgency to next generations through forced marriage of underage girls, raping and impregnating many young women. As points out by Matfess, quite a number of victims experienced sexual violence and those married were having sex with their husbands. The study observed that old women are still in Boko Haram captivity. The women must have been use for other purposes other than sexual purpose if not they might not have been continue remaining in captivity. Worth noting is the fact that despite the condemning of Boko Haram's forced marriage of minors, some community members too had married underage girls similar to that forced to marry Boko Haram members. This can be seen within the context of societal norms in northern Nigeria. The findings are consistent with a number of recent studies - Oriola for example, which suggest societal prevailing cultural practices of sexual violence against women and girls.

Results showed that since after the kidnapped of numerous schoolgirls in Chibok, the violence against women and children has increased and extended to various parts of the region with many kidnapped victims used as suicide bombers. This is consistent with

[377] Badiora A. Israel, "Civil Unrest, Insurgences and the Challenges of Community Displacement in Sub Sahara Africa: A Silhouette of selected states in Nigeria," *International Journal of criminal Justices Sciences*, 12, no. 2. (2017): 302-318. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1034 678 accessed on 03/02/2019

[378] Abdu and Shehu, "Implication of Boko Haram Insurgency," 12.

[379] UNICEF, *Boko Haram Violence displaces 1.4 million children in Nigeria and Beyond, Report, 2019,* https://www.un.org/africarenewal/news/boko-haram-violence-displaces-14-million-children-nigeria-and-beyong-%E2%80%93-unicef

Nwangwu and Ezeibe; Maiangwa and Agbiboa's study. Using women and children as suicide bombers indicated the extent at which the victims became perpetrators as well. The experience of women in the hands of Boko Haram is therefore similar to women in African conflicts. Maiangwa and Agbiboa's study show that armed groups see sexual violence as a weapon to be used against women; they became habitual sex slave.

The implications of these however, is that children would lose years of schooling as this is one of the Boko Haram's principle missions to terminate Western education in Nigeria by attacking and kidnapping schoolchildren. Several scholars have argued along this line Sverdlov; Wilson; Human Rights Watch; Afzal). The Children will lose childhood instead of playing with toys they were forced to hold small arms and light weapons such as AK47. Children would exposure to sexual behaviour at a very tender age. They would also be future threat to human and national security. Afzal argues that "as long as these attitudes are held, women are not safe; across a number of countries, rates of domestic violence spiked at the end of conflicts.

Due to sexual violence experienced, Afzal asserts that women suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder and mental health challenges; in addition to being susceptible to sexually transmitted diseases such as HIV AIDS and other infections. They would also be exposing to high rate of prostitution or sex for food as a result of many years of enduring sexual violence. Empirical evidences show that some freed young women and girls in many IDPs camps and communities around engaged in sexual relationships with men. This is corroborated by Obaji's findings that security personnel and their visiting colleagues involved in sexual acts with girls, divorcees and widows in many camps in the North East.

Conclusion

This study examined Boko Haram violence against women and children in North-East. Since the start of the insurgency and especially at its peak in 2010 to the time of writing this paper women and children have borne the brunt of violence in the hands of Boko Haram. Women have suffered physical, psychological and emotional violence through rape and other sexual and gender-based violence, forced marriage and force religious conversion of non-Muslims women. The study established that Boko Haram kidnap women and children and use them as suicide bombers to target civilians. Children of less than ten years were recruited and directly involve as combatants.

The study also contributes to growing scholarship indicating that sexual violence against women hinges on the group's strategy of multiplying its members in order to extend the insurgency to next generation. Our finding also adds to a growing body of research that establish a nexus between Boko Haram sexual violence and emotional and psychological trauma among victims. In addition, we find that rape and forced marriage will increase the likelihood that women would expose to sexually transmitted diseases (STD). Generally, literature focuses on Boko Haram targets on young women, this study extend this literature by examining the insurgents' kidnap of old women and the need to investigate the motive behind it. We find that some old women kidnapped by Boko Haram are still in captivity use in various ways.

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WILDLIFE IN THE ECONOMY AND SOCIETY OF KILBA KINGDOM IN NORTHERN NIGERIA, 1700AD – 1904 AD

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Abstract

Wild animals, just like humans, have a fascinating history which has not been properly studied and documented, except for the efforts made by zoologists, ecologist and geographers. Wild animals have occupied an important place in the pre-colonial history of Northern Nigeria, but in Kilba society such aspect of historical landmark has not received the scholarly attention being an area that played a significant role in the society's socio-political and economic activities for centuries before the advent of colonial rule. In light of this, this essay explores the contribution of wildlife to the economy and society of the pre-colonial Kilba kingdom in Northern Nigeria beginning in 1700AD., when a dynasty rule was established and helped the kingdom grow powerful enough to expand its domain beyond the area currently inhabited by Kilba people. Then comes 1904, the year that the Kilba kingdom was conquered and put under colonial authority. It accomplishes so by relying on primary and secondary sources such oral interviews, archival records, books, journals, theses, and dissertations, as well as quantitative and historical research approaches. This is accomplished by also examining the unique roles played by wildlife in Kilba cultural identity, entrepreneurship, play reserve and security. This paper finds out that in Kilba society, wildlife served as a source of totem for long-life, discipline, security of life and properties, cavalry force, means of transportation, medicine, and entrepreneurship, which contributed immensely to the growth and development of Kilba Kingdom and bond of interaction within its communities and neighbours.

Keywords: Wildlife, Kilba, Pre-colonial, Northern Nigeria, Totem,

Introduction

Many Nigerian and foreign historians have written about pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial Kilba society and her neighbors, emphasizing social, political, economic, and

ideological dimensions; However, the impact on the physical environment within which Kilba people lived for centuries has received little attention, particularly in regard to how man affected wildlife and how the wildlife affected man's life for centuries before the advent of British colonial rule. Thus, what is surprising on studies on Kilba society in the three phases of Nigerian history (pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial) is the impact of pre-colonial Kilba society on wildlife ecology, which is rarely discussed, at least in any reasonable depth and from a historical perspective. It is against this backdrop that, this paper attempts a historical study of the relationship between human and wild animal inhabitations of Kilba kingdom from the pre-colonial period. The main focus the paper is the impact of the wildlife on the socio-economic and political life of the pre-colonial Kilba society. Writing this paper is necessary in the sense that, it would expose one of the importance of wild animals in the pre-colonial Kilba kingdom or society. It is by so doing that one would appreciate the interest in the history of wildlife in the economy and society of Kilba kingdom. This study become necessary in view of the fact that, even those whose field of research has a direct bearing on wildlife have not given the much-needed attention to the subject in their recent studies on biodiversity and physical landscape of Kilba. They completely neglected the wild animals as if they are not part of the ecosystem of Kilba society. The environmental impact of human modification of the ecological landscape and "de-reservation" on wildlife in the area is ignored. Examples of such scholarly studies are works of the works of "Socio-Economic and Political History of the Kilba People in the Pre-Colonial Period" by A. Wajiga; "A Study of the Emergence, Growth and Fall of the Huba Kingdom from C.1500AD to 1906AD" by B.Y. Gudumbul; *The Kilba and their literature by* J.P. Hananiya; "The Establishment of a Government-General among the Kilba" by G.M. Chaskda; *Aspects of the Economic History of Kilbaland, 1820 to 1934* by J.H. Pongri; "Economical and Traditional Uses of Highlands among the Kilba Tribe of Hong Local Government Area, Adamawa State in Nigeria" by E.N. Gandapa; *Political Developments in Adamawa, 1900–1960* by J.H. Pongri; *Adamawa Past and Present: An Historical Approach to the Development of a Northern Cameroun Province* by A.H.M. Kirk-Greene; *An African Church has borne. The Story of Adamawa and Central Sardauna Province in Nigeria* by M. Nissen; *Chronicles of A Golden Era – A Biography of Aliyu Musdafa the 11th Lamido Adamawa* by Y.A. Yakubu; *Colonialism by Proxy: Hausa Imperial Agents and Middle Belt consciousness in Nigeria* by M.E. Ochonu; *The Emirates of Northern Nigeria: A Preliminary Survey of their Historical Traditions* by S.J. Hogben and A.H.M. Kirk-Greene.[380]

[380] Wajiga, A. "Socio-Economic and Political History of the Kilba People in the Pre-Colonial Period." MA (History) Dissertation, University of Maiduguri, Borno-Nigeria, 2002; Gudumbul, B. Y. "A Study of the Emergence, Growth and Fall of the Huba Kingdom from C.1500AD to 1906AD." PhD (History) Thesis, University of Maiduguri, Borno-Nigeria, 2006; Hananiya, J. P. *The Kilba and their literature.* Lagos: Concept Publications Limited, 1993; Chaskda, G. M. "The Establishment of a Government-General among the Kilba." BA (History) Project, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria-Nigeria 1972; Pongri, J. H. *Aspects of the Economic History of Kilbaland, 1820 to 1934.* Markurdi: Aboki Publisher, 2015; Gandapa, E. N. "Economic and Traditional Uses of Highlands among the Kilba Tribe of Hong Local Government Area, Adamawa State in Nigeria." *International Journal of Research in Arts and Social Sciences*. Volume 9, Number 1, 2016; Pongri, J. H. *Political Developments in Adamawa, 1900–1960.* Lagos: Bahiti & Dalila Publishers, 2017; Kirk-Greene, A. H. M. *Adamawa Past and Present. An Historical Approach of the Development of A Northern Cameroun Province*. London: Dawson of Pall Mall, 1969; Nissen, M. An *African Church is Born. The Story of Adamawa and Central Sardauna Province in Nigeria*. Denmark: Denmark: Purups Grafiske Hus, Viby, 1968; Yakubu, Y. A. *Chronicles of*

To this aim, it is significant to remember that, historically, wildlife has been vital undomesticated or untamed animal species that lives and grows wild and finds its food, water, shelter and other needs on its own whether in or near urban areas or in the country side, have value to humans.[381] The wild animals provided food, clothing and decorative materials for use by the people. Their byproducts have also been used for medicinal and cultural purposes, including providing weaponry for human use. They have also been used for sport, recreational and educational purposes. They have killed and have been killed. Thus, they have been feared and admired at the same time depending on what side of the divide one views them.[382] It was for their relevance as "natural asset" that the Kilba society so much admired them as discussed in subsequent pages of the paper.

Methodology

This paper is solely built on both primary and secondary data. The primary sources included oral interviews with Kilba traditional title holders, farmers, Kilba historians, government officials, government gazettes, magazines, newspapers and pictures. Informants were identified using purposive sampling and snowballing techniques. These two research techniques help in identifying important informants who are knowledgeable about Kilba community, its culture, identity and nationhood. To achieve this, sets of interview questions were designed in both English and Kilba for respondents. Meanwhile, gadgets such as digital camera (for taking pictures), tape-recorder, phones and the computer were also used for easy collection of data from the field. This was followed by the transcription and analysis of the interviews conducted.

The secondary sources, however, come largely from published and unpublished works such as books, journals, dissertations and theses. The paper also deployed the use of quantitative and historical research methodologies in the analysis of the data obtained. The data collected was also correlated, corroborated, selected and interpreted. This process gave a room for juxtaposing the different information collected from the field.

Area Of The Study

To study wildlife in the economy and society of Kilba kingdom, it is imperative to have a historic look at the geographic and demographic settings in the period under review.

Geographic and Demographic Setting of the Area

Kilba is as an ethnic group of Afro-Asiatic language group that occupies the present-day Hong Local Government Area (LGA) of Adamawa State in the North-East Geo-Political Zone of Nigeria. It was one of the most powerful kingdoms in the then northern parts of

A Golden Era – A Biography of Aliyu Musdafa the 11thLamido Adamawa. Ibadan: Spectrum Books Ltd, 1997; Hogben, S. J. and Kirk-Greene, A. H. M. *The Emirates of Northern Nigeria: A Preliminary Survey of their Historical Traditions.* London: Oxford University Press, 1966 and Ochonu, M. E. *Colonialism By Proxy: Hausa Imperial Agents and Middle Belt Consciousness in Nigeria*. USA: Indiana University Press, 2014.

[381] Falconer, J. D. *The Geology and Geography of Northern Nigeria*. London: Macmillan, 1911. 1-3.

[382] Ya'u, U. I. "Endangered Species: Wildlife in the Colonial History of Gombe Division in Bauchi Province, 1902–1960." *Gombe Journal of Historical Studies*. Volume 1 Number 1, June, 2021:184-199.

Adamawa Emirate since the 15th century down to the early 20th century.[383] In the pre-colonial period, it was approximately located between latitudes $09^{0}57'$ and $10^{0}32'$N and between longitudes $12^{0}38'$ and $13^{0}16'$E, and occupies an area of about 1200 square kilometers (170 square miles) between the Hawal and the Kulayi rivers, tributaries of the Gongola and the Benue rivers respectively.[384] The land is situated east of the road leading from Yola to Garkida and its eastern border coincides with the boundary between Adamawa and Sardauna. They were bordered on the north by their kinsmen, the Burra, the Chibabbak, and the Marghi; on the east by the Gude, the Nzanyi, and the Holma; on the south by the Batta; and the west by the Yungur, the Gudu, and the Hona.[385] Coupled with that, her land is surrounded by hills and mountains, of which prominent within the communities represent the names of the 'gods' that live in such hills and mountains.[386] In fact, the region lies in Guinea Savannah region and experiences two distinct seasons (wet and dry) of nearly equal duration. The rainy seasons last from April to October. The area is drained by the river Kulayi, (the biggest river in the area) and numerous streams like the Gashala, Bakwa, Gulauci, Turn and Dzagula, with the last two serving as feeders of the Hawal.[387]

In the case of physical environment, Kilba kingdom is highland characterized by rock-mountains, valley, plains and streams. During the period under review, these mountains provided hunting grounds; rocks and stones provided grinding mills, grain-threshing places, and circumcision and sitting tools; valley and mountains were source of farming and grazing lands and communication channels; rivers and streams were source of water, fishing, and bathing/swimming places.[388] In a short note, the highlands in Kilba kingdom have diverse attributes such as presence of settlement sites, caves, perennial water points, observation post and niches that are used for defence and sustenance. The people attach predominant socio-economic and traditional activities to some observable locations in the highlands that enabled them to withstand undesirable circumstances. The area is also blessed with a variety of mineral resources as well as plant and animal sources, which respectively enabled gathering and hunting activities as supplements to agriculture.[389] The vegetation is the bushy type of secondary bush with trees of low height and patches of tall grasses. The soil is generally rich everywhere, especially as the foothills of the mountains where the soil is constantly enriched by dungs and dumps of rabbit and cows, and other compost washed down the hills. This very

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[383] Abubakar, S. *Lamibe Fombina – A History of Adamawa Emirate.* Ibadan: Book Wright, 2008. 13-53 and Abubakar, S. *The Lamibe of Fombina: A Political History of Adamawa 1809–1901*. Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University Press, Zaria, 1976.

[384] Sharndama, E. C and Suleiman, J. B. A. "An Analysis of Figurative Languages in Two Selected Traditional Funeral Songs of the Kilba People of Adamawa State." *International Journal of English and Literature*. Volume 4(4), June, 2013:166-173 and Gandapa, "Economic and Traditional Uses of Highlands among the Kilba Tribe of Hong Local Government Area, Adamawa State in Nigeria.":276-284.

[385] Nissen, *An African Church is Born. The Story of Adamawa and Central Sardauna Province in Nigeria*. 22-50 and 114-243.

[386] Gudumbul, "A Study of the Emergence, Growth and Fall of the Huba Kingdom from C.1500AD to 1906AD." 16-17.

[387] Wycliff, S. "The Roles of Mountains and Hills in the Political and Socio-Economic Security of Kilba Community in Hong Local Government Area in Adamawa State of Nigeria, C.1500AD–2016AD." *Kaduna Journal of Historical Studies (KJHS)*. Volume 10 Number 3, 2019:323-341.

[388] Wycliff, 323-341 and Gandapa, 276-284.

[389] Wycliff, 323-341 and Gandapa, 276.

factor did influenced the settlement pattern in the sense that the greatest population concentrations through Kilba kingdom were (and are still) around foothills of these mountains except Kala'a, Gashala and Kwambula, which are recent towns.[390] Prominent mountain sites of Kilba kingdom were that of Pella, Hong, Kulinyi, Mukwahwar, Garaha, Za Kofri, Kinging, Gaya, Zivi, Bangshika and Hyema.[391]

Worthy of note here is that, these mountains and hills situated in Kilba kingdom were not only a source of security to the Kilba society in terms of war because of their elevation, rugged surfaces, relatively inaccessible, presence of caves and niches but source of livelihood, shelter for wild animals and human beings, farming, traditional medicine and spiritual initiations.[392] Besides that, the caves are essential by serving as a 'room' to some wild animals such as Leopard, Baboon, Badger and Lion that are sensitive to rainy weather. Nocturnal animals such as Porcupine and Hyena spend their inactive day-length in the caves.[393] More so, because of the wildlife nature of Kilba kingdom, her mountains and hills serve as reserve for wildlife for examples Bubulum, Duva, Kinging, Kwagu, Kulinyi and Motuchi are ideal habitats for wildlife (mammals, reptiles and aves).[394] These phenomena serve as a secured habitat for the animals than the pediment because of the presence of caves, perennial pools, crowded vegetation cover and the physiographic nature (piled boulders, high sentry post and inaccessibility) that provide cover from sight by prey and predators. Likewise, there is insignificant intervention by human activities such as bush burning, massive vegetation clearance, hunting, and above all, the highlands are exclusively restricted from intervention by non-indigene.[395]

Flora and Fauna

In terms of Flora and Fauna in Kilba kingdom, from the oral traditions[396] collected by Gudumbul, the Kilba land used to be thickly forested with various species of Savannah type of trees including *guw* (baobabs), *fwaVvala-Gouda* (bamboos) *Wur-Siri* (mahogany), M'bla (tamarind), *Fu-nwa* (Shed), *Kanda* and *Mbuda* (Figs), *ngu'da* (berries), *ndil-MA* (Currants), *Kucha'a* (Palm trees), and other deciduous varieties. In addition, the flora also includes herbs and shrubs which are edible and supplemented by the food supply and medicinal requirements of the early settlers.

With regards to fauna, Kilba kingdom was well stocked with game, elephant, rhinoceros and giraffe, in addition to the usual antelope, buffalo, leopard and lion. Leopard and elephants are still common today in Dugwaba and Gaya districts. Furthermore, *Moi* (bush-cow), *Putaku* (roan), hartebeest, waterbuck, reedbuck, *kob*, *oribi*, gazelle, *Zhsinaku* (Ostrich), *dzan*

390 Wycliff, 323-341and Gudumbul, 17-20.
391 Wycliff, 323-341 and Gudumbul, 17-20.
392 Gandapa, 280.
393 Gandapa, 280.
394 Gandapa, 280.
395 Gandapa, 280.
396 Kirk-Greene, A. H. M. *Adamawa Past and Present. An Historical Approach of the Development of a Northern Cameroun Province*. London: Dawson of Pall Mall, 1969. 36. 12-14.

(red-fronted gazelle) *danglata-ku* (bush pig), *tsivir* (guinea fowl) are still abundant even today.[397]

Wildlife In Pre-Colonial Kilba Kingdom

There were several big and small wildlife species in pre-colonial Kilba kingdom based on the information generated from informant and colonial records.[398] From documentary evidence, the wild animals available in the area included but not limited to: Hippopotamus (*Luhah*), Fox (*Gaku*), Leopard (*Mapula'u*), Hyena (*Mabulang*), Baboon (*Mbulam* or *Blam*), Monkey (*Gadizhe*), Lion (*Luvari*), Chimpanzee (*Gau-Bulum*), Crocodile (*Karam*), Snakes (such as *Pwapu-Chiwar* (Python)), *Hurtibiri*, and *GuMbal Vami*), Vulture (*Kwaduga*), Hawk (such as *Tuwangali*), *Mbuthla* (Dove), Lizard (*Ghali*), and Birds.[399]

However, the physiographic setting of Kilba kingdom provided a good habitat for these wild animals who coexisted side by side with humans for a long time as noted above in the physical environment of Kilba kingdom.

Hunting

One of the aspects of wildlife in the economy and society of Kilba kingdom was hunting. This came into existence because in the course of human struggle for survival and development, individuals or group of people ventured into the wilderness to capture/hunt wildlife, sometimes becoming successful while sometimes not being successful as the unlucky ones were either injured, captured or even killed by ferocious wild animals. The courage and ability to get into the forest/bush, hunt or confront and kill wild animals provided the basis for traditional sports for the people's practical needs.[400] The quest for food, cultural/religious belief and practices made people to capture, hunt and kill wildlife and use valuable items obtained from them. It is therefore not surprising that hunting was one of the major occupations of pre-colonial Kilba people, who hunted wild animals on land and water as discussed below.

It is important to put on record that, Kilba people engaged in hunting wildlife games which was an auxiliary economic activity. This was because it was not necessary to give up farming and enter occupation such as crafts and manufacturing.[401] As such, the hunters in the Kilba community, especially in the last half of the 19th century used to undertake the hunting of animals on part time or seasonal basis; mostly in the dry season, when mostly there is scarcity

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[397] Gudumbul, "A Study of the Emergence, Growth and Fall of the Huba Kingdom from C.1500AD to 1906AD." 19.

[398] Bulundi, Y. G. Age 80. Retired Chief Agric. Field Officer. Interviewed at Hong LGA. September 18, 2019, Midataku, Catchiest T. Age 88. A Retired Clergyman. Interviewed at Hong LGA. September 19, 2019, Asawa, Dean E. Age 74. Retired Clergyman. Interviewed at Hong LGA. September 17, 2019, Bukata, Bishop A. E. G. Age 51. Clergyman. Hong LGA. September 18, 2019, Chaskda, G. M. Age 76. A Retired Director of Administration and Supply, National Commission for Museum and Monuments, Abuja. Hong, Adamawa State, December 31, 2018 and January 3, 2019, NAK/YOLAPROF/ D. F. H. MacBride, "Notes on the Hong Organization and Offices, 1936 and NAK/YOLAPROF/ No. l 14 G2A – C. K. Meek, Notes on the History of the Kilba, 1929.

[399] *Kefas, K. B. "*History and Religion of the Kilba People: A Brief Account and Analysis (1359–2012)." *Research Work, 2012.* 107 and *150-151.*

[400] Ya'u, I. U. "African Cultural Practices: A Historical Reflection on Traditional Sports in Nigeria." Bako, A. et al (ed.). *Issues in Nigerian Peoples Cultures Culture*. Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University Press, 2000. 295.

[401] Hopkins, A. G. *An Economic History of West Africa*. London: NP, 1973. 38-40 and 44-46.

of water supply which made it easier for the hunters to locate games that come out in masses in search of water to drink. Moreover, the forest in Kilba areas were rich in games.[402] Rhinos, Reedbucks, Wolves, Warthogs, Pythons, Leopards, Lions, Tigers, Elephants, Monkeys, and Baboons etc., where the animals found in these forests. Of these, Rhinos, Elephants, Tigers and wolves seemed to have disappeared from the said forest during the past sixty years. Birds like Guinea Fowls, Ostriches and Eagles were also found. Every man was a part time hunter in Kilba society. Hunting was associated with charms and magic,[403] possibly for safety or protection against the wild animals, their fellow human beings, and evil spirits in the forests, hills and mountains.[404]

The traditional hunters used traps, spears, bows and arrows to hunt wild animals like Monkeys, Baboons, pythons and birds etc. The essence of this was that, hunting provided additional protein and the skins of animals like Antelopes. *Njag* were used as Musical instruments, making of bags, loin clothes (*bantebutual*), whips, mats, and the horns of these animals were also used as musical instruments to produce many tunes for various purposes and occasions.[405] Thus the occasional communal hunting exercise - *Pali* was organized and all the big animals caught were given to the chief and his family for food.[406] Furthermore, when a big game was killed, the meat was smoked. Some of the roasted meat was sold in Kilba kingdom and part of it was carried to Borno to be sold there. Pongri, noted that, some Kilba hunters also travelled to Hong (Kilba kingdom) to hunt elephants for meat. Later on, they learnt of the importance of the Ivory from the Hausa and Kanuri hunters who were frequenting Song, Ngaudere, and Tibati areas to hunt elephants for Ivory which was sold to North Africa and to the Royal Niger Company at Ibi, especially in the last half of the 19th century.[407]

It is equally important to note that the Kilba kingdom had extensive forests that were teeming with game. Kilba hunters used traps, spears, hunters' axes, bows, and poisoned arrows to find and hunt a variety of animals, including rhinoceroses, readbucks, wolves, warthogs, pythons, leopards, lions, and tigers, elephants, monkeys, and baboons. The animals were slain to produce meat, and the skins (cow, python, and leopard hide and skins) were used to make mats, bags, whips, and ceremonial drums in the Kilba and Borno regions. While some of the meats were roasted and sold within the Kilba kingdom, others were in the region of Borno.[408]

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[402] Bukar, J. Age 62. A Farmer. Interviewed at Tilbang – Pella District, Hong LGA, Adamawa State-Nigeria. September 16, 2019 and Maspalma, N. Age 88. A Farmer. Interviewed at Tilbang – Pella District, Hong LGA, Adamawa State-Nigeria. September 16, 2019.

[403] Pongri, J. H. *Aspect of the Economic History of Kilbaland, 1820 to 1934.* Makurdi: Aboki Publishers, 2015. 16.

[404] Pongri, 16.

[405] Pongri, 14, 16-19 and 22-24.

[406] Wajiga, "Socio-Economic and Political History of the Kilba People in the Pre-Colonial Period." *276-286.*

[407] Pongri, 38-40 and 44-46.

[408] Pongri, J. H. "A Survey of the Economic History of Kilbaland from C.1820 to 1934." BA (History) Project, Ahamdu Bello University, Zaria-Nigeria, 1976. 32-35.

Military Might and Transportation

Wildlife was equally important in the military might of pre-colonial Kilba kingdom. A good example was its cavalry force or horse soldiers. Kilba extensively made use of horses in its defence formation, especially during its war, raids for slaves and booty in her neighbourhood like the Fulani. In fact, Gudumbul, noted that, pre-colonial Kilba society used to organize Lda'a (organized raid with aim of looting and catching of slaves) and Fa'avi (organized highway robbery, usually with arms) by Kambu (Royal Family) against their neighbouring communities who were actually the Marghi, Ndzanyi Fali, Holma, Zumo, Boi, Bura and Fulani.[409] Especially in attacking the Fulani and Fali, Kilba uses horses as their major means of transportation and carrying out the raids were *horses*. This was done in collaboration between Kilba and Shuwa Arabs people from Borno Empire because both of them (Kilba and Shuwa Arabs) hated the Fulani and they were also united in the love of adventurous raids for booty (treasury, cattle and slaves) in mid-19th century.[410] More so, the Shuwa Arabs who were expert horsemen and the Fulani feared chasing them to get back their cows because the Shuwa could easily turn back and kill them.[411] Thus, on, the day of the operation, the operators would come at night with their horses, armed with bow and arrow, knives, spears and other weapons. The group would then divide themselves into two sections. One group would round up the village with fire, while the other group would be on sentry. As the people would try to escape, the other group with horses and spears would strike to capture the people (men, women and children), loot the village and carry them away.[412]

In the case of the royal family, Dzarma take charge of the king's horses and head of the cavalry. In other words, the army was horsemen, headed by Dzarma Taku who was in charge of Kilba kingdom cavalry. [413] In Kilba society ownership of cotton, horses and slaves among the Kilba people, signify wealth.

In terms of economic value, horses in Kilba were held with great esteem. First, slaves were exchanged for prestigious animals like cows and horses.[414] For, it was cheaper to catch a slave and sell him or exchange for a horse, which might cost a person about 70 *Takulaku*[415] in terms of cotton currency.[416] In the area of unit of measurement in the last half of the 19th century in Kilba kingdom, baby horse equals to about 7 *Takulaku*, female horse for about 40 *Takulaku* while a male horse and a cow for about 60 to 80 *Takulaku*.[417]

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[409] Gudumbul, 119-120.

[410] Gudumbul, 100-105 and Pongri, 32-33.

[411] Pongri, "A Survey of the Economic History of Kilbaland from C.1820 to 1934." 29-33.

[412] Gudumbul, 119-120.

[413] Gudumbul, 122.

[414] Wycliff, S and Wajiga, A. B. "Slavery and Slave Trade in Kilba (Huba) Kingdom of Northern Nigeria, C.1500–1904AD." *Nigerian Journal of Arts and Humanities (NJAH)*. Volume 2 Number 1, 2022:55-66.

[415] *Takulaku* refers to rolls of woven cloth/strip of woven cloth. They are units of measures of cotton strips.

[416] Wycliff, S, "The Colonial Economy and Society of Kilba District in Adamawa Province of Northern Nigeria, 1904–1960." PhD (History), Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria-Nigeria, 2021. 152-172.

[417] Wycliff, S. "A Historical Survey of the Significance of Animal Husbandry in the Economic and Society of Kilba (Huba) People of Adamawa State, C.1500–1960AD." *Jalingo Journal of African Studies (JJAS)*. Volume 10, Number 1, April 2020:111-120.

In terms of road networking and transportation, narrow bush paths linked the Kilba villages. However, transport was by foot or on animals usually horses and donkeys, which carried more loads for transportation to long distances.[418] To this end, donkeys and horses served as additional means of transportation to Kilba kingdom that greatly reduced the problems of transport unlike before where Kilba people relied on carrying commodities on their head and walking using their foot.[419] Besides, one could also see that, the environment of Kilba kingdom was also a critical factor not merely in crop cultivation, but also in the raising of animals. More so, the changing nature of the environment also led to the introduction of a new breed of animals. For instance, like the Fulani breed of cows or cattle, horses and donkeys were introduced into Kilba kingdom[420] from Borno where they served as a means of transport while animals like dogs were used for hunting.[421]

Source of Totem Practices and Cultural Preservation

The beauty of every community in this world is seen in her language, culture, identity and nationhood. In pre-colonial Kilba kingdom, wildlife and game reserve, most especially wild animals were great sources of Totem which refers to the mystical relationship between man and animal. *MBA* in Kilba (Huba) language means to tie or unite while *Mutu* means totem in English. *Mba-Mutu* therefore means to destine, predetermine, ordain by divine or human will the relationship between a person and an animal, bird, amphibian or any other creature, so that whatever happens to the person will affect the creature he or she is tied to and vice versa.[422] Thus, the process of doing so is known as *MBA-Mutu* while the man (male or female) having the totem is called *Ndar-Mutu* and the plural of it is *Njir-Mutu*. The initiated person operates on two levels – human and spiritual and can see beyond the ordinary eyes.[423] It is evident that quite a number of the Kilba people enter secret mystical relationships by means of magical rites which is an aspect that was often argued as witchcraft or its aspect called "*Mutu*" in Kilba.[424] *However*, *MBA-Mutu* is done to any person, male or female, between the ages of 6, 15 and/or 18 years depending on the type of animal that the person wants. The act is normally authorized by any of the following relatives of the candidates: Father, uncle, mother or aunt.[425]

It is important to bring to our notice that, some of the wild animals used for *Mba-Mutu* among the Kilba pre-colonial kingdom include but not limited to Hippopotamus (*Luhah*), Fox

[418] Pongri, *Aspect of the Economic History of Kilbaland, 1820 to 1934.* 22.
[419] Pongri, 34.
[420] Abubakar, S. "People of the Upper Benue Basin and the Bauchi Plateau before 1800." Ikime, O. *Groundwork of Nigerian* History. Ibadan: Heinemann (Nig.) Ltd, 1980. 184-185 and Wajiga, A. "Socio-Economic and Political History of the Kilba People in the Pre-Colonial Period." 82-109.
[421] Wajiga, 85.
[422] Nissen, *An African Church is Born. The Story of Adamawa and Central Sardauna Province in Nigeria*. 14-16 and 151-200.
[423] Ndonya, D. N. *Kilba (Huba) Cultural Ceremonies, Festivals, Dances, Games, and Folk Tales*. Mubi: Chambu Production Services, 2019. 74-75 and Wajiga, A. and Bright, J. "Selected Themes in Kilba History." *Research Work, 2012.* 69-71.
[424] Wycliff, S and Wajiga, A. B. "Interrogating the Prospects and Challenges of Totem among the Kilba People of Adamawa State, Nigeria, C.1500–2014AD." *Babcock University Journal of History and International Studies (BUJOHIS)*. Volume 5, October, 2020:145-158.
[425] Ndonya, 76-77.

(*Gaku*), Leopard (*Mapula'u*), Hyena (*Mabulang*), Baboon (*Mbulam* or *Blam*), Monkey (*Gadizhe*), Lion (*Luvari*), Chimpanzee (*Gau-Bulum*), Crocodile (*Karam*), Snakes (such as *Pwapu-Chiwar* (Python), *Hurtibiri*, and *GuMbal Vami*), Vulture (*Kwaduga*), Hawk (such as *Tuwangali*), *Mbuthla* (Dove), and Lizard (*Ghali*).[426] Thus, the choice of the animals largely depended on the family or clan from which the person came. That means that, each family or clan has their own type of animal. Despite this, there is an exception, because someone can get a totem animal from his mother's kinsmen. In Kilba land, one enjoys the highest form of care, love and preferential treatment from his mother's kinsmen.[427] In fact, each Kilba clan in the community had different species of animals to be used for the *Mutu* e.g., blacksmiths which consist of a clan in Kilba, used the monkey.[428] All these show that totems, served to create a mystical brotherhood between members of every clan. It creates a common bond that strengthens care in each clan. Besides that, the totem will do whatever the owner wants it to do i.e., if the owner wants security, protection, information gathering or hard work, the *Mutu* will be available at anytime and anywhere it is required to provide such services.[429]

To this end, some of the roles of totem and animals involved were highlighted below.

(1) Security, information, spying and intelligence gathering

Totems like leopards were used in order to obtain the leopard's bravery for guarding the people's homes in their absence, or their farms and domestic animals from thieves, robbers and even invaders of Kilba kingdom such as the Fulani Jihadist in Adamawa Emirate (1809–) and Fad-el-Allah b. Rabih (Patr-Allah) (1893–1901AD) where Kilba people used their totem for information gathering and spying them.[430] In fact, field work revealed that people with *Mutu* were shrouded in mysteries before something good or bad happens in Kilba community or its surrounding villages, because they were the first people to know about it. That gave the community the opportunity to prepare itself against harmful circumstances. In fact, their activities complemented the watchmen in Kilba Mountains and hills against any enemy attacks.[431] This shows that *Mutu* was also used to keep watch over the activities of the family members, enemies and strangers and report back to the owner. All these blessings go with the presence of wild animals in the area of study and the cultural tie attached to it in the society.

(2) Long-life and Prosperity

In pre-colonial Kilba kingdom, people with totem experienced long-life and prosperity. For example, those people who were in alliance with the Baboon become rich or obtained riches because baboon is a wily animal and very clever. Those with python could become abstemious or have endurance and could live without food for a long time (even if there was

[426] Wycliff and Wajiga, 145-158.

[427] *Kefas, "*History and Religion of the Kilba People: A Brief Account and Analysis (1359–2012)." 107 and *150-151.*

[428] Kefas, 107 and *150-151.*

[429] Wycliff and Wajiga, 145-158.

[430] Wycliff and Wajiga, 145-158.

[431] Interview with Chaskda, Bulundi, Bukata and Asawa.

a famine) and still look nourished. Bird totems could aid long life since some birds are hardly killed while research has proved that the tortoise lives longer than human beings, therefore, those who had totems of the tortoise will live longer on earth as compared to others.[432]

(3) Hard-work and resilience in farming

Mutu is also used to enhance hard work. The amphibians and other animals used for *MBA-Mutu* (in this case) are very strong and resilient. The owner of the *Mutu* would therefore be strong and resilient and become a good and successful farmer. In other words, totems give bodily strength to the people having them. This is to say that totems make Njir-Mutu very virile. For instance, those that have wild-swine as totem never get tired with farming. The animals which were used as totem for hardworking were Snakes (*Pwapu Chiwar*), Buffalo (*Fur*), Crocodile (*Karam*), lion and hyena.[433]

(4) Discipline of children

It is worthy to note that the Mutu in Kilba community is also used for the disciplining of stubborn children who were fond of travelling from one village to another in the night against the wish of their parents and for unethical reasons. So, the parents who have been initiated to totems like lions, baboons, hyenas, tigers or cheetahs, would appear to the children on their way going to or coming back from in order to scare them, so that they would have a change of attitude towards night movements. This had indeed humbled quite a number of youths or children from their bad behaviour. In other words, the totem was used as a rod of correction. Naughty people or lads are corrected by totems. They are threatened by the animals, especially *Mutu-Mapla'u* (Leopard).[434] In addition to that, Mutu gives dignity to an individual when he was known to be Ndir-Mutu. An elder without Mutu does not command respect like the one with an Ndir-Mutu (*Mutu* owner).[435]

To this end therefore totem (*MBA-Mutu*) became a source of security, protection, information gathering, spying, intelligence, hardworking, as well as a source of discipline for children and towards its faith and unity, peace, and progress. This made it to be and impetus in the economy and society of Kilba kingdom in terms of wildlife and game reserve. Kilba people practiced this kind of pre-colonial cultural because they believed that it aided them with long life, security, protection, hard work, spying for information and intelligence gathering as experienced during the times of crisis.

Conclusion

From the above, it could be seen that the wild animals have great value to the pre-colonial inhabitants of Kilba kingdom as they provided food and a good source of protein for the people. Part of them had been used for cultural and ceremonial display and medicinal purposes, decorations (royal paraphernalia, ornaments and jewelries purposes) while their

[432] Wycliff, S. "Impact of Christianity on the Traditional Beliefs and Practices of Kilba People of Adamawa State." *Dutsinma Historical Review*. Volume 1 Number 1, 2018:248-249 and *Kefas*. 107-108 and 133-136.
[433] Wajiga and Bright, *68-69.*
[434] *Kefas,* 107-108 and 133-136.
[435] *Kefas,* 107-108 and 133-136.

skins had been used for clothing, making mats and drums. They had also been turned into shields and weapons for human use. Ostrich egg shells, for example, were used as container for storing water. Porcupines' spikes and head had been for losing weaving hair. Lions' skin and head had been used in the royal palace as a symbol of power. Mixture of dried bones with wildlife parts had been used for healing ailments and curative purposes. Certain wild animals are believed to possess some spiritual powers for which they were revered. That is why Kilba people practiced totem or mystical relationship with the wild animals in the period under review. On the whole, through hunting and bush fires, many pre-colonial wild animals were caught and killed through the use of threat traps (snares), pit traps or shot with sling shoot, bows and arrows. In essence, several wild animals in Kilba kingdom were hunted and eaten or used for different purposes by the local people such as prolon

ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND ELECTRONIC VOTING IN NIGERIA: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE 2018 LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS IN KADUNA STATE

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Abstract

Electronic voting is often seen as a tool for making the electoral process more efficient and for increasing trust in its management. On February 6, 2018, the Kaduna State Independent Electoral Commission (KAD-SIECOM) passed the electronic election law for the introduction of Electronic Voting Machine (EVM), with the aim of making elections fair and credible, and to build trust in the electoral system. This study assesses the conduct of 2018 local government elections in Kaduna State to demonstrate how electronic voting was deployed by the electoral system in the electoral process. **Anchored on determinism theory, the study adopts** descriptive research design and uses primary and secondary data sources. The primary data was sourced through an in-depth interview while, secondary data was sourced through internet and archive materials. Findings reveal that e-voting is fast, accurate, stress-free, and easy to use as, it will help in eliminating the errors caused by human factor. The study concludes that, there was a relative significant and positive influence of e-voting on electoral credibility all through the conduct of the 2018 Local Government elections in Kaduna State as, the party in government did not win in all the local government areas as was the norm in the previous elections where manual paper ballot system was used. The study recommends that e-voting system should be adopted in Nigeria in order to foster electoral outcomes that are free, fair and credible as, this will in turn culminate into increased political participation and foster democratic growth in Nigeria.

Key Words: Electoral System, Electronic Voting, Manual Voting, Voting, Local Government.

Introduction

Nigeria has for many years been held down by high incidence of electoral malaise manifesting in the prevalence of electoral rigging, violence and other forms of malpractices which tend to erode established electoral standards and defy the prospects of free, fair and credible elections as seen in past manual elections in the country[1]. In the face of the challenges that beset the Nigerian electoral process, the Independent National Electoral Commission (1NEC), which is Nigeria's Electoral management body (EMB) since the inception of the fourth republic has been seen over time struggling to salvage the situation. This, it has done through the adoption of various strategies aimed at curtailing the preponderant electoral malpractices that has eaten deep into the fabric of the Nigerian electoral system following the electoral reform of 2010[2]. This clamour (the need for viable elections) is further reinforced by the fact that the existing traditional paper ballot system employed in the elections from 1999 has been exposed as being susceptible to the stable flow of electoral bigotry and democratic sabotage overtime[3]. As such, the traditional ballot paper, as evident in the Nigerian electoral experience, falls short of the requisite elements of credible elections such as accountability, transparency and free and fair play.

Interestingly, using technology in elections including the deployment of e-voting, is a fast emerging global trend that has been embraced by at least 21% of the 123 countries surveyed by the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance[4], while feasibility studies are ongoing in 57% of the countries[5]. The quest for better electoral practice particularly, in the aspect of voting has informed the adoption of enhanced Information Communication Technologies (ICT) into the electoral process[6]. Across the world, electronic voting means have been employed to increase voter's participation, produce taintless electoral outcome,

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[1]A. Y. Zainawa.. Elections and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria. A Study of 2007 and 2011 Elections in North-West Geo-Political Zone. Ph D. thesis 2008, Department Of Political Science And International Studies, ABU, Zaria. Retrieved from https://www.grossarchive.com/project/3915

[2] C. C. Amuzie. Electronic Voting System and Its Role in Ensuring Credible Electoral Process (Nigeria as a Case Study). Proceedings of 17th ISERD International Conference, New York, USA, 15th November, 2015. ISBN: 978-93-85832-38

[3]World Fact Book 2019. Nigeria. Central Intelligence Agency. Retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/librarv/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ni.html

[4]Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Introducing Electronic Voting: Essential Considerations 2011. Policy Paper, Bulls Graphics, Sweden. ISBN: 978-91-86565-21-3

[5]European Centre for Electoral Support. Performance Assessment And Post Election Report On The 2018 Local Government Elections Retrieved from http://www.ecn.na/documents/278571/193258/ECN+Elections+Report.pdf/be9cl04-7e37-4bf9-9cb8-c6dla29ec988

[6]T. P. Ayeni and A. O. Esan. The Impact of ICT in the Conduct of Elections in Nigeria. *American Journal of Computer Science and Information Technology*, 6(14), 1-6, 2018. ISSN 2349-3917. Retrieved https://www.imednub.com/articlcs/the-impact-of-ict-in theconduct-of-elections-in-nigeia-php?aid=22

[7]INEC and E-voting Option. Punch editorials Punch 2018, July1. Retrieved from https://www.punchng.com/inec-and-e-voting-option

and further consolidate democratic practices. Nevertheless, this isn't to say that adopted electronic means are perfect, as evident in the alleged Russian involvement in the supposedly hacked US elections of 2016 [7].

In Nigeria, one of such strategies amidst many, put in place by INEC to combat electoral misdemanour is the engagement of technological gadgets in Electoral Activities. INEC introduced the INEC Voters Identification System (IVAS), Permanent Voters Card (PVC), Smart Card Readers (SCRs) and the improved Automated Fingerprints Identification System (AFIS) with bio-metric technology prior the commencement of the 2015 general election[2]. It is crystal clear that the introduction of these technological devices was targeted at authenticating eligible voters and at the same time, reducing the scope of electoral compromise in the elections. However, the introduction of the card readers and biometric equipment in the 2015 general elections earmarked an epoch of technological renaissance in the history of the Nigerian voting system as Information Communication Technologies were deployed in the said election[6]. The technology was said to have drastically reduced multiple voters' registration which leads to inflation of the voters' register. Also, it allegedly put a stop to unregistered voters taking part in the polls by impersonating and alien voters[7].

On February 6, 2018, the Kaduna State Independent Electoral Commission (KAD-SIECOM) passed the electronic election law for the introduction of Electronic Voting Machine (EVM) with the aim of making elections fair and credible, and to build trust in the electoral system. On May 12, 2018, the Kaduna State Independent Electoral Commission (SIECOM) in collaboration with the Kaduna Slate Government furthered the cause of INEC by advancing the tech-election synchrony as it transitioned from the use of Smart Card Readers (SCRs) to the use of advanced electronic machines in conducting the 2018 local government elections. Thus, Kaduna State became the first in Nigeria and second in Africa to use electronic voting after Namibia[8]. However, the exercise was deemed successful and after the process the justification given for the adoption of electronic voting in the said elections boiled down to the need to promote transparency and electoral integrity' in the Kaduna electoral system. Several studies on e-voting in Nigeria revealed that a comprehensive electronic voting system would enhance the standard of elections and save the country from the horrible experiences of the past as it promises free, fair, transparent, convenient and confidential elections as well as the speedy processing of results[9]. Despite the enormity of studies by these scholars, the use of e-voting in Kaduna states has not received the required academic attention. It is in this context, that this study examines electoral system and e-voting in the 2018 local government election in Kaduna State. The study is divided into six sections. Section one is the introduction and it follows immediately by a review of related literature on e-voting in section two. Section three is the theoretical framework used in the study. The use of e-voting in Kaduna local government elections is discussed in section four. In section five, the study considers the challenges associated with the use of e-voting platform for election not only in Kaduna and Nigeria in general. The last section is the conclusion and recommendation.

Conceptual Review

Voting

According to[10] "Voting is the most pivotal process of democratic society through which people determine its government." It is one of the principal mechanisms through which

citizens exercise their right to participate in the political process[11]. In the words of [12] voting is one significant way people express their opinion of choice is through voting. The act of voting is most welcomed in democratic societies and is therefore used as a method through which a society expresses willingness in choice of leadership. Most importantly, voting helps in electoral process of a democratic country in the choice of its government composition. The electoral systems formulate rules that translate individual votes into seals, and therefore affect the representation of society's interests in governance and policy making[12]. In the light of the above, voting can be conceived as quintessential to democracy because it provides the platform for the citizens to choose their leaders and also express their views freely on issues that pertains to the political system.

Manual Voting System

This can be otherwise called the traditional voting system or the paper ballot system where vote casting, recording and tabulation are done on a paper sheets or paper cards[13]. In recent times, owing to preponderance of electoral misconduct associated with the use of the paper ballot system, some electronic devices have been developed to complement the paper ballot system to checkmate these excesses (for example, in Nigeria, biometric technology have been introduced for voters' accreditation). According to[12] some arguments for the paper ballot system include;

a) It is very simple and easy to understand. Hence, it can be used by anyone regardless of academic background.

b) It protects the anonymity or identity of the voter.

c) Votes can be counted and recounted severally.

d) Paper ballots are not prone to cyber-attacks or malware error.

e) Where contentions exist, paper ballots can be used as evidence in the court of law. However, the manual voting or paper ballot have been largely criticized on the following grounds;

a) It is largely susceptible to electoral fraud. Votes can be rigged easily through corrupt polling officials instigated by influential candidates. This culminates into electoral violence and political instability.

b) It is inefficient in terms of terms of time management as it takes longer hours to count votes.

[8]Premium Times Editorials 2018. Explainer: understanding Kaduna electronic voting system as state makes history. (2018, May 11). Retrieved from https://www.premiumtimesng.com/features-and-interviews/268084-explainerunderstanding-kaduna-electronic-voting-svstem-as-state-makes-history.html

[9] E. Abu-Shanab and M. B. Knight. E-Systems: A Tool for E- Democracy. Knowledge Management Research and Practice 2(3):264-274, 2010.

[10]P. Diponkar and S. K.Ray, S. K. A Preview On Microcontroller Based Electronic Voting machine. *International Journal of Information and Electronics Engineering* Vol. 3.No.2. 2013.

[11]F. Mendez and A. Treschel. The European Union and E-Voting: Addressing the European Parliament's Internet Voting Challenge. Routledge Taylor and Francis group, New York and London. 2005.

[12]G. O. Uzedhe and J. E. Okhaifoh. A Technological Framework for Transparent E-Voting Solution in the Nigerian Electoral System. *Nigerian Journal of Technology* (NIJOTECH) Vol. 35, No. 3, July 2016, pp. 627 – 636.

[13]G. O. Dwumfuo and E. Paatey. The Design of an Electronic Voting System. *Research Journal of Information Technology 3(2):* 91-98, 2011.

c) It is more capital intensive as a lot of paper ballots are printed and a lot of polling officials are recruited to conduct election.
d) Snatching of ballot boxes, the electoral materials and massive rigging.
e) Loss of voters' trust in the electoral process and consequently political apathy.
f) Problems of invalid votes as a result of improper voting or rough handling of the ballot papers

E-Voting System

It is no gainsay that advancement in technology has led to an evolution in the electoral process of democratic stales, consequently, impacting on the traditional ways of voters' registration, voting and vote counting. That is to say, unlike the traditional or manual voting system that relied on the use of ballot papers, electronic voting system is technologically enhanced or digitized. According to[14] e-voting system is a "voting system in which the election data is recorded, stored and processed primarily as digital information." In addition[15], conceived e-voting as "voting supported by electronic devices – the range of devices may include electronic registration of votes, electronic counting of votes and, lately, channels for remote voting, especially the internet."

Also conceptualizing the concept[10] posited that e-voting refers to "the definition, collection and dissemination of people's opinions with the help of some machinery that is more or less computer supported." From the definition, it can be gathered that e-voting is the reliance on machines to aid the decision making process of selecting those who will represent the will of the people in government. From the perspective of [16] Electronic voting is a term encompassing several different types of voting, embracing both electronic means of casting a vote and electronic means of counting votes. Electronic voting technology can include punched cards, optical scan voting systems and specialized voting kiosks (including self-contained direct-recording electronic voting systems, or DRE). It can also involve transmission of ballots and votes via telephones, private computer networks of the internet.

This definition further gives an elaborate explanation on the concept of e-voting by revealing the perspective that e-voting can be based on machine counting, computer voting or internet voting. lso[17] further presents a lucid view of the concept by asserting that e-voting is a means of having a paperless voting system. It is a term used to describe any of several means of determining people's collective intent electronically. It is a system of voting that uses electronic methods to record and/or count votes[17]

In addition Most broadly, electronic voting refers to both the electronic means of casting a vote and the electronic means of tabulating votes. In this broad sense, most voting methods currently in use in the United States employ electronics. This can include punch card systems, optical scan voting systems, direct-recording electronic (DRE) and Internet voting... In common usage now, however, "electronic voting" refers to DRE voting systems most often utilizing touch-screens as well as electronic panels with push buttons or pointing devices to

record votes. This is an important distinction because other systems which employ electronics, nevertheless, have a physical ballot that at least could be counted manually[17].

Meanwhile, it is pertinent to distinguish between the concepts of "e-voting" and "internets voting as both concepts are erroneously used interchangeably. Attention must be drawn to the fact that the concept "e-voting" is a broad concept that captures "internet voting" and "other forms of electronic voting technology that are not internet based." Bolstering this argument is the assertion by[15] that

...First, electronic voting procedures may be characterized by the type of channel of communication offered to the voter with regard to the act of casting the vote. Here, the main distinction is between the 'internet and other types of devices.' Furthermore, the level of control exercised by the electoral authorities. In some cases, electoral computers are located in the polling station and can thus be completely controlled by the electoral authorities. Identification and authentication are carried out by the officials in the polling station through existing voter registers. External manipulation, for example by computer viruses, Trojan horses or other service attacks is not possible because there is no external communication and the data are stored on the polling machine[15].

Corroborating the above position is[18] who also categorized e-voting into two major types which are:

a. Remote e-voting where voting is performed within the voter's sole influence, and is not physically supervised by representatives of governmental authorities (e.g. voting from one's personal computer, mobile phone, television via the Internet)

b. Non-remote e-voting which is supervised physically by representatives of governmental or independent electoral authorities (e.g. electronic voting machines located at polling stations).

Typologies of E-voting

E-voting encompasses all voting techniques involving electronic voting equipment, including voting over the internet, using booths in polling stations and sometimes those used in counting votes. The following are the various typologies of the e-voting systems;

a. Paper-Based Electronic Voting System: This is otherwise called "document ballot voting system' It entails a voting system whereby paper ballots are used to cast votes and votes cast by voters are counted by hand. Paper-based e-voting came with the advent of electronic tabulation machines where paper sheets or cards arc marked by the voters using their hands

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[14]D. Gritzalis. Secure Electronic Voting. Kluwer Academic Publishers, USA. 2003

[15]N. Kersting, and Baldersheim. Electronic Voting and Democracy: A Com parativeAnalysis. Palgrave Macmillan Publishers. 2004:5

[16]S. Lindberg. Democracy and Elections in Africa. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore USA. 2006.

[17]V. Teague. Electronic Voting. Proceedings from the First International Joint conference, bregenz, Austria. Springer. 2016. Retrieved from https://link.springer.eom/content/pdf/l0.1007%2F978-3-319-52240-1.pdf

but the votes are counted electronically. The PBEVS also comprise of Punch cards voting, mark sense and subsequently, digital pen voting system[19].

b. Direct-Recording Electronic (DRE) Voting System: A direct-recording electronic (DRE) voting machine records votes by means of a ballot display provided with electro-optical or mechanical components that can be activated by the voter (typically buttons or a touch screen). The DRE processes data with computer software and records voting data and ballot images in memory components. After the election, it produces a tabulation of the voting data stored in a removable memory component as a printed copy[20].

c. Public Network DRE Voting System: The public network DRE voting system is another typology of the e-voting system which makes use of electronic ballots and also facilitates the transmission of voting data from one polling place to another through a public network. Vote data may either be transmitted as individual voters cast votes or as batches of votes are compiled periodically throughout the election. Public network DRE voting system includes telephone voting as well as internet voting.

d. Internet Voting: This voting system makes use of remote location, that is, votes can be cast via any internet enable devices from anywhere. Internet voting can also be in the form of traditional polling locations with polling booths consisting of internet enabled voting systems.

e. Electronic Voting Machine: According to[16] EVM refers to the use of electronic apparatus or gadgets to count and record votes in a fixed public place. The machine might be a specialized electronic voting machine (EVM) in a voting booth with stand-alone PC or touch screen specially installed for the purpose of voting in a voting kiosk.

f. Electronic Ballot Voting: This refers to casting of ballot votes at public places where the process is strictly monitored by election officials who control the various voting 1CT systems. Voters can use different technique to cast vote; for instance, they could use a touch screen to select choices or push special button control. After which a special software will record the votes which is in turn stored in the ballot machine electronically[21].

g. Electronic Kiosks Voting: In this model of voting, tamper-proofed terminals and located in convenient places like schools, post offices or shopping centers, but still remain under the control of polling officials[17]. Election officials, observers, the media and even installed Closed Circuit Television cameras (CCTV) help to address security and privacy concerns. Also, it prevents coercion or other forms of intervention for election sabotage. The risks and challenges associated with kiosk voting are quite considerable, but less disturbing than those associated with remote distance voting.

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[13]European Centre for Electoral Support. Challenges and Opportunities for the implementation of e-voting in Nigeria. July 2021.

[18]G. E. Anichebe. E-Voting and Credible Elections in Nigeria. *International Journal of Engineering Science Invention* Vol 5 issue 1 PP 01-14. 2016. Retrieved from https://repositorv.unn.edu.n12/handle/

[19]D. W. Alausa. and L/ O. Akingbade. Electronic Voting: Challenges and Prospects in Nigeria's Democracy. *The International Journal of Engineering and Science (IJES),* 6(5), 67-76. 2017. Retrieved from https://wwwtheiies.com/papers/vol6-issue5-electronicvoting

[20]M. Margaret. E-voting: An Immature Technology in a Critical Context. Department of Computer Science, National University of Ireland, 2008.

[21]International Peace Institute 2011. Elections in Africa: Challenges and Opportunities. Report on Election. Retrieved from https://www.ipinst.org/wp content/uploads/publications/ipi_e_ pub_elections_in_africa_2_.pdf.

h. Electronic Distance Voting: Electronic distance voting implies the electronic registration, casting and counting votes from different and separate locations. Just it typically allows the voter to use a more generic technology such as, telephone, interactive digital TV, Short Message Service (SMS) or the Internet, to cast their vote from any preferred location.

Theoretical Framework

The study is anchored on technological determinism. The term was conceived by Thorsten Veblen (1857-1929). Technological determinism is an idea that presumes that a society's technology drives the improvement of its social shape and cultural values[22]. Electronic voting (and polling) is already discussed for quite some years, but recently also the development of electronic voting systems is becoming a major activity. The development and introduction of new voting technologies generally is lacking serious evaluation. From a social and from a scientific point of view, there is a need for testing the functioning of voting technologies and the effects on participation and outcomes of the democratic process.

The role of a certain technology will be determined by the social context into which it is introduced. In other words, technology is socially shaped or constructed by its users. Therefore, social constructionists are interested in engaging the immediate users, as well as others who will be affected by the system, in the development and design process. Social constructionists see the complexity of the interplay between society and technology[22]. If we do not correct the tendency to neglect social and behavioural issues, the result may be an uncritical introduction of new voting technologies, without any fundamental reflection about the technical, but more importantly, about the political, social, and organizational modalities of the systems introduced. The aim of this study is to examine electoral system and e-voting in the 2018 local government election in Kaduna State.

Technology is evolving at a very fast pace, yet most Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs) in developing countries are not using it fully. However, some EMBs like Namibia, Brazil, India, and Estonia are acknowledging trends within their environments by embracing technology in all the electoral processes under their control to enhance the credibility of elections[23]. As current environments generally have high usage of technological products such as mobile phones, banking, and the internet, EMBs are encouraged to be proactive in technology implementation to counter some of the challenges (frauds, spoilt papers, and credibility) in manual voting system and low voter turnout[24]. Thus, encouraging the adoption of e-voting has clear benefits in the study state especially, during the conduct of 2018 local government elections as the new technology method of voting proves to protect the integrity of the electoral system in delivering a free and fair elections. With the use of electronic voting to determine the outcome of the 2018 local government elections in Kaduna state, it was difficult to manipulate results, stuff ballot boxes and thump-print multiple ballot papers. Also, the applications of e-voting on the electoral system helped in determine some unique features which assisted users to assess results from different polling units displayed on the dashboard. There are certain lessons that can be learnt from the Kaduna experience, and from other countries including Namibia and the West.

Factors that Necessitated the Adoption of Electronic Voting in Nigeria

Basically, the paramount reason why electronic voting is adopted in elections is because it

has the potential to facilitate higher political participation especially as it is deemed to be convenient for voting, coupled with its ability to enhance electoral credibility, transparency and integrity. Several scholars such as [15] clearly ascertained that electronic voting is an aspect of e-democracy that can help engender trust in the electoral process and broaden the scope of citizen participation. However, in interrogating the factors that necessitated the adoption of e-voting in Nigeria, several factors were earmarked. According to Hassan (the Commissioner for Logistics and Operations, KADSIECOM) the need to produce an election that is free from electoral irregularities, malpractices and manipulations which had led to the eruption of electoral violence in previous elections underscored the adoption of e-voting in Nigeria during the conduct of the 2018 local government elections in Kaduna state. Furthermore, he revealed that previous elections where the manual paper ballot system was used have been characterized by incidences of electoral bigotry manifesting in diverse forms and degrees. Thus the need to avoid these incidences from recurring and violence from erupting informed the adoption of e-voting; He affirmed that;

> The main reasons for adopting electronic voting is that in the past, there are were so many manipulations and confusions regarding the manual voting. Manipulations in the sense that the officials and the ad hoc staff were usually influenced either financially or sometimes forcefully. We found that the ballot box could be taken to a house and then they would stock it with the ballot papers of the party they want to win. There were so many instances. Even during the 2015 election, so many people sent videos online where people were stocking the ballot boxes. There was a lot of violence and a lot of people were killed because of election results. You can imagine when people vote for party A, and majority of the people know that they voted for party A; at the end of the day, party B gets declared as the winner then, there would be violence. So when we came on board, the government said election in Nigeria are mired with suspicions, allegations and counter allegations which eventually leads to violence, how do we avoid all this? We then tried to think of ways to introduce technology into the system so that we can try minimizing this kind of problem.

Buttressing Hassan's perspective was the position of Yahaya (the Commission in charge of Planning, Research, Statistics and Training, KADSIECOM). Yahaya ascertained that the need to foster an election that was credible and transparent formed the bedrock of the decision taken by KADSIECOM to adopt e-voting in the local government elections. Suleiman further opined that the e-voting through its technical compositions and characteristics makes it efficient in combating issues of electoral malpractices in elections. By technical compositions, he was referring to the in-built

[22]B. Binber. Three faces of technological determinism. In M.R. Smith & L. Marx (Eds.), Does Technology Drives History? - The Dilemma of Technological
Determinism (pp. 79-100). Cambridge (MA), London: MIT Press. 1994.

[23]E. Green., J. Owen, and D. Pain. Gendered by design? Information Technology and Office Systems. London: Taylor and Francis. 1993.

[24]M. Salazar and A. Holbrook. Some Notes on Theories of Technolog), Society and Innovation Systems for S&T Policy Studies. CPROST Report 2008.

biometric system embedded in the e-voting machines; its Voters Verified Audit Paper Trail (VVPAT) system which enables the votes cast on the machine to be recounted manually; the card authorization system which disallows multiple voting and alien voting; and transmission capacity to automatically send votes cast on the machine to the routine server immediately such votes are cast.

Opening up a fresh perspective to the narrative on what had spurred the adoption of e-voting in Nigeria during the conduct of the 2018 Local Government election in Kaduna state, Rebecca (the Executive Coordinator of the Legal Awareness for Women in Nigeria) a Civil Society organization that monitored the election asserted that the adoption of e-voting by KADS1ECOM is a significant indication of the gradual embrace of the e-move (the embrace of technology) in electoral process in Nigeria. She averred thus "well it is for progress. We are living in this century of technology; everything is driven by technology so it makes things easier trying to move up to the times to progress." Reflective from the statement is the fact that, there is no denial of the synchrony that exists between politics and technology as established by the proponents of the technological determinism paradigm, the socio-constructivist theorist and the technological acceptance model. Rebecca continued by establishing the fact that e-voting had been adopted in the election because of the problematic nature of the manual paper ballot system experienced in the country. However, some of the highlighted problems of the manual ballot system pointed out by the respondent are not far-fetched; as they have been highlighted in several literatures on the discourse. Notably, the point that the paper-ballot has proven ineffective in the conduct of viable elections in the nation is largely emphasized. Furthermore, other presumed factors for the adoption of e-voting by the respondent significantly dwells on the seeming benefits of e-voting which include; fast vote counting and computation process; ease of usage; and simple approaches to vote casting;

> The above expressed opinions correspond with the view of[2] who had projected that e-voting affords itself as a feasible and viable solution to the Nigerian electoral process.
>
> The Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) is quite an easy system and offers appropriate work place potency because it is simple to grasp and operate. Given the voluminous technological inadequacies that surrounds Nigeria, this technique presents the most effective escape route...this technique will also facilitate to revive the boldness of individuals towards participation and democracy in Nigeria.

Rili substantially stressed the ease associated with the use of e-voting as the principal factor that led to its (e-voting) adoption in the election. According to him, as against previous elections, the adoption of e-voting was geared towards increasing voters' turnout in the election by KADSIECOM as many electorates have already lost interest in the electoral process because of the undue stress they pass through during voting periods. Hence, the utility of a new technology stirred up the electorate's eagerness to participate in the voting process of the 2018 local government election. Additionally, he said;

> Our manual voting is very stressful. You need to come and get accredited, after which you go and cast your vote. It is a double process but you know

> with e-voting, you get accredited after which you could vote. In the first place you cannot be authenticated to vote unless you are eligible to vote that is; you have your Permanent Voters Card (PVC). It is the easiest process we can have. There is no point going for election and spending 8 or 7 hours. It's uncalled for at this 21st century. We are doing that and we are way backward as a nation. It literally takes you less than two minutes. So people, especially new electorates, will get excited at this and go out to vote.

Speaking further, Ibrahim enjoined the Nigerian Electoral Management Body (EMB) and Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) to adopt e-voting for the conduct of national elections and every other forms of election. He mentioned that,

> Nigeria has a population of over one hundred and eighty million however, much less than twenty million cast their votes during the conduct of election. This is due to the fact that, some people have seen the process as very difficult. Imagine fifty million people want to vote in Nigeria; we can't finish election in one day unless we would disenfranchise a lot of people. So, the earlier we sensitize people to come out and vote, the better is it for INEC to start giving consideration for e- voting because as much as we are spending a lot of money on publicity and orientation for people to come out and vote, we should equally look at the tendency that if all Nigerians decide to come out and vote, our one hundred and eighty million eligible voters, we cannot finish election in one day and any election you can't finish in one day can be suspected for malpractices. So, we need to work in that direction. So electronic voting is ideal and good, it may result in increased participation.

Speaking from a contrary perspective, Sonu asserted that the prospective turnout of voters in the election cannot be linked with e-voting. Thus, it could not have formed a rationale for the adoption of e-voting in any election. Rather, as emphasized, voter's turnout is largely determined by the overall performance of the incumbent government and also, the efforts of the political parties to mobilize people to come out and vote in the election. He affirmed thus that

> The turnout of registered voters depends on the overall performance of the party. If you really convince your people to come out, they will and if you don't, they won't come out to vote during election. If the government doesn't perform well and except people are anxious to send the government out, this is the only way they can come out massively to vote... when political parties campaign vigorously and convince people to come out and vote, definitely people will come. Like what we did during the conduct of local government election in Kaduna state, we convinced our people to come out and test the machines, and they did even though their vote didn't count. So the turn out of the voter in election depends on the political party and not on e-voting.

The perspective of Sonu cannot be discarded as it lays claim to the major reason why voters' turnout during elections in Nigeria has been largely regressing. The failures of political

office holders to deliver the dividend of democracy to the people largely accounts for why people no longer turn up to vote during elections. Another critical point raised by his position is the increased influence of political parties on voters' mobilization and voters' behaviour in Nigeria. The[25] bolsters this position by asserting that political affiliation goes a long way in determining voters turn out and voters' behaviour in election; that is, why voters come out to vote is simply because they want their respective parties to win and not because a particular mode of operation (e-voting) can trigger their interest to vote all of a sudden.

Strengths and Weaknesses of Electronic Voting in the Electoral Process of the 2018 Local Government Election in Kaduna

The use of electronic voting machines in the 2018 local government election in Kaduna definitely had obtainable strengths and at the same time, loopholes that nearly defeated the motivation that sparked off the adoption of e-voting machines in the election. On the Electronic Voting Machine (EVMs), the voting process was less tedious - the vote casting and vote counting was done conveniently without stress. Additionally, EVMs sped up the vote casting and vote counting process compared to the paper ballot system. Specifically, Yahaya ascertained that EVMs were faster, more accurate and easy to use compared to the manual voting system. In the same vein, Rili emphasized that the tendency to have invalid votes which is common with the use of the ballot paper was wiped out. On the part of Hassan, he pointed out that the EVMs are equipped with VVPAT which makes it possible for the result computed by the machine to be revalidated manually. Also, John made it clear that the transmission of the result by the machine was done on a three-way encryption channel such that no hacker will find it easy to crack or manipulate. He further states that, the result produced by the machine could be cross checked in three ways; first, through the final slip produced by the machine after the election ended; two, the VVPAT technology which made it possible to be printed manually so as to be counted in case of unexpected circumstances; and lastly, the machines simultaneously transmitted the result of the vote cast to the server which was monitored as the election went on. Also, human error was reduced to the minimum, and there was reduction in the number of Poll officials employed thereby saving high cost expended on the payment of these ad hoc staff.

Rebecca opines that the e-voting will be cheaper to run in subsequent elections compared to the high cost of printing the manual ballot papers. Furthermore, she pointed out that, the machines were user-friendly and easy to operate. In trying to give a brief description of how simple it was to operate the machine, she stated that

> After the machine had been authorized with the two authorization cards which were held by two different polling officials, the voter is only expected to select the logo of the political party of choice. After this selection had been made, a larger logo pops up giving the voter the ability to reconfirm

[25]International Press Service 2019. Electronic Voting Comes to Namibia. Global Information Network-Retrieved from http://www.ipsnews.net/2014/l2/electronic-voting-comes-to-namibia/

> that the party he/she intends to vote for has been selected; after this, the voter is expected to press a green button which then confirms that the vote had been cast. Immediately after the green button is pressed, the printer prints out the receipt of the vote which is drop into the ballot box underneath the EVM. In case the voter makes a mistake by choosing the wrong political party when voting, there is also a red button that he can press to cancel the vote and choose again.

Indicative from this is the fact that, the voters had the opportunity to cancel vote should a mistake occurs before it get finally confirmed. Meanwhile, it is pertinent to point out that most of the strength obtainable from the 2018 local government election are in tandem with the strengths projected by IDEA; these include: faster vote count; accurate result, as the possibility for human error is avoided; efficient handling of the laborious vote counting process; prevention of electoral fraud as results are simultaneously transmitted; and potential or long term saving as ballot papers are no longer printed and less ad hoc staff are required.

The weaknesses that trolled the use of the e-voting machines in the 2018 local government are basically two problems; technical problems and human induced problems. Yero pointed out some of the technical problems as such; that the EVMs could not be used at some rural locations because of the absence of electricity to charge the EVM when the battery was low; and the limited supply of generator set. In addition, Sonu revealed that the machine could not detect if the electronic ballot paper had been properly inserted on it. Where these have been placed improperly, the machines would not print a corresponding receipt to validate votes cast. Furthermore, he pointed out that some of the machines did not respond when switched on and some malfunctioned while the election was on-going. Consequently, the voters were unduly delayed as it took a longer time for such problems to be rectified or change the EVM. The delay in fixing the machine was practically due to the long distant road network to these polling units. Going further, human induced weaknesses as put by Hassan were the external variables that nearly impeded on the credibility of the elections. These factors were deliberate acts perpetrated by humans to sabotage the electoral process. He pointed out that some desperate politicians compromised the election by abducting some of the Electoral Officers (EOs) together with their machines. These people were taken to an undesignated location to vote since the machine could not reject multiple voting because of authorization problem. Hassan lamented thus

> One of our commissioners was more or less adopted; they told him they were going to kill him if he doesn't play along. They hijacked some electoral officials together with the materials and tried writing what the machine did not record. So the credibility of the machine as far as the use of EVM is concerned is okay; it is the human factor that should be held responsible.

Yakubu buttressed this position by asserting that some EVMs were tampered with, stolen and even burnt by thugs. However, there was also report of sabotage by KADSIECOM's staff that allegedly conspired with politicians to make the election work out in the politicians

favor. There were also report of replacement of trained ad hoc staff with persons who were not trained but were members of some political parties at some Polling units. John also concurred to the human induced factors by pointing out that some of the EVMs deployed for use in the election came back without their sim cards. He claimed that the problem of the machines' inability to authenticate voters was human induced as INEC declined to release the necessary materials that would have made voter's authentication possible. Thus, the issue of deliberate sabotage of the machine was the major challenge the electoral umpire faced during the election.

Discussion of Findings

In identifying the factors that necessitated the adoption of e-voting in Nigeria especially, in the conduct of the 2018 local government elections of Kaduna State, findings revealed numerous factors had spurred the adoption of e-voting as against the manual paper ballot system in the elections. The need to produce an electoral outcome that was devoid of manipulations and any other election irregularities formed the focal rationale for the adoption of e-voting technology in the election. This can be adduced to the perceived failure of the manual ballot system to produce taintless electoral outcomes which had culminated into violence with its devastating aftermath on lives and valuable property in the state. In tandem with this findings are the submission of[26] who affirmed that the use of e-voting served as a replacement for the paper ballot system which is highly prone to manipulation.

However, as revealed by the study, e-voting is not perfect in itself; it is also vulnerable to manipulations from experts who know how to tinker with it. Several cases across the world lay claim to this fact; the alleged Russian involvement in the US election of 2016 is a good example.

Significantly, in assessing the strengths and weaknesses of electronic voting in the electoral process with reference to the 2018 local government election in Kaduna State, Nigeria,[15] conceived e-voting as "voting supported by electronic devices – the range of devices may include electronic registration of votes, electronic counting of votes and, lately, channels for remote voting, especially the internet". Finding revealed the following strengths of EVMs;

(a) It was effective for faster vote count

(b) It produced accurate results as the possibility for human error was limited

(c) It enhanced convenience of the voters

(d) It prevented electoral fraud as results are simultaneously transmitted

(f) It was easy to use. In other words, it was user-friendly.

(g) It demonstrated a potential for long term saving as ballot papers and less ad hoc staff are required.

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[26]J. Egbas. How Government Made Electronic Voting History. Pulse Politics. 2021.Retrieved from https://www.pulse.ng/news/politics/el-rufai-how-gov-made-electronic-votinghistory/e5thlep

(h) It completely eliminated the possibility of invalid votes. This means that, all vote cast was counted by the machine.

(i) It was equipped with VVPAT technology which allowed for the revalidation of votes counted by the EVMs.

On the other hand, the study revealed the following as weaknesses witnessed in the 2018 local government election of Kaduna State as follows;

(a) The EVMs were not adequately protected as they were reports of abduction of the machines by desperate politicians.

(b) Some of the EVMs developed technical issues which is common with most electronic devices.

(c) The absence of electricity and generator set in some Polling Units (PUs) rendered some of the machines useless after their battery was drained.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The study ascertained that there is a relative significant and positive influence of e-voting on electoral credibility during the conduct of 2018 Local Government elections in Kaduna State. This is because, the ruling party did not win in all the local government areas as it used to be the norm in the previous local government elections where manual paper ballot system were used.

Apparently, the study recommends that e-voting system should be adopted in Nigeria in order to foster electoral outcomes that are free, fair and credible. This will in turn culminate into increased political participation and foster democratic growth in Nigeria. Additionally, all loopholes witnessed all through the 2018 local government elections in Kaduna state must be taken into consideration by relevant stakeholders, most importantly, INEC if the adoption of e-voting must be fructify into better electoral praxis in Nig

THE ROLE OF STATE ACTORS IN PROMOTING SUSTAINABLE PEACE-BUILDING: AN EVALUATION OF PLATEAU NORTH SENATORIAL DISTRICT

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Abstract

For over the past two decades now, violent conflicts have been a recurring decimal in Plateau State, most especially within most communities in Northern senatorial district. However, this paper examines the simmering conflicts and the role the state Government in promoting sustainable and positive peace building. Anchored on eclectic model of conflict analysis and with heavy reliance on secondary data, this study examined violent conflicts and strategies/approaches employed by the state government in achieving peace. The study x-rayed the effectiveness of workable and suggestive solutions employed by the Plateau State Government in bringing lasting peace within northern senatorial district.

Introduction

Emerging and dominant ethno-religious divisions and violent conflicts are an on-going feature of the global order and landscape in most states in Nigeria to include Kaduna, Benue, Taraba, Borno, Osun, Imo, Zamfara, Niger and Plateau. These states provide insight into the dynamics and impact of ethno-religious violent conflicts. In societies where these elements are common place, many things go wrong and both people and the order in the world are deeply affected negatively. [1] Africa has had its share of ethnic-related conflicts in countries such as Ghana, Kenya, Senegal, Nigeria, and Rwanda. A widely observed trend in these global and continental cases is that ethnicity and religion become a source of conflict when they pervade the political space to mobilize support for or promote specific ethnic, political and economic agendas. [2]

The State in its holistic and modern senses, nature and characteristics is a product and generator of conflict situations and a promoter of peace-building in the society. [3] This is

particularly evident in the fact that at any point in time, the State represents certain specific social, political, economic and general material interest of certain dominant social group(s) in the society and which also control it. However, it is very important to note that conflicts are inevitable facts of socio-economic existence. Dumoye emphasized that in any social formation, conflict is as inevitable as co-operation. Conflicts may be functional to the social system by creating a form of social cohesion within groups; but it is the dysfunctional aspect of conflicts that are detrimental to the survival of the State. [4] Thus, conflict is a barometer for testing the fragility or otherwise of every State and creates the basis for future remedy and adjustments.

Ethnic and religious violent conflicts in Plateau state seems to have increased in frequency as well as severity since the turn of the century particularly, since the return to democratic rule in Nigeria. There are some consensuses that the generally accepted peace which prevailed in the state before 2000 has been shattered; this is largely attributed to the inability of the state actors to be in the fore-front of managing conflict and promoting sustainable peace-building. [5] Successful civilian administrations since 2001 had adopted several constitutional and institutional remedies towards the resolutions of these conflicts and process of peace-building. These includes; setting up commissions of enquiries, establishment of developmental institutions and peace agency, creation of grazing reserve areas for herdsmen, the use of armed forces, provision of political opportunities, seizure of lands (under the land use decree) and the provision of additional incentives to resource producing communities. Most of these measures had rarely worked while some were seen as pacification methods and mere palliatives. [6]

This paper seeks to evaluate and examine previously outlined recommendations and implementations and in so doing, establish what is required to transform them into action, developing and recommending a state-wide strategic peace-building framework for Plateau state guided by conflict transformation theory which defines and crafts relevant programmes, policies and institutions to achieve these recommendations. Most importantly, examining the usefulness and relevance of these state actors in peace-building programs, policies and institutions in the context of Plateau state and providing clarity on the implementation of these recommendations and the role of the state in so doing.

Plateau North Senatorial District And Peculiarity Of Its Violent Conflicts

The peculiarity of issues around violent conflicts in Plateau North Senatorial district over the past two decades is multi factorial in creating an understanding to it. The violent conflicts in Plateau state run mainly along religious and ethnic lines and have been most concentrated on the northern part of the high Plateau, in Jos and its environs, in Jos North, Jos South, Jos East, Bassa, Riyom and Barkin Ladi LGAs. Since 2021, the violent armed conflicts have been protracted in both rural and rural communities. Prior to the spread of violence from urban Jos there was inter-dependence between farmers and pastoralists on the Plateau and this was often mutually beneficial. For example, pastoralists benefitted from access to farmland after the harvest, when cattle grazed on crop residues and corn stalks and in the process manured farmers' fields, increasing the land's fertility and helping farmers. Competition over land between indigenous ethnic groups of Beroms, Anaguta and Irigwe

with the migrant Fulani pastoralist have changed and shaped the dynamics of the conflict within the zone from a symbiotic relationship to rivalry. [7]
The political factor over control of elections and appointments since 1999 have metamorphosis a history of violent conflicts between indigenous and migrant groups that has led to the development of negative stereotypes, racial intolerance and discrimination. Such a history of negative exchanges between groups have made it difficult for them to trust one another. These are clearly seen mostly in Jos North LGA which holds a densely migrant Muslim population who hold the pollical -economy advantage of the area. A trajectory to these communal violent conflicts in both urban and rural areas have been exacerbated by the economic factors' pauperization of citizens in recent times. Economic factors that account for these violent conflicts include control of markets, land ownership/grabbing and Tin mining control areas significantly within Jos-South, Barkin-Ladi, Riyom and parts of Bassa LGAs.

The urban and rural violent conflicts had greatly reduced in scale by 2022 but had not been eliminated. Unfortunately, media and public narratives of the conflicts tend to be very superficial, and lacking investigative depth in addressing the specifics and crux of each violent conflict. The issues have become heavily politicized. Within the Plateau North senatorial district, enduring political, social and economic solutions have eluded past and presents state actors needed to tackle the roots of insecurity and violent conflicts.

Plateau State In Conflict Prevention

In the case of Plateau state, Danfulani and Fwatshak, emphasize that a conflict prevention strategy needs to be devised by the state and utilize a "more sensitive and responsive approach to security reports, security threats and security matters" in improving prevention. [8] The past failures of political institutions and security agencies should not be repeated. According to Salawu pointed out they played a major role in deepening and exacerbating ethnic and communal conflicts. The state should address issues such as; unemployment, poor social and economic conditions, abject poverty and corruption factors that directly or indirectly contribute to violent conflict in the state. [9] All these efforts will ensure that it is seen as credible and will help to address long-held grievances and prevent tensions from escalating. It can therefore be deduced that while the state is important in achieving sustainable peace and effectively managing diversity, it needs to build its capacity to respond in a more preventive than reactive manner. While ethnic and religious diversity might restrict political integration, their impact can be limited and reversed so that mutual understanding is developed between groups and the root causes of the conflicts between them are addressed. Successive Plateau state governments since 1999 have being able to put the following mechanisms in place which includes;

- **Deployment of security forces to trouble areas**
- **Deployment of humanitarian interventions**
- **Creation of a state security outfit - "Operation Rainbow"**
- **Set up of Plateau Peace Building Agency**
- **Organization of peace building sessions**
- **Setting up of Commission of Inquiries.** [10]

Successful peace-building and conflict prevention require the involvement of the state and political actors. For Kwaja, that component of a merger of the state and the informal actors within the various conflicts is virtually absent, and thus interventions are spontaneous and not really methodical. This study recognizes the state's role and relevance in contributing to peace and stability and will later discuss its role in prevention. The growing role of the state in peacebuilding has crowded out the valuable role of non-state actors in peacebuilding. Thus, even though the state has successfully acquired sufficient resources for peacebuilding, it has more or less arrogated itself the task of both planning and implementation without the use of the informal actors within. Non-state actors have in the past played a critical peacebuilding role by challenging state structures contributing to violence and their declining engagements that negatively influence the depth of peacebuilding required for conflict transformation. [11]

Apart from the basic function of protecting life and property, Plateau state is in an optimal position to address some of the roots of violent conflicts such as; Contentious borders or crime-related violent conflicts like cattle raiding. The sustainability of peace is facilitated by a favorable socio-economic environment and the state is best placed to ensure needed infrastructure such as roads, education, health and communication services that would promote social-economic growth. Even in the arable lands of Plateau North senatorial district where pastorals and farming are the major sources of livelihood, the state can put in place adequate mechanisms to protect the mobility of pastoralists, prevent cattle theft and increase the profitability of this livelihood by guaranteeing access to markets. Whereas state presence is minimal in the most rural communities in LGAs of Barkin Ladi and Riyom the symbolic power of the state has legitimized traditional conflict resolution mechanisms and also gained legitimacy from the cooperation of non-state actors to keep peace.

The Plateau state Government have in the past years positively contributed to the peacebuilding achievements of the infrastructure for peace especially in the domain of security and early warning mechanism and framework, yet the negative impact of the state's engagement on the nature of peacebuilding and the prospects for peace raises important questions on the viability of this collaborative approach of state and non-state actors in peacebuilding. The state does have a role to play in peace building but this must not be at the expense of the critical engagement of non-state actors in a comprehensive peacebuilding strategy. If the state maintained its role of coordinating peacebuilding, it would not crowd out non-state actors in implementing peace building activities. The state then needs to take up aspects of peace building as it is best placed to do.

Features and Characteristics of Modern State Peace Building

There seems to be many variances to peace-building status and definitions as its affects state actors approach, key features and characteristics. Oyebisi in her doctorate thesis titled *"The state and ethno- religious violence in Plateau state: Developing a peace building framework as a conflict prevention strategy*" suggested six characteristics that can be distinguished as modern-day state actor's peacebuilding mechanism and framework: [12]

(a) **Peace-Building Geared Towards Responses to Economic, Social and Political Issues**:

The literature recognizes that peace-building creates an environment where social, economic, and political institutions can flourish and prevent violent conflicts in both rural and urban communities in Plateau state. Its aim then is to "create the conditions necessary for a sustainable peace in war-torn societies". Many causes of conflict are broadly political, economic and social in nature; therefore, effective peace-building addresses these roots, proximate causes and similarly develops political, economic, and social resolutions to them. In addition to these, peace-building also addresses insecurity and psycho-social needs.

(b) **Peace-Building Is Not A One Time Event**:

Peace-building does not have a precise beginning and end but involves long-term processes that occur before, during and after violent conflicts. [13] Most importantly, state actors should not define peace building by projects or bound by timeframes and deadlines but should be based on political and social change processes which take a considerable amount of time, in removing structures that contribute to conflict, peace-building must therefore go beyond short-term functions like monitoring a ceasefire, demobilization, disarmament and monitoring competitive elections to longer term measures like reconciliation, security and judicial reform 21.

(c) **Peace-Building Demands An In-Depth Conflict Analysis And Assessment Exercise:**

In order to produce positive and relevant results, the state government must do a sufficient analysis of the context and the causes of the conflict in order to devise adequate responses to transform it. Ackermann establishes a strong linkage between conflict analysis and an effective preventive policy, noting that "any conflict analysis that informs an effective preventive policy must examine the proximate or direct causes of conflict, as well as its underlying roots". Failure to adequately analyze the nature, causes and dynamics of intra-state conflict could lead to a lack of effective preventive responses and result in incorrect or insufficient policy decisions and poorly thought-out solutions.

(d) **Peace Building Intervention Should Be Context Specific**:

Beyond understanding the nature and causes of conflicts, state actors peace-building approach must be context-specific. For instance, in the context of Africa, Francis notes that the ultimate goal of peace-building is the "rebuilding of relationships, asserting communal responsibility and solidarity". This means that responses by the state government to resolve and transform ethno-religious violent conflicts require an understanding of the context and the environment in which the conflict is taking place. In the same way, peace-building responses needs to be participatory and must include the views and perspectives of all those who are involved in the conflict. According stakeholders, beneficiaries and implementing partners must be fully and regularly engaged by the state actors. [14]

(e) **Good Governance Is Inherent In Sustainable Peace- Building**:
Good governance is a requirement in addressing the underlying causes of ethno-religious violence and in achieving success in peace-building. A publication by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights defines good governance "as the exercise of authority through political and institutional processes that are transparent, accountable and encourage public participation". [23] It goes on to establish a link between good governance and human rights, stating that the latter require that good governance promotes public participation, provides services and goods to the citizens, develops and implements legislation and establishes anti-corruption measures. These measures, approaches and actions will contribute greatly to the success and sustainability of any peace-building process. A resolution (2000/64) passed by the former UN Commission on Human Rights (UNHCR) identified transparency, responsibility, accountability, participation and responsiveness (to the needs of the people) as the key attributes of good governance. Good governance impedes corruption and ensures the delivery of services to all citizens in a society. Fisher & Zimina identify economic injustice and the lack of public participation in policy decisions as key triggers of violence. [15]

Good governance can address this by not only devising avenues for justice for groups but through political, economic and social change. For Merav, it is essential that peace-building also recognizes the right of groups to assert their rights and claims while also giving others the opportunity to do so. The denial of right impediments to participation and unfair policies all contribute to the underlying causes of conflicts, which good governance can resolve. [16]

2.4 Statebuilding, Promoting And Enhancing Peace-Building:
The theory and concept of peace-building has also been used in the context of (re) building effective legitimate government institutions that can be referred to as state-building. Fukuyama defines state-building as "the creating of new government institutions and the strengthening of existing ones". [17] In recent years state actors, scholars Paris and Sisk have emphasized the importance of the state power functions and its institutions in building sustainable peace in developing countries. [18] According to Fukuyama state-building is one of the most crucial issues for the global community since "weak or failed states are the source of many of the world's serious problems", including terrorism and poverty. In addition, such states are regarded as impediments to development the eradication of poverty as well as a threat to domestic and global stability. Since the 9/11, 2001 terrorist attacks which were linked to Afghanistan – a "weak state" on the United States of America. Domestic and international terrorism has been linked to state fragility/weak statehood. In this regard, such states have been viewed having lost their monopoly over the use of violence to insurgents, militia groups and terrorists. Rotberg states that nation-states fail "when they are consumed by internal violence and cease delivering positive political dividends to their citizens". Rotberg notes that political goods are: those intangible and hard to quantify claims that citizens once made on sovereigns and now make on states. They encompass indigenous expectations, conceivably obligations, inform the political culture and together give content to the social contract between. [19]

If a reasonable measure of security exists, then it becomes much easier for the state to deliver

other political goods. In addition to security, a state ought to provide "predictable, recognizable, systematized methods of adjudicating disputes and regulating both the norms and the prevailing mores of a particular society or polity" – this implies the existence of codes and procedures essential for the respect of the rule of law, private property and contracts as an efficient and effective judiciary system. Another crucial political good that Rotberg notes is one that allows for an open polity that promotes the vital freedom for citizens, including their ability to freely express themselves, freely participate in politics and in competition for office. In such an open political system fundamental human and civil rights are respected. Other public goods that a state is expected to provide to its citizens includes education, physical infrastructure (roads, railway lines, telephones, electricity and so on), employment, health care (which can also be provided by private companies), space for the development of a vibrant civil society, national currency and a central bank. Rotberg notes that put together this bundle of political goods does establish a set of criteria for determining whether a state is strong, weak or failed. For Rotberg posited that strong states tend to fulfill expectations in all the areas, weak states tend to meet expectations in some areas and fail in some, while failed states fail to meet expectations in all the areas.

An institutional approach to state-building focuses on building effective state institutions in post-conflict environments as a remedy for the "weirdness" or "abnormality" found in weak and failed states that is absent in strong states and also as a way of enhancing conditions for building self-sustaining peace in them. This approach largely draws from the Weberian notion of statehood which views a state as a political entity that has monopoly over the legitimate use of violence. Since the institutional approach made emphasis on building the capacity of state institutions it ignores customary institutions. In addition to service delivery, another important element of the state according to the institutional approach is the state's capacity to institutionalize its diverse organizations. "Institutionalization" according to Call, means "the process by which a cluster of activities acquires a persistent set of rules that constrain activity, shape expectations and prescribe roles for actors".

Institutionalization enhances the durability of the state and its institutions. The death of a leader would not result in the collapse of the state, predominant approaches to peace-building ignore institutionalization of state agencies since these agencies are usually not functioning well and can be an impediment to the peace-building process, instead internationals often end up devising their strategies around influential leaders and this could have negative outcomes in relation to building durable institutions. The "legitimacy" approach finds the institutional approach's focus on institutions insufficient, thus argues for the need to also focus on "socio-political cohesion and the legitimacy central authorities can generate" (Lemay-Hebert). In this regard, issues of legitimacy are considered of paramount importance when building states. This also relates to issues of nation-building that is, issues related to socio-political cohesion and how non- state actors shape conditions under which social integration is enhanced in post-conflict states. However, this idea of non- state actors being involved in nation building contradicts the empirical and theoretical understandings of the nature of social integration which occurs when distinct groups are incorporated into a common society with the creation of an over-arching supra-national identity by means of standardizing and unifying of various cultures and identities. [20] As Newman notes "The idea of international nation-building seems a contradiction in terms as peace-building seems like

a historical aberration; historically nation-building was achieved through widespread violence". And as such, an emphasis on state legitimacy makes sense since a state needs to be acceptable to its citizens for them to be able to rally behind its authority, thus enhancing stability and order in it. [21]

In terms of conceptual viability, according to Newman state-building is more conceptually viable than nation-building given its focus on meanings that are more objective such as the (re)building of government institutions and the provision of positive political goods including security amongst others. The assumption behind state-building as peace-building is that once strong and legitimate state institutions are built then societies emerging from violent civil war are freed from the troubles of weak statehood. As such, this will enable positive political goods necessary for promoting internal order and stability as well as international peace and security. A number of scholars and international bilateral and development organizations have been engaged in debates on state-building and how it can contribute to peace-building.

For Fritz and Menocal of the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), state-building means; constructing the foundations of the very (government) edifice within which governance ought to operate. Without the construction of this edifice, government interventions cannot have an impact. [22] At the same time, ensuring the quality and integrity of government is an important dimension of the state-building process including; Fukuyama's view that weak states tend to be aggressive against their neighbors. Generating legitimacy of a new or re-emerging state and contributing to the creation of "national public" and a shared sense of the public realm. This represents the idea of state-building and external nation-building as peace-building which is problematic as earlier noted.

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in its "Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations" considers a focus on state-building as the main objective in enhancing state stability, order and peace-building. In 2008 the UNDP launched the "State-building for Peace'' the project was aimed at empowering "national and local actors to develop and implement strategies that address fragilities, enhance responsiveness and resilience of states for sustainable peace". [23] Analysts such as, Paris and Sisk have argued for the need to bring state-building into peace-building and consider state-building a sub-component of peace-building.

In the case of Plateau state, especially its Northern Senatorial district, Danfulani and Fwatshak, emphasizes that a conflict prevention strategy needs to be devised by the state actors. Furthermore, it should utilize a "more sensitive and responsive approach to security reports, security threats and security matters" in improving prevention. The past failures of state political institutions and security agencies should not be repeated. According to Salawu, they played a major role in deepening and exacerbating ethnic and communal conflict. The state should address unemployment, poor social and economic conditions, abject poverty, corruption and factors that directly or indirectly contribute to violent conflict in the state. [24] All these efforts will ensure that it is seen as credible and will help to address long-held grievances and prevent tensions from escalating. It can therefore be deduced that while the state is important in achieving sustainable peace and effectively managing

diversity, it needs to build its capacity to respond in a more preventive than reactive manner. While ethnic and religious diversity might restrict political integrations, their impact can be limited and reversed so that mutual understanding is developed between groups and the root causes of the conflicts between them are addressed. The state is well-placed to lead this change.

However, limitations of previous and present efforts of the Plateau state governments in sustaining peacebuilding and conflict resolutions includes:

- Plateau State Government as dominant actor in the approach in achieving peacebuilding and conflict resolutions. It is ideal for it to be multi actors' approach to include state and non-state.
- Poor implementation of Commission of inquiry reports and White Papers over the years.
- Weak coordination between Federal, state and local governments due to some of them being interested parties
- Weak coordination between MDAs in addressing issues of insecurity that include banditry, farmers/herders conflict, mob action, small and light arms infiltration, illegal border migrations and cattle rustlings incidents.
- Dominant use of Kinetic approach; non-kinetics approach is becoming an emerging trend in conflict resolution and peace building. Negotiation, conciliation, dialogue, reconciliation and peace agreement.
- Weak synergy within the armed forces and weakness in intelligence gathering and its effective use.

Conclusion

State peace-building solutions need to be decentralised, inclusive and based on the needs of grassroots communities. This is because these communities are at the core of the conflict and their members have both been victims and perpetrators of the violence. While peace-building is of the utmost importance in restoring peace it should be decentralised and should address the economic and developmental needs of groups in all areas of Plateau North Senatorial District of the state. While not the only actor but a dominant one, the state plays a critical role in contributing to inequalities between groups and in carrying out violence. The pivotal role of the state in resolving the root causes of the conflict and in finding long-lasting and sustainable solutions for transformation at the lowest levels cannot be overemphasised. In a federal system, the national government should be willing, if necessary, to wield more control over subnational units (states and provinces) to improve peace-building responses. It can act as a check and balance in order to avoid their abuse of power.

A state peace-building framework provides a structure and a roadmap for how the complex process of rebuilding post conflict societies is achieved. A state peace building framework outlines the programmes, policies and institutions required for peacebuilding and conflict transformation, state actors and institutions responsible for implementation, the steps involved in implementation, the estimated timelines, necessary resources, and the possible challenges that might emerge. It is a useful way to measure progress, identify gaps and build

avenues for collaboration. It also brings about a coordinated and sustained response to the peace-building process.

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